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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
Few statesmen stand so high in the annals ot the modern
Papacy as Ercole Cardinal Consalvi, Secretary ot State of Pope
Pius VII.

The conspicuous ability which he displayed in dealing

with such ditticult diplomatic problems as the negotiation of the
French Concordat of 1801, the restoration of the Papal territories
at the Congress of Vienna, and the defense of Papal interests
during the revolutionary upheaval of 1820-1821 entitles

hi~

to

rank among the leading Papal diplomats of reoent centuries.

In

internal affairs, he was the first Papal statesman to realize
that it was necessary to liberalize the Papal government and bring
it into greater harmony with modern conditions--the forerunner
of Pius IX.
The importanee of Conaalvi fS ca.reer has not been unrecognized by historians, but their attention has been largely confined
to hi3 first ministry (1800-1806), to the neglect of his second

(1814-1823).

That they have been attracted to the earlier phases
In 1800-1815, the Papacy moved

ot his career is understandable.

on an heroic plane: it was an age of crisis, of dramatic struggle
agains t the ruleD' of halt Europe, of courage and endurance amid
persecution, exile, and imprisonment, ot tinal victory against
1

2

overwhelming odds.

Little wonder, then, that the spectacular

events and obvious importance of Consalvils first ministry during
the turbulent Napoleonic period have overshadowed his second
during the superficial calm of the Restoration era.
Yet Consalvils second ministry, though less abundant in
drama, has its own importance.

In domestic affairs, it was

marked by the nearest, indeed the only, approach to a liberalization and modernization of the Papal government before the days of
Pius IX--the longest such attempt in the history of the Papal
state.

In the field of diplomacy, this period saw the Papacy

involved in a half-hidden but still bitter struggle to preserve
its spiritual authority against the Erastian rulers of Europe
and its temporal independence against the encroachments of its
presumed ally Austria, while at the same time it had to deal with
the growing threat of the revolutionary movement.
In view of its importance this latter part of Consalvils
career is deserving of greater attention than it has hitherto
received from historians.

Some part at least of the neglect of

this subject may be remed1ed by treat1ng one of its most significant aspects:

the Cardinal's Austrian policy.

The most important single thread in the diplomacy of
Consa1vi's second min1stry was his conduct of Austro-Papa1 relations.

It was inevitable that the Papal Secretary of state

shOUld have to give much of his time and thought to this relationship.

The Hapsburg Empire was the dominant political and

military power in Italy, the leader of the conservative cause

3

in Europe, and, during the eclipse of France, the greatest power
in the Catholic world.

Austrian and Papal interests were in

contact--and often in conf1i.ct--a10ng a wide tront in both the
secular and the religious fields.

What should be the relation-

ship between the Papacy, intent on preserving its temporal
independence, and Austria, desirous of exercising hegemony in the
Italian Peninsula?

How and to what extent should the Papacy co-

operate with Austria against their common foe, the revolutionary
movement?
I~perial

How should the Papacy react to the attempts of the
government to dominate the Church in its territories?

These and other questions arising from his dealings with
Austria were among the most important problems that Consa1vi had
to solve in 1815-1823, but no comprehensive study of the
Cardina1's Austrian dip1omaoy exists.

Moreover, of the few

works that do touch upon this subject, a large proportion are
either out of date or distorted by the anti-Austrian and anticlerical prejudioes of the Risorgimento era.

In particular,

these works, when dealing with Austro-Papal relatiOns under
Consalvi, usually take the worst view possible of Austrian
policies and intentions and tend to pictUre Empire and Papacy as
being on consistently hostile terms. l
ISee, LZ.., N1correde Bianchi, Storia docu:nentata della
diplomazia europea in Italia dall'anno 181# a1 1851-{8 vola.;
Turin, 1865-1872}, r, 221-223; nellie Cassl, Llcrardinale C:msalv
ed i prir;t~ anni della restaurazione ~ontificia; jID"5-a8~ {Milan,
I93I)j an Y.rnesto Veraes!, Plo-vrrTurln, 1933 _ 25 - 3.

This traditional Italian interpretation, however, is' not
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borne out by the documents in the Vatican Arohives, whioh demonstrate that both Consalvi and the Austrian Foreign Minister,
Prince Klemens von Metternich,2 sincerely desired a mutually
advantageous co-operation between the Papacy and Austria and for
a time, in 1815-1817, came close to achieving it.

After 1817,

however, conflicting religious and political interests gradually
drove the two states apart, relations deteriorated rapidly after
1820, and the experiment in co-operation ended in failure.

By

the time Consalvi left office in 1823, Austro-Papal relations we
unfriendly, almost hostile, but this hostility had developed late
in Consalvi's ministry and was not a permanent feature of it.
Consalvi had had a long and distinguished career in the
service of the Papacy before the Restoration era opened. 3

Born

2prince Klemens von Metternich (1773-1859), Austrian
Foreign Minister 1809-1848, Imperial Chancellor, 1821-1848. Long
the bane of liberal and nationalist historians because of his
oonservatism, Mettcrnich has been defended by the Revisionist
historians, led by Heinrich Ritter von Srbik, whose Metteruich:
Del' Staatsmann und del' Mensoh (3 vols.; Munioh, 1925-1954) is the
s tanaard b!ograpny.--- - - - 3The basic source for Consalvits career prior to 1815 is his
own Me~orie., ed. Mario Nasalli Rocca di Corneliano (Roma, 1950);
this worK will be referred to henoeforth as Memorie. The most
thorough study of Consalvi1s diplomaoy during thIs period is
Ilario Rinieri, La (i1RlomaZia pontifioia nel aeoolo XIX (5 vols.;
Rona-Torino, 1901'-=-1'90 ), based on very thorougIiI'esearch in the
Vatican Archives. For a useful short account, see Joseph
Sohmidlin, Histoire des paPfi de Itepogue oontem~ralne1 I: Pie
VII, le Pape--ae-ra--Restaura on, trans .i:. March
(Par s"; 1938).
Also U8erur-ls-vOIuW~·XX or the" F11che-Martln Hlstoire de
1 !_~.e;11~,~ I Jean Lerlon, La .=!'la~ ~evoluti~alre;-1j82-1B1r6 (Paris
r9491. There is no gooa; mo-dern DIOgrapny C>n'onsal vi.

at Rome of noble parents on 8 June 1757, he was destined to the
Churoh from an early age.

5

However, though he successfully

oompleted his eoclesiastioal studies, he never chose to be
ordained a priest, but remained a deaoon throughout his l1fe.
His ab1lity attraoted the attent10n of Pius VI, under whom he had
risen to h1gh ofrioe in the Papal government by the time of the
Frenoh invasion of 1798.

After a bl"'ief imprison'11ent by the

Frenoh, he was released in time to attend the Conolave whioh met
at Venice to ohoose a suocessor to Pius VI.

Eleoted Seoretary of

the Conolave, Consalv1 performed a major service to the Papacy
when he promoted the compromise that broke a three-and-a-half
month deadlock with the election of the Bishop of Imola, Gregorio
Cardinal

Chiar~nonti,

as Pius VII.

This was the beginning of an

association that ended only with the death of Pius in 1823, an
association marked net only by the closest offioial eo-operation,
but by a rare degree of personal affection and mu.tual trust as
well.

The new pontiff Boon demonstrated his confidence in

Consalvi by raiSing him to the Cardinalate and appoint1ng him
Secretary of State in August, 1800.

The Cardinal was promptly

involved in negotiations w1th the French government that resulted
in the

ra.e-tOUS

Concordat of 1801, perhaps his

'1108 t

notable

aohievem.ent.
After five years of defending the political and religious
rights of the Papacy against Napoleon, Consalvi reSigned under
French pressure in 1806.

His continued oppos1tion to Napoleon

led in 1810 to his arrest and banishment

tp

Beziers.

In 1814
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he was freed and returned to Italy, but was promptly sent by Pius
VII as Papal representative to the Congress of Vienna.

Hera he

was chiefly occupied with securing the restoration of the Papal
territories seized by France and now occupied by Austria and
Naples.

It was while engaged in this difficult task that he

first encountered Metternich, with whom he worked closely during
the latter part of the Congress.

While devising solutions for

the many difficult problems involved in the restoration of the
Papal territories, the two statesmen developed a mutual respect
and esteem tha.t was an important factor in later Austro-Papal
relationa.

For several years afterwards, Consalvi, and possibly

Metternich as well, remained convinced that:nos t of the Papal
problems with Austria could be readily solved if only they could
meet again and hold friendly discussions, as they had done

60

successfully at Vienna.
In the end, the Cardinal's diplomatic ability ... - greatly
aided, it must be confessed, by favorable circwnstancea-secured a resounding trlumpa: all of the Popels Italian
les (except a
ed to him.

a~all

territ~r

part of the Legation of Ferrara) were

retul~

Consalvi returned to Rome in triwnph, to the applause

of friend and toe alike.

It was the sumrllit of his oareer. never

before had he known auch general acclaim, nor would be ever again.
Within a few short years his poliaies were to turn into bittel.'
ene,nias ,l1any

~Iho

now cheered him, in Rome a.nd Vienna alike.

rl1he

Vietor'S laucels have ever withered rapidly in the hot Roman sun.

CHAPTER II
AN ERA OF GOOD FEELING, 1815-1817
1.

The Aftermath of the Austrian Occupation

After his success at the Congress of Vienna, Consalv1
believed that he would be able to turn away from diplomatic
problems for a time and devote himself instead to internal
reform.

Leas than a week after his return to Rome, however,

he had to confess sadly to the Nuncio in Vienna, Msgr. Antonio
Severoli:
I hoped after the immense labors undergone at Vienna
to obtain the restoration of our Provinces, that there
would be nothing else to occupy me after my return to
Rome except the Plan for the new form of govern~ent
to be given to them. Unfortunately, and to the infinite
surprise and sorrow of His Holiness and myself, I find
myself in the midst of infinite difficulties • • • •
This "multitude of cares" arose from the Austrian occupation
or the Papal state (all save the area E3.round Rome) and its
aftermath. 1

1ArchiVio Vaticano (hereafter cited as A.V.), Archives of
the NuncIiture' rn~enna, tile #125 (hereafter cited 88 ANY
followed by file number), Consa1vi to Severo1i, 10 July 1815.
The above document, like all others quoted in the dissertation,
was translated by the author. Magr. Antonio Severo1i, nuncio in
Vienna, 1801-1817; a Cardinal in 1816; at first a supporter or
Consalvi, but broke with him in 1816 over the 1atter's rerorms
in the Papal states; then became a bitter enemy of Consa1vi and
a leader or the reactionary party (Zelanti) in the Curia that
opposed the Secretary or State's policies.

The occupation itself had not notioeably contributed to
better Austro-Papal relations.

8

The occupying forces, their

discipline sapped by years of war, were often guilty of brutal
mistreatment of the people whom they were supposed to be
defending.

Papal protests brought only the true but unhelpful

reply that indiscipline was by
that the Austrian

gove~1ment

responsible for excesses

nO)1

epidem'.c in all armies and

obviously could net be held

co~mitted

by its troops, much though

it regretted them. 2
~~ore

serious, the long Austrian occupation had aroused

widespread suspicion that Austria coveted the Papal territories,
and even after the Treaty of Vienna had provided for their return
the conduct of the Austrian provisional

govern~ent

tinued to provoke the livel:l.est distrust.

there con-

A pro:ninent example

was the issuance of a circu.1ar by the Austrian Intendant-General
Dondi on 27 ,June 1815, ordering all public officials and employee
in the occupied areas to swear an oath of loyalty to the
Austrian provisional government.

The Papacy protested vigorously

that the oath was a violation of Papal sovereignty which could
give rise

&rrIOng

the "ill-lntentioned" to doubts as to whether

Austria really intended to return the territories or not.

Austri

replied, reasonably enough, that as the oath was only to a
provisional government, it was itself only provisional, and would

2A.V., ANY 233, Severoli to Consalvi, 1 July, 5 July 1815.

9

lapse when the government did. 3
The question as to why Austria should exact an oath of

loyalty to a regime which was to end in a few weeks remained unanswered.

A possible answer soon suggested itself when it became

apparent that Austria intended to prolong the occupation far
beyond its determined end.

An Austro-Papa1 Convention of 12 June

1815 had provided that the Austrian evacuation would begin within
four weeks, that is on 10 July, and Metternich had promised
Consa1vi that it would take place by 15 July at the 1atest. 4
Shortly after his arrival in Rome on 3 July, Consalvi was
informed that Count Franz Saurau, in charge of the Austrian
occupying forces, refused to turn over the occupled territories
until a number of conditions had been met.

In particular, the

Papacy must agree to pay certain debts contracted by the former
Kingdom of Italy (into which the Papal territories had been
incorporated) and by the Austrian occupation forces. Furthermore,
even if the Papal government complied with all these demands,
the transfer of sovereignty made to it would still be only
"virtual and Ero forma"; the territories themselves would only
be turned over gradually, over an extended period of time, and
in the interim the administration would remain in Austrian hands.
3A.V., RtUbrica, i.e., file) 260, Pacca to Lebze1t~rn, 1
July 1815; Le zeltern toIrronsalvi, 7 July 1815.
4A•V., R242, Consalvi-Pacea, 12 June 1815; Convention of
12 June 1815, in R242.

Consalvi protested vehemently to Metternich that the debts in

10

question were no concern of the Papal government, and that the
Convention of 12 June had definitely provided for the return in
full sovereignty of the Papal territories within four weeks, with
no mention of further delay for any cause.

ttl have never seen

anything like this," complained Consalvi in exasperation.

"The

Holy Father is exasperated, with good reason, and public opinion
• •

• is most unfavorable to Austria.

• • • "5

Consalvi's vigorous protests, together with those which he
instructed Severoli to make in Vienna, had the desired effect.
The Impertal

govern~nt

ordered the transfer of the provinces,

in both theory and fact J to the Papacy.

The trat".llfer of authori-

ty took place on 15-18 July 1815, and the evacuation of Austrian
troops followed soon after. 6
In all probability, the responsibility for this attempted
delay did not lie with Vienna.

When Severoli protested to Count

Hudelist (in charge of foreign affairs during the absence of
Metternich from Vienna), the latter seemed genuinely astonished
and annoyed, and assured Severoli that the Imperlal government
had not ordered Saurau to pursue this course of action. Probably
Hude11st.s protests were sincere; neither Francis I nor

5Charles van Duerm, CorresI?ondence du Cardinal Hereule
Consalvi avec le Prince Clement de Mitternicn, 1815-!~§f
(touYain, -r899T,- 81, COll8al vi to-~tternich, 10 J'Uly
5.
6

A.V., ANY 125, Consalv1 to Severoli, 27 July 1815.
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Metternich was likely to have ordered a policy that was certain
to annoy the Papacy without producing any visible benefits for
Austria.

Severoli was inclined to put the blame upon the failure

of the Imperial government to maintain effective control and
supervision over its subordinates, such as Saurau, who were thus
allowed to devise their po1icies. 7
Meanwhile, even before the transfer of the Papal territories
had taken place, two new sources of dispute had appeared: the
destruction of the fortress at Ancona by the Austrians, and the
Austrian request for the arrest of suspected revolutionaries in
the Papal State.
The latter problem was quickly dealt with by Consalvi.

On

10 July 1815, the Austrian Provisional Government requested that,
in the general amnesty which the Pope was soon to proclaim, an
exception be made for certain suspected revolutionaries, or, at
least, that the Papal government refrain in practice from applying the amnesty to these suspects.

Consalvi rejected both

alternatives as contrary to Article 103 of the Treaty of Vienna,
which obliged the Pope to grant a general amnesty without any
sort of limitation.

Moreover, to grant either request would have

7A•V., R247, Severo1i to Consalvi, 26 July 1815. Count
Franz Saurau, Military Governor of the Austrian-held territories
in Italy, 1813-15J a firm Josephist, hostile to the Papacy in
general. Count Josef von Hude11st (1759-1818), close friend and
collaborator of Metternich, through whose influence he was appointed a Councillor in the Staatskanz1ei in 1813.

amos t pernicious effect upon public opinion; the l:second in
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particular would cause general distrust of' the Papl!ll government'8
good faith. 8
Although Austria accepted this rejection with(:>ut apparent
protest, the saMe problell soon reappeared.
transfer

Shortly after the

or Bologna to the Papal governnent, the

De~legate

of

that city received from the commander of the Austr:tan troops in
that area, General Steff'anini, a request that some nine suspects
be arrested and transported to Trieste.

Whether these suspects

were a'Tlong those whom the Provisional Government hald wished exoepted from the

~~nesty

is uncertain, but it seems very possible

that this was another attempt, perhaps by the local oommander on
his own initiative, to secure the punishment of the suspects in
question.

If so, this attempt was equally unsuooessful.

Consalvi repeated that Pius could not violate Article 103 by
granting the Austrian request; in addition to the moral factors
involved, the effects on public opinion of such a violation would
be most unfortunate. 9 These argu~ents seem to have convinced
the Austrtan government, which made no further attempt to bring
up this subject.
No Austrian action of 1815 aroused such Papal :lndignation
as the destruction of the Papal fortress at Ancona.

Early in

----8
..

A.V., Bologna R165, Consalvi to Lebzeltern, 13 July 1815.

9A•V., R260, Consalv! to Lebzeltern, 29 July la15.

13

July, 1815, Consalv1 was alnazed to learn that "1n sp1te of
everything agreed upon in the first article of the Convention

[of 12 June 1815], that the fortress of Ancona would be restored
intact, now that the time for that restoration draws near, the
fortress is being blown up" by the Austrian troops.lO
The Cardinal's strong protests produced no

imm~diate

action

from Austria, though many expressions of regret, for both the
Emperor and Metternich were absent from Vienna and no one there
seemed to have the authority to halt the destructIon. ll
Meanwhile, the destruction of the fortress continued, until
finally the Emperor was informed. of the situation.

He promptly

ordered the destruction to cease, and promised full compensation
to the Papal

govern~ent

for its losses.

The

E~peror

was highly

annoyed by the destruction, which was the result of old orders
which he had g1ven dur1ng the war and had neglected to revoke,
and which "were therefore carried out at a tIme when all was
confUSion, dtsorder" a.nd the arbItrary will of subalterns in our
Italy. ,,12

lOA.V., ANV 125, Consalvi to Severoli, 10 July 1815.
llIbld., Consalvi to Severol1, 27 July 1815; Severoli to
Consalvl,--"26 July 1815 (#1).
12
-A.V., R247, Severoli to Consa1vi, 12 August 1815. Also,
R260, Delegate of Ancona to Consalvi, 13 August 1815. Van Duerm,
90-92, Note 2: FranciS I to Mettern1eh, 7 August 1815.

A "mult1tude of cares 1\ 1ndeedl··-and all or most of them

14

had arisen not from-the will of the Imper1al government# but
from the spontaneous or un1ntended actions of its Bubordinates.
It 1s not surprising that in exasperation at the ftinfinite
diff1culties II surrounding hl':n--none of them critical in itself
but all taking the Cardinal's time and distracting

hi~

from his

desperately-needed plans for internal reform--Consalvi should
have cried out to Mette:t--nich that "I have wished a thousand times
to be with Your Highness, and I have been tempted a thousand
times to take the post-horses and hurry to talk with you," had
he only been

ce~taln

where

Mett~rnloh

was to be found; for surely

he and the Prince, if they could only meet, could work out a
satisfaetor-.r solution for any pr"blems, as they had done at
Vlenna .. 13
Metternichls reply was fr1endly and oonciliatory.

He

apologized for not replying earlier to Consalvlfs complaints,
but "facts aX'e worth rnore than prOr:'llSe3, n a.nd surely Consa.lvi
must have been convinced by the satisfactory way in which these
disputes had been settled that "if any measures have given the
Court of Rome just cause for complaint, the motives that provoke
them have always re~-:'la.lned alien to the will of His t4:ajesty. "14
The Austrian spoke too soon, tor not all problems growing
out

or

the occupation had been settled.

l3Ibid., 87, Conealvi to

T\10

f.inancial questions

~tternlch, 12 August 1815.

l4I~id., 90, Metternieh to Consalvi, 28 August 1815.

l"'emained, and neither was to be solved qu1ckly, or 1n a w'ay

15

sat1sfactory to Consalv1.

As had been noted, the Emperor Francis I promised compensation to the Papacy for the danage done at Ancon8..

Unfor-

tunately, this pro::nise soon slipped the Emperorfs mind, for five

i;lOnths pa.ssed '>'lith no further a.etion by the Austria.n government,
a,lt;hough beth Consalvi and the Pope spoke to Iebzeltern15
several times on this subject.
patience

Car:l(~

At the end of. January Consalvi's

to an end and he a.ddressed a stiff note of protest

to the Austrian ambassador, dema.nding that the Imperial govern-

ment fulfill the Emperor's promise as soon as possible.
Lebzeltern not only forwarded Consalvi's protest, but also wrote
to Metternlch urging rapid

B atls faction

of the Papal demands,

which he considered juatifled. 16
Consalvifs protest, supported thus by Lebzeltern. produced
prompt but not entirely satisfactory results.

Upon the report

l5Count Louts Lebzeltern, Austrian B..!"1lbaese.dol" at Ronte from
AprIl 1814 to May 1816. A strong Bupporter of Austro-Papal
co-operation as essential for European stability, he often opposed the po11c1es of his government that seemed likely to weaken
Austrc-PapaJ. good relattona. He was on close and friend.ly terms
with Conaalvi; Blanchi's claim (I, 221) that he worked against
Consal vi's pol1otes is not borne out by the evldeno~. See Prinop.
Emanuel de Robich (ed.), Un Collaborateur de Metternleh:
Memoires et p-a~iers de Leozeltern (ParIs, 1949 ,; hereafter oited
tebzeltern. ASo-;'lIudar," 15'fe-Oe~fterrelchlsche Vatikanbotschaf't,

-

I8.~~§ ~~I1?""{ Mun:t ch, 1952),

rr-=-41. -

~

.

16A•V., R260, Consalvl's Note to Lebzeltern, 26 January
1816; Consalv! to Lebzeltern, 30 J!!tnuary 1816; Lebzeltern to
Consalvl, 3 February l816.

of an Austrian investigating commission, the Emperor ordered
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the shipment of a large battery of artillery to replace that
destroyed by his troops at Ancona.

Unfortunately, even the best

artillery could not effectively defend a half-ruined fortress,
and Austria refused Consalvi'. requests to provide the funds
necessary to repair the destruction its troops had caused.

The

fortress therefore remained in a state of near-uselessness for
some years, until the impoverished Papal government could at
last afford to repair it.17
The Austrian refusal to compensate fully the Papal government for its losses at Ancona was particularly annoying because
Vienna was just at that moment rigorously insisting upon the
most scrupulous fulfillment by the Papal government of its
financial obligations.
By an article "separeet secret" of the Convention of 12
June 1815, Consalvi had reluctantly agreed that the Papal
government should pay Austria the sum of 1,700,000 Roman Scudi
as compensation for the latter '8 expenditures in reconquering
Payment was to be in installments
18
to be oompleted by 12 June 1816.
Though not explicitly stated,
the Papal States for the Pope.

it seems likely that this payment was a quid pro quo for Austrian

---17-Ibid., Lebzeltern to Consalvi, 10 March 1816; Apponyi to
Consalvr,-B August 1816.
18
Ibid., Lebze1tern to Consa1vl, 23 September 1816, with
copy of~ secret article. Five Roman scudi were approximately
equa.l to one pound sterling.

17
support for the restoration of Papal territories at the Congress

of Vienna.
Almost immediately the Papal government began to experience
the greatest difficulties in meeting the installments, and in
December, 1815, it was obliged to request a delay.

Austria

agreed to show its "sincere respect" for the Holy Father by not
insisting upon any further payments until June 1816, when, however, the entire balance must be paid in ful1. 19
This respite, though most welco1'l'1e, was only temporary.

The

payment of the whole sum would eventually have to be made, and
Consa1v! was frankly doubtful whether this could be done without
res ort to ruinous expedients.

He therefore begged the Aus trian

government to give concrete proof of its ott-expressed devotion
to His Holiness by remitting the Papal debt in part if not in
full, or at least extending the date due until 1817 when Papal
finances would be on a sounder basis.

Although in his letters

to Lebzeltern Consalvi eXhausted his ingenuity and rose to new
heights of eloquence in discovering and expressing reasons for
the remission or delay of payment, it was to no avail.
Lebzeltern and Metternich expressed their sincere sympathy for
the Papacy's difficult position, but they could do nothing, for
the matter was outside the jurisdiction of the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs.

They could only refer the question to the

19Ibid., Lebzeltern to Consalvi, 8 January 1816, Conealvi
to Lebziltern, 14 January 1816.

Imperial Minister of Finance, who insisted that the money was

18

absolutely necessary to supply the deficit created by Austrian
military operations in Italy.20
Payment of the debt was therefore necessary, and by heroic
efforts Consalvi was able to raise the sum by the apPointed day.
The Austrian government accepted with effusive thanks: it was
"ravished with delight" at the "loyalty and precision with \,fhich
the Papal government satisfied its obligations," which it felt
would result in a still greater increase in Austro-Papal friendShip.21
Consalvi's reaction was less enthusiastic. 22

The Austrian

government often appeared at its worst in financial matters: its
general tendency was to insist upon the rigorous fulfillment of
all Papal obligations while showing itself negligent about its
own.

However, the Cardinal does not seem to have blamed

Metternich or the Emperor for this rigorous insistence, for it
was too obviously the result of the determination of the
Austrian Finance Minister to collect everything due his government, without regard for the interests of Austrian diplomacy-a policy which the disorganisation of the Austrian goverrunent

2Orbid., Consalvi to Lebze1tern, 14 January, 10 February,

4 June,~June 1816; Lebzeltern to Consalvi, 5 February, 28

March 1816.

21Ibid., Lebzeltern to Consalvi, 9 June 1816.

22~bi~., Consalvi to Severoli, 9 June 1816.

and its lack of effective central control encouraged.

19
Nor did

Consalvi allow either this financial disagreement or the other
disputes arising from the Austrian occupation to dissuade him
from giving a favorable response to the overtures which
Metternich was even then making for a policy of close Austropapal co-operation.

2. The Theme of Austro-Papal Co-operation
Consalvi was correct in not ascribing responsibility to
Metternich for the disputes of 1815·-1816 for nothing was farther
from the Austrian Foreign Minister's mind than unnecessary
conflict with the Papacy.
If Metternich had had his way, the years after 1815 would
have been a period of close Austro-Papal co-operation--of a
"Union of Throne and Altar" on an international scale.

The

neceSSity of using religion as a bulwark against the spread of
revolutionary principles was a comnonplace of Restoration
thought; the special value of papal support for the 1tgood cause"
of oonservatism was obvious.
the Holy See and

"A close and cordial union between

• • • , a perfect accord ..
aacerdotium
inter
et imperium,ff was, Metternich felt, a necessity to defeat the
H.I.~

"Spirit of the Agel! that was attacking seoular and religious
authority alike. 23 The temporal power alone could not entirely
destroy this revolutionary spirit, for its roots were in a
warped morality which only spiritual weapons could reach. 24
23A.. V. J R247, Leardi to Conealvi, 22 February 1818. The
following abbreviations of the titles of the Austrian Emperor
ooeur in the documents: H.MrHls Majesty; H.I.r·f.-His Imperial
MajestYJ H.I.R.A.M.-His Imperial and Royal Apostolic Majesty.
24A•V., R245, Franois I to Pius VII, 12 April 1821.

Fortunately, the true Catholic was impervious to its influence

21

because he revered the authority or his King as he did that of
his bishop and the Pope. 25
Nor did Metternich need the advice or Gentz 26 or
Lebzeltern 27 that the support of the Papacy was especially
necessary in turbulent Italy, where Austria had recently acquired valuable terri tories •

He was convinced that:

Their [Austria fS and the Papacy fS] intimate union is
not merely deSirable, but even absolutely necessary
for maintaining the repose of Italy. Her tranquility
will never be compromised if the Court of Rome is
filled with the importance of employing all the
spiritual means at its disposal for the common interest
of the two governments.
Seconded by this moral force, the military power
of Austria in Italy ofters the surest guarantee of her
internal tranquility, while that of the maintenance of
peace with the outside world is found in its [Austria IS]
political system, which is essentially conservative. It
is therefore in the interest of both courts to remain
closely united.28
With Metternich thus firmly convinced of the neceSSity of Papal
co-operation, it is not surprising that he showered Consalvi
25A•V .. , R247, Leardi to Consalvi, 22 February 1818, R242,
Leardi to ConsalTi, 18 January 1821.
26
Wittichen, Friedrich Carl, and Ernest Salzer (ads.)
Briefe von und an Friedrich von Gentz (Munich, 1913), III,
P'art I, -2lJ9;--tJeiii"z to MetteriiICh, II April 1814. Friedrich von
Gentz (1764-1832), friend and publicist of Metternich and
Secretary of the Restoration congresses.
27
Lebzeltern, 308-311, Lebze1tern to Metternich, 23 April
1814.
28
Maass, Ferdinand, Der JOBernin1SmuB. Quellen zu seiner
Geschichte in Oesterreic~;-r76Q-!~O (VIenna; 1956-1901) IV,
5Blf=586, "Instructions tor PrInce aunt tz, 31 May 1817; hereatter cited as Maass.
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with voluminous exhortations to Austro-Papa1 unity.29
How should Consa1vi respond to these overtures?

He could

hardly be unaware that Austrian and Papal interests were not
always so "identical" as Metternich c1aimed;3 0 pOints of conflict
were numerous in both the religious and the political fields.
The development of Austro-Papal relations since 1780 did
not encourage overmuch faith in the Hapsburg Empire.

Thirty-

five years of almost continuous religious conflict with the
Josephist Court of Vienna had emb1ttered the Papacy, and this
strife had not yet ended in 1815. 31 The Emperor Francis I,
though devoutly religious, held firmly to Josephist principles,
as did most of the Imperial bureaucracy.

Metternich alone,

disinterested in religious problems as such and reluctant to
sacrifice political for religious advantages, dared to oppose
the J08ephist faction but his influence over Francis I in

2%ee, .L.!..-, A. V., R247, Leardi to Consalvi, 21 July 1816,
11 October 1817, 5 November 1817, 22 February 1818, R260,
Lebze1tern to Consa1vi, 6 April 1816; Metternich to Consalvi, 23
April, 3 July 1816, 11 January 1817.

3~.v., R260, Lebzeltern to Consalvi, 1 July 1816;
Metternich to Consalvi, 3 July 1816.
3l"JoSephinism tt was the name given to the system of the
Emperor Joseph II (1780-1790), who wished to bring the Austrian
Chureh under the control of the secular government. See below,
Chapter III, for a further description of Josephinism and its
effects on Austro-Papal relations.

religious matters was not great)2

encountered

COn:3al Vi had
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difficulties with the Erlperor over the latter's Josephiat
policies during the Congress of Vlenna}3 and hardly had the Pop

been

restol~d

to Rome than Severoli was dispatching a stream of

aomplaints concerning

!~perial

interferenoe In the Austrian

Church. 34

Nor In seeular affa1rs had the Aus tri8,n behsLvior been preoisely that expected of' the "Premier Protecteur Clle 1 'Egl1se." 35
Pius VII knd his Secretary of state could

tha.t

Aust~':'La,

rememb~r

only too well

having driven tht! Freneh from the I,egations (the

northcaatern provinoes of the Papal state, aroundl Bologna) in
1'799, had then sought to add them to her own terrjitorles; that
she had attempted to dominate the Conclave of Venice to seoure
a Pope \'lho would consent to thIS annexatIon; and ,that when
despite her efforts Pius VII had been elected, she had shown her
displeasure in no uncertain fashion.

Even then, Austria had not

abandoned her efforts to retain the Legations, but had con~inued

to put the strongest

pr~ssure

on Pius VII .to compel him
I

32For a discussion of Metternieh's attempts to check the
Josephists, see below, Chapter III.

3~ln1eri, IV, 340-348.
34E• g ., A.V., ANV 233, Severoll to Pro-Secre·tary of State
Pacea, 29 August, 10 September, 19 November 1814, 18 February,

30 April 1815.

35van Duerm, 64, Cousal"i to Metternich, 21 February- 1815.
The following may be consulted for Austro-Papal roelations during
the first flfteen years of Plus VII's pontificate: Memorie,
Chaptem II, IV, and Appendix; Schm'.dlln, Chapter,s rand II,
Rinleri; Lebzeltern, Chapters I, II, x.

to yield the desired territories by a

fo~a1

treaty.

24
Only

the destruction of Austrian power by Napoleon at Marengo had
finally brought thIs pressure to an end.
During the Napoleonic era Austrian policy towards the
Papacy had been largely dictated by selfish considerations, with
little regard for the welfare of the Church.

In 1804-1806 she

had encouraged the Papacy to resist Napoleon and had done her
best to stir up strife between them; then, having become after
her defeat the camp follower of the Emperor of the French,
Austria had endeavored to

pers~ade

Pius to make peace with

Napoleon by granting him the conoessions which he desired.
Throughout the long imprisonment of Pius VII, Austria had done
little to aid him. but had only sought to persuade him to oease
that heroic resistance which Francis I, MetternIch, and all
EllrOpe so lavishly praised later.

Only when the tide had

definitely tltrned against Napoleon did Austria dare to speak
out for the Pontiff.
In 1814 Austrian troops drove the French from the Papal
State and restored Pius VII to hIs See--a deed of which Francis
I was fond of reminding the Pope when he wanted conceSSions.
The gratitude of Pius and Consalvi was considerably diminished
when Austria demanded a sizable sum to cover the expenses of
this liberation, and was still further tempered by the realisation that Austria had acted thus only for her own strategiC

25
1nterests. 36

Moreover, Consalvi nourished well-founded

suspicions that Austria had not yet lost interest in annexing
the liberated territories,37 and he soon learned that she had
not scrupled to buy the support of Murat by promising him a
sizable area of the Papal State. 38
At the Congress of Vienna Austria did indeed display great
interest in the legatiOns, and apparently considered retaining
them as won by right of conquest. 39 That she did not press for
annexation at the Congress was not due to
for the Papacy.

any

special reverence

The real explanation can be found in

Metternich's fear that the turbulent Romagnols would make
undesirable subjects who might infect the other Austrian

~6---

A.V., R260, Conaalvi to Lebzeltern, 10 February l8l6J
Lebzeltern to Conaalvi, 28 March 1816.
37
A.V., R242, Conaalvi to Pacca, 26 June 1814.
38
By a secret treaty of 11 January 1814: Rinieri, IV,
45-74. Joachim Murat, apPOinted King of Naples by Napoleon in
1808; went over to the Allies with the above treaty; in 1815
tried unsuocessfully to arouse a national movement against
Austria in Italy; captured and shot.
39
Rinieri, IV, 309-310 does not believe that Austria had
serious designs on the Legations, an idea which Consa1vi came
to share to some extent: A.V., R242, Consalvi to Paoca, 8
September 1814. But for convincing evidence to the contrary,
see Lebzeltern, 322-341, and especially Angelo Filipuzzi (ed.),
Pio LX e la ~olitioa austriaca in Italia dal 1815 a1 1848,
nellareaIi"z one de Riccardo WeISs at starICenreIS '{"Florence,
1958), -"I;T-156, Metternlcl'i t'o LebzeItern, June TIUS.
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territories with revolutionary ideas,40 and in the crucial fact
that Austria "could not retain the Legations without making
proportional concessions to Russia and Prussia, disadvantageous
in that they would necessarily have involved lands and subjects
infinitely more valuable. • • • "41
With this background in view, it is not surprising that
distrust of Austria was endemic in the Papal States, or that
rumours circulated widely that Francis I was only awaiting some
favorable moment--perhaps a revolution or the death of Pius
VII--to seize the Legations. 42 These suspicions were nourished
by the agitation of a faction in the legations which wished
Austrian annexation, pretering the efficient and secular
43

Imperial rule to the Papal administration.

In fact, such suspiCions seem to have been unjustified. 44
40---~

Prince Clement de Metternich, Memoires, documents, et
ecrits divers, ed. Richard de Metternrch {Paris, 188o-1884r;
~tternrch to Francis I, 3 November 1811. Also, G. de
Bertier: de Sauvigny, Metternich et son temps (Paris, 1959),
171, Metternich to Neumann, 1"0" Ma,y--1832.-·
41
Fl1ipuzzi, 153-156.
42
Casai, 189-192. A.V., 247, Excerpt from Morning Chronicle, 21 April 1819. R260, Genotte to Consalvi, n-""J"'UW 1819.
ANV--'250, Mazio to Leardi, 16 September 1823.
43
A. V ., ANV 233. Severo1i to Pacca, 5 Augua t 1814.; Severoli
to COTh~alvl, 13 September 1815. R242,Consa1vl to Paeca, 24 May
1815.
44
Bianchi, I, 221--223, and Cassi, 130, 189-193, accept
these suspicions as correct, but give no evidence other than the
rumours then prevalent in Italy to support their contention. As
for the faction in the Legations that sought Austrian rule,
Austria distrusted rather than encouraged it: Van Duerm, 175,
Apponyi to Metternich, 18 March 1817.
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There is no evidence that the Austrian government seriously

considered annexation after the Congress of Vienna, nor that it
was in any way involved in the agitation in the Legations. Apparently, Austria, having onoe decided in 1815 not to annex
that area, definitely abandoned the projeot.
Consalvi never shared these suspicions.

His apprehensions

in regard to Austria were more limited, but more concrete.

The

real Austrian threat was not annexation, but the gradual extension of Austrian influence over the Papal State to such a
degree that the latter would become a mere satellite or
protectorate, losing thereby that temporal independence which

was then felt to be essential to the spiritual freedom of the
Papacy.

COi'lsalvi was well aware the "Austria seems to believe

that she has the right • • • to take a sort of predominance"
in the management of Italian aftairs,45 and that her aim was
"the acquisition of a direct influence on the governments of all
the Italian states, indeed the political management of them.~46
Metternleh would have preferred to achieve this aim
through the crea.tion of an Italian Confederation, somewhat
-~----

---",----,.

5
'
A.V., R242, Instructions for Spina, 1822. Metternich did
in fact believe that Austria was entitled to sueh predominance:
see G. Viezzoll, till princ1pe di Carignano nei d:!spaeci dei
ministri 3.U8trlaci a TorIno," RUI!I~na. Storl~ti. del Risorglmento~
XXX (1943), 293, Metternlch tost'arnemberg-~-o-JUly 1815.
-46
A.V., R242, Quesitl ahe oi propongono ••• , 1822, Also,
R248, Consalv1 to Macchi, 2 December 1822.

similar to that in Germany.47 He had privately suggested such
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a Confederation at the Congress of Vienna, but Consalvi had re:iected the plan. 48 In view of Italian reSistance, Metternieh
began to work more cautiously.

Abandoning for the moment his

Con:"ederation; he l30ught instead to extend Auatr>ian influence in
the indtvidltal states I especially by perauading them to sign

treaties of' alliance giving Austria cons:l.t'1erable control over
their policies.

In this more limited aim he had considerable

success: the petty states of Parma and Modena were AustrIan
satellites by their nature end loeation, while both Naples and
Tuscany were persuaded to sign secret treaties of a11iance. 49
Sardinia was placed under heavy pres8ure to do likewise, but
with English and Russian diplomatic support was able to resist. 5

------zrr.-------ill.d., Instructions for Spina~ Quesiti che si propongono •
• • ,1822. On Matt.mich'e Confederation scheme, see Antonio
Bettaninl, nUn disegno 0.1 confederazlone Ita1iana nella politica
Internazionale della restaurazlone,1I in his Stud1 di "tor1a dei
trattatl
e politica
internazionale
---_. 48"'· .-..
- . -.. ---- -"
.--.- ...- (Padua, 193~- 3=50i.
A. V., R2 Ll2, Consal vi to Pacca, 8 Septe'nber 1814, 1
November 1814, 1 February, 11 February 1815,J Pacca to Conaalvi,
13 November 1814.
49

I·. S. B. Chodzko ("Comte d 'Angeberg n ) I Recuel1 des

~~.!~~SI'h~,?-ntenti~,1~-,
~_t(.. !~~-~~ ·ld';.~;~1!l~-~!q~~~ ~~~~-~.fP..~
t
.J. '.t\u"r c e e
l' a .... le Paris ,0;;.19/ 20r-203, RUS ... ro-l-Jeapo1i an
Trea"ty'of--12-"June" 'I'Bf'S.
50
Bettanlnl, 3-50. Blanchi, I, 440-441. N. Rosselli,

I~~1ter~~ ~. Reltl!o ~1: ~ardeln~ .~~l !!?15 a~ ~§!rr (Turin, 1954),

39-&+ •
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To a certain extent, then, Metternichrs overtures to the
Papacy for close co-operation were only a part of his overall
Italian policy. However, the spiritual character of the Pope
made his co-operation more valuable than that of the mere ruler
ef a minor state would have been, while at the same time it made
difficult the application to him of such direct pressure as
could be used with other Italian princes. Papal co-operation
would have to be won by persuasion, not force--hence, the
frequent Austrian messages of this period stressing the identity
of Austrian and Papal interests and the need for close cooperation and unity between them. 51
Consalvi was aware of Metternichrs ulterior aims, that
Austria, "not being able to obtain a

Federation~

. . , will try

all the ways of obtaining at least a direct influence upon the
governments of the other Italian states,,,52 and "not being able
to propose this project openly now • • • will seek to prepare
for it by securing the adoption of principles and institutions
of such a nature as to lead little by little to a system of
51

See especially A.V., R260, Lebzeltern to Consalvi, 16
April 1816, 4 May 1816, 1 July 1816; Metternich to Consalvi,
3 July 1816; et pass im in much of the R260 correspondence
for l8l6-l8lr;-AISO;1r247, Severoli to Consalvi, 21 July
1816; Leardi to Consalvi., 5 November 1817, 22 February 1818,
et E~~~im in R247, 1816-1818.
52
A.V., R242, Quesiti che si propongono • • • , September,
1822. See also Consalvils similar comments in R242, Instructions
for Spina, 1822;
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federation under Austrian protection.,,53 He was therefore wary
of too-close unity with Austria, which might enable that state
to

establ~.sh

gradually a quasi-protectorate over the Papal State

Yet, at the sarne time Gonsalvi eould see sound reasons in
favor of eo-operation with Austria.

The

Napoleonic Wars had

proven beyond s.ll doubt that the Papal States wer-a too weak
mill tarily to de:t'end thernsel ves, and that neither tt..e Papal

principle of neutrality nor fear of ita spiritual sanctions
would. suffic.e to protect thert) fro'n attack by an unscrupulous
and determined enemy.

As in the past, the spiritual sword.

needed the temporal aword to support; it,

&l1Q

for this role

Austria, as the greatest Catholic state and the dominant power

in Italy, was clearly indicated. 54

In fact, though no new

Napoleon arose to threaten the Papal States, Austrian aid was
useful tn the diplomatic sphere.

For example, in 1816 a

diplomatic break threatened by Russia because of what it deemed
mistreatment of" its representative at Rome was s'l1oothed over by
Austria'S good offices, while in 1823 Austria upon Consa1vi's
request used its influence to persuade Naples to halt its

-----53----..··--Ibid., InstructIons for Spina, 1822.
54---'"
Consalvi was 30 well aware of this that during the tense
sprIng of 1815 when an attack by Murat was feared, he had reproached Metternioh for not ~xtending a guarantee of Austrian
protection to include the Papal State--a recognition of Papal
dependenoe upon Austrian protection that he may well have
regl'-'etted later. Van Duerm, 64, Consa1vi to Metternich, 26

'1,

February 1815.

I

pernicious practice of exiling suspected revolutionaries to
the Papal States. 55
Austrian friendshlp could be equally valuable for the
protection of the spiritual interests of the Church.

No less

than three times in 1815-1823 persecutions of Catholics in the
ottoman Empire which the Papacy was powerless to hinder were
halted when Consalvl invoked the influence of Austria at
Constantinople. 56

Austrian support also proved useful in the

controversy between the Papacy and the Protestant German
princes over the control of the Church in their states. 57Nor

was such Austrian support automatic: it

~ould

be quickly

terminated, for Austria, intent upon its own interests, would

-

55

8

May,

A.V., R260, Consalvi to Metternich, 2 June 1816;
Metternich to Consalvi, 3 July 1816. ANY 250, Consalvi to
Leardi, 26 Apr!l, 31 May 1823, ANV247, Leard! to Consalvi,

56

15

May,

29

May

1823 ..

In Bosnia in 1816: ANY 242, Hudelist to Severoli, 25
1816. At Aleppo in 1818: ANY 242, Consalvi to Metternieh,
4 July 1818: f>1etternioh to Leardi, 22 December 1818: R247,
Muxi to Consalvi, 24 April, 8 May 1819. At Constantinople
in 1819: R2 J.rT, Leardi to Consalvi, 20 October 1819, 8 June
1822.
57
See especially A.V., R247, Severol! to Consalvi, 12
Apr!l 1817; Leardi to Conaalvi, 4 July 1818, 16 January, 16
October, 6 Novereber 1819, 5 January 1820; et £assim in R247
May

during those years.. On the controversy between~he-'Papacy
and the Protestant,German princes of the upper Rhine, see
Schmidlin, 306-318.
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withdraw should the Papacy prove unco-operative. 58
However, the chief motive impelling Consalvi towards co-

operation with Austria was-- as Metternlch correctly divined 59 _the threat from the
on the other. 60

S~_~~ar,t

on the one hand and the

Ze1.?-n~J:

on

Each of these factions represented in its own

way a menace to the stability, and indeed to the very existence,

58

Austrian support was in fact withdrawn temporarily in
the controversy with the German princes when Austria failed in
1817-1818 to obtain desired religious concessions from the
Papacy (see below, Chapter III). The Papacy was bluntly told
that Austria. could easily "extinguish this conflagration," but
saw no reason to do so in view of the papal attitude: A.V., ANY
246, Leardi to Consa1vl, 25 May 1818.
59
Maass, IV, 584, Metternichfs Instructions for Prince
Kauni t~, 31 May 1817.
60
The 8ettarj were the members of the If Sects", the Italian
secret soeietres-of the Restoration Era which sought to overthrow the existing Italian governments by foree, drive out the
Austrians, and set up a constitutional unified Italian state;
the CarLonari were the best known of these societies; see below,
sectTon 4 of -this chapter. The Zelanti or "Zealots" were a
faction in the Papal Curia. Theihad no definite organization
or program, but were held together by certain com~on characteristics: dislike of the predominant position of Consalvi in the
Papal government, fir~ OPPOSition to any attempt to modernize
or reforTI the Papal regi~, and a desire to increase the effective control of the P~paey over the Catholic Church as a whole
by an uncompromising assault upon the secular rulers of Europe
who had gained control of the Church within their territories.
These aims brought them into conflict with Conaa1vi, a.nd they
sought constantly to hinder his policies and to drive him .from
oftice. See below, Chapter II, Section 3, and Chapter III,
Section 1, for a discussion of these two groups, their aims
and policies, and their relation to Consalvi and his policies.

of the Papal State: the

S~.tta~J,

because

~'i(>

,- (

-(

'-,;,~·~.r-l.·;:,::,-~·~ ~
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they were oonstantly plotting to overthrow the Papal government
which stood in the way of their liberal and nationalist ideals;
the

Z~}~n);_i,

because their ultrareactionary principles would,

if fully put into effect, arouse such discontent that revolution
would be almost inevitable.

The moderate Conaa1vi feared all

fanatics equally, and '.dshed at the savne time to carry out
refo~ns

despite

~a~ 0pp~sition

and to suppress the ?ettarJ.

Metternich, realizing the necessity of these policies for the
stability not only of the Papal State but of all Italy as well,
and realizing too that only Consalvi could carry them out,61
gave the Cardinal his wholehearted support in both endeavours.
This natural community of interests was largely responsible
for the good relations that existed between Metternich and
Con"3alvL
For "good" those relations generally were, at least in
the years iMmediately following the Congress of Vienna when
their mutual fear of the Zelantl and the

~~~.i.arj

was strongest

--61-····-Sauvigny, 178, Instructions for Apponyi, 16 September
1820. For T·1etternich fS fears of the harm a Zelanti-dominated
Papacy could do, see G. de BertieI' de Sauvigny," France and the
~t~Fean Alliance, 1816-1821 (South Bend, Ind., 1958)~ 1~~1g;
. e ernlCen to Rioherieu~ 17 April 1817; hereafter cited as
sauvifnl 1~28. These opinions conflict with those of Bianchi,
I: 22 -22~, and Cassi, 189-192, who attempt, without supporting
evidence except dubious ru,'11o,!-ra.,·to.p.t~ture Consal vi and
Metternich as cons t ant lYfP. lIe; the latter is described as
plotting against Consalv 8hd opposing hta plans for reform.
, 'J '.'

;;
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and when those aspeots of Austrian policy that threatened

papal interests were less in evidence than they had been earlier
During the 1815-1817 period, therefore,

or would becoMe later.

and to a steadily lessening extent

therearte~,

Consalvi

s:tn(}erely desirt1d to co-operate with Austria and sought to do
so "in any i,fay that would not \lieaken the te'T;!)opal independence of

rr-

the Pap3,c~l" or its ess,~:mtlal spi:r.-ltual a:u Ghorit 3·• o £:
J

Consal vi could not,

o~'

course, be unalfzare of' the threaten-

tng as}:ects of Austrian pollcy--its deslre for' hege"l()ny 1n
Italy, the nenaoe of its Josephiat policies-·-but; in the yeal"S

l.mmediately a.fter

thEwe elc:nentG were not 8 tr'uJl[;:;ly in

l81~~

evidence; they were then overshadowed for Cons 9.1 vi hy the
immediately serious

opposltlO1'l, and

pr()ble~.13

Set~a.r.t

r:lore

of internal :;:'ef'rJl--r", Zel?-nt1:

subversion, in all of which Austria.n

SUppOl"'t would be helpful a.nd perhaps invaluable.

This situation c:)uld not long endure: the A'ustro··Papal

a.1liance was unstable

frOTl'l the

beginning.

No 8.'flount of good

will, or of fine rhetoric about the identity of Papal and

Austrian interest, could per:nanently concGal the pa.inful truth
that those

inter~sts

were in fact divergent, a.nd at times

-----'-62-----'For apparently sincere expres3ion3 of -chis deJire, see
Consalvi '3 lsttel"S to iiletternich in Van li'Uerrn, 136, 151, 196,
206, 218. Both Lebzeltern (Van Duerra, 127) and lVietternich
(Maass, IV, 584; Sauvigny, 173) believed 1n the Cardinal's

sincerity.

diametrleall~r

opposite.

In the la.at analysis, Austria. did

consider herself entitled to exercise hege'1'lony in Ita.ly,
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8.

heger'lony which Cans al vi could not recognis e, while the
J ooephis t spIrit d·Y·'linating the Austrian court was in dlrect
contradlcti0~

wft t,)

postpon:?c!

01"

to the Papal
th~'Jlselves,

clai~s

'~::msalvl

o~ a~lritual

and f"ietternich c,)uld have

!1itie;ated Austra::?apal conflict, especially in

the religious f'iL!1.d.

l'oth favored a ',ore conciliatory policy

in reI i.gious lr!s'cters than the;!

t;ltH--e

especially

"iho had no

Josephif~t

authority.

tl"UI3

of

Netternich~

able to ad.opt.
gl"ea°t;

zeal

1\his w'as
1'01'

principles c'ne]. was ul1HillL1g to sacrifice '!;he

political advantages of' Papal co· ope rat inn fo:! the sake of
tncrea.~ing

royal control

ov(~r

the Chur'ch.

have been willing to ma.ke sJ'newhat

great~r

Consalv:i. toe would

ooncessions on

non essential natters and opposed. the unrealistic a'nbltiona of

thf:!

t~}.!int3:,

the Pa.pal

but he could not; comprotlise on the E:sserltlals of

poslt~ion.

As the Carclinaltold Metternich, no matter

how strongly he r'1ight t'lish closer friendsh:i;p with Austria,
there wer'e cp.rtain po:tnts on which he
Austl~ia

00\,1.10.

not yield, ana if

insisted on de .. la.'1ding IT'ore than he CQuld give, she

1iJQuld dest:-..-.os' the baDis of Auatro-Papal unit y o3-- aa in fact she
eventually did.

For

ulti~ately

neither Ifletternich nor Consalvi iJ{as entirely

63 - - Van DueX'r.1, 136, Consalv! to Metternlch> 11 .June 1816.
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the master of his own policy. Behind Metternich were the
Josephist Court and Emperor; behind Consalvi were the Zelanti
with their growing influence on Pius VII in religious matters.
Under Josephist influence, Francis I demanded far greater concessions than Consalvi, much less the Zelanti, could make. As
Consalvi warned Metternich,

If

I desire a close union with Austria

and will do everything possible for this. But there are certain
things which are impossible for us. • • • I beg Y. H. (jour
Highnes~

for the love of God to oppose with all your influence

things of this nature. n64 But Metternich1s opposition could not
prevent Francis I from demanding such things, while Consalvi,
hampered by the Zelanti, could not adopt as flexible an attitude
on non-essential points as he would have liked. 65 That AustroPapal co-operation broke down as soon as it did was in large
part the result of the influence of these two factions, Zelanti
and Josephists, on the policies of their respective courtsj66
but the break-down itself was in the long run probably inevitable
64

Ibid. Also, 206-210, Consalvi to Metternich, 1 October
1818, in-wKich the Cardinal declares he has obtained for Austria
everything except those things on which the Pope cannot yield.
65For the way in which the conciliatory religious policies
advocated by Metternich and Consalvi were thwarted by the
Josephists and the Zelanti, especially the fo~ner, see below,
Chapter III.
66~.

3. Reform and Opposition in the Papal State
Oppos1t10n to Consalv1 at Rome had not been absent dur1ng
h1s first ministry; 1t was an early consequence of jealousy of
his influence over P1us VII, d1s11ke of h1s reform1ng po11c1es,
and d1strust of h1s f1ex1b1e att1tude towards Napoleon. However,
it

W88

not unt11 h1s second m1n1stry that he became 1nvo1ved 1n

open conflict w1th a powerful oppos1t10n party w1th1n the Cur1a:
the ultra-react10nary

~lant1.

The conf11ct was an unequal one.

The Ze1ant1, led by such 1nf1uent1a1 Card1nals

88

Severo1i and

Bartolomeo Pacca, included the majority of the higher clergy
and the College of Card1na1s, while Consa1v1's supporters-the "D1p10mat1c1" or "Po11t1cant1"--1nc1uded only a few
cardinals and a limited number of the lower c1ergy.67 Only the
support of P1us VII kept Conaalv1 1n power aga1nst such strong
oPPo31t!OD, and as the Pope grew older the Ze1anti gained an

----67
On Consa1vi's struggle wlth the Ze1anti, see: Massimo
Petrocch1 La restautazlone, 11 Card1nale Conselvl, e 1a Rlforma
de 1 1816 (FlOrence, 1941), hereafter clteda.s petroc'Chrt941 J
Scnmmin, 190, 197-198J Lef1on, 317-320J A.V.=; R241, IX raot
from MDrnl~ Chronlo1e, 27 Apr11 1819, presents an lnteresting
contemporary view. ~arto1omeo Cardlnal Paoea (1756-1844), ProSecretary of State ln 1808-1809; flrm1y opposed all oompromise
wlth Napoleon, who impr1soned him 1n 1809-1813J Pro-Beoretary
of State during Consa1vl's absenoe in Vienna, 1814-1815J probably the most influential leader of the Ze1ant1 in 1815-1823_
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increasing influence over him. 68
Aside from personal factors, there were two main causes
for conflict between Consalvi and the

zelant~.

The first point

at issue was the question of reform or reaction in the Papal
government.

Consalvi favored reforming and modernizing the

antiquated and inefficient Pontifical regime, while the Zelanti
were bitterly opposed to any innovation.

The second question

was the policy which the Papacy should adopt toward the secular
power in religious affairs.

This question involved a difference

not of principle--both Consalvi and the Zelanti opposed the
interference of' secular government in religious matters and
wished to prevent it--but of tactics.

The Ze1anti tended to

favor an open assault on governmental control over the Church
and to oppose any compromise with the secular power.

Consalvi,

with a more realistic appreciation of the international !!I.eRe;
and the strengths and weaknesses of' the Papal position than his
adversaries,

f'e1~

that any such policy would be most unwise.

A

frontal attack upon the principle and practice of governmental
control over the Church would surely lead to conflict with moat
of the European powers, a conf'lict which would have the most
unfortunate effecta on religion in general and the Papacy in
particular.

Such a conflict was especially undesirable at that

particular moment when the revolutionary threat was so strong,

-.----

68
Van Duerm, 263, Note 1; 281, Apponyi to Metternich, 20
September 1820; Maass, V, 113-114, Genotte to Metternich, 5
February 1820.
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as a long church-state conflict would only weaken both, to the
joy of their common enemy.

Consalvl was theretore reluctant to

attack the secular power openly.

He preferred to work indirect-

1y, taking advantage ot favorable opportunitles to increase

Papal control over the natlonal churches.

Unlike the

~lanti,

he was willing to make conceaelons on non-essentlal8 If it
seemed advlsable.
Zelan~

In so far as Austria was concerned, the

were bltterly antagonlstic to that Josephist power,

while Consalvi, though dlstrustful of' Austrlan alms, was well
aware of' the politlcal and rel1g10us advantages of' remaining
on good terms w1th her.
The Zelanti gained a major in1tial advantage over Conealvi

when the latter spent the fIrst year ot the Re8toration away
trom Rome, thus leav1ng a free f1eld to his opponents to take
control ot the admin1stration and carry out their react10nary
policies.

Both MOnsignor Agostino R1varola, Whom Pius VII

sent ahead to restore Papal government in the territories of'
the Mprima ricupera" (that i8, those restored to the Papaoy in

1814, principally Rome and the surround1ng area, as opposed
to the "seconda ricupera;" the rest ot the Papal possessions
restored at the Congress ot Vienna), and the heroic but intransigent Pacca, appointed Prosecretar,y ot State upon the
Pope's arrival 1n Rome, were Zelanti fervently opposed to any
~---........"--".

innovation 1n Church or State.

The two lost no time destroying

every traoe ot the French regime and replacing it with the

ancient pre-1189 Papal administration.

69

The French admini-

40

strative and financial innovations were abolished, and the
modern efficient French law codes and courts were replaced by
70
the antiquated and dis organized Papal legal ays te:n.
The
reaction extended even to the abolition of such salutary
measures as vaccination, lighting of the streets, and
pation of the Jews from the ghetto.

ew~nci

The Inquisition (With the

power of capital punishment though not of torture) was re··
established, as were the feudal rights and jurisdiction of the
nobility.

The aale or secularized ecclesiastical properties

was annulled and a commis81on set up to supervise their return;
few or the well-to-do would not have SUffered loss from these
measures.

---,

'~-'osr'----

Almost equally otfensive to the educated classes ,_.;'

.... - ' -- ...

The best account of the reaction under Pacea, as well as
the reforms of Consalvi, 1s in the works of Massimo Petrocahi:
La restaurazione romana, 1812-1823 (Florence, 1943), hereafter
OIted as fetrOcchrI91i"j; ana Petrocchl 1941. A good briet
account i8 "In Scnmial1n, 119-201. ni'conthe reaetion,
R1n1er1 1 IV, 203-297, rather apologetiC in tone; and the excellent but very critioal Adolfo Omodeo, ttCattolicismo e clvilta
modemo nel aecolo xix, III: II Cardinale Consalvi al Congresso
di Vienna," 1n La Critica, XXXVI (November, 1938), 426-440.
70
-- -----.
A system described by a moderate eontemporary as "a law
code compiled thirteen centuries ago, oontaining tourteen or
more thousand laws, often mutually contradictory, and no longer
eompat1ble with the customs and outlook ot the times whioh have
utterly changed • • • • " A.V., R25, Pro-Memorial ot Dr. Gua~ani,
sent to Consalvi by Cardinal Opizzoni, 18 October 1815. This
Memorial contains a very interea ting analys 18, all the more
impressive tor ita comparative moderation, of the manifold Ills
of the Papal regime.

was the removal of laymen from the Papal government.

The

41

laicization of the administration by the French had been highly
popular with the educated classes, especially the numerous and
often impecunious lawyers, and the return to ecclesiastical rule
was bitterly erltlelzed. 71
More defensible, though :nuch ar:lti<.!lzed.

abroad~

was the

general removal from their benefices ot the elerg;r who had
taken the oath of loyalty to Napoleon; desirable on polItical
and religious grounds, it was perhaps equally
of justice.

30

as a

~atter

It could scarcely be denied that the olergy who

had sur;ered for their refusal to take the oath should be restored to their positions at the expense of the jurors, nor
could men like Paoca, who had suffered per.secutlon ror their
refusal to bow to Napoleon, be expacted to have muoh sympathy
for those who had been

1038

heroio.

Also underatandable was

the punishment of a vel" few 1n:; collaboratore, notably those
who had led the assault on the Quirinale in 1309.

Less

justifiable was the publio hwniliatlon inflicted on certain
prelates liiho had co-operated

~lith

the Frenoh.

however, no widespread persecution, no "white

There was,
terrorJ~,·,

despite

the wildly exaggerated stories whioh circulated freely beyond

7I

It is significant that

ex-ottieial~

replaced by

eccleSiastics were perhaps the most important single grQup

in the secret societies. Petrocchi

~943,

38, 53.

\

the Alps, spread by enemies of the Papal governl1ent. 72
Consal vi was appalled by these proceed1ngs.
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He was not

a liberal in the strict senae of the te~a:73 his refornm and his
administI'ation as a whole had more in common with the
EnlIghtened Ve.patIsrn of the eighteenth century then wIth the
Liberalism ot' the nineteenth.

However, 1f not a liberal, he

was oertainly an anti-reaotionary, an intelligent and statesmanlike conael-v'atlve who realized that llthe circUJr18i;ancea of the
Age we live In are very dIfferent from those of the Past. • .It
is necessary to come to terms with the spirit of the tlmes. il74
He had long planned a thorough
during his first m1nistry

refo~~

zelL~i~

of the Papal regime, but

opposition and his own pre-

oocupation with other problems had combIned to thwart his plans.
'7

12

_.

A.V., R242, Consalvi to Pacea, 9 June, 17 August 1814.

R247, Severoli to Pacea, 25 July, 30 July, 6 August H314. Suuh
stories rendered Consalvl ts task in securing restoration of
the P8.pal States l"IjUch more d:U'"fi cuI t .
73

The theme of Casai's work,

th~t

Conaalv1

W~~

indeed a

true liberal, seems untenable; the general spirit pervading his
T-efON15 and hie ac5.mintstration was tha.t of an intelligent conservative. Upon being informed that a SwiSS paper had praIsed
hiB refol"i115 as u11bera1 ft, Conea,lvl replied that such articles

were attempts by the Liberals to associate the Papacy with their
cause in the pub1:tc eye. He stated h1.8 opposition to Liberalism
as a doctrine and denied that his reforms were liberal in that
sense" A. V., R257, Consalvi to Vftlentl, 10 Februa.r.r 1817.
'"{4

A.V., R247, ConealvLto Severo'11; . ll1. September 1816.
Severoli had criticized Consalv1 '8 reformn J and an increasingly

bitter dispute sprang up between them that eventually led to an
open break. Severoli later became an implacable foe of the
Secretary of State and led th~ ~J!l,!l~.~" in the Conclave of 1823.

In 1815, the disrupt10n of the Papal government by the French
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occupation seemed to offer the opportun1ty for thorough reorganization for wh1ch he had hoped during his oxile. 75 Any

attempt to restore the past would be futile, and would merely
al'ouse popul&.l." diseontent and a.1ienate Europea.n op1n:5.on.

It

was necessary to move forward, to carry out rei'OlTlS thr.t 'Would
be in keeping with the "Spirit of the Age!' if the best interests

of the Papacy and its subjects were to be served.

Consalvi had

no intention of satisfying liberal d.emands for a wrl tten oon-

stitution, a parliament. or any other innovation that might
weaken the authority of the Pope, which must be absolute 1n

secUlar as in religious matters. 76
adr~lt

Consa.lv1 was willing to

that the syateT:1. or eOIl8tltutlonal government, "oBsia del

Contratto Sociale, ff might be desirable in a government ruled by
a purely secular prineeJ but in an eooles1astical state it
would be "most perilous," for a.ny limitation of tr..e authority
of the Pope as a secular ruler might be thought to affect his

75

r~morie, 145-161, written by Consalvi during his
lmprisorunem'l:n 1811, describes hiB earlier attedpts at refOrI'Il,
his bitterness at the reaotionaries who had frustrated hls
projects, and his hope that in the event of a Papal l'eator-ation
he would be able to profit by the disruption of the old system
to create a new one.

76

A.V., R242, Consalvl to Paoca, 20 Maroh 1815J Consalvi
to Spina, 8 FebruaI"Y' 1821 J Irmtruettons fur Spina, 1822, Rl6S,
Cons 3.1 vi to Metternieh, 23 Augus t 1823 (oopy).

- necessary and divinely-given absolute power as Head of the
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Church. 77
What the Cardinal did propose was an amnesty for the past,

plus large-seale administrative rerorm that would eliminate
the sources or popular discontent against the Papal

~egi~e.

A

general raorganlsatlon and streamlining of the administrative
system to l.nomue its effioiency and its a.bility to disoha.rge

it3 funotions satisfaotorily, flnanoial reforms to reduce the
burden of' taxat1on, stimulate the eeOnOii'ly, and place the st!l.te

on a. sound

f.'1n~nej.al

bas is, a well-organized and

huynane

legal

eystelJ1, the abolition of priv1lege, and the admission of laymen
to the government in larger

numbers-~the3e

were the

rero~~~

that Consalvl sought to put into affect.
Throughout his stay in Vienna Consalvl dispatched a constant stream of letters to Paces urging moderation and reform
and pOinting out the evil effects of the prevailinr; reaction
and repreesion. 78 In O~ of his last di8pRt~hes before departing f0r Rome, the Cardinal warned that:

77

A.V., R2!~2, Consalvl to Spina, 8 February 1821.
78
"Jar.! espeola.l1y A.V., R2!~2, Consalv1 to Pacca, 30 June,
17 August, 3 Deoember, 7 December, 14 December, 25 Deoember
191!l, l!~ .January 12 .Tune 1815; and P:\cca fS de~en8e of' th(:!
justice and neoessity of h1s polioies, Paeea to Consalvl, 8
cTun~, 23!uly.. () ,~uglJS t, 8 AUgt.lfl t, 17 A'llgus t, 20 September I 3
November 1814. Much of this Consalvi-Paoca oorrespondenoe has
been published 1n R1nieri, V; it is an excellent 30urce f8r the
confliot of opinion between Consalvi and the Zelantl 1n 18141815 when open strife between the'cn had not yet-brOKen out.
J
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If it has been difticult, God knows, to recover what
haa been recovered, it will be yet more difficult to
preserve it. You must believe what I am about to tell
you. It we do not take the right path, if tata1 errors
are made, we will not keep the recovered territories
s 1x months. Heaven grant that the future does not confirm this predictionI But unfortunately so it will be
if we make the wrong moves.
The only "right path tt was to conciliate the people by a policy
of moderation and retorm, in particular by "adopting as soon

as possible a new plan [ot government] based on those views
that wisdom, prudence, experience, the nature or the age, and
circumstances imperiously counael ••• 0. When the current is
of such great torce that it cannot be reSisted, better to seek
to control and direct it than to let oneselt be swept aW87 by
it." 79
It was in this firm conviction that Consalvi set to work
upon hi. return to Rome.

His tirst step was an Edict of 5 July

1815, providing tor the temporary maintenance of the French
legal and administrative

with some necessary modifications, in the Seconda Ricupera. 80 Soon afterwards, an Edict of
sy8te~

79

A.V., R242, Consalvi to Facca, 12 June 1815.
80
The provisional government set up by this Edict was
based on the plans which two Roman lawyers, Cristaldi and
Barberi, had drawn up at the orders of Pius VII, and which they
presented to Conselvi upon his return. However, though not
developed by the Cardinal, it was revised by him prior to its
publication. Its provis1ons, even it not ent1rely originated
by Consalvi, show his influence and are in keeping with the
spirit of his policy. See Ano~ous, "La cong1ura d1 Macerata:
la ReBta~razione Pontific!a del 1815 e 1e scontentezze settarie,
La C1v11ta Cattol1ca, 1916, I, 405. Also ----Petrocchi 1941, 52-53.
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14 July guaranteed a complete amnesty and the possession or all
purchased secularized ecclesiastical land. 8l Meanwhile, though
distracted by other problema,82 he had begun work on the preparation of a Plan of Reform, which proved to be a long and
laborious task.

The Plan might have appeared in early 1816

had it not been constantly hampered and delayed by the opposition ot the Zelanti, who had taken advantage ot the Cardinal's
long absence to occupy most ot the ottices, spiritual and
secular alike, in the State and to win considerable influence
over Pius VII.83 Finally, in March, 1816, the Plan was completed, and COMalvi looked forward to its speedy PUQ,lJ1<iEi.tJ;;<ll'h\? '
However, when the Plan was submitted to Pius VII, although
he stated his approval, the Pope hesitated to publish it, tor
the

Z~lanti:

reject it.

were now making a supreme ertort to persuade him to
For two montha the Pope heSitated and the issue hu

in the balance, while Cons.lv1 fought a constant, desperate
battle with the

Zelant~

for the support of Pius VII.

The long

and bitter struggle took its toll or even Consalvi's indomitable
spirit, and so weary and disheartened was he at times by the

81

Some Zelanti officials did their best to ignore this
amnesty: A. V :, H2o, Consalvi to Leopardi, 6 September 1815;
Pro-Memorial or Monaldo Leopardi, 1815.
82
See above, Section 1, for these problems.
83
Van Duerm, 127 Lebzeltern to Metternich, 30 April 1816,
21 May 1816. A.V., R247, Extract trom Morning Chronicle, 27
April 1819. ANV 125, Consalvi to Severoli, 4 Febru&r7 1816.
84

ANi 125, Consa1vi to Severoli, 25 March 1816.

exhausting conflict, by his inability to secure the refo'rms
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he knew to be vitally necessary, and above all by the tailure

ot his triend Pius to support him that he told Lebzeltern that
he was seriously oonsidering resigning his oftice.

The

Austrian ambassador, well aware of the gravity of Consalvi's
position, tried to encourage the Cardinal, but nonetheless his
report to Metternich painted the situation in dark colors:
The party opposed to him has daily gained ground, it
spares no means of injuring him in the opinion of the
publio and the Pope • • • • Strong in his conscience,
sacrificing his existence to his sovereign and the
general welfare, he errs perhaps by over-confidence
in the righteousness of his intentions and leaves too
much latitude to hiS adversaries. The Pope, oonstantly
surrounded and worked upon by them, does not oease to
respect him, but has less confidence in him_ He is
reticent towards him, he struggles between his attraction to a man 'Who has rendered him suoh great services
and the impressions that are given him daily_
His Plan of organization is already criticized,
before being known. Even the most innooent moves of the
Cardinal are misinterpreted, until an accolade which he
gave to Lord stuart was taken here as a baccio di framassoni, for the Cardinal 1s judged such-Slnce he fias
Deen in Vienna and has announced ideas more liberal, or
rather, les8 reactionary and ignorant than those that
prevail in this city which has become the homeland of
ignorance and egoism. He is reproached with wishing
to do everyth1ng hirnself and tUlowing others to do
nothing: a just reproach, but the answer 1s that it he
abandoned the smallest matter to others, it would intallibly be thwarted and concluded 1n a sense contrary
to his views.
The delay 1n introducing necessary reforms was caUSing mounting
discontent and the sprea.d of' revolutionary sel1ti!1lent:
During the few weeks that I have been gone, I have
found that public sentiment has deteriorated remarkably in every w~, and I consider this state in a
sort of criSiS, due chiefly to the bad administration
•• - ,. to ignorance, to presumption, and above all to

the intrigues of the CardInals, who ~itate against
the Secretary of State quite openly [visiere levee]
without control or opposition, authorlzea,--so--i(;-speak, by the weakness of the Holy Father.
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Lebzeltern gloomily conoluded that he doubted Consalvl would
be able to carry through his reform Plan. 85
Though Consalvi's threat to resign

rn~

have been uttered

mainly to impress 18bzeltem with the gravity of his pOSition
in order to wtn Austrian support in the struggle, the
Ambassador's description was not exaggerated.

The opposition

had suceoeded 1n checkIng his plans, and diScontent was growing
stead1ly as a result of the delay.

Much alarmed

by

the de-

terltorating Situation, Mettemich reacted as Consalvi had hoped
by giving the Cardinal his support against the Zelanti. 86
Metternich had long been interested in reform In the Papal
Contrary to the tradition ot nIneteenth century LIberal

State.

hIstorIans, Metternich did believe in retorm, but onlY' to a
certain extent and in a limited sense.

No concessions that

affected the rights of sovereignty or the prerogatives ot the
crown could be granted, tor "kings, like bankers, when they
live on their capital, must sooner or later arrIve at bankruptcy."

However, legislative and administrative reforms that

---:--._----_.._85

Van Duerm, 127, Lebzeltern to MetternIoh, 30 Apr!l, 1816

86

A.V., ~TV 233, Severoll to Consa1vi, 13 AprIl 1816.
Lebzeltern was already doing his best to support and encourage
Consalvi, almost oertainly upon 1nstr-uctlons from Mette.rnioh:
Van Duerm, Lebze1tern to MetternIeh, 121: 30 April 1816. 131:
21 May 1816.

did not affect the rights ot sovereignty were quite another
matter: "they

~l~

simply

gove~~nt
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acts, tending to a

progresalve amelioration, a process just, simple, and WiSe. n87
Change Gould not be avoided; the reform ot government in keeping with Ilthe progress of' knowledge and the needs which recent
events have created." was neeessary. 88 The eBsentia.I point was
that such

refol~

must be

gr~nted

by

the sovereign of his own

free Will, not wrung from him by revolutionary pressure. 89
~~ttern1oh

Papal state.

did not fall to apply these pr1nciples to the

rrne widespread discontent and consequent growth

of revolutionary activity in that Stnte was not only distaste-

ful to his conservative principles, but a direct menace to

Austria, for revolutionary agitation there would certainly
spread to Austria's Italian territories. 90 Thorough repression
of the

Setta~l

was necessary, but it was equally neees8&r,1 to

remove the legitimate causes of discontent by timely reforms,
thus depriving the revolutioraries of popular support.
Mettern1eh had already urged reforms upon Consa1vi at the

87
1832.

88

Metternieh, V, 392, !etternieh to Neumann, 31 October

Sauvig~,

89

77, Caraman'8 dispatch of 23 February 1818.

Ibid., 77, Circular of 12 Ma1 1821. For Metternioh's
attempts-to secure suoh reforms "trom above" in the Hapsburg
Empire, see Srblk, I, 454-464.
90
A.V., ANV 233, Severo11 to Consalvl, 16 July 1814, 10
October 1815, R260, Lebze1tern to Consalv1, 1 July 1816,
Mettern1ch to Consalv1, 3 July 1816.
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Congress ot Vienna; but as the chief point of the suggested
reforms was some: sort of constitution similar to the French

Charter, the plan was rejected as incompatible with Papal
8uthorlty.91 However, the Austrian minister dId not lose sight
of the situation in the Papal States, and Consalvi's reforms,

being quite in line with his

Idea.'3,'llet wj.th hi3 approval.

Ow"TI

It was natural therefore that when Lebzeltern tnforned him of
Consalvi's difficult position, he was seriously alarmed and

instructed Lebzeltern to give COI15alvi full support to secure
the adoption of these necessary
Meanwhile I though by

refo~I~.

1'l11d-Ma~r

the Plan had been in Pius'

hands for six weeks, not all Consalvifs argwuents a.nd pleas

could pel"'8ua.de him to publish it.
that in the end the
the Plan, or to

50

It did not seem impossible

might persuade the Pope to reject
modify it as to destroy its va1ue. 92 Either
~~.1ant~.

outcome would have disastrous consequences fer the Papal states,
where the Plan was awa1ted wjth great impatience as the sole
hope of saving the' rapidly deteriorating lSituatlon,,93

It would

also, Lebze1tern believed, result in the tall of Consalvi,

who

had committed himself to carry1ng out reform and would certain!
resign if he failed to do

90. 94

91

R21l-2, COMa1v! to Pacoa, 20 May 1815.
92
Van Duerm, 131, Lebzeltern to Metternlch, 21

93

May

1816"

A.V., ANY 233, Severoli to Consalvi, 24 Februar,r 1816.
94
Van Duerm, 131, Lebzeltern to Metternich, 21 May 1816.

\

Realizing that Consalvl fa reaignation waa oontrary to both
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Austrian and Papal interests, Lebzeltcrn did everything he
could to aid the Cardinal.

The crisis calJ!e in late May: Pius

was about to make his decision, and neither Consalvl nor
Lebzel tern

e~)uld

be

aUl'"e

that it would not bd unfavorable. The

Austrian 8}nbassl1clor found Consalvi in an extremely \iorr1eo
state:

Exhausted by the battles which he lWUSt fight at every
moment> mortified at seeing hinself so wet'lkly, so 111
supported by a sovereign to whom he has rendered such
great nerviees a.nd whoso chs.::."2.cter and principles have
much ehanged and who has yle::i.ded himself up to the
daily impulses he receives; seeing himself deprived of
all means of execution by the maneuvers of the party. • •
which took care to f':tll with its creatures all offices
before the arrival of Gonsalvi from Vienna, he is in a
truly critioal

ii'lOo:1lent.

I..cbzeltern diel hls. best to calm the "extreme agitation" of
Consalvi and to enaourage him to continue the struggle.

Nor

did he confine hie ass 1stance to mere encouragement:
As I am conv1noed or the extreme l~lportanee of keeping
Consalvi 1n office [Lebzeltern explained to ~1etternich1,
ror both the public good and for Austria; as I am also
eonvinced that 1f Consalvl resigns and 1f the Pope
decides to do everything after the rashion of '96, he
will ensure the most evil consequences for this oountry,
inhabited by malcontents or every type; I plan to have
an interv1ew with His HolIness on these subjects, and I
flatter myself that the remonstrances which I plan to
make with m1 usual frankness, will not be made without
success.
The Pope was to make his decision w1thin the next eight hours.
If the decision was unfavorable and Conealvi reSigned, "public
opinion would range itself completely on his side, and the

'III

II

I

III

confusion that would result from the restoration of the old
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regime would form his greatest triumph. n95
Fortunately, Lebzeltern did not have an opportunity to
determine the accuracy of his prediction, for the Pope decided
1n favor of publishing the Plan of Reform.

The extent to which

Lebzeltern's "remonstrances t1 and Austrian support in general
contributed to this outcome 1s uncertain.

In v1ew of the Pope's

recognition of the Papal need for Austrian support and good
W111,9 6 he would probably be inclined to listen with respect to
Lebzeltern's remonstrances, and the Austrian ambassador'S support

was therefore almost certainly of signlflcant value.
Opposition to Conaalvi'8 rcforrns was not by any means ended
by

the Pope IS decision.

The

~e.~;ttnt!

continued to use every means

to block or delay the appearance ot the Plan, wh1ch was finally
published only in mid-July.

During this try1ng period Consalvi

lost the much-appreciated support of Lebzeltern, wno (much
against his will) \fas recalled to Vienna preparatory to being

sent as ambassador to St. Petersburg.97

95
Ibid.
96---Ibid., 127, Lebzeltern to Metternlah, 30 April 1816.
97
Lebzeltern, 345,-349. Consa,lvi and Lebzcltern remained on
close tS)?1;lS for some years afterwards, exchanging letters in verafriendly terms. The Zelanti, however, never forgave Lebzeltern
for supporting ConsalvI"f s-re'foMlS, and when in 1826 Austria
proposed to send him back as ambassador, their oppos1tion caused
the project to be dropped.

I

I:!
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However, his sucoessor, Count Apponyi, was instruoted to support
consalvi "en tout at pour tout~98

The ,secretary of state waa

also assured of continued Austrian support by Lebzeltern himself

in a. long letter written by the latter shortly before his departure from Vienna; this letter embodied the ideas of

~~tternlch,

who wa.s unable to write hLullelf beoa:use uf an eye ail;1rent.

After onoe again stressing the need for Auetr'o-Papal unity,

Lebzeltern assured Consalvi that the Emperor was extremely interested in the fate of the Reform Plan and of Consalv1 himself,

ot whose possible diamissa.l he had heard alarming

rUi;10Ul~.

The

Plan was eagerly awaited not only at Vienna but throughout Europe,
beoause of' Uthe news. perhaps exaggerated, If of discontent in the
papal Sta.te t and because the Holy Father'S Ediet of III July 1815
had given rise to general hopes that he

wou~d

tollow a moderate

and progressive polley as the only means of quieting this dis-

content.

Vienna realized that an eaaleslastical state could not

be governed 1n exactly the sa..'TI.E' way as others, but the enl1ghtened
principles now beIng adopted by the other

J'llel~-J~{H'B

of the "GNat

Family" of nations must be imitated to the greatest extent
pract1eal. for a reactlonar,r poliey could only lead to "the most
fatal consequences."

It was known at Vienna

t~at

Pius VII and

Consalv1 supported reforrna I but unfortunatel,. they were opposed

--.--98

Van Duerm, 160, Mettemleh to Conaalvl, 2 Septe l 71ber 1816.
Anton Count Apponyl, AustrIan ambassador in Rome, M,y 1816 to
March 1817, and 1820-1826; at first on very good terms with
Consalvi, he beoame very or1tieal ot the Card1nal and ot Plus VII
atter 1820. See Hudel, 42-47, 61-73.

by

many at Rome who were ut'terly ignorant of the realities

of the 7l1odern wOY'ld "bey-ond the Aurel:tan Walls."
were notorious and universally condemned.

5Jt

Their intrigues

'tNo one can unC.erstand

why the Pope tolerates them, or why He does not make energetic
use of His authott:tty to end them at one stroke. If

Only !lH18

goodness and evangelical sweetness" could explain h1s strange
reluctance to suppress their opposition and their intri.gues. 99
Having expressed Austria's interest in reform and its
OPPOSition to the

~~~ant~,

Lebzeltern went on to the chief point

of his letter: Austrian BUppO:rt for Consalvi and opposit1on to
hiS dismissal:

If." I were to assure Y.E. rYour Eminence] that the
Emperor axpretsses personally thIS "noat sincere esteem
and confidence for you and that Prinoe Metternich
professes towards you sentiments of genuine affection,
I would not be saying enough to Y.E. The fact 1s that
you have inspired high confidenoe and sincere respeot
in all cabinets • • • • They, like ourselves, would
regard your dism1ssal as a veritable calam1ty, as an
event that could lead to the most disastrous consequences for the Holy See. If only oertaln peraona
of my acquaintance, very hIghly placed too, who would
lik-e to take the Holy See back to the t'ourteenth
century. • • . would take the trouble to become acqua.inted With the CatholiC world beyondi;;he Oll"cuit
of the Aurelian Wall, they would tremble at the
possible consequences (·f their systemo
Lebzeltern conoluded by apologizIng for hIs frankness, which he
99
Worth noting ia the remarkable way in which CaBsi, 181,
allows his anti-Austrian bias to distort the meaning of this
passage. By careful selection and omiSSion, he ~i1li.kes it appear
as if Lebzeltern was oriticizing the Pope for his excessive
toleranoe towards the Liberals (who are in fact 'battelymentioned
in this letter) inateaa of.' £he Zela.ntl. Schmidlin, 201, Note 31,
unfortunately follows Cassl on £&18 point, as he also does on
some others.

said was motivated only by regard for the welfare of Consalvi
and the pope. lOO
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The purpose of this letter was apparently to encourage
Consalvi and to a.ssure him of Austrian support for reform, as a
weanon to strengthen him in his struggle against the Zelanti •
.a..

_

_.~

There is no evidence that Pius VII at any time considered dismissing his Secretary of State, though if the Plan had been rejected he might have reSigned.

However, this new pledge of

Austrian support may have aided Consalvi to aooelerate the
publication of the Plan, which appeared soon afterwards as the
Motu-pr0J>J:'l.i.'>. of 6 July 1816. 101
Only the most important points of this lengthy and detailed
plan need be recounted here. 102

The administration was thoroughl

reorganized along Napoleonic lines of oentralization and uniformity.

In accord with enlightened contemporary opinion, separation

of administrative from judicial powers was effected.

In response

to general demand, laymen were to be admitted to most secular
A limited concession was made to liberal demands for

offices.

popular representation by providing that each delegate, legate,

106--'-"
A.V., R260, Lebzeltern to Consalvi, 1 July 1816.
101
Barber! (ed.), Bullaril Romani Continuatio (Rome, 18351855), XIV, 47 -196, Motu:~rojirro --or--oJitly 1816 ~r.t'hrough dated
6 July, it was not aCtual y puolished until 18 July: Anonymous,
"II governo provvisorio degli State Pontifici nell 'anno 1815
e 10 statuto del 1816,", 409, in ~ivi1ta Cattolica, 1915, II,
404-420.
--.------102

For a more detailed analysis of the Motu-P£oprio, see
67-80, or Schmidlin, 184-189:------

Petrocch!_.~241_,

"I

and governor

W88
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to be assisted by a council ot two to four men

trom his provinceJ their functions were pure17 consultative, but
they must be summoned three times a week to give their opinion
on important matters.

The intricate network ot privileges ot the

Old Regime was swept away, except for a tew baronial privileges
in the Prima Ricupera.
The complicated, inefficient, and disorganized Judicial
system was to be much simplified and reduced to coherent order,
under the influence of the Cod! Napoleon.

New civil, criminal,

and commercial tribunals were to be provided; the old ecclesiastical tribunals survived, but their Jurisdiction was strictly
limited to ecclesiastical affairs.
ment or imprisonment were forbidden.

Torture and arbitrar.r punishCommis.ions were to be

named to draw up new civil, criminal, and commercial codes) in
the interim, the present system would remain in effect.
The financial sytltem was reorganized

OD

simp1er:- and more

efficient lines, so that it would be possible to reduce taxation
by a million scudi a year.

Taxes, customs duties, and government

monopolies were made uniform in all provinces, and an effort was
made to redistribute the tax burden on a more equitable basiS.
These reforms were, as the Preamble to the

~t:!!-proprio

made clear, onl1' a basis on which further reforms must be constructed.

Consalvi was aware how limited they were and would

have preferred more extensive innovations, especially in regard
to abolishing all noble privileges and replacing eccleSiastics

by

laymen in the government;103 but in view of the oPPosition
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which even these limited measures aroused, there can be little
doubt that Consalvi had indeed, as he claimed, accompllshed all
that was posslb1e under the cIrcumstances .104
MOdest though they were, the reforms stlrred the Zelanti to
rury and allied with, them the nobilIty who resented the loss of
their privileges. 105 The Plan was denounoed as "Jacobinism"
and "Napoleonic," the latter with a certain amount of justice. 106
The

~elat:!ti,

led by Consalvi's bItter enemsr, Annibale Cardinal

Della Genga, worked day' and night to influence Pius VII to dismiss his Secretar,r

~r

State,

L~d

a few fanatical reactionaries

10"3
A.V., R247, Consalvi to Severoli, 14 September 1816.
R242, Consa1vi to Pacca, 20 March 1815, 12 June 1815.
104
Van Duerm, 151-160, Consalvi to Mattemich, 23 August
1816.
105
See especially A.V., R247, Severoli to Consalvi, 10
August, 17 August, 6 November 1816, 4 January, 12 February 1817.
25, Giuatiniani to Consalvl, 17 August 1816. Severoll was
typical of many- former admirers (e.g., At'V 233, Severo1i to
Pacca, 17 J~ne 1815) of Consalvi who now turned against him.
106
Ibid., Severo1i to Consa1vi, 6 November 1816, Consalvi
o SeverOl)L;- 14 December 1816. R257, Conaalvi to Valenti, 10
ebruary 1817. The strong inf1uenoe of Napoleonic precedents
n Consalvl's reforms is undeniable( though Artaud de Montour,
toria di Papa Pio VII (Lucca, 1837" III, 182, exaggerates
n- s8¥lng t1ii:t' 'n-except tor the changed nomenclature", the new
rganization was "nothIng other than the French system".

were even sald to be p10ttlng agalnst the Pope hlmse1f. 107
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Consalvl remained undaunted by the furious critioism and abuse
of the Ze1anti--for Whom he had only contempt-... "dolts," "asses,"
"fools," (to quote a few of his more charitable descrlptions)
who could not Bee that the old regime had gone forever and
thought they could turn the clock back to 1789!108
Conaa1vi was consoled for Ze1antl condemnation by the
generally favorable reaction to his Plan of moderate liberals
and intelligent conservatives both at home and abroa.d. 109 In
particular, Metternieh was pleased that the reforms he had long
advocated had at last been enacted.

as reformed and reorganized by the

Though the Papal government
Motu-proEri~

was still not

entirely satisfactory, it was a great improvement over the past,
It it is still far from being entirely in conformity
with the circumstances and spirit of the times, it
nonetheless approaches them sufficiently to be in
harmony with that government which we have introduced
in our provinces and to paralyze the efforts ot those

1157

.--

C&8s1, 157-159. Annibale Cardinal della Genga (1760-1829)
was sent in May, 1814, to represent the Papaoy at the conferenoe
drawing up the Peace of PariS. Through his own procrastination,
he arrived too late to defend Papal interests, thus earning a
harsh rebuke from Consa1viJ the two prelates were thenceforth
on hostile terms, and when Della Genga was elected as Pope Leo
XII (1823-1829), he undid much of Consalvi's work of reform.
108
A.V., R247, Conealvi to Severoli, 14 September, 14
December 1816, 20 January 1817.

109

Ibid., Consalvi to Severo1i, 14 December 1816, R254
Papal Internunzio in Lucerne to Conaalvl, 3 August 1816, R257,
Valenti, oharge d'affaires in Turin, to Consalvi, 7 August, 28
SeptemberJ.1JI'6;" '2rjanuari 1817.

who have not moved with the age and who cherish the
vain and dangerous hope of seeing re-establ1shed an
order of things which twenty years or war and revolution ha.ve ''lorally and phyaica1lJr destroyed. It .+lould
be superfluous to l1nger over the inconveniences that
would necessar1ly result from so impolitic a system;
it 1s undoubtedly- to be f"eare d by us, but hO!l~Ch
more dangerous for the Roman government. • !
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Though he recognized that there were definite l1mits to what
the Secretary of State could accomplish under the circumstances
and was pleased that he had managed to do as much as he had,
Metternich cont1nued to urge Consalvi to carry out further reforms, especially greater laioization of the govermnent.

The

Cardinal, he urged, must continue onward 1n hi= course and not
allow fear of opposition to divert him from What

was

necessary.11

Conaalvi needed no encouragement to continue his work of
reform, whibh ocoupied him tor the rest of his ministry. Numerous
economic reforms were enacted with a view to

sti~u1ating

the

economy, but they had little effect beca.use of the prolonged
post-war depression.

The police and army were reorganized and

their efficiency increased, so that some progress was made
against the endemio soourge of brigandage. 112
-'-~ln---

111

Maass, IV, 584,

Inst~ctions

tor Kaunitz, 31 May 1811.

A.V., R241, Severoli to Consalvi, 13 November 1816:
Leard! to Conaalvi, 30 June 1821.
112
Consalv1 '8 retoz-ms are summarized conveniently in
Petrocchi 1943, Chapter I. Anonymous, "La industrie, il oommerol0,
Ie impost·e-sotto 1 Pontifici Pio VI e Pio VII, sino a1 1815, tt
Civi1ta Cattolioa, 1906, IV, 434-449_ Cassl, 65-71, 161-79.
A~V:-;-tf21r7-;'""Sivi'roli to Consa1vi, 13 November 1816J Leardl to
Consalvi, 30 June 1821, ANV 250, Consalvi to Leardi, 8 July
1823.

In the more important areas of

refo~,
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however, he was able

to make little headway against the constant Zelanti opposition.

A code of civil procedure was enacted in 1817 and a code of
commercial law in 1821,113 but the codes of civil and criminal
law promised in the Motu-pr?prio were never published.

They were

drawn up and submitted for considerat1on to congregations appointed for the purpose,114 but apparently the opposition to
them was too strong, as they never appeared.

Nor did he succeed

in introducing further political reforms} indeed, because of the
ceaseless opposition which it enoountered at all levels of the
Papal government, many parts of the
remained a dead letter. 115
----~T3---

Mo~u-proprio

of 1816 itself

-- --, .

Barberi, XIV, 444,

Motu-trO~io

ot 22 November 1811.

A.V., R241, Consalvi to Learar;- 2eember 1817, 9 June 1821;

Leardi to Consalvi, 30 June 1821.
114
A.V., R242, Instructions for Spina, 1822. R247, Consalvi
to Leardi, 9 June 1821.
115
A.V., R241, Extract trom the Morning Chronicle, 27
April 1819; Leardi to Consalvi, 30 June 1821. R25, Consalvi
to the Delegate of Fermo, 5 July 1817, provides an interesting
example of opposition on the loeal level: this Delegate had
publicly proclaimed that he had never read the Motu-prorrio,
did not plan to do so, and hoped to die before PUttIng ts
provisions into etrect. R242, Instructions tor Spina, 1822.
Maass, IV, 584 .. Instructions for Kaun1tz, 31 1'I.ay 1817. Van
Due rm , 253, Note 1, Genotte to Metternich, 2 August 1820.
Sauvig!V', 118, Instruct10ns tor Appony1, 1820. However, part
ot the d1fficulty of putting the reforms into etfect was the
result not or the ill-will of his subordinates, but ot their
sheer incompetence: see Petrocchi 194~, Chapter III.
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The opposition of the

~~1~~~~

to Consalvi and his policies

oontinued to the end of his ministry, nor did it slacken in
intenslty.116 His measures were constantly opposed and critioized, and he was tldaily thwarted" in the routine operat1on of
his government by ~elanti office-holders. 117 They ga1ned inoreasing influence over the ag1ng Pius VII, especially 1n
re11gious affa1rs where they represented Consalvi as being luke-

warm in his devotion to re11gious Interests--he was even accused
of seeking to separate the spiritual from the temporal power and
to give the Papal States to Austria at Pius' death. 118
Every occasion was seized upon

by

the

~~_~!lti

to attack him,

often with little regard for consistency, as when (after having
condemned Con.elvi for years as too pro-AustrIan) they criticized
the Secretary' of State for not tak1ng a stronger stand 1n support
of Austrian actlon against the Neapolitan Revolutlon. ll9
116
Ibid., Alao, Van Duerm,
September"T820. Their plotting
Pius VII was on hla death-bed.
to Cardinal Opizzonl, 13 August
111

Through

281 Apponyi to Metternlch, 20

continued to the very end, while
Petroeehi 1943, 106, Conealv!
1823-:---'--

Sauv1gny, 168, Instruct10ns for Apponyi, 1820.
118
A.V., R247, Extract from Morn1ng Chronicle, 27 April 1819.
Also, Maass, V, 173, Genotte to Milternlch, 5 ~ebruar,y 1820. Van
Duerm, 253, Genotte to Metternich, 2 A~~at 1820.
119
Van Duerm, 206 J Conas.lvi to f~etternich, 1 Oatober 1818;
281J Apponyi to Metternioh, 20 September 1820. Apponyi however
realized that the1r sudden support was not due to any change of
views, but merely to an incorr1gible spirit of opPOSition to any
policy of Consalvi t s.

out his second ministry he was under a constant pressure that
would hs:ve broken a less resilient and deter-nined spirit.
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As it

was, his energy and health were sapped by the long struggle. 120
Perhaps the constant strain and fatigue, both mental and physioal,
whioh he had to endure were a factor in his comparatively early
death. 121 Certainly, much tirr:e and energy that he might otherwise
have devoted to internal

refor:~

and diploillacy, probably with

significant results, had instead to be expended on the ceaseless,
f'ut1tle struggle with the
achievements and
any evaluation

abillty~t

or.

Any evaluation of Consalvi's

~elant!.

take this factor into account, and

his Austrian policy must likewise take in

account his Wish for Austrian support in this struggle.
If the surrounding circumstances are ignored, the reforms
which Oonsalvi carried out may not seem impressive.
when consIdered against the background of oonstant

It 1s only
Zalant~

opposItion that they can be seen as the oonsiderable aohievement
they in fact were.

The important and impressive points about

Consalvi. '13 reforms are, that they were made in the Papal States,
and that they were made at all.
li~lted

Consalvi himself was aware how

they were and would have wished to go fuz'ther, but in

view of the strength of the

Z~~an!!

it would seem that he was

justIfied in hIS claim that he had done all that was possible in
120

Ibid., 281, Apponyi to Metterniah, 20 September 1820.

l~l--'

As early as 1816, Severoli, then an admirer of the
Cardinal, had 't'farned hi" that he was putting Ittroppo dtattivita
ed Intena ione \I into his efforts to secure reform and would ruin
haiS health by over-wol'k. R247, Severoli to Consalvi, 13 April
1 16.

the circumstances.
r~oreover,

even these limited reform.8 1I1Sre of SOT'lle value in

themselves: they dld give the Papal State a

~nore

efficient a.nd

satisfactory governc1ent, one tha.t satisfied at lea.st the minimum
demands of the politically educated classes.
The value of his reforms was proven by subsequent events:

in 1820-1821, the Papal State, which in 1814-1816 had been the
,noS t

turbult1nt and dis contented area in Italy and 1t1Ould again

become suoh after Consalv1 1 8 fall,

re~ained

remarkably qu1et,

despite the tenlptatlon or an a\!t:lve and temporar1ly successful
revolution at its very door in Naples.

Thi$. remarkable change

in public spirit must be largely attributed to Consalvi'8 reforms
and the comparatively good government which the Papal States
en.loyed under his rule.

It 1s s ign1flea.nt tha.t a.fter the

SllS-

pension of CorlSa1vl fa l,easures by the successors of' Pd.us VII,
the Papal territories once again becs'rne a hotbed of revolutionary

activity and played a prominent role in the revolutions of 18301832.

The contrast between the condition of the Papal States in

1314 -1816 and 1830··11132 on the one hand, :mel 1820-1821 on the

other, 13 the

mOf!lt

lmpre3sive testimony to Consalvi l 3 achievement.

4. Co-operation against the SettarJ
Few factors encourage alliance so much
a mutual enemy.

88

the possession of

Consal vi and Metternich had the dubious fortune

to possess two such foes: the Zelanti, already described, and the
settarJ, the members of the "Sects" or revolutionary secret
societies .122 Baaed perhaps on Masonry,123 inspired certainly
-----

-.-~ ~f2'"·-'-·'-

The chief source of information on the Settarj of the
papal State is A.V., R165, which contains ConsalVi's alrections
for dealing with them, reports of papal officials on their
activities, strength, and aims, and much similar material. Of
special interest are the reports of the Legates of Ravenna,
Forli, and in part1cular Bologna, whoae Legate, Card1nal Spina,
was perhaps the most loyal and capable of Consalv1 'a subordinates J
see, !L.&.., his perceptive account of the a trength and a1ms of the
various Sects and the dangers eaoh presented to Papal rule,
R165, Sp1na to Consalv1, 12 August 1820, Both Sp1na and Consalvi
believed that the oh1ef danger came in the long run not trom
the Violently revolutionary CarbQnari, but trom the nationalist
liberals who were working slowly-out surely towards their goal
of Italian unity---a judgment whose validlty later events were
to confirm. A vast llterature haa appeared on the secret
societles, most of It more notable tor liberal and nationalist
enthusiasm and rhetoric than tor objectivity and the crltical
sense. Among the more useful works are: A. Ottolinl, La
Carbonaria dalle origlni ai trlil tent.tiyi Insurrezionall
o ena, 9'3"6TJA". Pieranton,
Carbonari dello Stato Pontlficio
Rome, 19l0),"D. Spadoni, Sette; cosplraziohl, cospfratorl nello
Stato Pontiticio (Turin, 1904).- -""--12:3
The masoniC origlns ot the Settarj are asserted in
Anonymous, Il settarismo," CiYilta ~attoll~a, 1915, II, 41-56,
and denied by A. Luzio, La MaisonerIa e 11 Rlsorfimento Italiano
(Bologna, 1925). The present wrIterDeIleveii' tha the' ~etEari
imitated the organization of the Masons and may well haye or glnated in their lodges, but split aw~ during the Napoleonic regime
the Masons supporting the latter, the Settart opposing it.
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by

the ideals of the French Revolution, these societies first

appeared during the Napoleonic domination as resistance movements
directed agains t French rule.

The fall of Napoleon did not bring

their activities to an end, but merely redireoted them against
Austria and the restored Italian governments.

--_

The alms and

ideals of the Settarj.... varied widely among the various groups
_,.

making up the movement, but oertain aims were generally held; the
expulsion of all foreign rule and influence (especially that of
Austria), some form of Italian unity, a written constitution and
a parliament, reduction of the influenoe and wealth of the Church,
and an end to special privilege.

They drew their main support

from the ex-otficials and soldiers of the Napoleonic regime, some
of the bourgeoisie, and a tew nobles, with little backing among
the other cl88ses. 124
These aims inevitably drew the Septari into conflict with
the existing Italian governments, there was conspiracy and
agitation on the one hand, repression on the other.

Austria was

the natural leader in the effort to repress the sects.
the

S~~tar~

Against

within her own territories Austria could and did take

effective measures, but Vienna was equally concerned with revolutionary activity in the rest of Italy.

The

~ettarJ

in the various

states seem to have co-operated to some extent, and were certain1
---J:2lr--A.V., 165, Report of V. Galissi, Forli, 17 April 1819.
For a diSCUSSion of the attitude of the various classes in the
Papal State towards the Pontifioal regime, see Petrocchi 1943,

36-39.

Iii,

in close touch;125 hence, a successful revolution in

any

other

66

Italian state would inevitably have serious repercussions in
Lombardy-Venetia as well.

Particularly worrisome to Austria was

the situation in the northern Papal States, in 1814-1816 the
most turbulent area in Italy; the waters of the Po would present
no barrier to the spread of the revolutionary movement north into
Lombardy.126 Suitable reforms could, by ending the sources of
disoontent, eliminate the basia for popular support of the movement.

Until such reforms eould have their effect, however, and

even thereafter in so far as a few fanatics were concerned,
efficient supervision and repreSSion would continue to be
necessary.
Aware that a peninsula-wide movement could best be fought
by peninsula-wide measures, and with little faith in the ability
of the Italian governments to suppress the revolutionary movement,
Metternich would have liked to acquire for Austria the direction
of all police activity against the ?ettarj throughout Italy.

At

the Congress of Vienna he had accordingly suggested to Consalvi
the establishment of a General Commission of Police under
Austrian direction. 127 All information gathered by the various
125

Petroochi 1943,
._ ..__..... 64-66.

12o---.-~-·-·-

A. V., ANV 233, Severoli to Consalvi, 10 October 1815.
127
A.V., R242, Consalvi to Pacca, 8 September 1814, 1
February, 11 February 1815; Pacca to Consalv!, 13 November, 1814.
This project was later revived by Metternich at the Congress of
Verona in 1822; see below, Chapter V.
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Italian states would be sent to this Commission for evaluation
and correlation, and used as a basis for introducing greater
co-ordination of the police activity of the various Italian
states; the aim was a general and systematic attack on the
gettarj throughout Italy. Consalvi was as eager as Metternich
to suppress the

Sett~~~

and was willing to use all reasonable

means to do so. However, he rejected the Commission, for its
establishment would mean, in effect, giving Austria control over
all police activity in the Peninsula, thus vastly increasing
Austrian influence and weakening the independence of the lesser
states~

In short, it would be a major step towards that Austrian

hegemony in Italy that the Cardinal so dreaded~128 In the face
of Consalvi1s oppOSition Metternich abandoned the Commission,
but only until the revolutionary crisis of 1820-1822 seemed
to present a more favorable

opportunity~

Consalvi was by no means opposed to all co-operation with
Austria against the

Set~arj.

He fully realized that they posed

a serious threat to the very existence of the Papal government.
Acutely aware of the strength of the Sects in the Papal State,
acutely aware too of the weakness of the Papal goverrrnent in the
event of a widespread revolt, he saw that some degree of cooperation with Austria was necessary. He was quite willing to
l28Ibid ., Observations on the Project of a Police Commission,-r822; Instructions for Spina, October 1822; Consalvi
to Macchi, 2 December 1822. For a more detailed description
of Consalvi1s motives for opposing the Commission, see below,
Chapter V, Sections 1 and 2~
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agree to eo-operation on a more limited scale than the Commission,
that would not threaten Papal independence, such as a reciprocal
exchange of information and a voluntary co-ordination of Austrian
and Papal police activities.

Co-operation of this type, he

believed, would have all the desirable effects of the Commission
without its dangers. 129 This attitude was the natural outgrowth
of his general policy of: ao-operating with Austria in every way

that did not affect the

te~poral

or spiritual independence of the

Papacy.
Although there had previously been

so~e

limited exchange

o.f information between Austria and the Papacy, it was not until
1815 that suoh exchange beoame standard prooedure.

It is un-

certain who took the initiative, but the credit probably goes to
Metternieh, who wrote to Consalv! on this subject in April, 1816.
After stressing as usual the identity of Austrian and papal
interests and the need for unity between them, he went on to
praise the reorganization and reform of the Papal police which
Consalvi was then carrying out as 'Tlost essential in view of the
forces working to overthrow both Austria and the Papacy.

Since

Austrian and Papal interests "cannot be divergent" on this point,
Metternich declared that he was counting upon a mutual exchange
of confidential information on this subject. 1 30

----_
-_._129
...

R242, Observations on the Project of a Police Commiss10n,
1822; Instructions for Sp1na, l822} Conaa1vi to Sp1na, 4
December 1822.
130

Consalvl was willing to agree to such an exchange, which
would be mutually profitable, and in April, 1816, he sent
Lebzeltern the most recent material uncovered by the Papal
police: an intercepted letter from Forli and an account of the
latest Settarj plans there. However, still held back by distrust
of Austria, he did not provide the Austrian ambassador with full
details of these activities, in particular the nrones of those
involved. Lebzeltern did not delay expressing his dissatisfaction~

\fhile thanking Consalvi for the information provided,

he expressed great regret that the Cardinal, by witholding the
most important part of the material without which the rest was
of little value, had failed to show complete confidence in
Austria: "What could be the cause of this reticence? I cannot
admit the least divergence of views or interests on a point of
this

nature~

In watching over police suspects we are working as

much for you as tor ourselves. i.l/e have more ways than you to
become acquainted with these things: • •• " If fully informed
by Consalvi, the Austrian government could follow up these
leads and with its greater resources obtain a much more thorough
knowledge of the subversive activities, which would benefit the
Papal government as well as the Austrian. Lebzeltern concluded
by again expressing his sorrow at Consalvifs unjustified distrust and his hope that in the future the Cardinal would see fit
to transmit complete lnformation. 13l
131 A.V., R200,
~
~
Lebzeltern to Consalvi, 4 !l1ay 1810.
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Evidently, Consalvi was impressed by Lebzeltern's complaint

and was careful henceforth to transmit full information; at
leut, no more complaints were heard on this

SOON.

In June he

wrote Metternich that he had been giving Lebzeltern much useful
information on the activities of the "ill-intentioned."

He

described with alarm the activities and aims of the Settarl.

In

view of their rapid growth and the fact that they were clearly
working on a peninsula-wide basiS to overthrow all existing
govel"nments, it was necessary, he agreed, that Austria and the
Papacy unite to thwart their plota. 132 Soon afterwards Conealvi,
perhaps to Impress

~etternich

with hiB desire for co-operation,

made a point of sending direct to him the most recent information
on

aotivity in Bologna, although it had already been
transmitted to the Austrian pollce by the Bologna pollce. l33
~ttarj

These measures.1 indlcating Conaalvl 's genuine deslre to
co-operate, did not fall to win Austrian approbation.

At the

beginning of July Lebzeltern conveyed to Conealvi the gratitude
of Metternioh (who could not write because ot an eye ailment)
for the confidence he had
tion.

displ~ed

in transmitting this informa-

Austria on its part would respond with equal confidence

in this and all else, and would do everything possible to aid
thl! Pope to naintain the tranquility ot his territories.

Austria

was eager to see peace and order reign in the Papal State, not

IJ2'
Van Duerm, 136, Consalvi to

133

~.,

r~tternich,

11 June 1816.

143, Consalv1 to Metternich, 22 June 1816.

only because of the filial devotion of Francis I for the Pope,
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but also in its own interest, for the Austrian territories 1n
Italy could only be tranquil if the nelghboring states were also
tranquil. 13h
A

rew days later tJfetternich (having recovered from his

illness) wrote that he attaohed an "infinite value" to the
confidential

Infol~na.tlon

which Consa1 vi had been sending himJ it

would be promptly followed up by the Imperial government.

In

l"'etui:'n, orders ha.d been given to the Austrian authorities in
Italy to pay particular attention to everything that could be of
interest to the Papal government and to keep the latter informed
of all such discovEU'·ies.

"iettel~ich

expressed great satisfaction

of Consalvits display of confidence, not only because of its
immediate advantages,

hut

because it was a marior step towards the

establishment of that perfeot accord between Austria and the
Papaoy whieh he so

desil~d.

He conoluded by assuring Consalvi

that the Papacy cou.ld count on Austrian aid and co-operation

whenever neces3ary: "We are convinced that if our own tranquility
18 to be assured, that of our neighbors must be equally so.n 1 35
Metternich drove home the same point a week later in

8

letter to Apponyi which the latter was to read to Consa1vi: the

134

AV,R200, Lebzeltern to Consalvi, 1 July 1816.

135

Ibi~.,

Metternich to Consalvi, 3 July 1816.

72

Austrlan pollce would keep hlm lnformed of all dlscoverles

concernlng the SettarJ, ln gratltude for Consalv1'e co-operation
and in recognition that tranqul1lty in the Papal State was
e!sentlal for the peace of Lombaray-venet1a. 136
In a.ddition to
Papal goV'erU{1H:!nt,
p:)licy
towards the
,
of AustrIa.

~eeurlng

r~ttern1ch

an exchange of information \(lth' the

also tried at tir:tes to influence its

SettarJ
_ . ..........-·_hT to bring .:tt into closer line w1th that

He has been accused of seeking to for08 Consalvl to

adapt harsher l~easures towards the Sects,137 but this accusation,
thour.'~

not entlrely without foundation, peI-tains largely to the

period after 1820.

Before the NeapolItan Revolution of that year,

he considered the Italian revo1utionar'1ea less dangerous than
the

Ge~nan,

and hence less harsh

~easure6

were necessary aga1nst

them. 138 The pollcy wh1ch he ll.dvised Conea1v1 to follow towards
Sect~

before 1820 was essentially one of watchful waiting: the

Cardinal should maintain a close :supervision over them with "the
ai:r. of. • • c-oning to a perfect knowledge"

plans, and peraonnel.

their organizatlGn,

This knowledge should be

the Austrian govarn'TIent,
Clyne to act

'Jf

\-fhi~h

co~nunicated

to

would decide when the time had

against the "10Ve'1l3nt as a. whole.

Until that

t1ne~

---'--136-- ..._Ibid., Appony:t to Consalvi, 8 August 1816, with extract
from diapa:c'ch of Metternlch to 'pponyi, 8 July 1816.

137

E.G., by Cassl, 188.,
138
w. Maturi, "La polltica eetera napolltana dal. 1815 al
1820, n Htvleta Stories. Italiana, 1939, 260, Ludo1l' to C1rcel10,
August;ltrrj-;- MetterrifaK;-nr,u 255 , 7 May 1819.
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there must be no "prematurely rigorous action" which would only
drive the Settarj into greater secrecy.139
Thus, Metternich did not condemn Consalvi IS treatment of
the

Sett~rj

as too lenient or urge a more severe policy against

them. On the contrary, when informed that the Secretary of State
was planning to exile all suspected 5ettarj from Rome, he
strongly advised against the plan as too rigorous. 140
Nor would Consalvi have needed pressure from Metternich to
act with severity against the Settarj. Although his best hope
for creating stability and order in the Papal State lay in his
reforms, he knew they would not win over the more fanatical
revolutionaries: "the way of thinking of these Settarj will not
be changed by means of leniency, indulgence, and pardon; only the
fear of punishment can affect them.,,141 He therefore consistently
directed his subordinates to take firm action against them. 142
However, there was to be no persecution or injustice, no
139A•V., R260, Extract from Metternichls dispatch to
Apponyi, 8 July 1816, in Apponyi to Consalvi, 8 August 1816.
140Ibid • Metternich had been misinformed on this pOint. In
fact, Consalvi had planned to expel from Rome only three or four
of the most prominent foreign agitators. There was no intention
of a general expulsion. Van Duerm, 151-160, Consalvi to Metternich, 23 August 18160
141A•V., R165, Consalvi to the Legate of Forli, 13 March
1821.
142
Ibid., Consalvi to the Legate of Bologna, 3 July 1816; to
the Delegate of Perugia, 31 July 1820; to the Legate of Forli,
16 July 1820, 8 July 1821; to the Legate of Ferrara, 5 July 1820;
and numerous other dispatches to these and other subordinates
throughout R165.
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"witch-hunt". Action was to be taken only against those who were
actually plotting against the government, not those who merely
held liberal ideas, nor was anyone to be prosecuted upon mere
suspiCion, but only after "prova incontestabile ft of his guilt had
been furnished. 143 Consalvi did not hesitate to administer
crushing rebukes to subordinates whose zeal led them beyond the
boundaries of strict legalit7 and moderation. 144
Metternich seems to have been satisfied with Consalvi's
treatment of the

Se..~tart

in 1815-1819.

It was only after the

1820 revolutions had greatly increased his fears of the Italian
revolutionaries that he began to complain of Papal laxity and
inefticiency in pursuing the

~ettarj

and to use diplomatio

pressure to persuade Consalvi to take stronger measures against
them. 145 Even then, Metternieh did not criticize Consalvi hlmselt, whose sound pollcies he continued to praise, but the
laxlty and incompetence ot his subordlnates. 146
Close co-operation with Austria in the form of reciprocal
143

Ibid./, eonsalvi to Legate of For1i, 15 July 1820, 13
March 1821r·to Delegate of Perugia, 31 July 1820; to Legate
ot Bologna, 28 June 1820; to Governor of Rome, 17 July 1820.
144
B.g., !bid., Consalvi to the Legate o~ "errara, 5 July
1821; Consalv1 to the Legate of For1l, 13 March 1821., S. Gualtero,;
Gli ultiml rtvo1£imenti italiani (5 vo1s.; Florence 1852), I,
280-281.
. 145
A. V., R247, Leardi to Consalvi, 10 March, 30 June, 10
July 1821.
146
~., Leardi to Consa1vi, 10 March 1821.

II
II

exchange of information continued for the rest of Consalvils
ministry until at least 1822. 147 Routine information was ex-
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changed between the Papal and the Austrlan police, while more
important items were sent to the Austrian ambassador in Rome, to
the Governor of Lo~bardy-Venetla, or direct to Metternich. 148
APparently, Consalvi tried sincerely to co-operate with Austria
on this polnt, as he claimed;149 there is no evidence that he
attempted to hold back information.

He was even willing to

oblige Metternich by having the Papal police conduct special
investigations of particular persons or groups whose activities
had aroused Austrian suspic10ns .15 0
Consalvi's efficient and reliable co-operation against the
?_~t~~~J.

regime.

greatly increased Austrian confidence 1n him and h1s
Atter observing Consalvi's cooperat1on in th1s way for

nearly a year, Apponyi felt justified in pra1sing h1ghly his
"activ1ty and so11citude, It and 1n report1ng to Metternich that

------141---<-<--<A.V., R242. Consalvi to Bernetti, September 1822;
Bernettl to Consalvi. 14 September 1822; Consa1vi to Splna, 16
November 1822.
148
Van Duerm. 151-160, Consalvi to Metternlch. 23 August
1816. R260, Apponyl to Consalvi, 26 February 1817; Genotte to
Consalvi, 23 April 1817. R242, Bernett1 to Consalvi, 14 September
1822. R165. Consalvi to Legate of Bologna, 13 June 1822.
149
Van Duerm, 151-160. A.V., Consa1vl to Spina, 16 November
1822.
150
A.V., R260. Apponyi to Consa1vi. 26 February 1817, 22
October 1820; Genotte to Governor of Rome, 18 August 1817. R165,
Consa1vl to Legate of Ferrara, 25 October 1820.

"I think I can be sure that everything discovered about the
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seoret societies will be communioated to us with loyalty and
frankness, and on this point we on our aide cannot use too much
confidence ViS-~-V~s, the Court of Rome, and must unite all our
efforts to arrive at our common end, the tranquility and solid
happiness of Ita1y.n l S1
This steady flow of reliable information was of considerable
value to Austria, and Metternich's desire to prevent any interruption of it was no doubt an important factor influencing him
to remain on good terms with Consalvi even after serious
religious and political disputes had begun to appear.

Equally

important, Consalvl l s obvious efficiency and good faith in
co-operating against the revolutionaries could not but increase
Metternich 'a already high regard for the Cardinal and his
confidence in him.
§.e_~.~~~J_

Austro-Papal co-operation against the

was, and long remained, even during the troubled period

after 1817, a major force making for good Austro-Papal relations.

151 . -_._-Van Duerm, 175, Apponyi to Metternich, 18 March 1817.

5. The Project of an Imperial Visit to Rome
While the foundations of an informal Austro-Papal alliance
were being laid by
Z~J:.an~_~,

co~,operation

against the

~_~rj_

and the

plans were already under way for a muoh-anticipated

event that was to set the seal upon Austro-Papal unity: the
visit of Francis I and Metternich to Rome as guests of Pius VII.
The Emperor had first expressed his destre to visit the

Pope soon after the conclusion of peaee in 1814.

At- the Congress

of Vienna he had told Conea1v! that he hoped to visit Rome in

1815, but the unexpeoted prolongation of the Congress made this
impossible.

After aOme semblanoe of normal conditions had

returned in the summer of 1815, Franois I once again began to
speak with inoreasing frequency of his wish to visit the Pope,
and at the beginning of October Severol! was assured that the
visit would definitely take place. 152
This news delighted Severoli, as it did Consalvi and Pius
VII, for it promised great benefits.

The meeting of the two

sovereigns and their oonsequent personal acquaintance would in

I

I

itself be of great value in promoting mutual understanding and
respect.

At the same time, the visit would allow the two rulers

------T52 .-- ..
A.V., R242, Consalvl to Pacea, 17 September 1814.
ANY 233, Severoli to Paeea, 20 July 1814; Severoli to Conealv1,
9 August, 12 August, 19 August, 16 September, 7 October 1815.
77
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to discuss Austro-Papal problems in person. Consalvi knew that
there was a powerful faction at the Austrian court hostile to
the Papacy, which was seeking with considerable sucoess to
influenoe the Emperor against the Papaoy and to stir up strife
with the latter by distorting its policies and

aotions~

If the

influence of this faction could be removed, if Francis I eould
come to Rome and discuss matters with Pius VII in personal
conversation rather than through hostile intermediaries, it
seemed reasonable to hope that he would see the essential justice
of the Papal position and would therefore adopt a more favorable
attitude towards it. Finally, the visit would serve to demonstrate to all the world the harmony and good will that reigned
between Pope and Emperor, thus discouraging the "visions of
many ill-intentioned minds," that is, the Settarj who hoped for
disunion among their enemies. 153
The Josephist party in Vienna was equally aware of these
advantages, however, and exerted all its influenoe to prevent
the

visit~

In consequence, by December "all Vienna is full of

rumours that Their Majesties will not go beyond Florence~ ,,154
A few days later Severoli reported that "the trip to Rome is
still uncertain~ ~ ~ ," for the Josephist ministers were making
a "supreme effort • • •
1 5 3 ,
A. V., ANV 233, Severoli to Cons.al vi, 7 Ootober 1815.
154
,
"""
Ibid., Severoli to Consalvi, 2 Deoember 1815. At this
time (November 1815--February 1816) Francis I was making a tour
of inspection of his Italian territories~

original ideas. II

Exaggerated rumours of disorder and unrest in

79

the Papal states were being spread with the obvious intent of
discouraging the trip.15S

At the end of December Severoli

learned thai; all the ministers except I"fetternich and Hudeligt had
decided to make an open formal appeal to FranciS I to return from
Italy without vis 1 ting Rome: "the reason given is the: needs of
the State; that which is not given, is fear of the discussions
between the Holy Father and H.I.M.

I have spoken with the

principa(l [ministers] and a.m convinced that they have done and
are doing • • • everything to prevent the trip • • • 11 1 56
Metternieh strongly supported the trip, ",hieh would do much
to promote the Auatro·Papal co-operation he ardently deSired, but
he was encountering great oppOSition, as he explained to
Lebzeltern:
This project of the visit is strongly eontested by
those immediately surrounding H.M •••• There are those
Who believe. despite all that one ean tell them, that
Our good Master will be forced to pass at least one
or two nights bareheaded, barefoot, and without his
shirt in the courtyard of the Quirinale, as wa.'3 the
Emperor Henry IV of unhappy memo17. When I pOinted
out to our learned friend Urbner that times have
changed and the clrcumstanoes-eLre very different, he
answered in a professorial tone that this was not
certain. • • • This affair, which I consider of great
importance, will only be definitely decided at
Florence • • • which will be visited in February.
The only obstacle that Metternich would admit as genuine was the

1-;-5- Ibid., Severoli to Consalvi, 6 December 1815.
150"Ibid., Severoli to Consalvi, 27 December 1815.

possibility that Francis I might be compelled by the current
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administrative reorganization of Lombardy-Venetia to spend too
~uch

time there.

Rome even if his

In any ease, he himself would definitely go to
If

August Masterll did not. l57

Consalvi, who knew well the strength of the Josephist party
in Vienna, was alarmed by Severoli's reports.
he wrote to

~~tternich

On I January 1816

stressing the great desire of Pius VII to

meet Francis I and his own eagerness to talk with Metternich
agaln. 158 The Austrian reply of 7 January 1816 was not encouraging: the Emperor greatly desired to visit Rome, but would not be
able to decide 1.f he could do so until he had arrived in Florenee.
Consalvi responded by again expressing the Pope's eagerness to
rneet the Emperor and by stress ing the unfortunate effects if the
visit did not take place.

The Papal government had already gone

to great expense to prepare a suitable welcome for Franeis I,
despite its impoveri3hed State, and it would be most unfortunate
if all of this outlay went for nothing.

More important, as

public opinion expected the v1.sit, its oancellation would be a
great humiliation for the Pope and would no doubt encourage the
mutual enemies of both Pope and Emperor, as well as starting
rumours of

157

5.

rift between them. l59

Lebzeltern, 343-344, Metternich to Lebzeltern, 6 January

1816. The author has been unable to identify the "Urbner" mentioned in the letter.
158yan Duerm, 103, Consalvi to Metternioh.

159

Ibld.., 106, Co~~alvl to ~etternich, 10 January 1816. The
author was unable to find a copy of Metternichts reply of 7
January.

But the balance had already tipped against the Imperial
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visit, and the circumstances which Metternich had feared previously had materialized.

On 16 February 1816 he regretfully

wrote Consalvi that the administrative organization would compel
the Emperor to prolong his stay 1n Lombardy-Venet1a on the one
hand, and on the other to hasten his return to Germany. He would
not even have time to v1sit Florence, much less Rome. 160
The explanation given by Metternich was essentially true.
Although the Josephist party had brought great pressure to bear,
this would not in 1tselt have suff10ed had it not been reinforced
by this more so11d mot1ve whioh conv1nced even Metternich that
the trip was impo8sible. 161
Consalvi was greatly disappointed by the abandonment of the
vis1t, whioh, as he had expected, at onoe gave rise to rumours
of an Austro-Papal qu.rrel,162 but he still had two consolations:
Franoi8 I had expres8ed his determination to visit Rome at some
time in the near future, and Metternioh was still expeoted to
come in 1816.

This last was especially important for ConsalVi,

for whom a personal disoussion with Metternioh of Austro-Papal
problems was one of the ohief attraotions of the visit.
Within a short time, however, doubt was thrown on
100

Ibid., 114, Metternich to Consalvi, 16 February 1816.

161~

Metternich gave this as the true explanation in his
oonfidential dispatch of 14 February 1816 to Lebzeltern:
Lebzeltern, 345.
162
A.V., ANY 233, Severoli to Consalvi, 25 March 1816.

Metternich's coming.

His subordinates opposed the trip, com-
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plicated negotiations with Bavaria might require him to remain
in Vienna, and, most important, he was afflicted with a serious
eye disease.

In the end it was the last which made it impossible

for Metternich to come to Rome; the trip
in June. 163
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definitely cancelled

Once again, Consalvi was diSappointed but not discouraged.
The Emperor still spoke of coming soon, while Metternich expressed his determination to come to Rome in the sprIng or
summer or 1817. 164
As 1817 began, the prospects for Austro-Papel unity and
co-operation seemed bright.

The problems growing out of the

Austrian occupation had been solved 1n a reasonably satisfactory
manner, mutually beneficial co-operation against the

~ettarj

was

1n progress, and wh11e Metternich was pleased by Consalvi's
reforms, the Secretary of the State was duly grateful for his
support in achieving them.

The coming meeting at Rome of the

Pope and the Emperor, and of Consalv1 and Mettern1ch, would no
doubt settle any problems that still existed and would set the
keystone in the arch of Austro-Papal unity for all the world to
see.

lor--

A.V., ANV 233, Severoli to Consalvi, 25 March, 2 April.
10 April 1816. Van Duerm, 119, Metternich to Consalvi, 12 March,
23 Apr11 1816; 124, Metternich to Consalvi, 7 June 1816.
164
ANV 233, Severoli to Consalvi, 8 January, 5 February,
7 February 1817.

~------------------------------~~
83
But storm clouds .ere building up on the horizon.

Within

the next three years the foundationa or Austro-Papal co-operation
were to be perilously weakened, and when the long-anticipated
visi t ot Francia I at 148 t took place , it wu not as the keys tone
of Auatro-Papal unity, but 48 a mere outward sbow, an attempt to
smooth over the gaping rent. that had appeared and to present to
the world a semblance ot unIty and good will that no longer
corresponded to reality_

CHAPTER III
RELIGIOUS AND FINANCIAL DISPUTES, 1817-1820
1. The Religious Controversy
By 1817 Consalvi and Metternieh had made considerable

progress towards their aim of close Austro-Papal co-operation.
Before 1817 had ended, however, that progress had been halted and
indeed reversed by the revival of the re11gious controversy between Austria and the Papacy.

The tensions arising from this

controversy were to bring the two states perilously close to an
open break, and though a settlement was at length worked out, a
legacy of bitterness and distrust remained to blight Austro-Papal
relations for the rest of Consalvi's ministry.
The religious controversies of the CardInal's second
minIstry were only the latest outbreak of a long and bitter
struggle between AustrIa and the Papacy, with control of the
Church in the Hapsburg Empire as the issue.
In thIs struggle the Papacy was defending its tradit10nal
claim to a divinely-conferred supreme authorIty over the entIre
Catholic Church, 1n Austria as elseWhere.

Sinee 1780, however,

this Papal cla1m had been strongly and successfully ohallenged
by the Austrian gdVernment.

Upon his accession in that year,
84

the Emperor Joseph II (1780-1790) began the introduction o'f the
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religious policy which under the name of "Joaephiniam" was to be
dominant in the Hapsburg states for seventy years.

The ultimate

aim of Josephinism was to create an Austrian state ehurch in
which all real authority was in the hands of the secular powerJ
the Papal author1ty would be formally restricted to doctrinal
matters, and even there would be largely nominal.

The Church,

reduced in effect to the level of a department of state, would
be used by the government as seemed best to promote the power of
the state and the general welfare. l
This policy was quickly realized under Joseph and his
successors.

All direct links between the Papacy and the Austrian

church were cut.

The Church in the Hapsburg territories was put

under the close oontrol and supervision of an Ecclesiastical
Court Commission apPOinted by the Emperor and inspired by
Josephist prinCiples.

All Papal attempts to "interfere" in

ecclesiastical affairs were firmly repulsed and any sign of
independence or pro-Papal sentiment among the clergy rigorously
repressed.

The selection ot the clergy, the administration of

eccleSiastical propert7, anel the organ1zation and d.iscipline of
the Church were all put in the hands of the government, which,
regulated them down to the most petty details.

Education was

1

On the origin and development of Josephinlsm, see Maass,
I-IV. Shorter accounts can be found in Josef Wodka, Kirche in
Oealerreich (Vienna, 1959, Chapter X. Fritz Valjavec, Dar -jOsepninIsmus: zur ge1stl~en Entwlcklun~ Oesterreichs
acnzehnten una iiiUrizennten"' S anrhundertVIenna, 1945) studies
the theoretTcil aspects of JOsephlnIsm.
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closely controlled and great palns were taken to instill

!

Joseph1at princ1ple., e.peelally 1n the sem1naries.
The Papacy d1d not acoept with passive resignation th1a
ohallenge to ita authority, and the reign ot Joseph II was filled
w1th rellgious cont rove rs7 •

But

once again, as so often dur1ng

the Enllghtenrnent, the Papacy proved too weak to resist the

.ecular power ertectively.

In the end, the Papacy had to accept

Imperlal control ot the Austrian church, it not de

Ju~,

at least

facto.
-de -_._--Nor d1d JosephinisM die w1th ita originator, Leopold II

(1790-1792) continued the Josephist tradit1on, while the reign
of Franeia I (1792-1836) was the apogee of the Austrian statechurch.

Francie, though devoutly religious, had been educated

in Josephist principles and was determined to defend What he
considered hi. sovereign rights over the Church.

"Moat jealous

of hiB authority" in religious aftairs, he "never haa the
sl1ghtest doubt about following and defend1ng the JOBephiBt
'Y'stem. ,,2

Moreover, should his own determination ever waver, he

was surrounded

by

Joseph1at advisers whose 1nfluenoe ... oon-

stantly exerted to defend state oontrol of the Church.
ThiS, then, .aB the Situation with which Conaalv1 had to
deal.

Durinc h1s first ministry (1800-1806) he wu aevera! times

embroiled w1th the Austrian court, moat notably over Imperlal
attempta to deprive the Papal nunoio at Vienna

of

the last

-r---A.V.~

ANY 233, Seyeroli to Consalvi, 15 July 1815.
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remnants of his ecclesiastical jurisdiction in the EmpIre' and
to reorganize various dioceses on Imperial authority alone.

In

the f1rst of these disputes a combination of firmness and conciliation won the day for Consalvi, but he could not alter the
fixed determination of Francis I to carry through the second. 3
The steady consolidation of Imperial authority over the
Austrian church did not cease while Consalvi was out of orrice

(1806-1814) and the Papacy was in conflict with Napoleon.

By

the opening of the Restoration era, the church in the Empire
had been reduced to a "stato servile,w completely dependent upon
the state, virtually independent ot the papacy.4 The consequence
for the church and the rellgious life ot the people were most
pernioious •

The reports of the Vienna nuncio paint a gloomy

picture of religious condltions in Austria.
a truly horrible aspect," Consalvi was told.

"The clergy present
Uncontrolled by

Papal authority and with the disciplinary power of their own
bishops constantly hampered by state interference, educated In
seminaries Where more stress was lald on poll tical reliabIlity
and anti-Papal sentiments than upon piety or religious zeal,
demoralized by the prevailing atmosphere in Which the tihole
emphasis .as on the use ot the Church for the good of the State
and Ifall eoelesi.etics are considered as agents and amp) oyes of
the State, If the clergy had suffered a d1sastrous decline in
3

Memoria, 174-179_ Sohmid11n, 336-340. Maass, IV, 52-97.

),--'~"-'-

r

A.V., ANY 246, Leard! to Consalvl, 29 August 1817.

numbera, quality, and prestige.

They were "scarsissimo," C(Uite

lnsuf'ticient to meet the religious needs of the people.
•

Their

level of morality. zeal, and learning was otten deplorably low.

Such clergy could not strengthen the religioua devotion of the
people or cOlU'1land their respect .•

Popular respeet for the clergy

the Church, and religion in general declined, While, the nunoio

warned, immorality, irreligion, and revolutionary principleswere
spreading rapldly.5
In 1814 there had been 80me hope. 1nspired by Francis'8

benevolent attitude towards Pius VII after his release from
oaptivity, that the Emperor might be prepared to depart from his

Jo.ephist polloles J but suoh hopes were Q.uickly dashed.

Soon

after Plus'll return to Rome, Severoll wrote in disgust that "we
here ln Vienna are stUI as ever in the old system, and very far

from expecting change) we will instead see consolidated in our
midat the old abU&es." Moreover, "there is no doubt that in

Lombardy and in the newly-oonquered territories they are thinking
or reviving or estab11sh111@; the laws of the Bmperor Joseph 11."6

Here was the first warning ot an Imperial policy whioh if
pursued would make conflict with the Papacy inevitable: the

5

Such pessimistio descriptions of religious conditions 1n
the Empire are ver,y frequent in the correspondence or the Vienna
nuncio. durIng the Restoration. See~ L,&.., ANV 246, Leard! to
Consalvi, 29 August 1817 (from which the above quotations are
taken), 28 r~cember 1817. ANV 233, Severol1 to Paooa, 29 August,
19 November 1814.
6

A.V _, ANV 233, Severoli to Faeca., 29 August

181!~.
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extension of Joeephlnlam to the newly-acquired territories.
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Most

of the religious eontroverl3ies of Consalvi's seoond ministry were
to stem trom this policy.

To see Josephist principles still

enthroned in the traditional Hapsburg territories was sufficiently
unpleaaant to the PapacYJ to see those principles introduced into
new areas, above all into Italy the very horne of the Papacy, was

not to be endured.

In Italy- the Pope had a. special interest and

exeroised a speoial authority, tor there he ru.led not only as

Head of the Universal Ohurch, but also and in a more immediate
sense as Primate of Italy.

As the p8I'eeptiva Lebzel tern warned

Metternioh, nAll innovations made in rel1gious affaire in Italy
touch the Pope at his most sensitIve spot.

It is, eo to speak,

hiS exolusive domain, and he draws grea.ter advantage perhaps
from his title of Primate of

Ital~

than from his others as Head

of the Un!veraal Church and Patria.rch of the Wes t • n

The Pope

would tolerate many things in ultramontane lands that he would

not accept in Italy uwhere he feels he rightfully exercises a
more immediate juriSdiction.,,1 Lebzeltern therefore advised
against the attempt to extend Joaeph1nism into Italy, for it
would certainly lead to conflict with the Papacy.
Lebzeltern's advice, though ignored by Vienna, was sound.
The Imperlal poliey dld eolilde with a firm Papal determInation
to resist further

Impe~lal

eneroaehmenta upon its own authority

and the freedom of the Churoh, especIally in Italy.

This

-r---Maass, IV, 512, Lebza1tern to Mettern1oh, 4 Apr11 1816.
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collision W8B the immediate cause of the religious disputes that

marked the Restor&tlon era.
At the same tIMe, however, the Papacy never forgot the evil
eonaequenees 'chat Josephinlsm ha,d a.lready had in the traditional
Hapsburg territories for both the authority of the Pope and the
rel:tglous life of the people, and 1t never ceased to desil"e the
overthrow of Josephinis:n in the Austrian Empire as a whole. This

Papal desire was a oonstant undercurrent in its quarrels with
Austria, an undercurrent

~4'hich

at tL'1les ca-ne to the surface. In

the last analy-sis, there could be no perr:1anentpe,aoe' or lastIng
agreement between the Papacy and AtlBtri21 'Nhile J oseph1nism
ruled at Vienna, for the Papacy eould never cease 1 ts efforts to
"

regain its lost authority.

Yet good relations between the two

powers could be preserved and close eo-opera.tion in the poll t1cal

field attained" as the situation in 1815-1817 demonstrated, provided lttlstria respected the statu.s quo.
Austria to do

80

It wa.s

th~

fa.llure of

that preCipitated the religious controversy w1th

Rome.
There was little dissent in the Roman CU1"ia as to the
desirability of checking the expansion of Josephiniam into Ita17
and of itlorking to weaken 1.t in .!.ustr1a.; but there was nc such
general agreement as to the best way in which to pursue these
a1f1't8.

Once again" as in regard to polit1cal reform, religIous

policy found Consalvl and the
To the

~l.!l1ti,

~elant!

on opposing SIdes.

the s1tuation was simple.

The Austrian

r,

--------------------------------------------------------~9~1~
state-ehurch was an affront to the divinely-conferred authorit7

ot the Pope and had had disastroWl ettects upon rel18ioua lite
1n AWltr1a; it must theretore be abolished as quickly as possible
There must be no turther compromise with Vienna, which would only
encour..e Awstrian pretensions.

Instead, the time had come,

with the post-war revival of religious tervour, to take the
offenaive agalnst Jo.ephin1am.

The attempt to extend the

Austrian religious s,.tem must be utterly oppos.d. only if the
Emperor first ahowed his good faith by the "prompt and sincere
revocation •• • ot all 1a.. oontary • • • to the prinoip1es, maxims
and laws ot the Catholio Church" oould any concesslon be made on
this point. 8 Nor should JoaephinisM be tolerated in the rest ot
the Empire.

Instead, it should be attacked directly, in

particular by the publication ot a Bull publioly condemning the
Austrian ecclesiastical 1a... 9
Conaal\'i wu in qreement with the basic aims ot the zelanti
He shared their devotion to the theory or Papal supreme authority
and their wish to make th1a theory a reality.

He too wsa

horrified by the condition ot the Austrian church, which he
considered "a hundred thousand times worae than in Franoe in the
worst or times. "10 As earl;, .. 1805, the Auatrian amba.ador in

-_.__ _--..

8
A.V., R260, Obb1igo de' Nominati, 1817.

9
Such a Bull ... actuall,. drawn up in 1819 'b7 the Zelanti
and received Papal approval, only the OPPOSition ot 00nailv1
prevented it. publication. Maass, V, 173, Oenotte to Metternich,
5 Febru&r7 1820.
10
R242, Cons&1\'i to Pacca, 8 September 1814.

r'
r
~

rRome had warned Ilis government that Conaalvl wlshed to revlve

"

the papal authority In Its fulleat extent. but he added that the
Cardlnal would proeeed wlth cautlon, for he peroelved the dangers
of suoh a pollCy.ll

Thls last phase ofters the key to Conaalvl 'a

attitude, the cruolal point on Which he differed trom the Zelantl
The Papaoy, he saw, was atlll too weak, Austrla too strong, tor

a dIrect assault

Oft

the state-church to have any hope 01' success.

In all probablllty such an attack, tar trom Intlmidating the
Emperor, would onlY' provoke an open break, perhaps even the
sch1sm at WhICh Austria ocoaslonally hlnted. 12 It would al80

surely end Auatro-Papel co-operatlon and deprive the Papaoy of
those Important benetlts whlch It could derive trom AustrIan
good wl11.
Therefore, In dealIng with Austria Conaalvi preterred to
adopt a poltcy 01' moderation which combined tirmneaa on essential
poInts with a conciliatory attItude on non-easentiala.

When the

bastc rights and authorlt,. 01' the Pope were involved, he could
be adamant 1n retualng to ,.i81d.

On leaa important pointa he

adopted a tlexible polie,., detending Papal rights or a.ek1ng to
extend Papal authority it it s ••med possible without undue risk,
but alao willing to ,.ield on specitic pointa it It seemed tor
the general good 01' the Church, or 11' reoiprocal concessions

11
Van Duerm, 35, Count Khevenhuel1er to ColloredoMannsteld, 26 Januar.r 1805.
12

E.G., A.V., ANV243, Consalvi to Leard1, 11 August 1811.
R260, Quesito da e.&minarei, 1817.

could be obtained.
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"Sacrificing interests at times cansiderable

but always unessential, he succeeded in saving that which was
substantial and essential for the Church and the Curia.,,13
Consalvi was encouraged in his policy of moderation by the
appearance of one ray of flickering light amid the prevailing
Austrian gloom: the adoption by Metternich of a conciliatory
religious policy towards the Papacy.
by

Metternich

W88

unimpressed

either the theoretical arguments for Josephinism or its

alleged practical advantages.

He believed in principle that

"to exalt the civil authority over that of' the Church is no less
an abuse than it would be to exalt the ecclesiastical authority
over the clvil. n14 In the practical f'ield, he saw that
Josephinism had weakened religion in Austria at a time when it
was vitally necessary to resist the spread of revolutionary

principles.

Moat important, the Foreign Minister opposed

Josephinism as contrary to the political interests of' the Empire:
the lustre-Papal co-operation that he considered so valuable
could hardly be maintained if the Papacy was to be constantly
13

Petrocehi 1943, 43. This judgment delivered on the
as a whole 18 equally relevant to his
dealings with Austria. See also the similar opinion of Ranke:
"Cardinal Consalvi und seine· Staatsverwaltung unter dem
Pontif1eat Pius VII," Historisch-biogra~iBche Studien.
Sammtliche Werke, XL (telpzlg,~ 1817):
CardinaIT8·rel1g1oua~-policY'

--

Ili-

A.V., R247, Leard1 to Consalvi, 22 February 1818.
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antagonized by Josephist enoroachments. 15
In 1814, therefore, Metternich began to advocate the
adoption of a more moderate religious policy, with the aim of
conoI1iating the Papaoy by lessening government control of the
Austrian ohurch and halting the expansion of Josephinism.
prince felt oblIged to proceed with great caution.

The

Josephist

principles prevailed everywhere in the government} Metternich's
later olaim that in his opposition to Josephinism he had been
"seul sur le terrain de 1a verite" in government circles was no
great exaggeration. 16 Any attempt to modify relIgious policy
was certain to arouse the strong and virtually unanimous opposition of the bureaucraoy.

More serious still, unless Metternich

proceeded very cautiously, his opposItion to Josephinism might
cost him the support of the Emperor, who was still firmly
attached to the princIples in which he had been eduoated.
therefore careful never to

conde~n

He was

Josephinism too bluntly or to

advocate the complete abolition of the state-church system, for
to do so would anger Francis I.

He confined himself instead to

seeking to halt the further expansion of Josephinism and to
moderate ita rigors in Austria.

On the baai. of this limited

policy, if put into effect, Metternich could have reached a modus
vIvendi in religious affaira with Consalvi, whose immedIate aims
--~5'---'---

For Metternich 'a OPPOSition to Joseph1n1srn a.nd his attempts
to moderate Austrian religious policy, see Maass, IV, 98-120.
Metternlch, III, 5-7. SrbIk, I, 523-524.

16

Metternlch, III, 5-7, Note.
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would have been met thereby.

Unfortunately, even the moderate aims of Metternioh aroused
strong opposition from the bureaucracy, and he could never seoure
the full Imperial support necessary to override it.

H1s

aohievements 1n moderating Austrian religious po11cy therefore
fell far short of what he Wished and of what would have been
neoessary to satisfy the Papacy.
At the outset, however, the Prince was suocessful in
moderating Austrian religious policy on several occasions,
thereby arousing Consalvi's hopes that a general modification of
Austrian religious policy was possible.

The first such occasion

came when in July, 1814, Pius VII apPOinted Bishop Joseph Maria
Peruzzi of Chioggia to administer the vacant Patriarchate of
Venice. 17 Lebze1tern had previously agreed to this step, but
now the Josephist President of the Eoc1esiastioal Court
CommiSSion, Prokop Count Lazanzky, stirred up Francis I against
the appOintment.

Arguing that this step represented Papal en-

oroachment on the Imperial right, inherited from the Venetian
Repub1io, to nominate the Patriarch, he persuaded the Emperor to
send. stiff protest to Severoli. 18 Before Lazans~ could provoke

a quarrel with the Papacy, Severoli and Consalvi hastily saw
Metternieh.

They pointed out that the temporary

rr--_ . _-

ad~inistration

A.V., R242, Pacca to Conaalvi, 18 August 1814.

18

Maass, IV, 417, Lazansky to Mettern1oh.. 11 July 1814.
A.V., ANY 233, Severoli to Pacca, 4 September 1814, 18 January
1815.

96

of the Patriarchate by Peruzzi was necessary to check disorders
among the Venetian clergy, that Lebzeltern had approved the Papal
appointment before it was made, and that Imperial approval was
not necessary In any case because the province had not yet been
formally incorporated Into the Austrian Empire.
won over by these

ar~~~nts

Metternich was

and was able to persuade Francis I to

accept the appointment temporari1y.19
Metternich was also successful in 1814 in dealing with the
reorganization of the diocese of the Tyrol which Austria had
recently regained.

Lazansk7 w1shed to carry out this reorganiza-

tion in accord with Joseph1st prinCiples, without regard to Papal
authority.

Once again Metternich intervened.

After rebuking

the President for his excessive zeal, he assured the Papacy that
the Imperial reorganization would be only temporary, and asked
the Pope to grant his necessary approval for the final reorganization.

Once again Metternich had successfully moderated

Austrian policy and averted a quarrel with the Papaoy.20
In 1815 Metternich had another opportunity to demonstrate
his opposition to Josephist expansion.

Lazansky wished to forbid

the Lombard-Venetian bishops to have recourse to the Pope for
marriage dispensations in the third and fourth degrees.

This

prohibition would have cut an important link between Rome and the
~

19

Maass, IV, 103-104, 489,
January 1815.
20

~~tternich

to Francis I, 4

~., IV, 102, 107.
The Bull was finally issued in 1818:
Bullari • • • , XV, 40-47, Nova diocesum distributio, 9 May 1818.
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Lombard-,Venettan church and aided in bringtng that church und.er
closer Josephist control.

The Foreign Minister successfully

opposed the plan, but he oarefully avoided attacking 'che principles involved; tm;tead, he 11terely a.rgued that this step would
antagonize the Papacy and was hence politically inexpedient. 2l
Thus on these and several less important occasions the

Prince was able to exercise a moderating influence on Imperial
religious policy.

Under the protective shelter of his moderating

influence, the Austro-Papa,l co··operation of 1815-1817 could come
into existence; lacking tha.t protection, it would probabl.:l have
been strangled at birth by the religious controversies w-vhich
Josephist policies lnust otherwise have provoked.

Furthermore,

Metternieh's conciliatory attitude encouraged Consalvl to
continue to co-operate with Austrla even when the Prince was not
able to prevent the adoption of Josephlst policies, for it
aroused in the Cardinal the hope that r1etternich might yet be
able to work a general transfo!'l1atlon of the state-church.

This

hope endured for several years after 1814, only gradually to be
smothered under the acoumulating evidence that Metternich could
work no such

~iracle.

Until 1818, Consalvi continued to express

his confidenae that the "spirit of conclliation Which animates
Prince Metternlch" might yet reverse the trend of Austrian
p011cy.22

21

Maass, 496, staatskanzlei to the Z. O. Hofkommission, 15
December 1815.
22
A. V., ANV 243, Consalvi to Leard!

14 June 181
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Even at best, however, Metternich'. campaign against
Josephinism was only partially successful.

He could not prevent

the introduotion of several measures that otfended and alarmed
the Papacy.

Some of these meft8ures--Bueh as the prohibition ot

oommunication between the Vienna nunoio and the Austrian
bishops,23 the rigid enforoement of the regio plaoet in
Lombardy,24 and the tntroduotion into Lombardy-Venetia of a new
oath and eeremontal, very ,Tosephist in tone, for use at the
installation of bishops25_-were less a.laI'rllng in themselves than
than a.s evidence of the general trend of Austrian policy.

Three

innovations, however, were such as must arouse the strongest
Papal resistance! the prohibition to the Lombard-Venetian bishops
of the Romreise or visit to Rome to reoeive Papal preeonisation
and approval; the Imperial claim to nominate bishops in the
newly acquired territories without a formal conceSSion from the
Pope; and the introduction of the Austrian

Marria~e

laws into

Lo~bardy-Venetia.

For centuries the nominees to Italian bishoprics, before
they could assume their offices, had had the obligation to

~isit

Rome, there to he personally examined ("preccnisation"), instructed, and coneecrated by the Pope.

This duty was an outgrowt

of the special
. "'-, ".'", relationships between the Italian bishops and the

---~3'

24

AtN 233, Severe1! to Pacea, 10

Septe~ber

1814.

Maass, IV, ltP-;, Eellegarde to the Lombard bishops, 22
November 1814.

25

A.V., ANV 243, Consa1vi to Leard1, 24 April 1817.

Pope in his capacity as Primate of Italy.

In an age when most
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Italian bishops were nominated by secular rulers to whom they
tended to be subservient, this custom had acquired a special
value in that it preserved to the Papacy the influence that comes
from perlonal contact and reminded the bishops of their special
duties towards the Pope.

Consalvi frankly admitted that "the

Italian bishops are not in the least called to Rome to be examined or instructed, but solely to recall to them, to them and to
the people, that the Holy Father is Primate of Italy "and that
they therefore had special obligations towards him. 26 The Popes
were ver:/ tenacious of this right, as of all that pertained to
their status as Primate, especially since the weakening of their
authority outSide Italy_

As Consalvi explained, "since there

only remains to the Holy See, of all its tormer power, hardly
a~thing

except the canonical institution ot bishops throughout

Christendom and this direot Primatial influence on the Italian
bishops, it is necessary to preserve these two points, ot which
the tirst is reduced in most countries to little more than a
Simple formality_n 27 In view of this strong Papal determination
to preserve the Romreise, even Joseph II had not ventured to
attack it, but had formally recognized this right in the
Conventio

26

~ioabilis

of 1784.

28

Maus, IV, 591, Kaun1tz to Metternich, 1 July 1817.
27
Ibid.
28--Angelo Meroati (ed.), !tacc~lta d! Qoncordati (2 vola)
Rome, 1954), I, 514-515-
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was
In February of 1916, Francia I

persuaded by the·

Ecclesiastical Court Commission to forbid the Lombard-Vanetian
bishops to make the Romreiae. 29 The official reasons were the
great expense and inconvenienoe which this trip caused the
bishops and the need for administrative uniformity between
Lombardy-Venetia and the rest of the Empire (where the trip was
not required). The real reason was Josephist fear that at Rome
the bishops would come under Papal influence and would "return
to their diooeses as Roman converts, hypoorites, or indifferentists, and hence as useless bishops--doing

~ore

harm than

goo~

to Churoh and State. n30 The Papaoy did not fail to perceive this
motive: "the real reason must be the maxim of this Court • • • of
weakening ever more • • • the contact of the bishops with the
Supreme Head of the Churoh. ,,31

Metternich, foreseeing ; .~:.£.. ()(~:

strong Papal oppOSition, had argued forcefully but unsucoessfully
against the prohibition as inexpedient and Unjuatified. 32
The second major Papal grievance also appeared in 1816: the
Imperial claim to nominate bishops in the new1y-acqu1red terr1tories, especially the fOr"!'ler Republics of Venice and Ragusa
and the

A~chbi8hopric

of Salzburg, without obtaining a speoial

Papal concession of this privilege.

The Emperor argued that he

had inherited all the religious privileges, including the
-.'.---~-.-.-.-

30

31

Maass, IV, 505, Franois ! to Metternlch, 27 February 1816.
Ibid., 536, Lorenz to Francis I, 30 July 1816.

1817.

A.V., R260, Obbl1go del nominati,
32Maass , IV, 506-507, Matternich to Francis I, 3 April 1816

1m
nomination-right, of the former rulers of those states as their
legitimate successor. In May of 1816 he acted on this claim by
nominating Bishop Francesco Milesi of Vigevano to the Patriarchate of Venice, followed by the nomination in July of Bishop
Peruzzi of Chioggia to the Bishopric of Vicenza, and in August
of the Prince-Bishop of Lavant, Leopold Count Firmian, as
Arohbishop of Salzburg.33
The third Imperial policy that aroused major Papal
opposition was the introduction of the Austrian marriage laws
into Lombardy-Venetia; Originally drawn up by Joseph II for his
transalpine states, no other of his measures had so aroused the
Papacy. In the opinion of the Papacy, this legislation reduoed
marriage from its divinely-ordained status as a sacrament of the
Churoh to that of a mere civil contract under the authority of
the state. Moreover, many of the specific provisions were oontrary to canon law.34 The introduction of these laws into Italy,
where the Papacy was most sensitive to religious innovations, was
certain to antagonize Rome. 35 All attempts to dissuade Francis I
from this step failed, for he was convinced that his sovereign
authority rightfully extended over matrimonial questions~36
33A•V., R;60, Consalvi to Apponyi , 2 August, 30 August 1816;
34
Ibid., Innovazioni della Corte Austriaca, l8l9,summarizes
the Papal objections to the marriage laws~
35Maass, IV, 512, Lebzeltern to Metternich, 4 April 1816;
36
•
A.V., ANV 233, Severoli to Consalvi, 15 July 1815.
i

As Metternich h:.::.( feared, these three measures aroused

1C2

the greatest indignation in Rome, which flatly refused to accept
them.

Pius himself seerrlS to have been most alarmed by the

marriage laws, which he felt violated the most fundamental principles of the Church and feared would lead to a general moral
decl1ne. 37
laws

seeIT~

To secure the revoeation or modification of these
to have become his ohief ooncern in the negotiations

with Austria.
The Papacy did not long leave Austria in ignorance of its
displeasure.

In April of 1816 both the Pope and his Secretary

of Sta.te spoke with Lebzeltern on this subject.

The Ambassador

reported that although they had refrained thus far from making
an official protest, they were highly displeased by the recent
religious innovations.

Although the earlier innovations in

Lombardy-Venetia had made l1an unfortunate impression" upon the
Pope, he would nonetheless have retrained trom taking action
against them, I'from consideration for the

Emperor~

"his sacred duties did not oblige him to do

80.

11

as long as
Unfortunate1,.,

two Austrian poliCies oompelled his intervention; the marriage
laws, whose principles "surpassed those which Napoleon had
established, fI and the prohibition of the

!!.,?~~!.se.

To these

"thti Holy See could never consent, If for they were "destructive
of its authority and opposed,

80

far as the Marriage Patent was

concerned, to the prinoiples of Catholicism. 1I
-.--""l"r -._ ..
3.
Lebzeltern, 352, Lebzeltern to Metternich, 11 June 1816.
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Lebzelternts attempt to justify the innovations as necessary
for administrative uniformity was brushed aside by Conaalv1s
such a motive could never justify violation of the inoontestable
rights of the Holy See or of the principles of Catholioism. These
measures, he warned the Ambassador, could destroy the "good
harmony and real friendship presently unit1ng the two oourts. n38
Lebzeltern seemed profoundly alarmed by these interviews.
He wrote at once to warn Metternich that the ttpolitically indispensable" co-operation ot the Papacy was be1ng ser10usly endangered by Austria's re11gious policy.

"It is no doubt usetul

and advantageous to maintain our :regulations J 1t would be
dangerous to extend them. It Such an extension would surely
alienate the Papacy and lead to the loss ot all the advantages
which Austria derived from Papal co-operation. "There are some
things [Lebzeltern warned in conolusion] on which the Pope can
compromiJIe, and then vigorous measures oan oompel him to do so;
there are some inherent to hie oharacter, on which he cannot
yieldJ finally, there are others which he oan tolerate, but not
approve.

The measures indicated above oan never obtain his

consent.

They will be a souroe of interminable disagreements

without, I daresq, oftering us a result suffioiently advantageo
to counterbalance this. n 39 The warning was to prove prophetic.
In this letter Lebzeltern was preach1ng to the converted,
tor Metternich was already' alarmed by the threat to co -operation

'38
39

Maass, IV, 512, Lebzeltern to Metternich, 4 April 1816.
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with the Papacy_
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At that very mor'lent he was attempting to

persuade the Emperor to moderate Austrian religious poliey.
The oocasion for this attempt

WaB

the Papal refusal to

accept the Imperial nominee to the Bishopric of Laybach.

This

prelate, Monsignor Augustin Gruber, while acting as religious
adviser to the government at

~ilan

introduced into Lombardy-Venetia.

had signed the Marriage Patent
The Papacy therefore refused

to accept his nomination lest by doing so it seem to give indirect approval in the eyes of the Catholic world to the Imperial
marriage legislation. 40
Informed of this ret"u8al, Metternich sought to persuade
Francis I of the desirability of adopting a more conciliatory
attitude towards the Papacy, not only in this particular oase,
but as a general po1iey.

He

ref'ut~d

the arguments of the

Josephists that the Papacy was seeking a quarrel and was enoroaching on Imperial rights, pointing out that in faot the
Papacy had adopted a most conciliatory attitude and waa doing
everything it could to avoid a religious dispute with Austria.
The Pope would grant any reasonable Austrian requests.

Only the

introduction of inadmissible principles by Austria or tactless
Imperial diplomacy could drive the Papacy into opposition. Since
the Papacy was thus well··disposed to Austria, there was no sound
reason for raising principles whioh Rome could not accept and
40·_·--Ibid., 510, Metternich to Francis I, 3 April 1816; 511
Staatakanzlei to the Z. O. Hofkommission, 3 April 1816.

which would only lead to a quarrel cel·tain to have adverse'
political effects.

Metternich

thel~fore
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advocated the adoptIon

of conciliatory policies which 'Wuuld e.liminate all possIble

causes

fiJI'

conf'lict with the Papacy_ 41

The Josephists counter-attacked vigorously, arguing that the
recent innovations were entirely jus tified and clal:ning that if
the Emperor stood firm the Papaoy
~las

~'lould

soon yield.

Francis I

persuaded by their reasoning to reject; his Foreign Minister's

St~gestions and refuse any ooncession to the papacy.42
Contrary to Josephist expectations, the ImperIal policy of'
firmness had not the slightest effect upon Pius or Consalvi,
except to annoy them and to make it more difficult for Consalvi
to resist Zelant:1: denanoa for a stronger polloy towards AustrIa.
The Cardinal was still

Qete~~ined

to pursue his policy of

moderation and there was no publio Papal protest or crltioiam of'
AU$t~ia,

but the Papacy gave no sign

innovations.

or

accepting the relIgious

On the contrary, in June the Pope again foroef.ully

protested to Lebzeltern, espeoially on the marriage laws, Ifa
point on whieh he feels strongly."

The Pope "deolaimed against

the imprudent innovators" responsible for recent Austrian
measures "who miaoalculate the results of their plans. 11

41

(#

Only his

IbId., 506-510, Metternieh to Faancis I, 3 April 1816.
139), 514, Metternich to Lazansky, 5 April 1816.

137,-13~,

srkik

I, 523-524.

42

Maass, 515, Lazanaky to FranciS I, 11 AprIl 1816) 519,
Lazansky to Francis I, 12 April l816J 521-522, Lorenz to Francis
I, 22 April 1816.

great respect for the piety of Francis I and his trust in the
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good intentions of Metternieh, Piue warned the ambassador, had
thus far restrained him from publicly condemning the marriage
patent. 43
Atter thla ominous conversation, Lebzeltern sent another
urgent warning to Metternich that a breakdown of relations with
the Papacy was possible if Austria persisted in her religious
policies.

The Pope and Conaalvi, he reported, were still firm.

in their wish for co-operation and were Willing to make reasonab1
concess10ns, but they would not and indeed could not agree to
demands that attacked the basic rights and authority of the
Papacy and the pr1nciples of Catholicism.

The Ambassador then

enumerated at length the benefits which Austria derived trom
Papal good will and the grave disadvantages whioh would flow from
a break with the Papacy.

He concluded by:

respectfully pointing out to His Majesty I) that
the exercise of His sovereign rights 1s not at
all imcom~atlb1e with recogn1zing those of the
Papacy; 2) that a perfect accord with the spiritual
power is oompletely in the interests of the Emperor,
and, I boldly affirm, in the rank of his first
interests. 44
This warning, like

80

many others, had. no effect upon the

Emperor.
Conealvi'. policy d.uring 1816 was a delicate balance of
firmness and conciliation.

The path he had to tread to reach a

43------44

Lebzeltern, 352, Lebzeltern to Metternich, 11 June 1816.
Ibid.
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satisfactory settlement was narrow.

On the one hand, an open

break with Austria must be avoided if at all possible, hence no
action likely to antagonize that power should be taken unless
absolutely necessary.

Consa1vi must continue to display his

essentially friendly attitude towards the Empire and his willingness to make reasonable conceSSions, thus encouraging

I~tternioh

to continue his efforts to moderate Imperial policy.

At the same

time, it was necessary to avoid the appearance of weakness, which
would both encourage the Josephists and arouse the Zelantl.

A

further complicating factor was the neceSSity that the religious
life of the people should be disturbed as little as possible by
Papal resistance to Imperial demands) for

ex~nple,

prolonged

Papal refusal to accept the Imperial nominees to Venetian bishoprios, resulting in lengthy vacancies in those sees, would have a
detrimental errect upon religious conditions there.

It was worth

sacrificing non-essential Papal prerogatives if necessary to
prevent such harm to the religious life of the people. 45
Throughout 1816 Consalvi was able to tread the narrow path
between intransigence and appeasement with some success.

He was

able to work out .ettlements for various disputes which met the
reqUirements of' his position fairly well.

In July

ill

reasonably

satisfactory oompromise was worked out in the case of' Bishop
Gruber. ..The
---If;"-,.,.·
·- -,,--- Papacy agreed to accept the Imperial nominee as
The Joaephists were well aware or thi8 weakness in the
Papal pOSition, and the~ argued that it would eventually force
the Papacy to yield on the Austrian innovations if the Emperor
persisted long enough, Maass, IV, 557, ',Iallis to Fra.ncis I, 30
January 1817.

rr
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Bishop o.f tayba:m, but only on the secrwG oondition that'atter
assu~'llng

his office he would state his support for the orthodox

Catholic do()trine un ;-1~uTlage in a paa tl)ra1 letter. 46 Also
cTllring

the summer ot 1816 the Papaoy expressed its will1ngness to

gl ve formal approval to the Ir:'lperlal projeot :eor a reorganization
of the Venetian dioceses; but Consalvi took oare to insert in the
Papal reply a rearrirn1&tion of Papal rlghtsand a veiled oritlf31.m.

of Josephist pol1cies that greatly annoyed the Joaephi8ts. 47
In August Conaalvl took up the dispute over the Imperlal
claim to nominate to Venetian blahoprlos, offering a compromise
solution. 48

The Imperial alaim was firmly- rejeoted, for ttsuch

privileges oannot be inherIted or transmitued to a person of
dynasty different from that to whieb it was granted."

To

sweeten this bitter pill, he added that the Pope was w1lling to
gra.nt the nomination-right to the Emperor, if the latter would
request it as a speoial privilege.

Consalvi had realized that on

grounds of consistenoy it would have been very diffioult to refuse to allow the Emperor to exercise in Venetia a privilege
which was exeroi2ed by ever.1 other Italian prince and whioh
Francis himself held in all of h1a other territories. If th1.
40-'-Maaa. J IV, 541, Mette1"l'l1ch to Prancis It 4 August 1816.
R247, Consalvi to Leardi, 27 April 1820.
47 '

A.V., R260, Lebzeltern to Consalvi, 1 Ju17 1816.

48
The follOWing aooount ot the .ettlement proposed b7

CORealvi for the nomination-right 1s based on: A.V., R260,
C08salvi to APpoD7i, 2 August 1816.
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power was not granted to the Emperor as a privilege, he woUld
probably continue to exercise it as an inherent right of
sovereignty, as the Josephists wished him to do in any case. 49
All that the Papacy could do was to grant the nomination-right
as a privilege and thus preserve at least the principle of
Papal authority. At the same time, Consalvi insisted on the
necessity of the Romreise before the Imperial nominees could
be recognized by the Pope. Apparently the Cardinal hoped that
by yielding on the nomination-right while insisting on the more
important--and more defensible--Romreise he might persuade the
Emperor to yield on the latter. This was to be the strategy he
would follow during future negotiations, with ultimate success.
Once again, firmness and conciliation met in the Secretary of
S tate I s pol icy. Cons al vi I s note to Apponyi in which he set forth
this proposal closed with the suggestion that Papal and Austrian
representatives be appointed to work out a Convention to settle
Venetian affairs. The whole tone of this note is one of studied
moderation and friendliness, but the underlying firmness of the
Papal stand was unmistakable. 50
During the same month, Consalvi found another opportunity
to demons trate his friendly attitude towards Aus tria and Papalwillingness to make concessions that did not affect its
essential authority. The traditional though unofficial custom

49--Maass , IV, 557, Wallis to Francis I, 30 January 1817.
50
A.V., R260, Consalvi to Apponyi, 2 August 1816.
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pONeI'

infor,TIed

to grant h1=';). the
It Has only just, he

a3 success:>!' tG the Ven.:;tlan Republic
cal--id~.nD.l

as Hell a.s h13

he Has quick to add, h'rancis did not

clai'~

O'ffl.

However"

this as a right, but

only a3ked i-t as a special favo!' for which he would be forever
.t..
... 1 51
grave.1.u
•

r.rhis reQ.uest Consalvi was Q.uite willing to grant, as it
provided an opportunity to display the friendly attitude of the
Papacy wlthout involving any weakening of Papal authority.

therefore

l~eplied

He

that the Pope, though denying that the Emperor

had inherited any right fro'll the Venetian Reput,llc, would grant

Fr'ancis s. special T;ark

:;,f

his regard.

secretly communioat.-: to him the
oonfer the red hat upon him

8.13

in strictest secrecy lest the

nal~e

If the Err-perer would
of his candidate, Pius would

his own choice.
oth~r

All must be done

Catholio courts be profoundly

irr'itated by this special favor; but even thts, Consa1vi stressed,
the Pope wa.s willing to risk in order to show his great regard

for the

Emper(~r ~

Whose wishes he

l'las

always eager to please if at

all poselb1e.5~
--5r----Ibid., Lebzeltern to Consalvi, 3 July 1816.
Metternr-cn-to Consa1vi, 4 July 1816.

Al80

52

~., Consalv:1 to

Metternlah, 23 August 1816.

11

Thl. concel.lon had an excellent eff"ect at Vlenna. 53 . A.
Consalvl had no doubt lntended, Metternloh dld not f"ail to cite

it to Francia I as pOlitlve proof that the Papacy was wllllng to
grant all reasonable Austrian requests provided the e •• enoe of"
the Papal pOlition was not affected. 54
By the time thia conces8ion had been formally granted,

Metternich had deoided to resume his efforts to moderate the
Emperorts religious policy.

It was obvious by mid-summer that

the Papacy could not be bullied into acoept1ng the religious
innovatlons, but a religious .ettlement wu urgently needed.

In

late July therefore Mettern1ch sugsested to FranciS I that a
committee be set up to discus. the revision of" Austrian religious
legislatlon and the conclUSion of a concordat with the papacy.55
~

The JOlephist8 were up' in arms

a~

onoe, bitterly oppo.ing

&nF moditioation of" the state-church .ystem or &nJ agreement wlth
Rome. 56 The Foreign Mini8ter nonathele•• persi.ted in his
ef"tort.,57 and tor a t~me ~eemed clo.e to IUGcesa.

Franci. I

gradually became convinoed that negotiationa f"or a settlement
with the Holy See were unavoidable.
truL..oonc~W11on

He even began to consider

of a f"ormal concordat with the PapacT.

In October

53
Ibid., Metternich to Oo_alvi" 2 September 1816.
54Maul, IV" 545, Mettemich to Francia I, 26 August 1816.
55
Ibid., 534, Metternich to Francia I" 24 July 1816.
56 Ibid., 536, Lorenz to Francis I, 30 July 1816.

5"-~.,

545, Metternich to Franci. I, 26 August 1816.

of 1816 he set up a commission which was to prepare in secret

112

all the material necessary to negotiate a concordat tor LombardTVenetIa, IstrIa, and Dalmatia. 58
Since thIs commission was oomposed entire17 of Josephi.ts,
the outcome was prediotable.

When atter three months their re-

port was presented, it proved to be a torceful polemic against
the very idea of a concordat. 59
The Emperor apparent17 aooepted the reasoning ot the oommision and abandoned plana tor a OOftoordat.

However, Mettern1ch

oontinued to press tor some aort ot agreement, the need tor which
was beooming inoreasingl,. presaing, as no atable organization ot
religious attaira in LombardJ'-Venetia would be worked out in its
abseftOe. 60 At length he persuaded Franci. I to authorize the
opening or informal nesotiationa through the new ambassador to
Rome, Prince Kaunitz, who was to leave tor his post in June,
1817. 61 But Nettemioh t . . . .10t01'7 was very limited in 800pe.

He

acoepted the Joaephist Oouncillor Juestel as Kaunitz's religious
adviser in the negotiations, and he had to submit h1s Instructions

58··'
Ibid., 557, Wallis to Franois I, 30 January 1817.

59-

Ibid.
60---Ibid.,
571, Mettem10h to Francia I, Februar,r 1817.
tiJ..._-

Prince Aloia von Kaunitz-Rietberg, • grandson ot Prince
Anton von Kaun1tz, the great minister ot Maria Theres., entered
the diplomatic ae"lce at an earl,. ase and held several important
posts betore being sent to Rome in 1817. In 1819 he beoame
mental17 ill, sutter1. periods ot protound depres8ion, and was
relieved trom his poat in 1820.
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tor the amb..sador to LaZaMlq "tor inspeotion and oomment. "62
How limited Mattemiohts victory really was i8 clear from
theae Instructions to Kaunitz. 63

Little trace can be round in

them ot the policies of oonci1iation and mutual ooncesaion that
the Foreign Minister favored.

The apparent purpose of the

negotiations was not to work out a stable and mutually sat istaotory settlement of Austro-Papal religious relations
to .eoure oonce.aions.

bu~

solely

The most import&ftt of the desired con-

ceaaiona were: Imperial nomination to Venetian bishoprios,
abolition of the

Ro~18~,

Papal reoognition ot the Imperial

nominee to the Arohbiahoprio ot Salzburg with the retention by
that prelate ot allot the apecial privileges ot hiB predecessors
concession to the Lombard-Venetian bishops ot the faculty ot
grantina: marriage elispenaationa in the third and tourth degrees,
and formal Papal approval for the new diooesan organization in
LombardJ'-Ven.etia, the 17rol, and Vorarlberg.

or

these points I

the greatest diffioulty w.. antioipated, correctlY,with the
Romreiae.
These oonceasions were to be obtained, not by reoiprocal
oonceaalons, but bY' playlng on the Papal tear ot a break with
Autria and by appealing to Papal gratitude tor the restoration

ot the Papal Statea.

62

An additional means was the possible visit

Ibid., IV, lQ4-12S_

63-

The.e instructions .ere 1n two parts J the tirst, in
Oerman, dealt with rel18ioua negot1ations (Ibid .. , IV, 518) J the
a.cond, in French, po11tical C1ue.tiona (IV, -;8ir).
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of Metternioh to Rome, Which would take place onlY' if thePapaoy
responded f"a'YorablY' to all the Imperial demands.

In return for

these major concessiona, Kaunitz was authorized to otfer only one
minor concession, in the secular field at that: the possible
withdrawal of the garrisons Which the Treaty at Vienna allowed
Austria to station 1n the Papal oities at Ferrara and Comacohio.
No religIous ooncessiona to the Papaoy could be considered, and
Kaunitz was to avoid if possible e'Yen discussing Austrian religious policies, especially the marriage laws. 64
Metternich was not blind to the untavorab1e impression the
Imperial attitude prescribed by the Instructions would make upon

the Papac,-.

Negotiations conducted in a spirit ot mutual eon-

ciliation such as he had adYiaed eould have appeased the religious
controversJ'J but negotiations 1n whioh Austria demanded everythi
and ottered nothing had little chance of suocess--indeed, the,.
might only utagon1ze the Papacy still tul'l'ther.

He

warned

KaUJl1tz that the religious negotiations could lead to further
disput.s that would threaten ·our sincere desire to maintain with
the Court ot Rome the moat int1mate relat10na ot confiden.e and
friendship, If but he hoped--o'Yer-opt1m1stlcally, as he muat have
known--that Kaunitzts diplomatic ability would pre'Yent this.
Above all, he warned the ambassador, he Hmuat never contuse
[religious relations] with the political relations exiStIng bet.een the Emperor and the Pope as

tempo~

sovereign ot one ot

the tirst states ot Italy. On th1a delioate nuanoe • • • hangs the
54
.
Ibid., 578, InstructioNS tor KaunitzJ 583, SUpplementary
InatrucID'iiis •

success or the negotlatlons. n65 Metternieh'8 over-riding concern
with the polItical implications of the Austro-Papal relIgious
disputes i8 here qu1te evident.
Conealv1 learned with great satisfaction of the projected

negot1e.t1ona, whioh seemed to promise a settlement or the vexing
rel1g1ous

d18pt\te~

w1th

Austria.

Moreover, such a settlement,

especially 1t 1n the torm ot a Concordat, would tit
into the overall pattern ot

Cons~vlta

a<i"n1r~l.blw

relIgious diplomaoy.

The ehief aim ot Cons&l.i '8 religious po1ic,. during his

second ministry was to revive Papal authority over the semiIndependent atate-churches under royal control which had been
set up in moat countries.
negotiate a aer1es

or

To attain this purpose he sought to

concordats with the European states by

which the Papal authority, it not completely restored, was at
Iealt Increased.

Such concordats

by

1817 had been or were being

worked out with France, Bavaria, and Naples, and negotiationa

were 1n preparatIon tor other states. 56 A ooncordat or other
agreement with AustrIa, the greateat Catholio power, would

obviously be an essential part of Consalv1 's pollo,- J eSp801ally
as it would give a good example that many other states would be
inclIned to tollOW. 57
Gradually the Secretary or state ts aattstaction evaporated

.---:----'_.,
65

Ibld., 584, Instruotions tor Kaun1tz.

60'-IV-VII.

On Consa1v1 t s conoordat polICies, see SChmidlIn, chapters

61

A. V. J R247, Leard1 to Consalvl, 23 March 1818.
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as disquieting reports began to arrive from Vienna.

The news

116

that Metternieh himself' would come to Rome only it the Papacy

seemed diSposed to accept the Austrian terms was ominous. QS
Further cause for

al&l~a

was the selection of Juestel as eccleai-

aatical adviser, for his Josephlst principles were well known.
Most serious of all was the

~~our

which the Hew Vienna nuncio,

Paolo Cardinal Leard!, reported, that Austr1a planned to (;onduct
the negotiations tlnot by way of prinoiples to be discussed but
by way of concessions to be

demanded."

Leard! added that,

8.8

usual, the "Austrian oabinet, which never wiShes to retract an
order onoe published," was unwilling to "recede from its adopbed

prinCiPles.,,69
LearcU 18 suspicions were confirmed when Kaunitz, just befvl'l8
leaving for Rome, warned him that the Emperor had a very broad
conception of his sovereign rights over the Church in his states,
and would not enter into discussion on those alleged rights or on
the prinoiples of his religious 1)01101'.70 A conversation with
Mettemieh brought no enoouragement.
the Papal 01a1ma, espeoially to the

The Prinae admitted that
!!.ornrei6e~

were well founded,

but he warned Leardi of the "danger of an absolute refusal" wh1ch

-

....

~.--..---------

68

--

A. V., ANV 246, Learcl1 to Coualvi, 21 Mq 1817 (#1).

69

Ib1d., Leardi to Conaalvi, 21 Mq 1817 (#2). Paolo
Carc1ina.rua.N1 (1161-l823) replaced Severoli in 1817 after the
latter had qual'l91led with Conaalvi. A loyal supporter of
COMalvi but interior as a. d1plomat to his predecessor, be remained nuncio until his death in 1823.

10
!b!d.,

Leardi to Consa1vi, 4 June 1817.

would allenate the Emperor and perhaps lead to the los. ot.
Austrian support in polltieal and rellglous attai".

'!'hi. would

be especially unfortunate at a moment when Francis I had at last
been persuaded to retreat

80

far from hla Joaephiat principles

as to open aagotiationa and ask as Papal Goneesslona what he had
t'o1-mer17 olaimed .. ilia righta.
negotiate "even againat ·the

The Emperor's deciSion to

ad.a. of' his

min13ters lt

ln

WaB

ltse1t', Metternloh argued,". great step t'orward.!71
Oonaalvl read theae reporta with mounting ooncern.

From

Leardi's information lt was unmistakably olear that Austrla had
no intention ot concluding

I. eoneo~at,

or even ot working out

a mutual17 satistactory .ettlement ot lmmediate problems. There
had obviousl,. been no basle chance ot policy ln the Austrian

goYemment, so that
aeanted unlikel,..

I.

.ucoe.sful concluslon ot the negotationa

Frlendahlp and co-operation between AU8trla and

the Papaq, he told Leardl jUllt betore Kaunitzt's arrival, "would

be solidl,. .stablished. • .onl,. 'When there disappears trom the
mind ot H. M. that m1ataken d1atruat towards
just and essentlal righta ot the Hol,. See,
opposed to the rlghts ot soYere1gnty."

th~

&8 1t

exercise ot the
they were

The Oardinal concluded

that 1t Austri& insisted on oonfining the negot1ations to the
oonce•• iona demanded trom the Papaoy, with no discussion or

prinoiple. or even ot reciprocal oonc.'.iona, there would
1!~~~1-7~().~ __ ~or

a tavourable outoome.

be

ConsalYl 'a "onl7 hope n

Ibid., Leardi to 00_&1'9'1, 7 June 1817.

,,_
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that "the spirit of conoiliation which animates Prince Metternlah
milbt yet lead to a favourable mod1f1oat1on of the Aus tr1an
att1tude. 72

The Cardinal'. forebodings quiokly

pl~ved

Justitied.

As

early as their first conference on 16 June, it became clear to
both Oons.lvl and Kaun1tz that the negotiat1ons were unlikely to

produc. a sat1sfactory result. T3 Consalv1 was dlap1eas~d to
obse"e that Kaunitz

lf8.8

eJttPC*ered only to request

oonc~88ions,

not to a.rra.nce a general settlement. 'but of this he had been
forewarned.

More disconcert1ng was the discover" that in return

for the sizable cone.aaiona requested, Austria ottered only one

minor temporal advantqe.

He quickly intormed Kaunitz that the

Austrian proposal' were unaat1aractory.

Not Conaalv1 ts ; anxiety

to end the relig10us cont rove ray , hi8 eagemeas to see J4ettern1ch
in Rome, bun1ts'. ve11ed threat of the withdrawal of M:ustr1an

diplomatic .upport, nor even the amb.... adol". hint. at t.. possible
schism could 1nduce him to aceept such extensive conces$10ns with
no reciprocal oompensation.
Furthermore, even had Conaalv1 '6een m1nded to
eould hardly have done so.

71el~:l,

he

Pius VII had been .erioua11 I 111 for

some weeka, and hts death was generally teared.

i

'!'he

i

ne~arnes8

ot

1'2

73

A.V., ANV 243, 00118&1v1 to Leard1, 14 June 1817.

.

This account ot the first interview 18 based on: ANV 243,
Consalvi to Learo1, 11 August 1817, a very long and detl!liled
account of the negotiation!! to that date; and Maass, IV., 586,
Kauni tz to Mettcrniah, 17 June 1617.
.
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death lntens iried ln Pius the a crupulom.tW';. lIhich of"ten troubled

him and which made him very susceptlble to the influence at the
Z,!lan~1.

The Pope refused to make any deaisiona on the negotia-

tions wlth Austria except with the advice of a speo1al congregation.

This requ1rement was not unusual for' P1U6, but as the

congregation was made up of

~elanti,

with Pacea at their head, lt

could exert a hampering influence on Consalvi t 8 conduct of the
negotlat10ns. 74
On the following day, 17 June, Kaun1tz sent Consalv1 a
"Punctuation" in whioh--af'ter much preliminary stress on the

need for Auatre-papal unity to counteract the revolutionarles-he listed. the rive chler Imperlal demands, as prescribed 1n h1B

lrustruetiona 75 Consalv! at once arranged for a meeting of the _
Congregation to consider thee. demands.

At the

~_~~_~~ti-<1omlnat.d

congregatIon the Austrian request.

encountered "une plene et entlere renitence, II as least in eo

rar

as the !!.e>mrellE! and the grs.nt or d1spenaation t'acult1es were
concerned.

In view or this oppositlon, Consalvi aBsured Kaun1tz

that "there was nothlng to be done in this respect with the Holy
Father."

All that the Cardinal could do was to hint that perhaps

~J '~rJ!,!!gbt

be willing to grant frequent dlspensations from

A. V., ANV 243, Consalvl to Leardl, 11 August 1817.

R260,

Conaalv1 to Cardinals Litta, De Pietro, Pacca, Fontana, 21 June
1817. Maass, IV, ;86, Kaun1tz to Mettern10h 17 June 1817; 591,
Kaun1tz to Metterniah 1 July 1817. Van Duer1l1, 185, Consalvi -1;0
Mettemioh, 23 June 1817; 191, Mettern1ch to Franeis I, 19 July
1317.
75
Copy with Kaunltz to Consalvi, 17 June 1817, R260.
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the trip on an individual basis to nominees who had plausible
excuses.

This ,. Kaunitz felt, would a.t leWilt diminish "the danger

of contagion with ultralilontane prillciples_,,?6
In bis offiQial reply of 23 .June to Kaunitz 'a Punotuation,

the Secretary of State, atter' first stressing his desire for

Ifuna inalterabile oonoordla." with AU5trla, declared that the
Papa0Y' wished in consequence to lIelintinate all those

unf'ol~unate

d1fferenoes on Whioh His saored dUties did nat allow the Holy
Father to remain silent."

He therefore invited Austria to open

formal negotiatiOns for a religioUfJ agreement.

Sorna

at least

of the Austrian demands, Consalvl implied, the Pope would oer-

tainly grantJ but unfortunately h1s Hsaored
him from yielding on others.

dutie8~

prevented

The speeial oongregation would

decide what aoncesaiona eauld be ~ade.77

Kaunitz transm1tted Consalvi's note to Metternieh, who was
then in Florence.

The Foreign Minister replied that "as long as

the negotiation remains in this state • • • , it is impossible for
me to come to Rome."

Only if there was a "moral certainty" that

a satisfaotory agreement wuld be reaohed eould he make the
Vi8it, and only complete papal acoeptanoe of the Imperial demands
Gould provide such oertainty.

For the sake of hi. own reputation

both at Vienna and at Rome, Metternich would not become personall

76

Maass, IV, 589, Kaun1tz to Mettern1eh, 20 June 1817 (#2).
Also, ANV 243, Consalvi to Leard1, 11 August 1817.
77
A.V., R260, Consalv1 to Kaun1tz, 23 June 1811.
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l'

committed to negotiations that
outcome.

mi~ht
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.

have an unsatisfactory

He wished to Ittout concilier" It but we was determined

that if this was
sanctioned an

at least he wuu1d not have

i~possible,

ul~ati6factory

arrangenent.

Fron Consalvita reply

it seemed the Papa.cy vwuld re,1ect i:nportant Austrian
thel"eby l1aking an agreement i"1P05Sible.
the proposal to open ,formal negotlatlons.

cuma tanoes) he

'I

pel~onall,

de~nands,

He therefore rejected
Under these 01 _ _ "-

CQuld no nothing but regret n that religioUB

problems ,\4hich Here not essentially his concern would interfere
tfith Austro-Papal understanding non other questions of the

highest interest for ROT11e .. for Vienna, and -{'or all Europe."

His

only concern was !fto defend the great politioal interests which
link our states; n 1n religious questions he was "only a

neeotiator, only an intermediary," not an independent, and he
would have preferred not to have been involved in such ~a1Jtera ~,7?

Before this reply reaahed Kaunltz .. howeve:", matters had
taken a nore hopeful turn.

Conaalvl had received Papal support

for a compror.lise: the Papacy would agree to all the Au.stl'·ian

requests, provided "II. T1. on his side does something for the

Church by removing at least a ,revl of' those very serious abuses
in eccleSiastical affairs which have been intooduced into his

states, and thus put the Holy Father in a position to justify. ,
those conaessions to which he 1s ready to consent only because
or~e ~9y~~agea

78

that would result therefronl to religion and the

Maass, IV, 590, Metternich to Kaunitz, 27 June 1811.

.
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Church~

"!9 ,A •. peeial:ootl~regat~on would be set up to determine

just what abuses should be remedied, but Consalvi felt that the
most likely Papal requests would be that the Emperor "modify the
marriage laws in Lombardy-Venetia to agree with the doctrines
of the Church, and plan in concert with His Holiness the institutions of public instruction for the clergy~1I80 A few days
later the Congregation raised the Papal terms to include, besides
the two points mentioned by Consalvi, demands that free communication between the Papacy and the Lombard-Venetian bishops be
allowed and that Bulls concerning dogma should not be subject to
the regio placet;8l
In effect, the Papacy was demanding these concessions in
return for renouncing the Romreise, for this had quickly become
the crucial Austrian demand around which the rest of the
negotiations revolved. The Austrian requests for the nominationright in Venetia and the diocesan reorganizations would be
granted by the Papacy without reciprocal concessions. The
Salzburg question seems for some reason (perhaps a desire to
simplify the negotiations by confining them entirely to Italy)
to have disappeared from these negotiations. The request for
79ANV 243, Consalvi to Leardi, 11 August 1817.
80
Maass, IV, 591, Kaunitz to Metternich, 1 July 1817.
8l Ibid ., 595, Kaunitz to Metternich, 4 July 1817. Also,
ANV 243;-ITOnsalvi to Leardi, 11 August 1817.

l~

dispensation faculties the Pope definitely refused to grant, but
this was the least important of the Austrian requests and its
refusal would not disrupt the negotiations.
The Romreise therefore became the focal point of the
negotiations. Kaunitz argued the Austrian case: the Romreise
was a source of great expense and inconvenience for the bishops
without producing any corresponding benefit; bishops of nonItalian territories did not make the trip yet were considered
none the less Catholic for that; administrative uniformity
between Lombardy-Venetia and the rest of the Hapsburg Empire
demanded the elimination of the Romreise; and as the trip was
only a matter of discipline, not dogma, there was no reason why
the Pope could not yield on it--to refuse to do so could only
stem from lack of good will towards Austria, which would no
doubt have a detrimental effect upon Austro-Papal relations. 82
Consalvi retorted that Italy was a special case because
there the Pope was also Primate and the Italian bishops therefore
stood in a special relation to him with special obligations; He
admitted that the Romreise was not directly a matter of dogma,
and that the Pope could indeed yield it under certain conditions;
however, such a renunciation would tend to "weaken de facto the
dogma of inviolable unity • ~ ~ [bY] diminishing ever more the
bonds of communication and dependence of the bishops on their
82A•V., ANV 243, Consalvi to Leardi, 11 August 1816~ Maass,
IV, 587, Kaunitz to Metternich, 20 June 1817; 591, Kaunitz to
Metternich, 1 July 1817.
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Head. tt

Only if Francis ! counte:r>acted th:'_s weakening by allowing

free cO;'1munication between the blahops anrl the Pope c()uld the

:papacy consent to give up the ROl'\Y'else.
. 83
--~.-.......

Further-1l0l e, Conaa,lvi pOinted out to Kaunitz the serious
1

consequenc~s

of the I1very grave scandal that

6.

concession so

extroaordinary • • • without any corl'espondlng concession would
produoe. II

The Papacy would universally be acc;n.med of

pal"'~ia.lity

towards Austria, and 1ta reputation would 8Urrer accordingly.

Great scandal would be given to the faithful, while rIall the
govemrnents, both Catholio and non-Catholic, would be confirrned
in their opinion that

t La COUl'

de

ROJTte 6S tuna

cour pol tronne , ft

and would be encouraged to encroach on Papal rights.

Finally,

all the other Italian princes would immediately dem.and the sallie
concession, which the Pope clluld not 10gioal1y :refuse them.

The

only way to prevent these dire eoneequenoes was for Austria to
grant the Papacy religious conoessions sufficiently advantageous
to religion and the Church as to enable the Pope to justify h1s
coneeeeions to AU8tria. 8h

Moreover, Consalvi never fa1led to stress the indisputable
right of the Papacy to require the

Ro~reiseJ

which he claimed had

been exercised without ohallenge since the days of Gregory the

83

84

A.V., ANV 243, Consalvi to Leardi, 11 August 1817.
Ibid.
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Great, and to point out that Austria had torma1ly recognized this
claim in the 9_o_~~1!~io ~i~abi~i~ ot 1784. 85
Kaunltz was impressed despite himself by Consalvi's arguments.

He was a1ao alarmed by the

~_e.!ant~,

who had "grown

prodlg10ualytf in numbers and influenoe, and Who were encouraged
1n their intransigent attitude by the very favorable conoordats
whioh many powers, notably F:ranoe, were making with the Papaoy.
They had persuaded tae Pope to dra. up

III

Bull condemning the

marriage laws and the teaching in Austrian univers1t1es, whioh
had even been prInted, "it 18 only the Cardinal Seoretary of stat
who haa been able to prevent its publication. It

'rhel'efore Kaunitz

had become tonvlnced that\the questions which have leg to the
present discussions definitely cannot remain open. n86

If a

settlerl'tent was not reached now with the eoncl11atory Consalvl,
the situation would rapidly degenerate.

Austria could expect no

more favorable settlement than that now ofrered.

For all his

good will towards Austr1a, Consalvi eould do nothing more:
"Cardinal Consalvl 1s doIng and will do the

i~o8Bible

to give

Your Highness the possibility of coming to Rome, but I greatly
fear he wl11 obtaIn nothIng trom his colleagues. • • • ,,87

The ambassador therefore sugge.ted to Metternleh that it
~i~t b~ ~CIt~_t

to agree to aome or the Papal deman.ds, espeoially

85

Ibid. lVlaa.ss) IV, 587, Kaunitz to l~etternich, 20 June 1817)
591, Kauriitz to Metternloh, 1 July 1817.
35
Maass, IV, 591, Kaunltz to Metternich, 1 July 1817 (#1).

87

!E~d~1

594, Kaunitz to Metternloh, 1 July 1811 (#2).

on the marriage laws, 1n order to reach a stable settlement.
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In

this way the bishops would at least be t'reed trom the danger ot

oontamination by

u1trL~ontane

principles sinoe they would no

longer go to Rome, and a ,reat damger to the state-church system
would thus be removed. 88 "It is exaotly as I had toreseen~"
K&unitz advised; "we will not get what we want except by taking
w1.th it what ". do not want. ,,89
Despite Kaunitz'. advice, Metternich replied to the Papal

ofter with a firm and total refusal to make any religious con' •• 810ns. 90

In all probabi11ty he would have been ~11ag ~-

self" to satis.fy aome at least of the Papal demands, but realized.
that suoh conoession. would never seoure the approval of Francis
I and his Josephist advisers.

Mette-mieh accompanied his retusal with a set ot
replying 1n detail to each of the Papal requests.

Ra~li.ttQnS'(~

The marriage

laws eould not be revoked in Lombardy-Venetia lest this upset
ad~1ni8trative unlfo~ity

with the rest of the Empire.

The

instruction of the clergy was conducted in acoord with Catholic

principles and henoe Papal intervention was unnecessary.

There

was no point to the Papal request for free co:nmunicat1on w1th
the Lombar4-Venetian bishops, for they were already free to write
to him whenevel"' they wished.

88

The

E.!~~!'.t .~gl~

was necessary even

Ibid. , 594, Kaunitz to lIJfetternioh, I July 1817 (#3).
89Ibid. , 595, Kaunitz to Metternich, 4 July 1817.
90
Ibid. , 596, Metternieh to Kaunitz, 8 July 181",.
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tor dogmatic Bulls to ensure that suoh doouments did not oontain
anything likel,. to oause strite between Ohurch and State.
&11 ot the Papal demands were unjustitied.

'!'hue,

However, as the Pope

had now admitted that it was not beTOftd the 11mits ot his conscieftCe to renounoe the Romreise, there was no reaaon wh,. he
should not do so at once. 9l
These Retlections were read to Oo_&1vi

b,. Kaunitz.

"Un-

tortunatel,.," the Ambaasador reporteci, "I cannot tell Y. H. that
the explanatlona seemed to sat1sf)' H. E. 1ft the allghteat. • • • "
The Cardlnal fouftd "une mauyals. ralson" agallWt each at
Mettern.loh's argumeftts.

COR8alvl retuaed to aocept admlniatra-

tive unlformit,. aa sutticient justitication tor the marriage
la.. J he deolared. that ideaa oontrary to Catholic dootrine had
been openl,. taught and detended at Austrian sohools tor thirt,.
Tears J he denied that the mere ability of the bishops to write
private letters to the Pope while all ofticial oorrespondence was
clos.l,. oontrol1ed conatituted senuine treedom ot correspondenceJ
and finall,. he Gould not agree that the state had any right bo
supervise dogmatiC Bulla.

To Mattemich'l argument that the Pope

had Ihown that he CQuld renounce the !omreise and hence should do
10,

OoualYi merel,. repeated his remarks on the necessit,. ot

reciprooal oompensatlon to avoid the appearanoe ot part1al1ty.9 2
Ift the taoe ot the t1rm Papal attitude Austr1a mod1fied its
91

!!!~~. A. V., ANY 243, eoualv1 to Leard1, 11 Auguat 1817.
92
Maasl, IV, 601, Kauft1tz to Mattemich, 13 Ju1,. 1817.
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demands, as klng now that the Pope, as a special f'avor in return
f'or Imperial ald in the restoration of' the Papal state, should
grant the renunciation of' the Romreise only ad ~~tam 1mperatori8,
but this too Conaa1vi rejected. 93 Kaun1tz then warned that "H.M. ~
would never allow the bishope of' the Lombard-Venetian Kingdom to
come to Rome, and atter a long vacancy 11'1 the episcopal aeea, Hia
Hollneas would have to do w1thout profit what he could now do and
place H.

M.

under an ob11gation."

COMelv1 "did not hide trom

the ambassador the strength ot this argument," but he pOinted out
that 1t would be "bued on the princ1ple of' tore." whose use
would certainly lead to open Papal hoat111ty and would diacred1t
Austria 11'1 publlc opin10n.
toreed to y1eld, it would do

Even should the Papacy t1nally be
80

only in individual cuea and

would never surrender the general principle of' the Romre1aeJ thus
Awa trla would make no permanent

gain~

In the hope of' altering the Papal stand, Kaunlt% arranged a
meetins betw.en Juaatel and Oo_elvi on 13 Jul.,..

Jueatel's

enu.meration ot the sarvices of' Prucls I to religion and the
Papacy did not move the Oardinal, who only remarked dryly that
no other atate had leglslatlon so overtly anti-Papal u Austrla.
The Counc1llor's arguments made no impression.

Conaalvi told

Juestel trankly what neither he nor Kaunitz had ever openly

93
Except where other sourcea are c1ted, the f'ollowing aocoun
of' the negotiations is bued on Co_alvi's long dlspatch to Leard
of' 11 August 1811, In A.V., ANi 243. Slnoe this dispatoh oontalna
te. speclf'lc dates, a prec1se chronology tor the negotiatlons
cannot be derived trom it.
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admltted in their dlscusslonl, that he knew the true reason for

abolishlng the

~o~rel.~

was to remove Papal influence

OD

the

blshopa, and that Rome could never agree to th1s without adequate
compenaatlon. 94
In effect, the negotlatlons ended wlth thls meetlng, and
they ended 1n fa1.lure.
off

The negotiatlona were not formally broken

because they had never been formally opened, but the tacts .'

were plaln.

It wus ole8.r' that neither side would yield and that

theretore an

~sf!

. had been reached. "I have the sorrow of

having to announoe to Y. H.," Kaunitz wrote to Metternioh on 13
July, "that I no longer hope tor anythIng from this negotIation •
• • " The Papacy would sanctIon the dioeesan reorganIzatIon and

"ould grant the RomlraatioD-right if the Kmperor asked it as a
speclal prlvilegeJ but on the other demands, the Romreise above
all, the Papacy would not yield. 95
The failure of the 1817 negotiatlons was not followed by
an open break between Austria and the Papaoy, tor the evil'· eonsequence. of a rupture were apparent and neither side had given
up

hope ot pereuading the other to modif7 its stand.

Nonetheless,

a perceptlble ohI11 was introduced into Austro-Papal relationa.
The atmosphere

or

cordiality and frIendship that had marked

1816-1817 W83 gradually replaced by mutual distrust and a sense
94

!bid.

95

Mau.,

IV .. 603. Jueatel to MettemIoh, 15 July 1817.

Maasa, IV, 601, Kaunitz to Mettemlch, 13 July 1811.
ANV 243, Conaa! vi to Leardi, 11 August 1811.
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of' gri't!vanee. Both side. felt that they had. been unfairly treated
On the Austrian sid.e there was resentment and bitterness that "so
little justice i. paid [in Romel to the magnamimoua efforts that

Our August Muter had made in 'favour of the Church, ~ whioh should
surely have entitled him to special conoessione. 96 Consalvi was
informed that "the Imperial Court haa expressed itself most
strongly agaInst the refusal ot the Holy Pather, and H. I. M. was
irrItated in the extreme by it. n97 Austrian displeasure was 8Pon
shown in more tangible fashion by the

withdraw~lof

Its aupport

for the PapacJ' In Germany', bJ' AustrIan encouragement of Bavaria
to reject ita Concordat favorable to the PapaoJ', and by pressure
on Tuscany to refuse conoessiona. 98
At the Papal oourt there was equal indignatlon that Austrla,
while uldng such extensive ooncesalons, had refused to offer
anything of value in return, rejeoting "all of the just and verr
moderate requests of His Hol1ness. n99
RelatIons between Consalvi and Mettern1eh remained apparentl
cordial.

The AUltrian miniSter gave no lign of displeasure with

ths ..!l•.:rd1na 1 ; no doubt it was olear to him from Kaunitz '8

96Ma.. s , IV, 601.
97

A.V., ANY 243, Conaalvi to Leardi, 11 August 1817.

g8

A. V., AW 246, Leardi to Consu...1, 25 Ma7 1818. ANY 243,
Coual vi to Leardi, 6 November 1817. Maul, IV, 614, Mettern10h
to Kaun1tz, 17 February 1818.

99

ANV 243, Consalvi to LeardI, 11 Ausuat 1817.
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dispatches that Consalvi had pursued a conciliatory policy during
the negotiations and had done his best to work out a settlement.
Metternieh's high regadd tor the Secretary of state survived
intact throughout the latter's life. lOO
Consalvi's att1tude towards Metternich, however, seems to
have undergone some change in the wake of these negotiations.
Consalvi's great hope in his religious dealings with Austria had
been in Metternieh fS "conciliatory apirit. t1

He had counted upon

the Prince to secure the adoption by Austria

or

policy to match hi8 own.
failed to do 80.

a conciliatory

In 1817 Metternieh had singularly

The secretary of State did not lose his personaJ

respect for the Prince or his confidence in his good intentionB;101 but his faith in Metternioh's ability to put his good
intentions into practioe must
failure to secure

any

inevitab1~

suffer from the latter's

significant modification of Austrian policy

in 1817.
The only guide to Consalvi'a attitude towards Metternieh

and Austria

failure of the negotiations is
a very brief letter of 14 July to Metternioh. 102 Conea1Yi exi~diately

after

th~

pressed his deep regret at the failure of the negotiations and
100

See Sauv1gny, 178, Instructions for Apponyi, 1820; Van
Duerm, 381, Metternich to Conaalvi, 3 September 1823, Metternich,

IV, 91.

101

See, e.g., the high opinion of Mettern10h expressed 1n
ANY 243, Consalv1 to Leard1, 6 November 1817.
102

In Van Duerm, 190.

by

imp110atien repreached Metternich fer net having adepted a
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8utticleatly cenci11atory attitude when the Cardinal had dene
everything possible on h1s part to reach a settlement. Diplematic
as ever, the Secretar,v of State retrained frem direct criticism
of Austria.

Instead, he made hi. att1tude quite clear by cen-

cluding h1s letter with an apparently irrei'evant remark: ttl
oannot refrain from telling Your Highnes8 that a special
ceur1er. • • , just arrived, haa brought the ratification of the
Concordat by the King of France."

The implied oontrast between

the generous French concessiena in the CQncQrdat and the
niggardly and anti··Papal Austrian att1tude 1n the negetiations
was clear.

A warning was alSQ implied: the Papacy CQuld find

other friends than Austr1a.

It the Emperor persisted in his

attitude, the Papacy might turn to France fQr support, tQ revive,
perhaps, the tradit1Qnal Ita11an game ef playing ott Bourben
against Hapsburg.

Censalv1 was tQ move tQwards such a revival in

1821-1823_
The implications ef this letter were not lQst uPQn
Metternich, whQ found therein a compelling argument tor the
adoption of a more moderate religious polley.

In his report tQ

Franois I on the failure lOr the negotiations (which he asoribed
to the illness of Piua VII and the growing strength of the
Zelant1 encouraged by the Frenoh Conoordat), the Foreign Minlster
outlined the course of action whieh he adVised the Emperor tQ
follow.

It was "before all else

ne~e••

ar.v to provide for the

vacant biShoprics of Lombard7-Veuetla and to obtain the Pontlfio

sanct10n for the new diocesan divisions • • • 1 this done, a
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more fa.vorable moment could. be awaited for the examina.tion of the

other Q.uestions in dispute. II Kaunltz should therefore be ins tructed to ooncentrate on these meaauree.

As for the Romreise.

he suggested that the Lombar-d-Venetian bishops should be secretlY'
ordered to approach the Pope ind1viduallY', eaoh stressing "the

personal obstacles, such as age,

lack of financial

inri~aity,

resources, Wh1ch make It impossible ror

hi~n

to go to Rome in

person, and hellust in oonsequenoe beg His Holiness to accept his
excuses. 11

The Pope would no doubt grant these individual dis-

pensations, provided the prinCiples of the
attacked.

Thus the

Ro~reise

~~ise

was not

oould be avoided without antagon-

izing the Papacy until a rnore favorable tinte oarne to resu'ne discussions.

In the interim, however, it was essential that

lIW(}

avoid new subjects for :nlsunderstanding with the pontifical court.
This implies above all else suspending the publication of any new
eoclesiaetical ordinance in the

Lo~bard-Venet1an

Kingdom. • • • «

This policy was "the sole Jleans of mitigating somewhat the un-

favorable

i~pression

that could be produced by

th~ oo~parison

between the friendly relations of Spain and France with the
Roman court and those of Austria with that

COUl~.

This rapprooh-

ment (between Ro:ne and the Bourbons] could produce gra.ve dal'l'}age
to our political intereste.,, 103
__
The

Emp~ror

agreed grudgingly to his minister's suggestions,

103
Van Duerm, 191, Metternich to FranciS I, 19 JulY' 1811.
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but only, he .U oareful to .4ate, beeauae "all the eeelestaatic

ordinance. of m7 other statea have, I thInk, already been pubThe Emperor's agreement was therefere no sign
that he had been won over to Mattemich's policy of moderation. 1
lished in Ital,.."

The following year saw improvement in neither Austro-Papal
relations nor religious conditIons in Austl·la.
of the

nomination~rlght

The Papal grant

in Venetia, intended by the Papaoy as a

conoi1iator,y move, had the opposIte effect: the

Rmpe~or

was much

irritated that the Bull of concesston should insist on the necessity of the Ro'nrtise. 105 Austrian resentment found expression in
enoouragement given the Bavarian

gavern~ent

to repudiate its

reoent oonoordat, whose favorable provisions contrasted strongl,.
with the Austrian polioies.

This threat to one of his moat

notable achieveaents greatly angered Consalvi, and he protested
bit;terly to Vienna.

He did not, hm'lever, blane Metternich, but
rather the Josephist advlaers of the Emperor. 106
Nor was there the slighest evidence of a more moderate
rellgioU8 policy in the E;npire.

Papal or heretiaal teaohIng, of

Instanoes il1ultiplied of antianti-Pape~

books, and of. constant

government interference in religious affairs.

At the alose of

1817 Leard!. submitted a discouraging report on religious conditions I wh1ah could serve to sUi'lmarlze the disappointment of'

104

Ibid., Deci8ion of Francia I
105A.V •• R247. Leard.1 to Consalvl, 28 December 1817.
106
A.V •• R247, Leard! to Consalv!. 19 November, 28 December
1817, 6 February 1818.
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Conaalvita hopea:
The hope had been entertained that the Emperor • • •
would be induced by the favourable dispositions
of ministers convinoed of the ne~e.8ity of remedying
the most serious disorders. in relig10us affairs to
mOVe aw~ trom his pretended r~lts and to restore
to the Church little by little its liberty and independ.ence. There was also hope that, oonsidering
the very poor results of the requests sent by
H. I. R. A. M. to the Holy Father, all the bl~~
would fall upon his evil advisers, and they would
be disgraoed. Finally, there was a strong inclination to hope that the political interests of H. M.
would lead him to forge strong bondo with the Holy
See • • • • The sequel, however, has not corresponded
to these hopes.

The Emperor's attitude towards the Papacy was definitely hostile.
Metternich oould not even persuade him to send the Pope a formal
letter of thanks tor the nomination-right.

The influenoe of the

Josephists was supreme: "ever'Tthlng • • • show the predominance
over the mind of H. M. ot his evil counsellors."

Metternioh

"till lavored moderation, but he "laments that H. M. does not
apeak to him about relIgious affairs, and complains that no
bishop of the Monarchy haa the courage to tell H. M. the truth.
All are afraid and all obey his orders."

Those few ministers,

Mettern10h at their head, who opposed Josephinism were d1scouraged and tended to lapse into dtspairing apathy: they flare
aware of the eVil, but say that there is no remedy, that it is
neces8aI7 to temporize, and thus nothing is done. ff

There was

thus little effective resistance to the Josephists who "are
seeking in every way to put into efrect the principle of Joseph
II that one can be Catholic
Roman. \I

(~,

schlsm*tie) without being

Their latest move was to "insinuate" to the Emperor that

,...
he should demand from the Papacy the right to nominate the

Archbishop ot Salzburg, the retention by that prelate of all h18
former privileges, and hie apPointment as Patriarch of Germany.
"And God only knows where these demanda will end, tI LeaI'dl Qoneluded in despair. IO?

Evidently th$ Josephists were 3ueeeaaful in their
"ins Inuatlons," fc,r in Msrch,

to Conaalvi: that H.

r-1.

l81~.,

K£'1..l.nl tz presented two de:nands

be allowed to no'ninate the Archb1shop

of' Sa.lzburg ana all30 the b1ahops of Gurck, Seggau, Lavant, Trent,
and Br1xen, and to all the canonicates and

sees; and tha.t the Archbishop

~tatn

prebendarie~

o~

tho3e

all or hie extensive former

privileges, especiall,. that of.' giving canonical instltutilm to

his suffraga.n biehop3 of Gurek, Seggau, and Lavant. 108 The
demand that the Archbishop

b~

made Patriarch of Ger:-:18,ny had

evidently been dropped .• but the conceas"tons

de~-1anded

were in

the1"1selves sufficiently destructive of" Papal autho!'ity.

The

prl vl1eges or the Archblnhop l1ere very extens iva: if his :f:'ull

elal:ns were ree··)gnized, he

~'lould

dependenee from the Holy See. ~l09

be in a "state of virtual InThese special privileges v·.rere

a relic or the

pre--Napol~onic

era, T:lhen the Al"chbishnp had been

an independent

~ccleedastical

prince or considerable importance.

107

Ibid., Leard:: to Cons a,lvi , 28 December.' 1817.

November-rBI7, 6 February 1818.

Also, 19

108

Ibid., Conaalvi to Leard!, 2 April, 17 June 1818.
109Ib~., 17 June 1818.

The virtual independenoe ot the German ecclesiastioal prinees
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had long been a source ot worry to the Papao)", but Consalvi was
yet more reluctant to see the Arohbishop exercising his full
powers and privileges 11' at the

ea~ ~lme

he was to be nominated

by the Emperor and thus under Austr1an influenoe.

However,

partly as a oonol1!atorT move, partly because inoreasing disorder
1n the Arohbishopr1c (which had been vaoant since 1814) made a
rap1d settlement neoe8S&r7, the Papacy was willing to otter a
oompromise of the

I~per1al

request8.

The Emperor was given his

choice of two alternat1ves: the Imper1al nomination of the
Arohbishop, who would then be deprived 01' all his special
privilegesJ or the preservation 01' the status quo, leaving the
ArchbIshop with all his privileges but elected by the metropolitan chapter of Salzburg. 110
Th1s ohoioe d1d not satiafy Austria, whleh oontinued to
press for Ita original demands in full. lll When the Papaoy stood
firm, the Austr1an attItude,
became definitely hostIle.

0001

aince the previous Bummer,

The Papaoy reeelved unwe100me proof

ot thi8 When Austr1a oeased to support the Papftoy 1n its struggle

with the Prote.tant prince. of the Rhineland over control of the
Church in their atate•• 112 Questioned by Leardi, Counoil1or
Huda~_~11ed

110

bluntly that Auatri& had withdrawn its support

Ibid., 2 April, 17 June 1818.

111----A.V., ANV 243, Consalvi, to Leardl, 17 June 1818. ANY

246, Leard! to Consa1vi, 8 August, 1 September 1818.
112
On this struggle see Dorunldl1n, 306-318.

to show its displeasure at the Papal attitude on Salzburg and
the

~~.
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and at the recent oonoordats whose principles were

contrar,y to those held at Vienna.

Hudellst did not oonoeal the

joYi of his gcvern-nent at the difficulties whioh the Frenoh and
Bavarian Conoordats were encountering.

Summarising the Austrian

attitude ~ Leardi ooncluded that "everything consIdered, one would
.~

th&t this Imperial court would with pleasure see Rome

humiliated and almost on its knees imploring support and proteotion.
The behaviour of Auetria in regard to Sa.1zburg marked

another stage in Consalvi's disillusionment with the A'1.l8trlan
alliance.
lS11

Hitherto, even during the most

negotiations~

~ing

part of the

ennaa1vi had carefully preserved a tone of

m.oderation in his letters and dispatohes.

The Cardinal's letters

to I.eardi on the Salzburg question Mark the first 1"la,10r departure
from th:ts moderation.

Evidently his patience had worn thin, or

his faith in Austrian reasonablenes8 had evaporated.

The

Cardinal bitterly oondemned the 'tunreasonable demands It of" Austria

whioh, unsat1afied by the "very generous" Papal
contInued to make new

de~ands

eon~es!!lons,

upon the Papaey with the obvious

a1m of secur1ng oontrol over the Churoh by Itsmall 1neens1ble
degrees_ nl14 Consalvi was determined to oppose theee unending
113
114

A.V., ANY 246, Leardi to eonaalvi, 25 May 1818.

A.V., R247, Consalvi to LeardI, 2 AprIl 1818.

.
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demands,for 7ielding would onl7 enoourage atill further demands,
until 1n the end the Papal authority would vaniSh. 115
This blunt oriticism is the more significant 1n that
Consalvi knew that the Austrian

~overnMent

would at once

leal~

of it, for his correspondence with the Vienna nuncio was regularly interoepted by the Austrian pollcy.llS Either the Cardinal

was

80

annoyed that he n') longer ca.red lr Austria lee.rned of his

opinions,

or~·-("Jne

suspects - . he deliberately used this means of

informing Vienna of Papal displeasure.
Dete~nlned

to

st~nd fl~

but hoping to avoid an open

b~ak,

Consalvi appealed once again ror the intervention of MetterniohJ
and cnoa again he was disa.PPointed.
mitted to Leardi that the "Holy

~ee

but there was nothing he could do.
Emperor

\f8.8

The J?oreign Mln:'-ster B.d ...

has

~uch ~ight

on its Side,"

In religious affaire the

entirely under the influence of the Josephiste, who

"constantly insinuate to the sovereign that he must uphold all the
inherent rights of the Archbishopric. ,,117
This was the last time the.t Consa,lvi appealed to flfetternich
to use his

lnfluen~e

to moderate Auatrian religious policy.

Nor

after this incident can there be found 1n the Cardinal's correspondenoe any more of those expressions of ccnfidence in
Metternich and hope tha.t he would be able to a.lter the religious

----'115---·-Ibid., Consalvi to Leard1, 17 June 1818.

1J.6----See Chapter V, below.
117

A.V., R247,

I~ard1

to Consalvi, 4 July 1818.
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po1ioies of the Emperor, expressions which had been oommon 1n
1815-1817.

It would seem that Consa1vi's disillusionment with

Metternich, whioh had begun durins the 1817 negotiations, WII
completed during the 8Ul'1U1ler of 1818.

An important prop or

Auatro-Papal co-operation was weakened thereby.
Despite continued Austrian pressure, Consalvi refused to
make fur.ther conoessions in the Salzburg affair. ll8 As Auatria
did not 1easen its demands, no settlement could be reached.
Austrian

i~itation

at this 1mpasse showed 1tse1f in venomous

oritioism of Consa1v1 by h1gh offioia1s of the Imperial oourt. 119
The Secretary of State was 1noreasing1y annoyed by this oontinual
criticism, which attributed to him the blame for the deterioratio
of Austro-Papa1 relations.

In Ootober his pent-up resentment,

not merely against this slander, but against the Whole oour.. of
Austrian policy, burst forth in a bitter, eloquent letter of
pl'Oteat to Mettern1oh:
I am oonvinced that everything whioh has been done
at Rome for a long time in regard to the wishes or
the Court of Vienna, except tor a tew thIngs whioh
f0'r the soundes t reaaom His Holiness could not do.
must have been to the satistaotion of that court
• • • .All that coul.d be done has been done. • • •

-

I am too frank and loyal to hIde from Your
Highness that the ohange of sentiment to the Roman
government J and the unjust and bitter remarks
aga1nst its oonduct manifested tor some t1me by

lIS

A. v., ANV 246, Leard! to Consalv1, 8 August.. 1 S~ptember,
11 NoveMber 1818.
119
~.?isl:., Leard1 to Consalv1, 18 August, 1 September 1818.
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persona attaohed to the Imperlal oourt I have made a
deep impreaslon on me • • • • To have to earr,r
a.lmost the whole world on 'rry shoulders here J to be
made an objeot of slander as a man who does not hold
to principles; to be accused of laxity, because
within the proper lirlits I try to adapt myself to
modern ways J to al~o~e hatred as a supposed Austrian
partisan) ana after all this, instead of finding in
those attached to Austria. defenders and supporters, to
discover in them unjust crities and • • • ealumlnatore,
I confess to Your Highness that I cannot enduI~ it and
that I am deeply hurt by it. • • • r will tell Your
Highness frankJl:y tha.t were it not fOl' the unbounded
attachment which links me to His Holiness, I would
alrGaay have retired from the ministry I and that if
God should ~~)~ me survive thl. Pope, whioh I do not
deSire, then, not owing to Pius VIII what lowe to
Pius VII, I wo\~ld have no t'urther reason to prefer his
service to rny repose, and I would. certainly retire from
a position which yields me noth1ng but oalumnious
aecusation and bitterness • • • • What could be more
fal •• than tor me to be accUlJed ot refusing everything
to Austria and never doing anything for her satisfaction?120
This letter is of 1nterest because it reveal. the intense
frustration and resentment which had been produoed in Consalvi
not merely by recent critioism, but by the trustrating and disappointing attitude of Austria sinoe 1817.

The emotions of

resentment and grievanoe whieh mark this letter had been building
up for well over a year; Austrian slander was only the last
straw.

Consalvi had s1noerely- wished Austro-Papal co-operation

and had done everything possible to realize it, he had followed
policies in the Papal states

f~vourable

to Austria, he had

persuaded the Pope to grant Austria substantlal concesslons, he
had restrained the anti-Austrian efforts of the ~~~~--and hi.
._-Van Duerm, 206, Consalvi to Metternich, 1 October 1818.

----1.-~1r--

lL~2

reward for

th~_8

'tT8.8 slanderous criticlsrn and en utter f.ailu·re on

the Pfl,rt of I\ustrta to adopt an eq""a.lly oonciliatory policy.
Little wonder that he felt

:tn~ured

e.nd aggrievec 1

Metternich--50mewhnt astonished at this outburst of eMotion
from the usually reserved a.nd self'-c0ntrolled C:?rdlne.l--rep11ed
with soothing worcs that were at the se.rne tl",e a covert apology
and explflnatiot') of his railure to

mo~erate

P·ustrian religio\ls

poliey:

I am happy to render full Justice to all the nuances--

beos,use they

~U"e

el'l11~htened--th8,t

you have super-

imposed upon the attitude of the Holy See.

the.t Y. H. has done B.nd all that

I know all

\r~hlch

you could not
do-~all that you wish ann all that you do not wish.
Yo,-} have, Monseigneur, like all ministers, a 1i"il.ited
authority; mine i8 the same. I can do mueh goodJ I
try to do itJ but I cannot do eveTything . • • •

After praising COMalv! 's "enlI&htened. and conoiliatory spIrIt"

ana disavowing any ctlticiam of him or of the Papaoy, the Prinoe
concluded with a

piec~

of new. designed to enoourage the CardInal.

The long-anticipated visit of the Emperor to Rome, on which
Vienna ha.d blown now hot now cold tor the last year, waa definitely to take plaae at Aaster of 1819.
desirable purpuse

oi'

This would aerve the

putting an end to thl! Wide-spread rumours

ot an Austro-Papal break. !lIt is not 5ufficient, II r1etternlch
declared, "that governments be on an intimate footing, this 1s
an age 'ilhen it is useful that the people be not deceived as to
the nature of the relations which exiet.

I apply thiS principle

to our relatlona with the Court or Rome ••• • "121 143
Conltalvi and Pius were most pleased by thls nen, whloh

eapeciall~

ofrered the prospect or settllng Austro-Papal dlsputes by diaous8iona "at the 8ummlt." Suoh d18cus8ions were not
Austrian plana, however.

part

of the

HH. M. de8ires, n Metternlch explalned

to Kaunitz, "that the joy he wl11 experience on tinding himself
reunited with the Holy Father, whioh he 18 oonfident the latter
shares,

be pure

and unalloyed.

He deSires that his st..,. in the

Capital of the Chrlatlan World be marked only by reciprocal
testimonies or a contidence and agreement between the two
sovereigna so well established that the oriminal hopes ot the
enemi.s ot public order wl11 be contounded thereb7."122 Disoussion ot Austro-Papal disputes was to be ayoided, partly
because the Josephists teared Papal influence upon the Emperor
might lead to Austrian ooneesllona, partly "to preyent either
ot the sovereigns trom havlng the displeasure of not obtainlng
from the other ••• What he would 11ke. n123 A serlous dlspute
bet..e. Pope and Emperor 1n their pel'8onal conversatlona could
more than undo all the good that would otherwise be aocompllshed
by the Imperial Visit.
Instead ot dlscussiOnl or Auatro-Papal disputes between
Pius VII and. Franois I, Austria proposed that Kaunltz and
121
Van Duerm, 212, Mettemich to Conaa1vl, 17 october 1818.
122
Maass, IV, 611, Metternioh to lCaunltz, 24 February 1819.

123

A. V., AlW 248, Leardl to ConsalYi, 27 December 1818.

Consalvl resume negotlatlons
Salzburg and the

~omreise,

Oft

the two outstandlns problema,
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wlth the aim ot settllng them betore

the arrlval ot Francls I In Rome.

It a settlement could not be

worked out then, th.se questlona should
the Emperor'. departure. 124

be

lett open untl1 atter

Conaalvl agreed to these proposals, but hls increaslng dlstrust ot Auetrla waa evldent In hls comments to Leard.1:
I tear that th1a [the project tor negotlatlons] wl11
create a new souroe or sorrow tor the HolY' See. • • •
I cannot help toreseelnc that there wl11 be attached
new demands and new prete_10M J and II Ince the way In
whlch theY' wl11 want to dlscusa eccleslastlcal aftalrs
wl11 oertainly Dot be oura, the prinoiple protessed in
the Austrolan atates belng too well known, the HolY'
Father has theretore every reason to tear that [theae
negotlations] ••• wlll be a new source ot aftllctlon
tor the Holy 8ee. 125
On

thls oocaslon, however, Conaalvl 's apprehenslons were

not entirely jWlti.f'ied.

When the Imperial proposals were pre-

.ented by the charge#d1attaires, Chevaller William Gennotte
(x&unltz being 111), It vaa evident that Austria had been sUftlclently impressed by the tlrm Papal stand to moderate Ita
demanda.

Imperlal oppositlon to the !omreise was contlnued, but

in a modifled torm.

The Emperor would agree to accept the

prlDclple ot the !omreise, and would allow "the flrst blshop
nominated in the Lombard-Venetlan Kingdom atter each acceaalon
to the Imperial throne, and llkewls. atter eaoh acceaslon to the
124
Maass

Ibld., A.V., lta47, Leardl to Conaalvi, 2 Feb:ruar;y 1819.
IV, 617, Mattemleh to Kaunltz, 24 February 1819.
125
A.V., ANV 2·~JL Conaalvl to - a
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Pontifical sovereignty, to make this trip • • • • In return, the
Holy Father would engage himself and his auocessors to dispense
the other bishops. • • from this obligation. tt
As

for Salzburg, Austria had deoided to aooept the compromis

offered by the Papacy.

Of the two alternatives presented, the

Emperor ohose the status quo--the Archbishop should retain all
his privileges but ahould be elected by hiB chapter, not the
Emperor.

However, Prancis I asked one modification of the

atatus quo: he felt that he should have the privilege of nominatiug to all the oanonicatea, prebendaries, and other dignities of
the metropolitan chapter as their patron, since he proposed to
endow them on a very lavish scale. 126
The explanation for this moderation of Austrian demands ia
not difficult to find: the Imperial government wished to settle
these disputes with the Papacy and had at length realized that
only if it moderated its terms could this be accompliahed. 127
If the Austrian government had indeed, held the opinion that "La
cour de Rome est une cour poltronne" which could be bullied into
submisaion, Conaalvi's firm stand on the Romreiae and Salzburg
had evidently disabused it of the notion.
More moderate though the Austrian proposals were, they were
atill not aoceptable in their entirety.

The Austrian propoaal

l2g---..---Maass, IV, 617, Metternioh
ANY 24_, Consalvi to Muzi, 2 April
127
Maua, IV, 617, Mettern1ch
A.V., ANV 244, Consalvi to Muzi, 2

to Kaunitz, 24 February 1819.
1819.
to Kaunitz, 24 February 1819.
April 1819.

on the Romreise, though it conceded the principle ot the trip,
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would to a large extent have eroded ita 8ub8tance, and the PapaCY'
was as determined as ever to preserve thla link between Rome and
the LOmbard-Venetian bishopa.

Not all the eloquenoe with which

Gennotte repeated the standard argumenta aga1nst the Romretse
could move Conaalvi to yield on thia point. 128 The Cardinal 1n
turn replied w1 th all the arguments he bad used a 0 otten aince

1816: the ancient and incontestable right of the Holy See, the
£onventl~ ~cabl~ls

&8

or 1784, the speclal position or the Pope

Primate ot Italy, "the eertainty or having in the ruture to

grant the aame conce.sions to all the other Italain sovereigns,"
and the acandal that would be given both to the mass ot the
faithful and to their rulers. l29 Atter a week ot tutile dlscU8110n Gennotte had to report a total lack ot suocesa. 130 On 15
March Consalvl formally rejected the Austrian propoaal. 131
More 8atlafactor" to all concerned .aa the termination of
the Salzburg question.

The Papacy, pleased that AUltria had

cholen to malntaln the status quo, agreed. to give the Bmperor
the rlght of nominatlng to those dignltiel of the Salzburg
chapter to which the Pope had traditlonally nomlnated. However,
128 Maas., IV, 620, Gennott. to Metternlch, 11 March 1819.
ANY 244, Conaalvi to Muzl, 2 April 1819.
129
Ibid., AIBo, Maass, IV, 623, Conaalvi to Kaunltz, 15
March 1819:--

~--=---X--"--

130

131

Maua, IV, 627 J Gennotte to Mettern1ch, 16 March 1819.
Ib1~.,

623, Consalv1 to Kaunitz, 15 March 1819.

,

the Archbiahop and his auffragan would continue to nominat"e to
thoae dignitieB to which they had
ot nom1nat1on. 132

p~vioU81y

1 1

pOBBessed the right

The Emperor declared himselt completely satisf1ed wIth the
Salzburg settlement and praIsed Consalvi for the "enlightened
efforta" by whIch he had contributed to settling thia questIon. 13
As

for the

!~mreia.,

the Emperor, though displeased by the Papal

atand, declared that he would not make it an "objet de
reorimlnat1on,"
Papacy.

&8

he deaired to 1mprove relations with the

Francia theretore accepted the princIple of the

~omreise,

but planned 1n the future to request frequent d1epensatiora for
indIv1dual blShOPS.lj4
With theee nesotlat1on. there ended at last the religious
controversy which had arieen from the Imperial

~.

( attempt to

extend Joaephin1em into the newly-acquired territories.

In

dealing with this attempt, Consalv!'s policy of mixed conciliatI0
and firmness had been as euccessful .. was POSSIble under the
eircumetaneea.

Givea the prevailing political and religious

ide.. of the age, some degree of Imperial control over the church
in thoe. territories was inevItable so long as they remained
under Austr1an control. Coualvi had recognized this fact J the
1 32-----ANY 244, Oo_al"i to Must, 2 April 1819. MaaaB, IV, 620,
Gennott. to Metternlch, 11 Maroh 1819.
133
Maass, IV, 628, Mettern1ch to Gennotte, 20 March 1819.
Alao, ANY 244.
134
Ibid., Alao, Maase, IV, 629, Metternich to Francia I,
11 July 1819.
0

Zelant1 apparently did not.

Yet, continued Papal influence

148

over the Church 1n Lombardy-Venetia had been assured by Consalvl'
long fIght for the

~omre18e,

wh11e Imperial control of a vir-

tually independent Archbishoprio of Salzburg had been avoided.
Furthermore--a crucial point for Consalvi--these aima had been
aohieved without provoking an open break with Austria, Which
would have been the moat likely result had the intransigent
polieiea of the Zelanti prevailed.

CODSal vi therefore had reuon

to feel that his polieies had been justified.
However, the more fundamental question of the status of
the Church in Austria proper stIll remained, and here all the
efforts of Consalvi and Plua had tailed to secure any signifioant
improvement.

The long··awaited ImperIal visit offered. an oppor-

tunity to alter this state of attairs.

'!'hen the Pope would be

able to explain direotly to the Emperor the need to modify the
state-church system.

It 8eemed likely that Francis I, sincerely

religious at heart, would be much influenced bY' this personal
a.ppeal, the

MOl!"e

so as he would not then be surrounded by his

Joaephlst advisers.

Such hopes might be further encouraged bY'

certaln indications that, the Emperor himself was becoming more
favorably disposed towards the Papacy_

The modltioation ot

Imperla1 demands during the 1819 negotiations, the aeeeptance

ot the principle ot the !tomre1se" the Emperor'. plan tor reform
1n the Austrian religious orders,135 and finally hls decision to

135

A. V •• R260, Leard1 to Consalvi, 5 Febru8.I7 1819.

\

come to

ROl1e

149
despite Joaephist opposition, all seemed to indioate

some modification of his attitude towards the Papacy.13 6
Francis I arrived in Rome on 3 April 1819 and spent some
two weeks there as the guest of the Pope.

In between public

celebrations and guided tours of the city, Pope and Emperor found
time to discuss the state of the Church in the Empire. Apparently,

no record of their conversations has been preserved. Fortunately,
it i8 not dIfficult to form a fairly accurate idea of the topics
which they discussed by studyIng the report! and memorials which
Pius ordered to be drawn up for his infor:nation in preparatIon
for the Imper1al VIBit. 131 Especially useful for this purpose
1s a. sUJ'mnary of the most objectionable Austrian mee.surea whose

revocation the Pope was to request from Francis I and whIch, it
seen. likely, he did In fact bring up during the dlecU8s1o~~.138

The seven points discussed in this summary (which are also
the points most frequently nentioned in the other material in
this file), most of which had long been the subject

or

Papal

compla1nt, were:

--~36

-

Maass, IV, 142-143; V, Chapter I, holds that this change
in the Emperor'. attitude took place only atter the visit to Rome,
Whioh was its cause. It aeems more 11kely, however, that _hange,"',,:
had 1n tact bepn aome tIme berore, tor the reasons given abov••
Maass (V, 8-12) oonsiders the Imperial reforms in the religious
orders as s1gnifioant evidenoe or the Emperor's ohanging attitude
atter h1a meetlng With Plus; however, the Emperor had already
planned the reforms before his v1sit to Rome (R26o# 5 Feb. 1819).
137
A considerable quant1ty of this ~ateri&l is to be found
in R250, tascio I, 1819, ino1uding reporta and opinions on auoh
points as the marrIage laws, teaching) and state or the clergy,
and oopies or the pertinent AustrIan edicts and laws.
138
A.V., R260, Innovazioni della Corte Austri&oa, delle qual
i1 B.P. non puo dispenaarai cia! ohi.dame la 1"8VOO&, 1819.
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1) !lint and foremost, the marr1age laws, long the chief subject
of Papal lndtgnation.

2) The "system

o~

instruotion in the Universities and sohools,"

whieh "inoludes a great number of theses which are taught and
defended. • • containing dootrines pervez-se or condemned. «139
3} The "Inperial prohibit1on of the introduction of certain

brief.," espec1ally

~uetore~ r!~e!

issued against the Synod of

Piea by Pius VI.
4) The

I~perlal

irJi8tenee that all Bulls and other Papal

documents receive the

E!~cet

regia before they might be admitted

into the Empire.
S) The prohibition of appeals to the Pope by Austrian subjects

in religious eases.
6) The new oeremonial for the installation of bishops, object1on-

able beeause it stressed the duties of the bishop to the state

rather than those to the Papacy.
~)

Imper1al rules for the instruction and ordination of nOVices,

objectIonable because they involved the teaching of Joseph18t
principles, and because it was the duty of the Church, not the
State', to regulate these matters .140
In all probab1lIty, these Imperial policies (and especially

the first five) were the points discussed

by

Pius VII with the

The Importance ot these personal dacus.lona must not

Emperor.

l-,g-- ----Maass, IV, 631, lists a large

140

1819.

n~~ber

ot such theses.

A.V., R260, Innovazlonl della corte &ustrlaca • • • • ,
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be under-rated.

In the wordB of"

r~aas8:

The Pope sald v1rtual1,. noth1ng that was new to
the monarohj but 1t was ot decisive importance
that he said it, that he had broken through the
magic circle of the rational1st court, and that
what the,. had presented as pr1mitive Christian
doctrines, he had branded as uncatholic, and had
thereby been able to plant the first doubts about
the correatnesa of' the Josephist St~ie.flhuroh
theory in the soul of the monaroh.
The Emperor waa undoubtedly greatly impressed by his d1soussions with Pius VII, and according to Metternich he "arrived
at an understanding" with the Pope on re11gious quest1ons. 142
The oritical quest ian was how long h1s favorable att1tude towards
the Papacy would survIve after his return to Vienna, where he
would once again be surrounded by those Josephist adv1sers to
Whose influence he had so long been susceptible.
For some time atter h1s visit to Rome, the conduct ot
Francis I gave the Papacy grounds to hope that a definite improvement in the Imperial attitude had taken place.

Shortly

after his return to Vienna the Emperor broke with long Joseph1st
tradition by agreeing to a Papal request to admit the Redemptorist'order into his territorlas. 143 Of much greater significance
in ita implications was the Imperial decision in 1820 to admit
the Jesuits who had been expelled from Russia and allow them to
~-i4l---~---

Maass, IV, 143.

142

143

Mett~rnioh,

III, 3-5, Note.

Maus, V, 1-8

work in the Empire.
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As devout oha'11plon..«J of Papal authority and

inveterate foes or the state-church, the Jesuits had long been
anathema. to the Josephists; the Imperial deoision, to re-admlt

into the F..mpire theref'l)re indicated a. '11ajor departure from

them

tradItional Joaephist concepts on the part

or

Franoi3 1.144

A more ravorable Imperial attitude to Papal proteeta now
beeame evident.

In Maroh of 1820

I~ardi

felt oompelled to

protest strongly to Metternieh against the "scandal or the
theses upheld at the Catho1ia University of Vienna.,,145 D18regarding the advioe of the Jogephist Lazanzky that there was

nothIng oontrary to Catholic doctrine in these theses, the
Emperor decreed that in the future all theo1ogica.1 theses must
be submitted to the looal bishop for approval. 146
Later in the sa...'TIe year Leardi was warned by "trustworthy

Per3ons" that the Austrian government planned to introduce into
the

Lo~bard-Venetian

seminaries the objectionably anti-Papal

i3ystem of instruction found in the other provInces.

The nuno10

proteeted to Metternich and Francis I, and the project was
quietly dropped. 141

144

Ibid., Chapter IV, A.V., R247, Leard1 to Consalvi, 12
July, 14-XUgust, 17 A\~t, 28 Auguat, 31 August, 10 September.
9 November, 20 November, 16 December 1820.

145

A. V., .MlV 24 J4, Leardi to Conaalvl .. 11 Il'farch 1820, with
copy of Leardl f s note of protest to Metternioh.

146
1820.

Maass, V, 1t-7. A.V., R247. Leard1 to 00naal.,.1, 29 Apr11

147
A. Y., ANV 247, Leard1 to Conaalvl, 17 Ootober 1620.
ANY 244. Conealvi to Leard1, 18 November 1820.

The extent and th& limitationa or the change in the

153

Imperial attitude were illustrated when in Janu&r;y', 1820, a
Papal Congregation placed on the Index the

!~h~_r!:~~~ juri~

ecclesiastici Austriaci of Rechberger and the Institutiones
_~

..... _ _ ,

••

_'"

... _ : I t

"".. _ ...

~

-,~

_ _ _ _, - " _ _ _

~i8tori8.E! !~!!.le.si_as~~8J!. ~f ~~~~~~r. 148 '!'hes. weN the
standard texts, the rormer on eanon law, the latter on ohurch
history, W!ed in Austrian sohools.

Both were permee.ted with

Jos.phiet prinolple., and the condemnation of these works was
an implicit condemnation or those

prlncl~1.8

which were the

foundatIon ot the state-churoh system.
This wider implIcation or the condemnation was at onee

perceived by Gennotte, a zealous Joseph1st.

He promptly pro-

tested to Consalv! that It constituted "a sort ot manifesto
agaInst the Austrian Ian" oontral")" to the "assurances whIch he
[ConsalVi] haa otten given me that he wanted a system ot ealm
and moderation • • • • "
The Secretary of State replied that he had no responsibilIty
for the condemnation, Which had been carried out by the Congregation ot the Index without consulting him.

No doubt the

Congregation had had "puissana motirs" tor its action, and after
all,

h~

pointed out, only the texts had been condemned, not the

AustrIan legi3lation as a whole as the
have preferred.

Zel~E_t..~

would no doubt

In any oue, hi. influence over Pius VII in

religious affairs ... deolining while that of the Zelanti grew

-·-"~--·-nB-·--<--·

On the condemnation of these works J

Chapter III.

- l5Iee MaU3, V,

steadily, and he "could not Answer for what they might i'lring
from (the Pope] in

8.

moment of weakness • • • • n
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Conealvi refused

to enter into further discussion of the condemnation, so Gennotte

could only await further instructions from Metterniah. 149
It seemed that another round of religious controversy was
about to begin.

Certainly, a few years before, such a Papal

oondemnation would have 8,roused the Emperor to vigorous protest.
If no such oontroversy developed in 1820, it was because of the
ohange in Franeis I 'a attitude.

The Emperor did not make the

condemnation a subJect for protest .. but merely ordered the preparation of revised texts to replaoe the older ones.
sinoe he did not speeifioal1y

~ntlon

the two

However,

oonde~ned

works,

they continued in use for some years. ISO
Consalvi was not overly impressed by What he ealled, rather
contemptuously, "thea. minor improvements II in Austrian relIgious
policy.151 After all, none of the major Papal grievanoes bad
been removed

by

them, nor had they affeeted the essence of the

state-church syetem.

The CardInal fa attitude mingled mild. hope

arising from the Emperor'. recent moderat1on with the strong
distrust that was a 1egaey of hie dea11ngs with Austria in 18171818. Franois I had been a stout defender of Joseph1niam too
--1"49----- .
Maass, V, 174, Gennotte to MetternIoh, 5 February 1820.
150
ILio., 52-58.
151--'-'

A.V., ANY 244, Consalv1 to Leardi, 20 December 1820.

long, it aeemed, to abandon it now.

155

Yet "these minor 1mprOve-

ments ," though at no great 1mportance 1n themaelves, m1ght be a
hopeful prognoatic tor the future.

There seemed, moreover, good

reason to hope that the outbreak at the Neapolitan Re'Yolut10n or
1820 might show the Emperor the need tor Papal moral support, e.YeD, ,
1t obtained at the expense ot Josephlst pr1noiples. l52
A touchatone could be tound tor the validity ot these hopes:
the response to the Papal Memorials sent to the Emperor shortly
atter his departure trom Rome.

These Memorials critioised

oertain Austrian religious principles and polioies, essentially
those alread7 discussed at Rorne, and called upon Prancis I to
abandon them. lS3 Prom the W&7 In which the Bmperor reacted to
these Memorials, it would be possible to dlvlne the true extent

at his ohance ot heart.
The impresslon which h1a meetlng With Plus VII had made
upon Fra.aoia I .as so protound that he was at tl" t eager to
comply wl th the Papal reque.t..

Even betore leavlng Italy, on

Jul,. 4, 1819, he sent the Memorials to hi. Eccle.lastlcal
Adviaer Ju.stel, lnatructlns him to report on the merlts ot the
Papal ideas, ftsardle.. ot whether or not they .ere 11'1 agreement
with exlstlne Austrlan legialatlon.

Juestel '8 report ot August,

1819, .as what the Emperor might have expected trom

152

Ibid. R247, Leardi to Consalvl, 31
153Partial coW in Maus I IV, 631.

~

1821.

80

ardent a

Josephiat.

He bluntly declared all the Papal complaints un-

156

justified, and adv1sed that the Memor1als should be ignored. 154
This negat1ve report failed to satisfy' the Emperor, Who wu
still under the influence of his meeting with the Pope.

On 24

August 1819 he ordered a prelate of more moderata views, Bishop
Jakob Frint, the
requests.

!of-~~-~pt~,

to oomment on the papal

Frint •• report was delivered over a year later, on

1 September 1820.

It was in general favorable to the Papaoy,

though markedly amb1poWi on certain pOints, perhaps from tear or
the Josephists.

Frint acreed that heretical doctrines were being

taught at Austr1an univers1t1es and Bchools, adm1tted that the
Pope could not properly perform h1s duties as Head ot the Ohurch
without tree communicat10n with the bishops, and opposed the exc1uaion of an ent1re Bull s1mply because part ot it was contrary
to Auatr1an pr1noiples.

However, he was unable or unwilling to

attempt to delimit the respeotive spheres ot authority or Ohurch
and Stat. in regard to marriage, and oontented himselt with
advising both to work in harmonr.

Nor.as his position on the

question or appeals to the Papacy ver.r clear, though he did
advise qainat unneo•• s&1",V state interpos1tlon between

A1l$t~.i\~':

olergy an4 the pope.155
_ __F~rancis I was favorabl)" impressed by Frint.s report and
r~-~-·

Ibid., 14-16.

155---

Ibid., 16-17. Blshop Jakob Fr1nt (1766-1834), appointed
in 1810s enoouraged the Catholic religious
Nv1ViI InAustrraj espec1al17 1nterested in the 1mprovement or
Catholic schools and s.minar1es.

Hot-und-!U~pfarrer

,-

seemed read7 to act upon it.

157

Leardi reported enthusiastically

that the Emperor .. "tilled with good will" towards the PapacY', was
detePmined~i

"to oorreot ever.Y'thing oontral'7 to the saund dootrine

ot religion and the Church."

He had just "sent to the Chancery

ot the Interior the repll" to be given to the Memorials • • • •
The.e good arrangements ot H.I.M. are most remarkable because
thel" involve abandon1ng doctrines held tor no less than halt a

,156

centurt in thia Emp1re. .. .

Consalvi, though enoouraged by Leardi fS report, did not
echo the nuncio's optim1sm as to the possibility of sreat changes
in Austrian religious polio7_

He had learned bl" sad experience

the strength ot the Josephist. at Vienna and the extent ot their
influence over the Emperor.

'lbe most he would hope tor was that

perhaps the Emperor had at last realized that "the Secular

Authol'1t,., threatened by the secret plotting ot the Settar,l and
b7 lrrel1gious prinoiples. • • haa no more solid support than 1n
the propqation and teaching ot the true religion, tt and might
aooordingly make some alterations in its religious polioY'.157
The Cardinal's soepticism .as justified by the event, tor
the Emperor'. original determination did not long survlve in the
hostl1e atmosphere ot the Jo.eph18t court.

The Joseph1sts tought

a del&)"1na actlon to prevent the sending ot the Imperial rep1l"

,'" ···";:-15tr--A.V., AHV 2-7, Leardl to Coualvi, 21 September· 1821.
151
A.V., AlIV 244, OO1'l8al"l to Lear<!1, 20 December 1820.
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while they gradually won Franei8 I away trom his original resolve
to satisfy the Papal complaints. lS8 Metternieh maJ--&S he later
olaimed-~ave

continued to work tor a better understanding with

the Papacy, but it

80, hiB

ettorts met with no auccess. 159

In March ot 1822, atter a ,.ar and a half of frustration and
del~.

Leard! reported 8adl1' that, although Francis I wu

"risoluti d1 proibire ogni iota di dottrine pern1oiose, che
\

s'1nsegno nelle universita," he had declded to take signlficant
action in response to the other Papal grieVanoes. lOG Soon even
this expectation began to seem overoptim1s tic.

The Emperor was

falling back again to an inoreasing extent under the influence
of advisers "hostile to the good cause," who were seeking to
persuade him to uphold in full the "pretended rights of the
orown over the ohuroh. f1

lAardi teared that they would be able to

delaT still further the Imperial reply and make changes in 1t

untavo~le to the papaoy.lol
The final blow to the Papal Memorials was delivered in
Jull.l .1823, when the Emperor t • otticial spiritual adviser,

158

Metternich, III, 3-5, Note.

159

Ibid., There is no oontempDrary evldence tor Mettern1eh's
clalm. Hilieems 1n tact to have taken little intereat in the
religious developments of l820-l8~3. He apparently dId not attemp
to support the Papal Memorials, the nuncio's protests, or the
Emperor-s projected change in Imperlal rel1gIoUli pollcy. Perhaps,
as Maass sussests (V,,), havIng "burned his tingera" ln opposlng
the Josephlsts in 1814-1811 to no aval1, he was reluotant to do
battle with them again.

160

161
1822.

A.V., ANi 247, Leardi to Consalvl, 6 March 1822.

~.,

Leardl to Consalv1. 21 AprIl 1822J alao, 17 Aprl1

~he

Josephist Counoillor (Staats - und Konferenzrat) Martin von

--- -----

159

ILorenz, submitted a tormal report on the opinions g1ven bY' Juestel

and Frint.

Lorenz was 1n complete agreement with Jues tel that the

Papal compla1nts were entirely

unj~tiried

and lnadmlseable.

The

Pope had only been persuaded to present these Memorial by the
~elanti,
I-----.--~

whose real aim was to place the Imperor and h1s pre-

decessora under susp1oion ot heresy.

He therefore advised
against any attempt to sat18ty the Papal grieVanoes. 162
In the taoe or th1a strong Josephlst oPPosit10n oulminating
in Lorenz 'a report, the Bmperor abandoned his orlginal aim of

satlsfying the Papacy and ceased to concern hlmselt wlth the
Memorlals.

No reply to the Papal Memorlals was ever sent.

On

this negative note the Austre-Papal rellgioua diplomacy ot
Conaalv~' • • econd

mln1atr,r oame to an end.

The etteot ot the rellglous di.pute. ot th1s mln18tr,r upon
lustro-Papal relationa w. . .erl1lW1ly detrimental.

The onset ot

the d.cline ot lustre-Papal eo-operation can be traced to the
tailure ot the 1817 necotiationa to produce a mutually satistact or)" .olut1on ot rellg10WJ probl.ma.

Mutual distrust and

resentment, th. inevItable result ot the dlsagreements of 18171818, led to a rap1d deterioration of the once frIendly relat10ns
betw••n the two powera.

lt the same tlme, COll8alvl t s confIdence

in Mett.rnioh (an ••••ntial faotor tor .ucc•• sful co-opera.tion)
gradually d1.appeared.
162
Maass, V I 213, Lorenz to Francia I, 3 July 1823.
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The more concilia.tory Austria.n attitude of 181:) 1820

cheeked for a time the deterioration of Austro-Papal relations.
Had the Emperor held to his original resolve to satisfy Papal
complaints, a revival of Consa1vi f s confidence in Austria and
hence of Au.etro,·Papal co.·operation would probably have resulted.
Thi.

did not take place, aDd as long as the buic Papal grievancell

remained, full Austro-Papal co-operation could not be attained.
Nonetheless, the modIfication of Imper1al pollcy, llmitea though
It was, had aome good effects.

The most presslng dlsputes Gould

now be settled, thus averting the danger ot an open break and
making possible the oontinuance of a certaIn measure of political
co-operation, notably against the

Set~.

The relIgIous truce

that prevailed after 1819 oftered the possibility, It not of the
ereation of full Austro-Papal eo-operation whlch was impossible
while Josephinism reigned at Vienna, at least of the revival of
that degree of co-operation whioh had existed in 1815-1817.

Had

political factors not supervened, the gaping rents which
religious controversy had torn In lustre-Papal unity might in
time have been patched up.

But within little more than a year

atter the ImperIal visit to Rome, the Neapolltan Revolution broke
out, and before its reperoU8lions had ceased, the lustro-Papal
allianee had received a mortal wound.
When Conaalvl's second ministr.y ended with the death ot
Pius VII in August, 1823, Joaephinlsm seemed hardlT less dominant
In the Hapsburg domains than it had been when the Cardinal returned from Vienna in 1815.

Nonetheless, all was not as before.

161
With the hindsight of a century and half, it is possible to
perceive that the flood tide of Josephinism was reached around

1815, and that by 1823 it had begun, very slowly, to recede. 163
Certainly, this recession had not as yet attained spectacular
proportions by 1823.

Few oontemporaries of Conaalvi peroeived it.

Nonetheless, the moderation of the Imperial demands in 1819 and
the aoceptanoe of the

~o~~~eJ

the admission of the Jesuits into

AustriaJ the increased attention paid to Papal protests; and the
serious, though ultimately unfruitful, attention given by Franois
I to the Papal Memorials: all of these are indications, small but
unmistakable, that the long, 8low course of Austrian policy away
from Josephinism had begun.

The polley of firmness and conciliatlon followed by
Consalvi deserves some credit for this development.

On the one

hand, his firmness had checked Austrian encroachment and had
shown Austria that the Papacy could not be bullied into surrender.
The Papacy was not a mere satellite of Austria, obsequious to its
will.

If Austria wished to be on good terms with the Papacy, its

pretenslons would have to be abated.

At the same time, the

Cardinalts attltude of studied moderation and conciliation had
averted quarrels and antagonism that would have retarded the
Austrian movement away from Josephinism.
favored by the
~~JL~tr~A-as

103

340-341.

~.alS,

Ze~ant.i

The aggressive policy

would, almost certainly, have so antagon-

to have prevented for an indefinite time that

IV, 142-143; Schmidlin, 344-345; Leflon,

Power from seek1ng a rs.pproche1'flent with the Papacy
away from

CLne

moving

J08ephinis~.

Thus Consalvi during hiB ministry carefully cherished that
tender plant whose seeds were the
fear

or

ultra~ontane

revival and royal

revolutionary prinoiples, and whose fruition would be

the destruction of Josephiniam in Austtl'e..
see the triumph of his workJ the
another's hand.

h~rvest

He did not live to

was gatheeed

by

But the credit for having cherished and pro-

tected its growth cannot be d.nied him.

2. The Forniture Affair: 1818-1821

-----

Paralleling the religious controversies of 1817-1821 both
in time and in effects was a financial dispute wh1ch, though less
intrins 10ally serious, nonetheless played a similar role in
undermining Auatro·-Papal friendship.
The subject of this dispute was the

~orni~ure

or military

supplies furnished by the Papal government to the Austrian army.
During the Austrian oooupation of Naples after the defeat of
Murat, large bodies of Austrian troops frequently passed through
the Papal States on their way to and from the Regno.

The

Austrian government, ita military logistics system disorganized
during the recent war, requested the Papal government to supply
these troops wlth provislons.

Consalvi

was

reluctant to add yet

another finanoial burden to the Papal treasury, but his desire
to remain on good terms with Austria and his fears that a shortage of provisions might lead to dis orders among the Austrian
troops Ie. hlm to agree to Metternloh'. request In the Convention
of 12 June 1815.

The detalls of this agreement were later

worked out between Consalvi and Lebzeltern and embodied in a
Convention of 24 August 1815.

The Papal government agreed to

meet the requisitions of the Austrian forees, while Austria
pledged that the Papal government would be tully reimbursed for

163

all forniture proVided atter 12 JulY' 1815. 164
During the remainder of the Austrian ocoupation of Naples,
the Papal goyernment provided the passing Imperial forces with
all necessary supplies, at great financial inconvenienoe to
itself.

The reimbursement promised for this outlay was vitally

necessary to the Papal treasury and hence was eagerly awaited.
Unfortunately, the procrastination and evasion on the part of
Austria which were to mark this whole affair soon made their
appearance.

Although Auetria

b~gan

to liquidate her debts from

the Italian campaign in 1817, it was not until september 1818
that she finally dispatehed an agent, Earon Johann von Koeller,
to Rome to settle the Papal claims.

Consalvi's annoyance at this

delay, whioh added oonsiderably to the finanoial diffioulties of
the Papacy, wu as nothing to his indignation when Koeller
announoed, immediately upon his arrival, that his government had
disallowed most of the Papal

c1ai~

by

reduoing it from Scudi

135,615.87 to the "minute fraction" of' So.

28,870.o6~.

Pressed by Consalv1 to justify this "soandalous reduct1on,"
Koeller enumerated the Papal olaims which Austria oonsidered

~

unjustlf1ech
1) Se. 37,796.50 1/8 or the fE.~u~ had been provided

, ~ot~~~~~:~an troops. but to those of her Italian allies.
164

I

Ii
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l

!
~

I

A.V., AWl 21t4, Consalvi to Leard!, 30 JanU&l7 1819, whioh)
oontains a ve.,." detailed account of the development of the.: af'r~.t

Also, Van Duerm, 81·-85, Consalv1 to Mettern1ch, 10 July 1815.
R242, Convention of 12 June 1815. R2l0, Convention of 24 August
1815.

i

i
l
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!
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Austria refused to assume responsibility for troops other than
her wwn, hence this sum ;1Ust be collected fro':l the Italian states
concerned.

Consalvi vehe1'nently dtsputed this eontention.

The

Papal governnent had granted the rlght of transit only to AUt3tria
and ha.d signed a Convention for' the supply of troops only with
her; the Italian troops had marched aB part of the Austl"'ia.n arll1Y
and had been supplied by the Papal
capacity.

govern~ent

only in that

Therefore, he a.rgued, Austria must accept the respon-

sibility for supplies given to these forces.

?) Pa.pal olail1'.s t(;tallng Sc. 13,186.65 for the de1::1ts of
Austrian of'f'icis'ls and officers were disallowed as not being the
concern of the Imperial government.

Consalvi accepted this dis-

allowance as justifled.

3) Sc. It-3,746.59 for clothing furnished Austrian troops was
disallowed, on the ground that although this had been supplied
after 12 July, it he.d been requisitioned before that date and
hence did not come under the Convention.

Consalvi rejected this

reasoning, arguing that the Convention stated simply that the
Papacy should be reimbursed for everything

~~PElie~

after 12

July; the date of requisitioning was cOl1pletely irrelevant.

lJ.) A Papal clai''''l ror Sc. 16,23 7 .59

7/8

fOl" tobal~Co

and

b·randy suppl:ted was reJected on the ground that these items were
not really military supplies, inasmu.ch as they no longer formed
part of. the standard rea.tion issued to Austria.n troops, and hence
they did not come under the Corrfentloli.
these

ite~s

Consalvi replied that

had been requisitioned by the appropriate Austrian

166
authorities, that the Papal government eould not re?"'3onably be
expeoted to be aware of preoisely what ltemB formed pa.rt of the
Auatrtan military ration, and that if the Austrian officers ha.d
made an unauthorized requisltton the blame should fall upon them,
not the Papal governMent.

It would be most unJust to penalize

the Papal government for dotng everything possible to meet the
needs of the Austrian army, especially as the denial of this
particular reCjuisition wuuld no doubt have led to disorders among
the troops,.
5) The final deduotion oonsisted of Se. 10,434, of which

968,26 was for Papal errors in oa.l cuI at ion, and the rer1ainder
for requisition forms (boni) illegibly or irregularly filled out.
Consalvi agreed that the errors in calculation should be corrected, but felt that in justice Austria was bound to cover the
irregular

~()ni

"because the Papal government in supplying the

Austrian army did not do so for its own benefit in hope of gain,
but in the oharacter of a good neIghbor and friend. • • and if
in

80

vast a transaction the Papal agents, ignorant of the

language and of the rigorous rules of account of the Austrian

army, had accepted and supplied irregular requisitions, the Papal
treasury should not :suffer thereby, tI for such errors stemlled

only fror'l the sincere des ire of the Papal officials to s atis ry
every wish of the Austrian forces.

Conaalvi therefore claimed payment in full for all the

Papal olaims (except the second above), "relying upon the wellknown justice of His Imperial Majesty" who had assured the Pope

that the passage of' his forees would not cause the papacy'the

167

slightest 108s.
With suoh skill and force did Consalvi argue his case that
he scored a minor diplomatio triumph by winning Koeller over
completely to his views.

In his last oonversation with Consalv!

and in a later Note of' 28 September 1818 .. the Auatrian representa

tive

l~cognized

the justtce of the Papal claims.

Althoug,.1-t his

instructions did not allow him to c()rmnlt his government to paying
these

clni~,

he a3sured Consalvi that while l6quidating Austrian

acoounts wlth her Italilln allies, he \'lOuld IlI'range for the
oolleotlon frol'1 each state

or t ts share of' the S c. 37,796.50 1/8

supplied to the allied troops and for the eventual delivery of
this auf1'\. through the proper ohannels of the Austrian government
to the Papa.cy.

As for the other Papal clair1.s J he would talce

upon himself the task of securing their paYMent by his

165

government. -

With this plsdge Koeller departed, leaving Consalvi in

apparent posseseion of' the field.

Disillusionment gradually

set in as 'nonthB pI.seed with the Austrian government ",)1aking no
move towe.rds paying the Papa.l

olai~s.

Finally, his patienee

exhaU8ted and hie confidenee in Austrian good faith strained,
Conealvion 30 Ja:1.1\.1a.ry 1819 instructed Leardi to inquire as to
the intentions

165

or

theAustrla.n

govern~ent

and to press for a

pro~p1

The above account of the ne~otlations with Koeller is
based on Consalvi's detailed description in A.V., ANV 244,
Consalvi to Leardi, 30 January 1819.

IGG
settle''1ent .166
Since Leard1. \'iaS then absent fror.1 Vienna, this task
devolved upon his Uditore, 11onsignor r.'tuZl. 167 The Uditore at

fiI"St directed his inquiries to Baron Koeller, only to be told
that this Jl1atter was now entil"'ely out of Koeller fS hands and in

those of the Finanoe Minister, Count Stadion.

Upon visiting

Count Stadion, I,1uzi learned that the il1atter was being dealt with
by one of the Count's Subol~inates, Councilor Joseph Von Filion,

whom he would have to see. 1G8
Well aware of Consa.1vi ta eagerness for information, Muzi
at once visited Filion.

T~

the Uditore fa surprise, however,

Filion refused his repeated requests for

info~nation,

insisting

that Muzl would have to direct hiMSelf to the JUnister of

Finance or the Foreign Minister.

Deoiding that it would be

fruitless to see Stadion again; Muzi oonsulted Baron Johann von
stuermer, in charge of the f.oreign ministry while Metternich was
absent from Vlenna.

The Baron professed himself unacqua.inted

with the Question and requested Muz1 to send him an off'oJ.al note

1(;6
Ib1ci.

167----A.V., ANV 246, Leardi to Conaalvi. 1"( February 1819.
Leard1 was accompanying the Emperor on his trip to Rome. Muzi
i8 best known for his mission to Chile in 1823; Sohnidlin,

397.

168

ANV 246, Muzi to Conaalvi, 10 March, 13 March, 20 March
1819. John Philip, Count von stadion (1763-1824), Austrian
Finance r·f1nister and in charge of the administra.tive reorganization of the ::;mpire.

information, to whioh he would reply

requ.eti~~

l~ornting

himself on the

t~~~ure

del~ed,

and

~men

. 169
More tully

affair.

This official note was duly sent, but
long

aft~r

Stue~~r's

it finally erune added

nothi~~

reply was
to Consalvl'.

The Baron merely announoed that he had sent the note

knowledge.

to Count Stadlon, whose concern it was, "requestlng him tc make
known as soon as possltle the decision that will be made. 1t169
And there, so far
\!>JEtS

to

l'SS t

f\.8

Vienna of'fieialdol':1. was concerned, the lJ'1atter

for many months.

Meanwhile, ConsaIvl was beooming increasingly irritated by
Austria'S procrastInation and

intentiona.

increasi~~ly

suspicious of her

At best the Austrian government was

s~owing

little

oonsideration for tha interests of its presumed close friend the

Papacy; whioh l1aCi. been c.ounting on the repa.yment of 1ts claims to
malte

ends

~neetj

at wurst, it seemed distinctly possible that

Austria was resorting to a delaying action in a deliberate
atte'npt to avoid paying her ,1ust debts.

Certainly, Muzi '6 ex ...

perience in bSing sent fro:n one Austria.n official to another,
none of the'll willing to express any knowledge of or responsibll1t;v
for the

t2Fn~.~~.

affair, suggested the la:l;ter alternative.

8Ul!5pieion was to gr()w ateadily stronger

Consa,lvi thcraf:)l"'e instructed

169

~,quzi

:lS

fl~i$

the affair dragged on.

to continue to press the

A.V., R2h'7, I,!ttzl to Con:ut.lvl, 8 r-1a.y 1819, with undated
reply of Stuermer and copy of Muz1 fa note to hi" of' 22 TI.arch

1819.

Austrian government for definite information as to ita inten ...
tiol13. 170

At the same time, he took advantage of the Imperial

visit to R()me to approsfth Metternich d1reotly on the
question.

170

!ornlt~.

The Prinoe aeemed sympathetic and promised to look

into the matter when he returned to Vienna, though it was not
within his Jurladiotion. 171
vl1th thiS 8.'3r!uranee COMalv! had to rest eontent during the

summer

o~

1819, as

r~tternieh

did not return to Vienna until

stirring the Awstrian

September.

Nor did Muzzi Bueoeed 1n

bureauer~ey

to action or even 1n obtaining more definite informa-

tion as to its actiOn!.
ContM!7 to COMal vi'e expectations, the return of

Metternich to the capital faIled to produee any Improvement 1n
the Situation.

Leardi

~et

with Metternlch eeveral times but

learned only that the matter was still under consideration by the
Ministry of Finanee.

the

!.,?rnltu~

manner. 1 72

However, Metternlch assured the nuncio that

aft"air would be settled "eoon" and in a satlsf'acto1'7

"1ettemlch '8 formal reply to Consalv1 fa inqulri9s

mer$1y repeated the same lnformatlon. 173
.......

Metternloh
may have sought to use his influence on behalf' ot
..... "- .... -,.-".

~--,.-.--

170
A.V.,
171
I~1_~.,

A}N

244, Ccnsa1vl to Muzl, '2lf- April, 26

r~.ay

1819.

Conealvl to Leard!, 2 October, 27 October 1819.

172

16

A. V. J.. R247, Leardi to C0l138,1vl, 15 September, 6 October,
October 1~19.

173

Ibid., Leardi to Consalvl, 27 Ootober 1819, with undated
reply or-1itetternlQ.h to Consalvl.

the Papacy in the

rO~E~tu~_

affair, as be had promised to' do,

171

but his authority was limited to his own Mlnistr,y of Foreign
Affairs and h1s influence on other branches of the

alight.

govern~nt

was

In any case, his influence, if exerted, produced no

via 1b1e results.
During the year that followed Mettern1eh '3 return to Vienna,

the

f~!!1..:i:t;ure

a.ffair ITlade lio progre3s tm·mrd a final settlement,

but merely repea.ted what had gone before.

Consa.lvi continued,

-v'11th gro\,11ng irl'}pa.tienoe a.nd irrltation, to exhort the Vlenna
nuncio to press for a settleMent of the arrair. 171l- Although
Consalvl at times suspected !..es.rdi of' not a.cting with suff:toient
vigor', the m.:mcio did his bes t to carry ou.t his orders J 175 but

all his efforts could not overcome the infinite talent of' the
Austrian bureaucra,oy for procr8.3tlne.tion and evasion.

For month.

after month Leard1 went on a futile round from one Austrian
:nini3tar to another, but f'l. . O'il none could he obtain e.rr.! definite

information as to the status of the question; all seemed "content
171+
Ibid., Consalv1 to Leardi, 13 November, 4 December, 18
December 1819, 15 January, 19 February, 1 I\1areh, 19 Apr!l, 30
August, 1-1- Oatober 1820 ..
175
See Consa1vi's orit1c1sm of the nune10 on this aecount
in $241, Consa1v1 to Leard!, 4 December 1819. Leard1, though
loyal to Conaalvi, was not notable for energy or initIative, but
in this case the Cardlnal's oriticism Seams to have been unjustified; see Leard! 's indignant defense in R247, Leard1 to Consalv
Such outburst u this --like, indeed all strong
expressions of eootion--were 'fIer'Y rare in Conaalvl IS correspon-

26 January 1820.

dence; it W~ no doubt an indication of the Cardinal's great
a.nnoyance and sense or f"rustrat1on at the Impasae which this
affair had reached.
--..----.--.

176

to let this d11lgraoef"..1l aff'a.ir sleep eternally. "

172

Innumerable

ll),eetings with thIs or that mInister, innumerable letters and

notes to and f:-o'TI the Auatrian goverrl'nent, innumerable promises
that the 'natter would be settled "soon, It hopes raised and hopes
disappointed, and all with no tangible result: this was the

course of the

r<?~i tu~

affair in 1819-1820.

The outbreak of the Neapolitan Revolution in July, 1820,

Which ',"lade neoessary a conSiderable increase in Papal defense
spending, increa.3ed at111 fur'char Consalv1 's anxiety to seoure

rapid payment of the Papal claims Itwhioh ciro.urnstanees have now
ma.d.e indispensable .ror us«"1 7'7
Mettemioh directly.

He therefore decided to address

Writing on the

SRrne

day that he learned

of the Revolution, he begged Metternich to secure payment "au
plus vite, tt for thi8 event would. put the PapaoY' in "extreme
need. "178

This letter having produced no effeot, Consalvi re-

newed his appeal in August, declaring that only MetternlohtB
intervention could bring about the settlement whioh was now more

-'----" -t7"€rIbiti .. , I.eardi to COl1Salvi, 29 SeptEwlber 1820. Virtually
every one 'oJ' Leard1 fa dispatches in R247 for the NovEtmber 1819··
october 1820 period mentions some new visit by the nuncio to one
Austrian rain1ster or another in an attempt to obtain information
but w'lthout succ~ss.
ITT
Ibid., Consalv1 to Leardi, 30 August 1820. For the
urgent Papal need ro~ repayment created by the Revolution, see
also: A...W, 2l~7, Leardi to Consalvi, 21~ July, ;;:)1- August, 29
September 1820. Van nuerm, 249-252, Consalvl to r~tternich; 8
July, 12 August 1820.

118
Van

~uerm,

249. Consalvl to Mettern1oh, 8 July 1820.

113
than ever necessary.179 The poreign Minister responded tavorably,
promising that as soon as he arrived at Troppau he would speak
to the Emperor on this Subjeot. 1SO
Conaalvi realized that Mettemich, preoccupied with the
manitold problema arising trom the Revolution, might easi17
torget what was tor Auatria a m1nor aftair. 181 Theretore while
cont1nuing to remind Mettern1ch ot h1a promiae J he direoted
Leardi to go over the heade ot the Austrian m1n1stera b7 complaining directl,. to the Emperor.

Prancis assured the nunol0

that he would look lnto the matter p81'110nall,. and 8ea that it was
settled as soon as posslble .182 Thua prompted, the Bmperor soon
atterwarde 1asued orders to Stadlon to settle the question, but
various unexplained ditticulties in the Mtn1str,y ot Flnance once
agaln brought del.,. .183 '!'wo more months dragged b7 whl1e the
Emperor and Metternich were at Troppau.

A letter in late

November to the Poreign Minister having elicited no rep11',
~QM.IY1 Jf.rOJ;e to him again in mid-December in terms ot near179
Ibid., Conaelvi to Mattemich, 12 AUSWlt 1820.
180A.V., R210, Conaal"i to Metternioh, 22 September 1820.
This letter was written to remind Metternioh ot his promise upon
his arrival at TroppauJ Mettarnioh t • letter containing this
promlse, like numerous others in the Consalv!-Metternich oorrespondenoe, apparentl,. has not survived in the Vatican Archivea.
181
Ibid.
182A.V., ANV 241, Leardi to Conaalvi, 24 Auauat 1820.
183
Ibid., Leard! to Consalvi, 29 September 1820; R241,
Leardi tOCol'l8alvi, 28 September, 12 Ootober 1820, Conaelvi to
Leardi, 4 October 1820.

desperation.

174
The expenses ot the Papal government were growing

Iteadi1y as a result ot the Neapolitan situation, and the need to
payment ot its olaims

WU

noW "M)eT EXTREME" (underlined three

timesl); it Metternich could not obtain aotion, Consalvi would
have to send an otticial note ot protest direot to the Emperor
h1mae1t. 184
That drastic step proved to be unnecessary, tor wlth the
oonc1usion ot the Congress ot Troppau Francls I and Metternloh
t'Uund time to attend to the tornlture affair.

In late November

the Emperor gave imperative orders that the matter be settled,
and in mid-December the Ministry ot Finance finally acted.

On

16 December 1820, Laardi Joyfully reported that Lebze1tern was
on hiS w., to Rome to aett1e the Papal c1aims. 18S
Conaalvi'l satistactlon that thiS artair was at long last
aettled was ahort-Ilved, tor the settlement proved little to his
liking.

He soon learned that the Austrian government, although

it had by now spent over three tedious years going over the
Papal claims,

W88

.til1 uncertain ot its ob1lgation to pa, the

greater part ot them.

When Lebze1tern arrlved 1n Rome, he

brought not the Sc. 106,181.01 to whlch the Papal government telt
i~8e1idntlt1ed,

but a mere So. 36,000 tor those claims tdlich

A.V., R165, Coualvl to Mettem1ch, 16 December 1820.
Conealvi's earlier letter ot 22 November is 1n Van nuerm, 308.
18S
A.V., ANV 242, Metternich to Leardl, 22 November 1820.
R247, Leardl to Con&alvi, 4 Deoember, 16 December 1820. The
ma1n purpose ot Lebze1tern's mi•• ion to Rome was to request Papal
.. aiatanGe tor the Austrian campaign agalnst Naples. See below,
Chapter IV, Section 2.

175
Auntr1a had deaided to aocept.

The remaining Papal claims would

have to be SUbmitted to a new and more detailed liquidation to be
held at some unspeeitied future date. 186
Conaslvi was utterly astounded and disgusted by this sudden
dlsappointment or his hopes just as they had seemed on the verge
of' fulfilment at lut.

He protested "most vigorously" to

Lebzeltern, with whom he argued the Papal cue for several days
but without effecting any change in the Austrian stand. l87 In
Vienna Leard:L too protested to Metternich, who waa sympathetiC
but unencoura.g1ng.

The Fore1gn Minister asserted that he had

used every possible me811flJ to secure a settlement favorable to the
PapacY', but unfortunately there were too m&rIJ' debatable points in
the Papal olaim for the Finanee Ministry to acoept it in full.

Unde~ the circumstanoes he could do nothing more tor 06nsal~1.1?a ~
Consalvl's indignation at this most unsatisfactory settle-

ment, eoming as it d1d after years of procrastination and evas10n
knew no bounds.

He had, he wrote Leard1, not been able to avoid

tee1ing lithe greatest disgust at hearing that, atter having spent
as you justly observe, tour years in the liquidation of this clai

ot ours, arter so rn&rl7 supplieations, atter so m&n7 promises

------18'
.- 0

A.V., ANV 247, Leardi to Consalv1, 16 December 29
December 1820. R247 J Leard1 to Consalv1, 21 December 1820. ANV
242, Stuermer to Leardi, 26 December 1820, 3 JanUltlT 1821. The
exact Bum ola1med brthe Papacy is g1ven 1n ANY 244, Conaalvl to
Leard!, 2 October 1819187
A.V., ANV 245, Consalvi to Leard1, 3 January 1821.

188

A. V., A.NV 247, Leardi to COMalv1, 29 December 1820.

given to us, all is to end by submitting our olaim again to·a

176

new liquidation which, if one is to take the past as a guide, God
h'l10WS

it it will ever be finished, and that a payment so tar out

ot proportion to the sum owed to the Pontifioal Governnent is to
b e g i ven • • • • "189

Consalv1's doubts as to the comp1et1on at this further
11qu1dation seem. to have been well-founded, for no mention of'
further progress 1n this affair is to be found in the records
ot'

hi. adm1ntstration.

If the promised lIquidation ever took

place, the result. would seem to have been negatIve, as no
further mentIon or. th1s p01nt oan be tound in the surviving
documents. 190
Thouah it thus disappeared trom the Burface of Austro-Papal

relat10ns after 1820, the eftecta of this "most d1sgusting
affair" of' the torn1ture were lasting, and most pernicious. These
etfects were to be seen not merely in the Papal ref'wsal to 8upp1y
the Austr1an army that marched on Naples 11'1 1821,191 but in the
189

A.V., ANV 245, Consalv1 to Leard!, 20 January 1821.
190
The writer has gone through all the pert1nent tiles 11'1
the Vatican Archives, as well as the .rohiyl0 4i StatQ (Rome), to
1825, without f'inding anJ turther reterence to the conclusion ot
thI8 liquidat10n or to &n7 addit10nal pqment bY' Austria. The
subject is never mentioned In Consalv1's correspondenoe with
Leardi after J anu&r1 1821. It Is possible that all the materIal
relating to this toplc was gathered into one file which has 81nce
been lost or mislaid; but one would still expect to fInd at least
80me casual reference to it In the Consalv1-Leardl letters atter
1821.
191
See below, Chapter IV, Sections 2 & 4.
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genel"a1 de<teriuI"atlon of relatiol1s between the tl'IO states.

At

best, Austria thl--QUghcut this affair had shown little consi<kratiol,'). for the needs and r1ghts of its presumed partner in the

Union of Tllronc a.nd Altar; at \-lOrst, its conduct was susceptible
of interpretat10n as a de11berate attempt to evade its just
obligations to the Papal governr:1snt.

In either case, it was

hardly calculated to increase Consalvi IS confidence in Austria,
a.lready eeriou.f3ly 't'leakened by the relig10us controversy.

Mettern!ch later attributed the Cardinal's growing

d1st~t

ot

AUf'!tr1a and. h1G increasing reluctance to co-operate w1th her
polioies in Ita17 solely to his resentment at the forniture
affa1r. 192 Tn!! 18 certainly a great exaggeration. OonsalV1 18
fa1th 1n Austria had already been undermined by the religious
controversy, and his po11tical princ1ples would in any ease have
eompelled him to oppose much ot that Power's policY' in Italy in
1821-1823. 193

Nonetheless, there can be no doubt that the

f'orniture affair did weaken still further Consalv1's already
deolin1llg trust 1n Austria and thus w1dened the breach between

Vienna add Rome.

As drops

ot water can in time wear

away the

rock they fallon, so the many petty delays and evuions of the
Austr:ten government, c11maxed by the utterly unsatisfactory
8ettlement whioh it offered, had gradually eroded Consalvi fS
faith 1n Austria.

It would requ1re onlY' the renewed display of

192

A.V., R247, Leardi to Conaalv1, 30 June 1821.
193

5ee below, Chapter V.

l\uBtrla1s desire for hege~nonY' in the Italian Pentnsula during

the after"nath of the Neapolitan RI!volut:ton to sweep away what
remained.

178

CHAPTER

rv

THE REVOLUTIONS OF 1820-1821

1. Revolution in Naples
Early in July, 1820.

COM alv1

was dis tractea trom his pre-

oocupation with internal retorm and religious affa11"S by the DeWS
that revolution had broker! out in Naples. 1 On 2 JUly, two
Neapolitan

~

offioers belonging to the secret society ot the

Carbonari led their men in a revolt whioh rapidly gained
adherents in other units of the arrrtJ.

Thanks to the inoompetenoe

and panio of the senile King Ferdinand and his government, the
rebels encountered no effective resistance and were
muters of the kingdom.

800n

the

The te1 ritied king granted their
1l

demands: the radical Spanish Constitution

ot"

1812 was proclaimed,

a liberal ministry installed, and a national parlIament elected.
The Revolution

W88

apparently a complete suocess.

Oonaalvi reaoted. with apprehension and dismay to the news
ot the Revolution.

The Papacy could hardly weloome the

establishment upon its southern frontier ot a revolutlonar,y
1

On the Revolution, see: George T. Romani, The Neafolitan
Revolution, 1820-1821 (Evanston, Ill., 1950). Ann-rsare :loertl
ie~.), Itti ail Par1am,nto delle Due Sicilie (6 vols; Bologna,
926.19qyr; 'Includea an excallent-s-tud; o? the revolution by the
editor (IV, vii-cdx). For Austrian policy during the revolutionary period, see Paul W. Schroeder, Mettemiohts Diplomaol at ita
Zenith, 1820-1823 (Austin, Tex., 1962), 25-163.
----119
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regi':19 by a secret society notorious for its l'adical and a..""ltlcleJ:~i!Ja.l

view'S, a

rebi~.:le

whose ver:; axis tenco waa a stimulus to

the Setta:j or tile Papal States.

Papal distrust grew' when re-

volta led by the C8.l.'\bonar1 ovel'thraw Papal authority in the small
Papal

enela~eD

in Neapol1tan terr1tory, Benevento and Pontecorvo,

even though the

Neapolit~n

government refused their requests tor

Tk,i:' was it long before anti-clerioal legislation

8lmexatioll.

began to appeal" in Haplon c
Under these

C.h'OUJ11stance~

J

rela.tions between R':)rne and the

revolutionary govern/7\ent would nevel" be cordial.
attitude was
tt~

a1t"~S

rO!"~laJ.ly

The Papal

correct,. and Consalvi was

oal~rul

avoid. anything that might give unneoessary offense to l1aples

lest it sarve as a pretext f.or attack.

the new reg:t:.lC!) as the

~

HOt"1ever, though 8,ccept1ng

facto government of Naples J the Papacy

ret'uaed to grant it formal reeognltton until the other European
powers had done so. 2

Except for Spain and Holland, the othel' European nations
showed no disposition to reoognize the new government.
it soon

bec~~e

evident that the great

powel~

Indeed,

were 1mplacably

hostile to the Neapolitan regime an.d that Austria in particular
-1).8

deter-nined to suppress it.

From this Austrian determination

sprang most of Consalvi fe problems in 1820-1821.
2

For a thorough study ot the Papal reaction to the
Neapolitan ReVolution, see Joseph H. Brady, Rome and the
Neapolit~ Revol.utlon, !?! l820-l~21: .! S~u!il Th PaRi!' 'RiUtral1tl

(!lew York,

193'71.
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Ur~fortunnt~l~T

l~~r

for the rapa.ey, itt: f'!tatf.!s

Naples and the Austrian terr:ttor:!.es 1 i f

AUf:'ltr:t~

betlJeen

proposed to

invade l'!aples # her f'..rmy woulrl firs t have to pus through the

Papal states.

Thus the Papacy 'Would. inevitably be invol'Yed,

direetly or 1ndireetly, in any Auatro-Neapo11tan hoetiI1t1ee--a
most cerious e:ttue..t1on, l'ar'tien.l.u-1,. in
aha.recter.

ThA Pope

WM

Yie~"

01' the 'opt' fa 1lual

obliged bY' his rejl:'.glous charaeter to

T'lR1.ntain peaoe with all statea unlet.., attaoDd and to preserve

his neut.ral.l ty- in

tlUl!l ~lWolVlng

other state...

Common pruc1eMe

dtntat8d the same p01i07, for the militarily weak Papa8Y could.
not hope to

de~end.

its IItatee

~aiMt

a determined attaok.

Un-

fortunately, the geographical position of the Papal. State. would.

make the preservation of thi. deSirable neutral1t7 diffioult 1n

an Austro-Neapolltan

W~.

A serioua oomplieation ... the

attitude ot Austria, whioh telt that as the champion ot order

and the eonserV'atlYe cause it deserved the wnole-hearted support
of the Papacy agalnat Naples and would be most ind1Snant it suoh
support was not forthcoming.

Henoe, the Papal dile:mma: to give

Autria the full support IIhe des1red W0111.d. be to 'Ylo1ate Papal
neutrality and risk 'Pl"O'Yoklng NeapolItan invasionJ to refuse that
support would mean alienating Austria and perhaps the other eonserYat1Ye powere all well.

Oo_&1vi 'a main concern durIng the

tall and wll'!Ater ot 1820-1821 was to extricate the Papacy frolil
this dile'l1.l'!1a.
The Seoretary of Sta.te was not long left In doubt as to the
intentions ot Autr!.. towards t.he Neapolitan l'tt&1.'I1le.

Within ..

tew weeks after the revolution

1e~ji

f':;,;aring the opread ';)1 loaevolutiuu to

solved to

Il

necessary.
on a

W&1"

r uta'bl11re
'l'h~

Iltol~d1ne

reported

t~1.e rQS t;

turbaJco U in

t~at

of' Europe t was
Naples~

ar1lY in Lombardy-Venetia had already

f~otlng. 3

l82

Vienna,
by

1"'-

force it

be~ll

ordeNd

SO()ft thel'eatter# the Austrian gov@rnnent in a

note of 10 August announced to tha varioua Italian courts the
Jlobiliza.t1on c£ lt3 forces and its deter:n1nation to ref] ~ore the
leg1tima.t~

order in Napl:;:!.

The Italian IS tate. weN called upon

to $UPPo.t't J\;\.U3tria by exhibltiIlg a "atrotlg and pronoUl'1ced !oors.l
at tit-ade It &;&1nll t the ravo lutionar-.f regi:ne. 4

Conaalvl 'a 1'1Nt J!'eAGt1on tQ th. new of the Austria.a plua

.as extreme &litation. "We are loet

the

told. the PrWIa1an

a.nbaaaador]. • •• At the fiNt news that Austrian troops ha.ve
moved from FeI'rar&, th~ Neapolitans w111 oceup3" Ro:ne. u5

realized that to
ni~

that power.

opPGa~

Yet he

Austria'. plana would oertainly antaso-

A,1J¥ doubts he miSllt have had on that point were

remov3d in m1d-AugWJt when Leard1 reported that Austria. waa moat

irritated beoause the Papacy had not adopted a sUftlOiently
(Jonde:imato1'7 attitude towards Naples and was not supporting the

Austrian position with $\lrrloient vigor.

Vienna was ttflrmly

·.l

..)

A.V. I 'R2J~1, Ieard1 to COl!l8alvl: 27 July 1820.
4
A.V., R165, GenMtte to Consalvl, 10 Au.swst 1820.
5

Van Duerm. 253, :Mote 1, NIebuhr to GeftJJC)tte. 2 August 1820.

d'!tern"1.!'!ed to
~11 th~

".n

~~tore

Italian

o~~.t1on,

oJ~.

o!'oer rtt

Nnp1.~~.

~ev~rn"'e!ltR d.ecla~ th~ms~lves

or a.t least

Papacy had not
"~e

t ......

~('mdcrm

don~, ~nvlng

t'no

M8tternich to exolalm

----....-------

that

in favor or such

Nhl\t has happened."

"'001" prefer the ...Carbone.ri to the

1

dc~ire~

Aust~lans."

'rhl~

~~r117

the

that

The Forel!ft

Minister wu &leo Maple ~8d bY' rnmo\ll"8 that Pius VII

wttS

plannl

to ~!'ant hie Aub,18ota a eOMtltut:ton. 6
Mett.1"ft~-oh

1"eruf'ed to see Leard1 when the latter sought aD

tnt""!e,, to defend the
thel'8fore

8.eet)mp~1tl.d

P""an,.

the

e.gfdnet these char'S...

of"ti~i&l

note of l() August (which merely

Consalvl

Papal reply to the Austrian

e~reeeed

d!l" approval. at the

Nelll}'1011tan regime, 'Pdslng ovet- 1n al1ene. the question ot

auppoJl't tot- Austria agat1llJt it) with .. oonfidential letter to
Mettemlch ift whteh he explained the true Papal position.

Conaalyl "agre•• pertectly with the ••ntiments ot H.I.R.A.M•••••
on the toree. of' Nyolutloa in Naples t
that

Gan

re.~t

operatIon

fro. them."

..

well .. the dangers

He acknowledged that

OJ~y

in co-

ot all goyerDmeDta ... ..tety to be towut t but

Ull-

tortlUlately the pee\lllar 8ituation 01' the Papacy imposed e .. rtat.

limit.tiona upon it. eO-9pentlo-n.

A8 the Cardinal explltlMd to

Mettemloh:
It Y.H. w111 cbse"e the double quality of the

the Holy Father, .. Head of the Church and ae aov.reign
of a state. • • 111 contaot alona a ver:t 1081 tJ.'llllt1er
with t...':tt K1ngdo"1'j. or Naples. • .. entirely- laoldng all

6

il,.;I!., AN'! 247, Leard! to Oo11881v1, 21 August 1820) also
15 Auauat l820.

3

meana

o~ 4e~eftSe, 70U

lnvtnethl.-.,

oare

n~ce9~ 1t~T

w111 no doubt peNetve the

th:'.t th,.

Ho~y r~~,thr.:;r

act i'11th

.ertain measure. tor putt1D& tato etreot
ht... tmi.on l~r:'-th R.I.R •.L N., :tf' it is e. question o~
tak1na aJ'l ln1nt1oal att1tud.e towarda the hapo11tan
govel"l".Ment.
III Ilia capuity as Hea.d of' the Ch'U.'POh. • • ,
1f the H01y Father eannot, even to save his political
e:x.1ateac., take actto. qa1aat aoa-Catholio . .tio_
in order not to inJure thf'lr Nle;~1cn6 With their
Catholio aubjeota, l1\\1.Ob 1••• OUI Be 40 80 qunat an
entirely Catho11e state, and still lese to the ~o8t
aenull u.trlme¥lt of III '1-l"J" reoent eOlloorclat o~ .uch
[treat 1mJ)Ol"'t:8.I'lce 'for relIgion ['.• e. s the Concordat
of 1818 which had made l.mpo~aat OODe. . . lo_ to the
Pape.cyJ. The Hol~ See, which hae a1 ways regarded the
Sect. &a oppo.ad to the .p1~lt or tkat x-el!alo11 of
Whieh it 1. the cent8r. • • ,will never cease to fight
, them, ana all &overnrflfJata that 8ef;tk to deatro7 them
w111 alw~ rind in the Holy tlee the rnoet eonstnnt
and aincere aupport • • • • Bu.t the re11810u relatloft8
• • • lfb1eh the Holy 8ee must presel"Ve with all governmenta. • • forb1<! it to taD It hoatUe attltucie to aD7
goyermnent. • • • 'the Pope. even 1n matters where he
acts all a ten~poral $oYere1pl, oan never forset [theae
rel1g1oUl consIderatIons) nor prefer aDT tempo:ril
OD

&avantage to them. • • •

But tbis is atUl mON evlC1ant • • • ltl.'UU'l one
eone1dere the Roll" lP..ther aa sovereign or a state

bovd~rln&

on

liap~s

• • • la.cldng

urt lmlaz:a of defense.

It 18 knOWft with certainty that the Neapo11tM govemment. or rather th$ Cu'bonaz':1 1 are enl7 ae_k1na II. pretext to invade the Papal l'Eates •••• The least appearanoe of a hO$tlla attitude on the part of the Boly
Path~l' would :sUffice to attract lntrne~late17 the entlT
ot the Neapo11tana 1nto Hia atatea ••• , <)ar17ing
there the flam•• of ~evolutlone.
All that I have said abova _111 d.mon6t~ate to
Y.H. how the moat just and co~pelling motives tores
th~ Hol,. Father to avoid ••• oertain meMUftI in puttIng into practIce his unIon with H.I.R.A.M. it it
inyol •• s a.tina against the Neapolitan government.
Consalvl

~onelud$d by

st:r-esslng again his desire to aid Austr1a

lIheMyer po.sible, but at the same ti'lte expl"'efJs1ng his hope

Metternioh would uader.tand and

'JmPath18~

that

with the dIfficult!••
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7
ot the Papal position.
Soon atterwards, Leardi was instruoted
to see Metternich and deft7 the absurd

rwDOUN

that the Papa0 7

preterred the Carboraarl to Auatria and that Pius VII was planning
to grant a conatltution. 8
At the same time, Oonaalvi took pains to demonstrate his
tri8.cUiM.S to Austria b7 deeds aa well as words.

Ear17 1n

Ausust, I4ettem1ch had requested Conaalv1 to p . .s on to him all
tfttormatloD on the aotlvltles ot the Neapo1ltans collected by
Papal oftlctals.

In order to show h18 lood wt11 Oo_alvi agreed

to th1s request, though it wa hardl7 1n _eping with Papal
Mutralit", he theretore aaked that it be kept striot1,. aeoret. 9

The Cardlnal oontinued th1s tlo. of uaetu1 intormation until the
tinal oyerthrow ot the 'eapo11tan regime .10 Another proot ot his
1004 w111 ... liven later in Auswst, When he complied with an

Austrian request to arrelt am ex-ottioer ot the Italian &rm7
•• ,ected ot Carboft&1'1 laaniop. 11
Conaalv1

f.

"1UN.l'lOe., lupporttd b,. these tarc1b1e proots

ot lood will, luccee4e4 1n 4ilpe111nc Mattemiohts tormer doubts
about the Papal attltucie.

At thelr next meetlng, the Prince

1

A.V., R165, Coualvl to Mettern1ch, 23 Aupat 1820.
8
A.V., ANi 244, Oo.. 81vi to Leardl, 9 September 1820.
9
Ibid., Cons81vl to Mettem1ch, 12 August 1820.
10Example., too numerous to list iOO1v14u8117, mq be tound
in Ibid., 252-355.

-n...n.u..,

259, Oonsalvl to Mette1'D1oh, 19 August 1820.
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received Leardi In the moat rrlendly mannep possible, warmly
prai8ed Conaelyi's "wi8e and. prudent conduct," and. "declared
htmself completely sattsfied wtth the honest and loyal principles
and maxima of the Pontitical government, which he unceasing17

applauded."

As

a token ot Austrian trien<lahlp, Metternich

ottered troops to detend the Pope aaainat

&D7

it the Holy Father vGluntarll)" requested them.

attack, but only
Leard! could

detect no 11ngerlna traoe ot doubt or suspioion 1n his manner. l2
The Seerete.I7

ot State took another opportunity to dIsplq

Papal frIendship, not to 887 partIalIty, tor Austria 1n late

September.

Two Neapolitan diplomats, the Duke dl Gallo and

Prince C1mitIl., had stopped in Bologna on their return trom
unauooesstul missioDa to Austria.

Their presenee so near to

Lom'bard7 where th.)" coUld eas11)" spy on AustrIan m111t8.17 preparatione ... moat d1epleaaI_ to V1enna.

f4ettemich theretore

.ecretly requested that ne1ther the7 nor &n1 other Neapolitans
'be allowed to remain long in Bologna, and that in the interim

their oorreapondence should be intercepted by the Papalpolice. 13
Oo_alyi promptly arraased tor the interception ot the
Heapo1it... mail, with no apparent qualma, but he wu reluctant
to antason1.e Naples b7 bluntly order1ng the diplomats to leave
Bologna. Iutead, he iD8tructed the Lelate in that c1ty,
12
A. V0, AJW 247, Leardi to CoUalY1, 29 September 1820.

13

Van Duerm, 279, Metternich to CODllaly1 15 September 1820.
A.V., R242, Co_alvl to Spina, 25 September 1820. R241, Leard!
to Consalv1, 14 September, 18 September 1820.
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Cardinal Spina, to interview the Neapolitans, point out the
embarrassing position in which their prolonged stay was placing

the Papacy, and request their eo-operation 1n leaving as soon as
III :
I

posaible.

Thus approached, Gallo and C1mitile expla1ned that

theY' were only awaIting ord(fVS from Naples before leaving Bologna,
and their intercepted corl"espondenoe oonfirmed this elalm. 14

Their orders aoon arrived, and by late October both dIplomats had
departed.
During the fall of 1820, then, Austria and the Papacy

seemed to be dra"iDg together under the threat posed to both bY'

the outbreak ot revolution in Naples.

Consalv! ts trielldly

attitude made a favorable impression upon Vienna) Mattemiohle
letters to the Cardinal during th1a period are
tOM

than arq- sinoe 1817.

~~re

fr1end17 1n

This wu alao the period, it will be

remembered, at which Franei3 I seemed about to turn away from
his Josephlat poliCies and to eo-operate with the Papaa.r in
re1ig1ous matters.

In consequence, Austro-Papal relatIons during

the tall and winter of 1820 were more cordial than theY' had been

for three ,.ears and more.

It seemed possible that the Austro-

Papal allianoe, strained b;r rel1&ious strite, m1cht yet be
restored to its pristine vigor.

14

A.V., R242, Consalvi to Spina, 25 September 1820J Spina
to Consalv1, 30 September, 1 october 1820.

II

I

I

2. The

Prel~ina.ries

to Austrian Intervention

Austrian preparations tor intervention in Naples went
torward rapidly in the tall of 1820.

M1lit8l!7 preparations were

soon completed, but the diplomatlc preliminaries were lengtn,.
Before Austria could act, she had first to obtain the support of
the other powers and to

arranae

with the Papacy tor the passage

ot Austrian troope.
The support of the Powers was sought at the Congress ot
Troppau in October-November 1820. 15

Ensland ana FI'anoe,

though privately friendly to the Austrian Intervention, refrained

tor political reasons trom openly endorsing it.

Rus.ia and

PrusSia, however, proclaimed their solidarity with Austria in
the well-known !TOppau Protocol, which announced that: "states ••
which have undergone a ohange ot regime due to revolution, the

results ot whloh menace other states, ipf!o facto cease to be
paI't of the Uliano.,

And

remain exoluded trom it until their

situation gives guarantees ot legal order and stability • • • • n

It these states "oausa by their pruz1mity other countries to

fear ir.m18diate danger," the Allied Powers would employ foroe

15

Schroeder, 60-103. Oharle. K. Webater, The Foreil!!
Pollc1 £! CutleNagh. 1815-1822 (London, 1925)-;-285-311.
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189
if'

t'.ecessary to "ering them back into thE: midst of.' the

Al11anee.,,16
With the support of the Powers thus assured, the next move
was to a.cure I:-'apal 60naent for the passage of Austr1an troops.
Consalvl had long tilnce foreseen such a de;nand, and while the
Congress of Troppau was still in 8Gssicn he had ol.:.tlinac. to the
ParilS nuncio ¥!.Cns;, 19nor Vinoenzo Macchi, the geool."'al pelicy which.

he planned to

rollOt~

There are tour maiD points to be considered:
first .. the pMsage of A~trian troops through the
Papal States J second. the statIoning ot part ot
these troops in the Papal ~tatee; third, t~e
supplies to be provIded tor these troops) tourth,
the restoration to His Holiness of Benevento and
Pontecol"V'o. To begin with the last, there oan be
no doubt that both these territories must be
restored at once to His Holiness • • • • Should
the Austrians propo1!e to lea.ve garrisons in those
place. to preserve order, the Papal government
wIll take eare of that itaelf.
As tor su.ppl7ing the &rm7, the Papal sovernm~nt is definite11 not l.n .. position to aseu.me eny
obligation, tor it lacks the nece.sary resource •
• • • • [!18~to furnish euppll•• ] would be to
take an active part qa1nat the Kingdom of Napl •• ,
eontrtl',ry to the attitude whleh the Papal governrnellt
must b7 its nature take towards all atates • • • •

!t'1n!!.l11', there 1s the ditf!.oulty which. hu been

and atill 18 being experienced in .ecuring reimburnement from the Austrian govern~nt tor its
expenditures made tor the maintenance ot its
t~ops :f.n p~t years.. • • •
The a tat ioning ot Aua trian troops in the Papal
State _wei only be asked 'by the Imperial Co'U.l"t tor
the preservation ot Its communications with the armr
in Naple., or tor the preservation ot order wlthAn

15A.V., R242, Journal of the Conferences at Troppau, Pre-

lhn1nar,y Protocol of 19

Nove~ber

1820.

the

P~pe,l

State. No other reason oould be accepted
by a government which must preserYe pertect neutrallty.
B'Jt the first of these reaaons does not require the
presence ot Austrlan garrlsons in the tortresses ot the
Papsl State nor the stationing of Austrian forees at
atV polnt lII1tbln the State • • • • The second motlve does
not exist, and is proved by the tranquil1ty maintained
here durlng the last tour months • • • • The Papal
governl"'fent therefore dee! not intend to coneent [to the
statlonlng at Austrian troops].
F1nally, the Ito1y "ather does not intend to ret'Uae passage to the Austrian &l"m1', but. • • • given the
peeul!ftr position of Hie Hol1neee, h1s acquiescence muzt
be h1dden 1n aome wQ'. I can assure ,-OU that the other
European gov.rn~nte believe that. • • the Holy Father,
beeause ot hls essentlal neutrality, must protest
against the pa.asa..~. But the Holy Father, because ot
the speclal fr1endlhip .nich binds him to H.M. • • •
would like to spare hi~ even the appearance o~ actIng
against .. protest on h18 part, and wIsh.es to find aome
way to avoid this While stll1 conoealing his consent
to the passqe of troops. When the Imperial Co~t
makes Its request tor the p... age, I will concert with
the Austrian arnbusador sOlne way to allow 1twitbout
oompromising the neutrality ot the Holy Father and
without creating the ~npresslon that A~tria 1s acting
contrary to a protest ot Hia Ho1lne.s.~1

190

Two point. wonhy of comment stand out in the above explana-

tion.

First, it

strict Papal
revolution.
he was

clear' that Consalvi had little interest in

is

neutralit~
partl~'

l?!.!:!!..

Pa..."'t1y f:ro;u d.islike 01'

from a. 6.$si;.'?e to retain Austrian gvod w1ll,

qult~ \~1l11ng

to

0.110'.1

thl! palla age of the Aue trian a.rrrry,

provided that I'apal acquiescence could be concealed.

His pr1maI7

motive for' ir..zlstlng en the preservatlon of oeutral1ty 1n publlc

17

A.V., Archlves ot the Nunciature at Pari3 (hereafter cited
... ANP). tile VIII. Cone alvi to Macchl, 1 Noy.mber 1820. A
Similar explanation was later sent to Leardl: R165, 15 November
1820. fI.ons1gnor Vinoenllc Macchi, a supporter or Consalvl and a
sldlltul diplomat, namec nuncio in Paris in 1819; ma.de a. Cardinal
in 1826.
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was

teal" of a Ne&.po11tari

his

invas1on~

whioh ha.unted him from

beginning to end of the Neapolitan crisis .18

He 'Was ceaaeless17

aware that the Pa.pal a.rmy oould never l-'u&ist .. strong Neapolitan

whiQh would caU&6 immense damage) in addition to the

att&ok~

m.aterial damage to the Capital of the CnUl"oh a.."ld the blow to
Papal prestige # he feared that it Pius VII was torced to .flee

ROlne again .. the hardahips

01~

the journe,. in hiS present very poor

health. might aul1y kill him.19 '!'his Bame dis1nterest in the
principle ot neutrality was to mdk the Carcl1.nal ta conduct
throughout the Nea.politan erisis--a good example of Consalv1'.

generall#, prag!rtatlc approach to all questions that did not
involve the eUlSential P1ghts of the Papacy or the doctrine of the
Churoh.
Th~

aeoond notable point is that I while Consalv1 still

hoped to prase". tr:1endl;y relatiorJ5 with Auatr1a, a oertain
d1:Jtx-ust

or

tha.t Powel" had beoome vv1dont on his part.

The

furniture affai:r.* had eV1dent17 destroyed the Cardinal-s oon-

fideRoe in Austrian good. faith in .fin.anoial mattorB.

140:-0

e1gni!ioant waa hi$ obviuua determination to prevent tho otat1ofting of Aua tJ.·ian troop6 arJ,J'WhSN. Oll Papal terri tory.

'!'hough

not

expl:ielt17 atateu, it "ee1ll& likely that one reason under171ng

this determinat10n waa Consalv1 1 a rear or the inol:'eased Auatr1an
·¢4i¥44 - - - - -

·'18

See~ ~!:k' Van Dut'rm,
~, 18, COMalv1

Petroochl

19 - .

petroceh1
... - ....

...-

1943. 78 •

253, N0te 1, 2 ~:ugust 1820;
to Opi.soni, 24 JMU8.PY 1821.

influenee, not to SR..,. control, in the Pa'Pal Stlltee that would
result trom such an oooupation.

192

'!'his oODt1"01 would N8trlot

the temporal independence of' the PApacy Which seemed essential
tor that spiritual treedom whioh CO_Uys. was determlned to pre-

BIn'e, 1ft the m1dat of' apparentl,. growlng Auatro-Papal

.e"e.

good wl11, .... the .e.da ot 41atruat--a

t~at.nlD1

portent tor

the tuture.
COllllalv1 soon had ooo.. loft to app17 the pr1ne1"le. outlined

1n the above 41.patoh.

In a ooDtldentlal letter

or

22 November,

Mettemloh aalat4 the Card.laal whether the Papae7 woul4 agree to
the PUII_ or AutrS... troops and would. provide them with
supplie..

He alao hlnted that an Auatrip oooupation or the

strategic o1t7

or

the .e.pallt.....

Anoona mlgbt be Dece.s&r7 to protect it trom
Finall7, he requested Coualvl to tell h1m In

ooatl<!enee the yl.. or the Pope 88 to the posalbUlt7 ot a
Papal oondemnation ot the Carbonari. 20
ct

•

III h1s repl7, the Secretar.r ot State pra.1e.d the deo1Blona

made by the Powera at Troppau (ot whloh APpol'Q'i had 1ntormed.
h1m 1a oontl'Aiulc.) aru1 declared. that the Papao,. would do e ....1'7thlq polla 1'b1. to aupport them.

Mattenioh te request.

..._"4 1ft aoooJ.'duoe w1th the Oard1ftal

priaeipl...

t.

WN

then

pMvioua17 .....t.rm.1ned

Tb.e Pope could aot tormal17 ..ree to the patS. . . .

Auatnan t1'Oopa, but "pemapa

80me

ot

aeeomodatloa oan be work8d

20

Van

Du~rT.,

315, Conaalvi to

311, ~~ttarnieh to Consalvi,
Yette~leh,
DeQemb~r

5

1820.

22

Nove~ber

1820;

out" ,r'between Conaa1..i and Appony1.

'!'he Pa:"a].

gov~rnment
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c.oul4

not suppl.,. the Austrian to roe. , tor the reasons earlier expla1ned
There was no need for' Au'!tria to ·P1"Oteet n

to the Pari. llUllOio.

Anoona, tor 1t ..... sate h'om attack.

Consalvi did not mention

the oondemnat1on ot the CarbOnaM. J the Papacy
war" of aueh a moYe. 21
---~.-

The Tl'OPPau PoweJIII hoped to

lut&U!'8

Wd

long to remain

more from ther PapacY'

the mere permis.lon tor the putuige ot troops; they hoped to

elll1at ita moral eupport tor the1r intervention.

Lat& 1n

NOYember the1 l"quested the Pope to support their invitation to
the Xing ot Naples to attend the comine: OcngNas at r.laybaeh.

Sueh support m1cht be useful 1n overoom1.ns the walstanee which
the Neapolitan Parlle..>nent
attendance.

expected. to !n.ake to the Kina IS

HopiJII that the Congreaam1ght lead to a peaceful

'ettlement, Pius VII
letter

WM

UJ.I&lns

wUlincl~

sent K1ng Fercllnand. a penonal

him to attend 1n tha lnterests ot peace &l'lC1 order.

The Powe" w1ahed to secUN the full support end. formal
approval or all the Itallu atatea trom the Austr-J.an intervention

tbe apPl"OYal ot the Pope was espeoially desired beeaWie at hi.
d.ual status as an importaDt Italian prinoe and as Head of' the

Ch\U'Ch.

In late Deoember or 1820, theretore. the Allies re-

quested Plus VII to send a representative to jo1n 11'1 the d.eliberations at Lqbaoh.

el

Aoeordlng to the inv1tation sent to the Pope,

!bid., 315, Conaa!v1 to Mettel!'Dioh, 5 Deoember 1920.

22-

A.. V. f AWl

2}~4,

PtU$ VII to Ferdlnemd. I, 3 Dec.mOOr 1820.

the purpose of the C01"'grees lias to \<wrlr cut a. new

l~eapolltan
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878-

tem of government Which would "en3ure tranqu1lity and peaee to
~ ince

Naples 3.nd Eu...'"'Ope-."

l1'!~ttf:r

certainly be a

was wil11ng

t{;· $.gr~e

that other as}:tecte

including the

t~e

that the Powers

c·r

the new syG te71'l of

of concern to 1'I..eighbor1na

to the AlltE:d
the

reql)_~~f'$t,

~ap()11tan

of forae

fJ111St

gOV'ltl."'nm.ent

ag~1nst

st,~tes,

woul "-

Conaalv!

th.cugh ht lnew well

situation would be discussed

Naples.

He lns1&ted, however,

first send Pius VII .. toX'me.1 note

or

in-

Yltat1on, to avo1t1. Siving Naple$ the impression that the Pap ...,.
was spontaneouE1ly pEU't1cipatlng in lstlat the
sidered

It

hot'ltUe gathering.

'N~apol1tarJS

eon-

'!'his done, Clmealv! .ppolated

Car4ina.l Spina, h15 most truated l1eutelWtt, to a.t aa }\apal

Npresentat1ve at Lqbaeb. !

'
At the Bame time,. the 1..111.e8 adopted .. Russlan proposal to

appeal to the Pope to aet .. mediate. tn ending th8 Neapolitan
cris 1s •

AuatPia. was net pleased. with th1a augestton, *ieh it

relt ... c

attempt to ,revlde Ferdlnar14 with analtenatlv. to

A_tria 1nteneat101l, but felt obl1gecl to agree.

Leb!'.eltem wu

e.tl"'WSted with this miss ion to Rome J he ... eeclNtly 1_ truoted
b7 Mettemieh that all. lIe.mint; to seek Papal med.la.tloll, he

-should
......... "
,

1n tact
. .... try to tum the Papaoy ag&1Mt it.24
~

23

AppoJO'l
J anU8.l~
portant
pointed

A. V., Rl65, COMaJ.v1 to ,....ttem1ch, 6 J a.rxuar:; 1821. R242,

to Oonsalvi. 6 Januar,y 1821, Consalvi to APPOllUl, 1

1821. Giuseppe Cardinal S p1na (1156-1828) plq-ed an im·
P&1tt in MSOt iat:t.Dg the Fx.n.h Conoordat of 1801 J ap ....
Lega.te or l301osna. in le11) or.te or CotlSal;ri la a\.leflt and

moat ne'v'oted f'!uppnrtel'S.
2 1t

Lebzeltem,

396~OO.
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Metternich's instructions were

superfluous~

1fuen Lebzeltern

arrived in Rome, he found the Papal goverrunent already opposed
to the idea of

media.tt6n~·

Consal vi explained his reasons for

opposition in a confidential letter of 6 January to

Metternich~

The Pope would have wished to act as mediator, partly to show
his appreciation of the honor paid him by the Allied invitation,
partly because his religious character obliged him to further
peace whenever possible. Unfortunately, certain practical
difficulties made this impossible. Since the King of Naples was
now in Laybach, the Papacy would have to mediate between the
Allies and the King on one hand, and a rebellious Parliament on
the other; the Pope would then have to recognize the Parliament
as representing the people and as being capable of being the
other party in the proposed mediation. Furthermore, the rebels
were determined to have the 1812 Constitution, the Powers were
determined they should not; it was difficult to see what compromise could be worked out between these two
the mediation could hardly

succeed~

extremes~

Hence,

The only possible compromise

would be the adoption of some less radical constitution, but the
Pope could not suggest this lest it give rise to demands that
he grant his own subjects a similar

constitution~

For these reasons, the Pope could not agree to act as a
mediator. He was eager to do everything possible to aid the
Allies and avert the threat of war, but under existing circumstances the most he could do would be to write a letter to the
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Neapolitan people pointing out "the dangers of war, the happiness
of being assured of peace, the duties to legitImate authority
Imposed by religion, and simIlar thIngs • • • • But what effect
could thIs have on the Liberals?"25

This offer was apparently

never taken up by the Allies.
DurIng his Vi8it to Rome, Lebze1tem also disoussed a number
of other points oonnected with the proposed Austrian intervention.
The tirst point was the pusage of' Austrian troops through the
Papal State.

The Austrian government had planned a tormal request

for Papal permis8ion, but Consalvi rejeoted this plan as likely
to antagonize Naples.

Instead, "give us, f1 he asked Metternich, •

"a Note in which we are told that after having exhausted all

means of conciliation. f'inding yourselves obliged to tight, and
considering that the enel'Tl7 ill near at hand. etc •• you are
regretfully compelled to enter our territory without a previous
request, etc.

This is plausible at 1eut, and the Neapolitans

will probably believe it."26
Lebze1tem had alllO been instructed to request that Austria
be allowed to garrilon Ancona.

Consalvi flatly rerueed.

To

Metternich, ae explained that no motive existed to just1fy such
a breach ot Papal neutrality.

Ancona was well defended. by Papal

troops and 1n no danger of capture b,. the Neapo11 tans.

Nor d1d

Austria have any real need to occupy the oity, either as a supp1,.

----25
26

A.V •• R16S. Consalvi to Mettemich, 6 January 1821.
Ibid.
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base or as a center upon which her army could fall back in the
event of a retreat: supplies could be stored at many other
points, and it was hardly likely that the superior Austrian
forces could be driven all the ','fay back to Ancona by the
Neapolitan army. The occupation of Ancona would therefore be
at most a convenience for Austria, and the Pope could not be
expected to violate his neutrality merely for the sake of
Austrian convenience. Such a violation, Consalvi warned, would
surely lead to

a Neapolitan invasion in reprisal, and he drew

a lurid picture for Metternich's benefit of vengeful Neapolitans
sacking Rome and destroying the artistic and cultural heritage
of centuries while even st. Peter's and the Vatican went up in
flames. Austria could not expect the Pope to expose his territories to such devastation without good cause. To Lebzelternts
suggestion that the Papacy yield Ancona after a feigned resistance, Consalvi replied that this stratagem would hardly deceive
the Neapolitans, and that in any case it would present to the
world the unedifying spectacle of apparent strife between the
Papacy and Austria just when their firm unity should be known
to all. 27
Consalvi was most deter.mined to prevent Austrian occupation
27Ibid • See also ANV 245, Consalvi to Leardi, 16 January
1821, wIl'IC11 contains a good description of the negotiations
over Ancona to that date.

of Ancona.

He had previously ordered the commander of the

Ancona garrison under no

clrc~stances

troops to enter the place. 28

to allow any foreign

~lo~.f, in addition to \,Iriting direct

to Metternich, he also wrote secretly to Count Blacas, the French
representative at Laybach, asking him to use his influenoe to
29
AURtria
prevent the proposed occupation.
As the traditional rival ot~
in Italy, France would no doubt be willing to support the Papacy
on this pOint.
French intervention wu not neeesaar.r.

Upon receiving

Conealv1 's letter ot 6 Januar;y, Mettemich replied that the
Emperor, to show h1s spec1al respect tor the Pope, had ordered
that the Neapolitan campaign be planned without the uae of
Ancona as an Austrian bue. 30 For the time being, Consalvils
resistance to the occupation of that city seemed suocessful.
However, Metternich had not given up hope of overComing the
"resistance opiniatre tt of ConsalviJ he was only awaiting .. more
favorable moment to: Deftew his demanda. 31 ~he question of
Anoona would once again rise to trouble Austro-Papal relations.

28

29

A.V., R242, Consalvi to Col. !ilvagni, 23 December 1820.

A.V., R165, Consalvl to Blaed 6 January 1821. Pierre
Loua Comte de B1acaa d •Aulps (1771 ...1839), cloatt friend and
adviser of Louis XVIII ot Prance J Prench ambassador to the
Papaoy, 1816-1822; 8ympathetic to the Papaoy_

30

A.V., R242, Mettemich to Conaalvi, 18 JanU117 1821.
31
Van Duerm, 359, Mettemieh to APpolQ'i, 21 January 1821.

3. '!'he Conare.1 ot Lqbach
In response to the inv1tation ot the PoweN. Conaalv1 had

&lree4 to .end Carc11nal Spina to repre.ent the Pap...y at the
Conere•• of La7baeh, wb.loh opened. oa 12 Janu&l'7' 1821. 32 The
central theme of the Inltruotiona Which he had prepared. tor

Spina'a guidance at the Oongress

WU

ot preserving Papal neutralIty.

The offioial purpo.. or Spina

mi.alon

.88

the oompellt. neoeaetty

t.

to Itud7 tho measure. adopte4 towards the new

government of Napl.. l •• t they should prove to contain &nJthing
likely to be c1etnmental to the weltare or the ne1ahbortng Papal

"On..'' ' from this

8tate.

point ot yiew 1. the Pa.pal representative

to participate in the measures to be takea in regard to the
Kingdom ot Naplesf" he might give his personal opin10n on other

points, 'but he could not apeak .. the orticial Papal delesat••\,
Abo... all, be must not llWOl•• the P&pac,. la &IV • .,., 41reet17
or l1l41reot17, 1ft aft7 hoatil. me_UN towardJI Napl•• , 'but should.

take eare to

,re••

rYe

the "most perteot neutNllt7" ot the

Papaq.

_ _....Tb~._.R.."••".tloll ot Papal aeutralit7 ... alao tob. the

31" -

OJ1 the CoqN•• ot l,Q'bach, ••• Scllroeder,

l~-l28J

Web.ter, 312-3451 Brady, 77-93J An.cel0 Tamborra, "I OODlNS.i
della Buta All....a 41 Lub1ana e 41 Vero. .

Santa

a.de."

!~hl,.10 _~t_o....P1
........e.....
o

lit

II. politic.. della

italiano, 1960, 190....11.
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governifl..g facto!' should the Allies rene\'J theil" request for
Papal med::ation; however, Spina lias to make no COT,ID't1tments on
auch a request I but should

cons1del"atiol1.

inste~d

t"efer :tt to Rome for careful

It the subject ct Papal condemnation of the

Carbonari should be brought UP. Spina

to explain ti'..at tw yet

1'1U

the Papaoy lacked sufficient information on the Society'S

religious principles to justify a
Powel~

conde~nat1on.

Finally. the

were reported to be planning to request the Italian

govern,;~en.t6

to

Car'l."'Y

popular discontent.

ou.t variol.t5 internal refo.!'tiW to allay
Because of the peculiar chara.cter ot the

Papacy J this was 8 very

question.

de11cat~

stitutional or parlia 1entar.y
Y

the Papacy; any I)ther type of

govern~nt
rerOl~

}OTo fOI'l'n of con-

could be considered by

suggested by the Powers

should be referTed to Rome for judgment. 33

Arr1vlag in L8)'baoh on 22 J a.nuar:f, Sp1na

1eal~d.

from

Ml;tternieh that the P()wers had already agrec,d to put the
Pl-:l.l\ciples of the Tl"*oppau ProtoGol into practioe.

Within ten

dalS an Austrian army with the bless1ng of the Allies was to

advanoe aga1nst Naple. to suppress the oo:aat1tutional regime and
restore the King to his full authority.

In effeot, the repre-

sentatives of the Italian atates had been summoned to La7baon to
give their approval to this plan.

Mattemion that "the Pope, both

SpIna at onoe remiftcied

rl~rn

his olt&l"uter and from the

geographIcal position ot h1a statea oannot depart for a moment

33

A.V., R242, Instruotions tor Spina, 10 JanU&17 1821.
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trom his 87Stem ot the most perfect neutral1ty, and that 1n case

ot &ll7 cOIl1.ll\unieation made to me, ray reply can only be in t'ull
accord with thiS prinoiple."

The Prinoe

times that nothing more than thl. wu

01'

aas~~d

Sp1na Im&n1

woula be asked ot'

'Wi. "34

The Italian representatives, inolud1ng Sp1na lIere tirst to
partieipate in the

OOJJgl.. S8

at the ae$SiOll of 26 January. Despite

Metternich '5 a.s.uraneeil, Spina. learned tbat at this meeting he,
l1ke the other Italian delegates, wo\lld be expected to express
hiS

govern~ent '5

to be ealled upon
regi~e

approval for the Allied propoeals.
by the Alliee to

~laples

was

aboliah the revolutionary

and restore full royal authority.

An Austrian army would

be dispatched to Naples to preserve order during the change of
£overnment, but if the demands of' the Powers were rejected, then
the

a.t~

would impo!:e the:n upon Napll!.la by toroe.

Vstternieh

b~fore

approv~ th~se

Spina saw

the 3ession and warned him that h$ could not

measurea with their lmpllclt threat of war aga1nst

Naples, for this would be a Violation of Papal neutra11t7. 35
Metternioh was not moved fro1'!1 hiS

ments.

COUNe by

Spina '8 argu-

At the meeting oft the 26th, ha explained the Allted plan
Itall~

to the

representatiyes ana requested their formal

approval for it.

Spt•• s comments were sought first.

He re-

iterated that the neutrality of the Papacy must prevent it tram

giving its approval to any plan that involved the use of foroe

34

Ibid. J Spina to CQnsalvi, 24 Ja,nutl.l7 1821 (#3).

35--

~.,

Spina to CODSa1v1, 28 Janu&1'7 1821.
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agalnet Naples.
tmy

t~e

Metternich denied that there was any l"eaeon

Papacy could not approve the Allied plan, whioh was

eeeent1all,. peaceful and

conel11~tory ~

the une or t'Ol"ce be:"ng
~

threatened on17 in the hypothetical sitUation that Naples rertuHtd to aecept it.
~1eh.

eo"ld

l'lf't

Spina. \-les un1mpreosed by- this reason100.

alter the fact that the tllreat of' force .,rtw an

eesentie.l pert 0'1' the plan.

The Pa.pacy could not approve the

plan without Implicitly approv'.ng its parts. :i.nclud1r4?; the
poes1~1.

use ef terce against Naples.

The Jit'lU!eian repreeentative. Ct'lpO dlIotr1a. next rose to
Iltte.(tk 8p'-ntl fttom a different angle.
hayif!!: sent

He argued that the Pope ..

e. repreaentatlve to d1soutls a new syst!!'Yi of' govern-

ment for Nap1ee, had by that very tact agreed that the existing
}.l~apo11tll'1

goyemment r;hould bE:!

t'!egtr:)'Y'e~.

Having approved

thl1 end. the Pope could not logioally refuse to approve an.y
tnel\M Mces.a17 to attain tt. the 'U8e or foree ':'ncluded.
ret,..,rted that the

a

eO~'1

Po~

had s

let!,i.ti~ate

that was to set up a

ohang.. in the Neapolitan

~w

Spina

right to part1e!pate in

Neapolitan government, for

s,.te~

OQuld h&ve repercu3310na upoa

hla own neilhboring terr1to191es.

Sucb pe,rt!elpatioJl, however,

d1~

not comm1t the Papao," to appro•• either that .,..tem or

covenrment or the

mttantl

used

t~

eatabl1"h it.

The Pope would

,ladl,. 41'prO'9'e all pea-eatnl meane for settling the Neapolitan

orista J but the A111ed. propoaall Jo1n.ed to conciliation a tllreat

ot toroe whioh the Pope'a aeutral1tJ' forbade him to approve.
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The f1nal attack on S!)ina came from the Eng11eh obee1"Ver,
LI)rd Stewa.rt) whQ re"l'Iarked that although Bngland, l1ke the Papacy.

had

ado~\ted

ventIon,
a
j

a neutral p031t:i.on in public on the proposed inter-

~he nonethel~s8 ~altzed

di.s~~ter s!H1 !!,~cepte(!

t.

The

bele~ered

who poi.nted out to

that the revolut10n had been

All1~d

the

measures to be taken

a~a1nst

Papttl delegate now found an ally in Blac.. ,

~tew.rt

tha,t the Pp,pal government!" whtch h-.d

the revolutf.on&ry' regime at i.tll very doorltep, could hardly
adopt the same att'.tttde toward8 it
distance

aw~.

The Frenoh

8.8

England,. which was a eate

~preeentatlve'8

intervention brought

the dlseuaeion to aft end. 36
As

~plM

was not to be moved from hill stand, it WY agreed

that he should prepare

~

statement explaining the Papal position

for the ,1ournal of the Congress.

In this a tatement, composed

with the aid of' Blaey, Sp1fta put on reoord the argumenta he had

used at the meeting 01 the 26th: but stressed espec1ally that the
!'apal relUsal to a!'prove the Allied measures stemme<i not f1"Om
allY' oppo:.1tlon to

those measures u such, but only from the

neeess1ty of' preserving Papal neutra11ty.37

Con,elvi
taken by !~lna
and
---- ,36
,-,-- rully approved the nosition
.
This account of the seSSion of 26 January 18 baaed on
Spina'S report to Conaalvi" R242, a8 January 1821. It is essentially the tUlmeas that in Brady', 81-84, based on the SaMe
aoewnent. The eaI"ller vel'$lon in Blanohi, II 43-44, ia inaccurate. Jean, CO"!'lte de Capo d' Istna (1776-1831 J.. Greek statesman
in Rus81an !Service, 1807-1827J later a leading figure in the
Greek Revolut1on. Charles VaM J Lord Stewart, Brittan Ambassador
1n Vielma, half-brother or. Lord Cutlereagh.
37
!.~1~. J with Nota Verbale ot 28 JanU&1T 1821 enclosed.
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prailled the 510.11 with wn1uh he bad

~arrled QU'!; h.1~

1astwot1oWl.

He dil-ected the Papal @lef:&w to perG:lat .In his ref'wial to

a88o.;.:.l.ate the

the

CQr~l"eas.

~apa.:"y

with

~

j,llan th.at 1molve<1

eVQn

stu~ f,UlQ

CQnsalvi st:;.:ressed. muat 'be tu

the lXIS ....

oor.l.:llel1t

upon the new sya',a;;l of &OVernr:1&ilt tor lla.plea .3fJ
Thia

on

W.n'l 3ye 'ce~il

20 Februar'J •

o.f goVeI'J.1.H18l1t w.as prtitaGnteo. 1;0 thlot Congress

I'e ocntalned onll two &ii;l'Ufl<JaJ.'1t i:rmovatioM a

separ"a.te aalYlini8 tratlons \'iere to be e.et up

Sicily # 'li,thich wrre to bi;,) Jollleu. only by a
a~"1ltem

of adVisoq CJouncila

contrel

by

to be crea.tGd to ah&..""e i •• the

WafS

h'hen

&ilPV1~lt\}d

lU3~d

1'o~

Naples and for

~O~jU:.-n m.o~J
tl~

and. a

kina a.:rMl under b.1.s

wO:i,'"lc

ot

oQftrDlnent. 39

:. . or h.1.a CQii'1nente upou tha ayatem, 3p1.na 1'"'ep11ec1

th.at fJinee he did net l'lAve rull powera be could. J¥.)t tormalll
approve the plan And wculd

retet' it

to Rome.

However, it waa h18

o·wn opinion that the Plan IlQnt&1ned tfno prlncipJ.e tb.&t In1&ht ha.t'nl

the

rigbt~

an4

1nter..:at~

of the Sta.te. of tb.e Hol,. ' . . ,It a».c1

that accor41n&lJ the rope \loula ttc.io full JliIIt1ee to the putt,.

of 1:1$ Majest7 'Ii 1nteniliou."
Th~

40

other Ita.l1aA .tate. na.vi.n& c1ven their approval, the

plan waa aocepteci on 25 FebJ:"U.U7 1821.

the CODgft.. then 010••4

'38 •
Did.. OODII&1yt to Ip1-., 8 "e'J.!'UU'J' 1811.

39-----

_

Ibid.., Journal or the Ooape•• , ao JPebNa17 1821,
DeelaraiIon III the Una or litapl"_ in Sp1aa to OQual,,1. 22
"eb1'Ual7 1921.

40

~. I Bpt. . 'a

Hote of 21 FebNa17 1821.

with the re801ution that another Congre88 8hould be held at
Florenoe 1n September 1822 to consider the development ot the
8ituat1on 1n Italy.4l
-~--

..

-'-"'L~:C

- ... .

Ibid., Sp1na to Constllv1. 27

o.elegat;s-·of 1:;ne Italian atatea

nOli

~eb1'Uary

1821.

The

left Laybaon, bu.t

tho8~

oJ:

the great powers l"ema1ned to ob8erve the progress ot the Austrian
inteI'V-en(;ion.

4-. The

pa,,~8as;C

cf the Alli.i trian Arr.1Y

On 6 February an Austrian srmT ot 50,000 men eros.ed the

w.,

Po and advanced southwards through the Papal States on their
42
to Maple..
In keeping with ConsalvllB advice to Metternich.

Austria dld not formally request permission tor the passage ot

its torcea, permission Whioh the
openly violating 1ta

Pa~ac7

neut~it,..

could not grant without

'1'0 all appearances, the

A\t8trian government 81.mp17 presented the Papac," with.
!:c~}')~lJ.

In all probability, however, th18 method

or

ta.!'!
procedure

had :previousl,. been agreed. upon 1n cU.scuasions between Consalvi

and the Austrian amb... ad.or .. the best

ot avoiding an open

W&"f

"Iiol.tion ot neutralIty, . . COMalvi had P1anned. 43
CoaealYi had al1"eady, in late Januar.v, instructed his

subordinates how to react to the entry ot toreign troops.

the Papacy was at war with

DO OM,

Sinoe

all foreign regular troops

Ihould be treated aa friends and no oppoSition to their passage
should be made.

HOlfever, this friendly attitude shotrld not

extend to supplying

them~

except that local town officials might

'\.t neces8&1'7 pro'Ylde lodgings for p9J1sing troops.

)for, Consalvi

42
Itld., Cor..sal'Y"i to 8pir..a. j :2 FebI-u.EU"J· 18'21.

43----

"'

Van Duorm. 311 J Consalvi to ~tternlch" 5 Deoentber 18·~O.
R165, Cot1aalv1 to I~ttern1ch, 6 ·Jatrutll'Y 1821. k'-P-VIII. Consa!vl
to Macchi, 1 Noyember 1820.
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t·
f

stressed, were foreign troops under any- circumstances to be
admitted to any fortified place in the State.

Even in unfortitie

places, the stay of' foreign troops should be no longer than
mi1itarr considerations required.

During this sojourn of'

foreign troops, Papal clvl1 and mI11tar.v officials were to continue with their normal duties, nor

WM

any toreign lnterterence

wlth the Papal adminiStration to be tolerated.

These principles

IQ)plled onl,- to regular troops J irregular torces, which would be
undisciplined and would have to 11ve ott the country, were to
be driven away.

As

these regulatlons app11ed to both Austrms

and Neapo11tans, the Papac,- could not be accused ot partlallty,
though ot course Austrla would protlt tar more trom them than
Naples.

i.j.':"

Atter the entrance ot the Austrian

&.rmy',

Consalvl again

wrote to his subordinates, informing them of' the Allied decls10ns
at Lqbach and ordering them to obserYe scrupulousl,- his previous
inatructlons. 4j On 8 February he issued a Proc1amatlon to intorm the People ot the State ot the sltuation.

This document

exp1alned the reasons tor the AustrIan troop movements,
described the attltude ot neutrallty adopted by the Papacy, and
oal1~d upon the people to treat the Austrians as rrlends. 46
..-- -""41f' "'- ..A. V •.' R210 Con.'!elvt to
"
January 1821.

all Delegllt@8

and T..a€;a.tes, 27

hr;

. ft.. V., R2!t2, Consalvi

Februw 1821.,

to all Delegates L"ld Legat3s, 7

t..~L!

,"
.)

At the beginning of the Neapolitan campaign, Consalvi
irnsisted upon rigorous compliance w1th his instructions in order
to avoid any open violation of neutrality or any friction with

the passlng At,ustrlan forces.
ever, 1t became

As the eampaigll progressed. how-

1nereaal~ly evld~nt

be completely achleved.

that these

ai~

could not

Difficulties goon aroBe on t\-m pointe:

the supplying of Auatrian troops and. AustrIan atteTllpts to occupy

certain place. ln the Papal states.
Consal.-!'. ru.le against Bupplying Austrian troops
broke down.

800n

The Austrian government before the campaign had

given contracts to local agents

(!0?!l.ltor~J

to supply Its troops.

Unfortunately, these preparatIons ha.d not been made on a sufflclently large scale, and to make matters worse, these forn1tor1
were often unable to fulfill their contracts.

Local Papal

officials .ere thereby placed 1n a very dlfticUlt poSition,

forced

co

choose between departIng from theIr prescribed

neutrality and seeing the Austrians resort 01' neeessIt7 to liVing

oft the countryside.
'l'hia problem arose as
the first

P~a1

so~n

as the Austrians reached Bologna,

cIty on their me.rch south.

The Austrian com-

his t:ccops with hospitals and. baggage animals,

goverrlment had tal1ec. to make

.u~l"a.ngements.

t01:'

kf'iat felt j'\.l.i5tifled

on hu,nar.iG.u'ian ,rc·',L"!os in authorizing th.e ea.re of
local hospitals.

which his

t):,.$

sick in

Furnishing traDSportatlon was a more dellcate

nlattet·,. 0 ....1; at le_th. Amat decicieu to perauaCie a number ot local
.,,, J1rovlde the Autr!au with the neoessary vehicles and

~itizeu

ar.lill6l.s, pro{1I1&1J,$ tutUl'e- compensation.

Another problem arose

tlt/len the Auatl-i&.h quaJ·t;e.mMtel" ... ked the Vice-Legate to lend. him

50,00(,; Ll'anoS with wbicb to pay the looal f'ornitore in actvaltoe,.

fvl'

ott-!~I'~i3e

al.4pplies.

tn. lattel' woule be unable to buy the necessary'

A.lna.t l-e£used till. l~que.t

.f:el~t1;y,

but Ciio qree to persuade,

.. loea! banker to honor an Austrian Graft for 12,000

1'l-a.nca wittl .nlcm to tide the tornito" over the LlTiillecUa.te

el'a!..

A.nat <:Lef.Deleti ili8 eonQuot, which he feared. was not 1n

L.e;t;51i l.g wlt.h (.;onfAalv1 'il instruotioM, on the grounu that he
bad

"."ltell

..Ln the oul,

posaible

w,,"

to prevent the <i18order that

cvw.lcl have z... v.lteci from the fa.ilure of the Auatrian auppl,.iviol.. ove:r,

ayatElilh

be hao.oeen oareful. to act aecret17 ana.

priyately, so tnat Papal neutrality had not been torfliallT or
f,...-;--

OlJ~nly

c:'>!Ilpro,nia.~.i i

Conaalvl agreed. that circumstances had Justified Amat la
oonchtet, but advised him to avoid su.ch meaaure8 unleas absolutel)"
\.0

neoessary.~v

Cardinal

When a similar problem came up at Perug1a, the

8ugg~sted

that the local officials there imitate !mat.s

exa~ple by

abtalning transportation unofficially tor the
Au.strians. 49
- - - - - . , 'FY"
'-1'1

.-~.-

A.V., R210, Al1l&t to Consalvl, 10 FebruaI'y 1821.

/,n

~i'V
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1821.

III 10., Cons aI-v 1. to A.:nat, 17 Febrtlal"Y 1821.

Ib1d., Consalv1 to the Lelegate of Perur1a, 14 Februar.r

The eventa at Bologna were repeated with varlat10na in

other eitiaa as the Austrian &ril1T mov3d southwards.

At the out ...

aet, Conzalvi eGntinueQ to insist on the strict observance of
lleutralit7 by local officials ~ and subordInates who atepred
too tar beyond his 1nstru.ct1or':i received st1ngip..g rebul'"..es.'O
Under the pressUl.'e of e'f'entf!, however, he was gradually driven

to approve an &yer-incl*eulng degr-ee of usutance to Austrian
foro&a by his subordInates, to the detriment of strict neutrality
Consaly1 himaelf' worked out with Apponyl a general arrangement
tor the treatment of' the Austrian alok, Who were to be received

into Papal hoapit&la or, if thea. proyed 1naurfloient, into new
hospItal.

that ahould be set up and tlupplied

by the !,C!.~!t~r!.

This polioy, he. .ver, oould be c:leten4ed on l\\lJ'nanltar1an groundt!
against the oh~e of' vielating Papal neut7allty.51
A few da7IJ 1atel'., on 17 Febru8l7 ~ Consa!v! 1ntervening 1n
another p?Oblem, instructed the Delegates to

~e

their influenoe

unottle!all.,. with loeal merchants and farmers who were taking

advantage of the inoreased demand caused

by-

the pl'esenoe or

Austrian troops to rais. their prices to exorbItant heights.

Such price raising !nade it dirrleult tor the
the AU4trlans adequate17 3upplled,

50

~~_~~.,

L~d

Delegate of ViteJ.--bo to

the

f.o~l~orl

r~sultlng

COM alv!,

to keep

shortages

17 :?ebruary 1821 J

COMalvi to Delegate of' V1terbo, 19 l?ebru1!I"Y 1821.

51

..

ill.~ ~ Consalv1 to A·;ll!t.t

and the Delesates of Urbino,

Anoona, Perugla, and V1terbo, 14 Pebr'W1!7 1821.
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could lead to disorders among the troops.

Conealvi theretore

sought to keep prices at a reaaonable level, but without tormal
action by the governmeftt. 52
The further the Austrians advanced trom their base of
operationa in Lombar4y-Venetia, the less etficient their supply
system became, until by late Februar.y it seemed on the verge ot
breaking down altogether.

Coualvi suspected that this was the

work of the 5ettarj, who hoped to sabotage the Austrian expedition. 53

In all probabilit7, however, the chief reasons were the

inadequate preparationa and the lack of co-ordination in the
Austrian arm7, added to the innate difficulties ot supp17ing a
large number of meD in a relative17 unproductive countr.y with
inadequate means ot transportation.
Whatever the cause, the breakdown ot the supply s18tem
could have serious consequences for the Papal states.

To prevent

that calamity, Conaal.vi was compelled to authorize increuingly
greater departures from strict neutralit7. 54

When in late

FebruaZT the \ Austrian supply 878tem tailed at Perugia and no one
i

could be foud to provision the troope, Conaalvi allowed the
local ~utbor1ties to take over the burden ot 8UPP17. 55 At the
52
Ibid,., Conealvi to all Delegates, 17 Febru&r1' 1821.
53

A.V., R242, Oonaalvi to Spina, 4 March 1821.
54
That th1a polic7 was not necessari17 motivated b7 partialit7 tor Austria 18 indicated b7 the adoption ot a 8imilar
polic7 towards the few Neapolitans who crossed the frontier.
Brady, 131-139.
55
A.V., R2l0, Coualv! to the Delegate of Perugia, 24
Febru&r7 1821.
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same time, as the fornitori were still having difficulty in
securing supplies because of inflated prices, he authorized the
Delegates to compel owners if necessary to sell at reasonable
prices or to lend their gooda against the later return of an
identical quantity and quality.56
The situation was at ita wont along the southern frontier
near Rieti, a poor area Which had alread7 been drained by a
Neapolitan occupation.

Here, all other remedies failing,

Conaal vi was compelled to authorize the Delegate to resort to
forced requ1sition if necesaar,y to aecure supplies from the inhabitants.

The Secretary of State also felt compelled to involve

the central government directly by sending supplies from Rome to
Rieti to relieve the shortage there. 57 A week later, crises
Similar to that in Rieti having appeared rapidly throughout the
Papal States, Conaalvi extended the power to make forced requisitions to all De1egates. 58 By this time, early March, the
Cardinal had reluctantly accepted the unpleasant necessity that,
given the diSintegration of the Austrian supply s1Btem, the city
governments of the State would have to act as agents for
supplying the Awstrian torces.

His chiet concern n9,IW

wa$

to

56

Ibid .. , Cons al vi to all Delegates and Legatea, 24
Februar7I8"21.
57
Ibid.( CODSalv1 to the Delegate ot Rieti, 28 Februar,y
1821 {#~2J.
58

1821.

.!!!!!., Ooualv1 to all Delegates and Legates, 7 March
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ensure that they, as well as all citizens who had dealt directly
with the Austrians, should secure receipts tor their goods from
the proper Austrian authorities so that they could later be
reimbursed. 59
Thus,

by

Maroh Consalvi had been oompe11ed

by

toroe of

circumstances to allow the Papal government to become involved
openly in the supplying at Austrian troops.

No doubt this in-

volvement violated the principle ot Papal neutrality, but
Consa1vi considered that violation well justitied as neceasar,y
to prevent aerious

inju~

to the Papal State and its people.

Fortunately, the situation rapidly improved with the total
rout ot the Neapolitan &rmJ at Rieti on 7 March and the subsequent rapid Austrian occupation ot Naples.

The bulk ot the

Austrian armT soon moved trom the Papal State into Naples, and
the supply problem disappeared.
The second cause of friction with the Austrian forces
arose from their attempts to oooupy various Papal cities against
the will of the Papaoy.

The cities mainly conoerned were

Anoona and Bologna.
It will be recalled that the Austrian government had
wished to occupy the strategic port ot Ancona as a baae of
operations against Naples but had temporarily abandoned this
design 1n the faee of Papal OPPOSition.
59
1821.

-Ib1d.,

Hardly had the Austrian

Consa1vi to all Delegates and Legates, 10 March
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march southwards begun than it became apparent that Austria
still cherished hopes of garrisoning the city.

On 12 February

Conselv! learned that the fornitore at Ancona had been instructed
by the

,,'~.

Auatrians to provide supplies for 2000 troops who

were to arrive at Ancona ahortly and remain there "until
further orders. ft

The Cardinal at onee suspected that Austria

planned to occupy the City without warning and thus present the
Papacy with a !!i:.1! accompli.

He protested strongly to Apponyi

whoae protestationa ot Austrian innocence failed to convInce
him.

The CardlBal therefore instructed the Delegate of Ancona

that when the Austrian had reached Slnigaglla tifteen miles to
the north, he was to intorm them that the Papacy was aware of
the order to remaIn "until further ordera" and had no intention
of allowing them to occupy the

tOWll.

If the Austrians con-

tinued to advance, when they were within three miles the City
gates were to be barred and the Austrian commander again forbidden to enter the City.

Should the Austrians nonetheless

insist on entering, they should be allowed to do
breaking through the gates.

80

only atter

It would then be obvious to all

that the Papacy had attempted to preserYe its neutrality and was
only yielding to Austrian violence. 60 However, Consalvi thought
it unlikely that the Austrians would actually proceed to such

60

A.V., R242, Consalv! to Spina, 12 February 1821. R165,
Conaalvi to the Delegate of Ancona, 12 February 1821. Petrocchi
1943, 82, Consalvl to Opizzoni, 14 February 1821.
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extremes beeause ot the bad effeot upon public opinion of
"presenting to the world the spectacle [of Austrian troops) tir61
ing upon the Pope."
Conaalvi alao instructed Spina to protest to Metternich at
Laybaeh.

The Foreign Minister, however, denied that his govern-

ment planned to occupy Ancona except in the case that Neapolitan
troops had alreadJ' done

80.

If the City waa a till in Papal

hands the Austrian &rm7 was to by-pass it and continue south. 62.
Despite Metternioh's denials, events soon indicated that
the Ca.rdinal fS suspicions were well founded.

As the Austrians

':1loved. towards Aneona, the Delegate duly warned them as Consalvi
had ordered.

Nonetheless, on Februal7 15 the commander of the

app~aehing a~7, General

Vermodeu, dispatched an officer to

Ancona to prepare the way tor the occupation ot the City.

The

officer explained that the occupation of Aneona was an integral
part of the general Auatrian war plan, and denied that any
orders to the contrary had been reeeived trom Vienna.

The

Delegate repeated hi. government'. determination to oppose an
oecupation, which could on17 be carried. out it the Austrians
tirst took the place by storn. General Vermoden was apparently

61

Petrocehi 1943, 82.
62
A.V., *242, Conaalvl to Spin&, 12 February 1821) Spina
to Cons al v1, 17 February 1821.
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~mpressed

by

the Papal s_and: upon receiving his officer's

report, he announced that trom respect tor Papal neutrality he
"ould retra1n from occupy1ng the c1tY'.

The Auatr1ans then

noyed away southward w1thout atte~pting to occupy the city.53

Consalvi was less suecessful in oppos1ng Austr1an plans
to occupy Bologna.

In m1d...January he was warned by the Papal

consul at M1lan, Count P1etro Alborghett1, that Austria planned
~o

occupy certa1n plaoes 1n the Legations, espec1ally Bologna.

il'he purpose was two-rold: to protect Austr1an lines of communl~atlon

and to "watch over the oonduct of those lands," where

A.ustria feared a
~plna

uprising.

Oonsalyl at once or<ieNd

to protest to Metternioh against this Violation of Papal

pemtra11ty.
~as

8ett~rJ

Spina was to point out th!tt neither Austrian pretext

justified: Austrian commun1cations were in no danger 1n the

~apa1

State, a friendly power, while the Papal gove:mment was

rlulte capable of maintaining order in the Lega.tions I where

~ranquility now prevailed. 64
In response to Spinals

questioni~J,

Metternich declared

Fhat his government had no intention or leaving garrisons any-

"here in the Papal states.

.ati8r1ed
63

~th

The Prince profesaed h1m8elf tullY'

the tranquility prevailing in the LegatioDS and

A.V., R165, Delegate ot AneoM to Oonsalvl# 15 February

821 (#l & 2). Blanchi, II, 73-75, inoorrectly describes th1s
ncident ~ taking plaoe 1n August, 1820, 8ix months earlier,
It a time when no Austrian troops had as yet entered the Papal
State.
64
A.V., $242, Consalvi to Spina .. 16 Ja.nuary 1821.
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the firm attitude taken by the Papal
S~t.tar.J

govern~ent

towards the

there. 65

Oonsalvl

hl~selr

approached Apponyl and compelled. him to

admit that the Austrian

~ilitar.r

had indeed eCn3idered leaving

e. garrison in Bologna, but the A":1baesador insi3tl!d that no plans
had been ~ade to put this project into effect. 56
Despite the atnuranees of Metternieh and. Appon:yi, COllfJalvi's

suaplclona were not allayed.

On the day after hts eOl'lYersetion

with Appony1, 7 Februll.l"'Y', he described to the Ar-ehbishop ot
Bologna the Austrian "proposizione lndeeente" of leaving a
garrison of 3000 1n the ctty..
Ap~onrl's

eomforting

re~liee,

He repeated Met ternieh '8 and
but added:

But I think that this is onl,. a feigned retreat,
and. I am or the opInIon th.at rrr:! determinat ion to

remain neutral trom the outset, and our constant

refusal to VariOll2\S requests for things eontrllry

to neutrality, have caused the adoption of a
plan of' aa.ylng nothi!U!:7to us and presenting us

with faits !ccomp11s. 0

On the following day Consalvi wrote to

~pina

of his fear that

the Austrian go,rernnent planned to occupy Bologna a.nd then place
the bla'le upon the initiative of the :-nilltal'7, but without
withdrawing its troops.
- . . - -..

-----

65

66

The Papal representative WafS to bring

Ibid., Spilla to Consalvi, 26, 30 January 1821.

Ibid., Apponyi to Consalvi, 5 Februa~J 1821.
67.IbId., Conaalvi to Spina, 8 Pebruary 1821.

this possibility to Metterniah's attentlon. 68
Under Spina's persi8tant questIoning, Metternieh finally
admitted that the Austri&.n army aa it passed throUGh Bologna was

to leave troops there to gue..rC. its commtmicatione.

However the

Prince ins leted that these trocops would not form a pernlanent
garrison, but would be withdrawn as soon as the ma.in Austrian
army reached Naples.

He alao denied that the force was in an1

way intended am a "mlsura dl pol1zia" s,galns t the

~ettarJ

and

expressed hiB satisfaction at the tranquility maintained by the
Papal government ~_n its territories. 69

Spinats proteste having had no effect. he enlisted the

help of Blaeas, who as French representatIve could be expeeted
to look with disfavor on any extension or. Austrian eontro1 in

Blaeas saw Ytetternlch. but received from him only the

Italy.
s~~e

assurances that the occupation was necessary and would end

when lTaplea was occupied.
a

fo~al

written

ple~ge

Blaeu next suggested that Spina seek

from Mettern1eh that the troops would

be withdrawn, but Spina fea.red that th.i8 tJould shot-' too apparent

e. distrust

of

the ft.ustr1an '$ good fa1th.

B1acas then arranged

with Ce.po d'!etria that the subject be brought up at the next

general

of the Congress, but for some unknown reason
this general discussion did not take plaee. 70 Consalvl was thus
~eesion

-------68. ----

Ibid •• Consalv1 to Spina, 8 Pebruary 1821.

69-

Ib14., Conaalv1 to Spina, 12, 15 February 1821.

~rcr--

!!!!!.,

Spina to Conaalvi, 17 Feb1"U&I'7 1821.

-:"... - 9

left with no

gua~antee

but Metternieh's word that the Austrian

foree would be witbdrawn.
the

By

tI~e

Consalvt learned of these developments at

Lay-bach the !ustr1a1'l oecupation of Bologn:l he,d 8.lready
pIaee..

On 8 !'ebrttaroy th.e pe.se age of

'.u~trian

tro::tps

t~.ken

throu;~h

the city bagan; on 13 T4'ebruary the A.ustrlal'\

e~'Tlmander

the municIpal of.flciale to provide

for 2000 troopsJ

~larters

requested

and on 14 'Feb'l"'Uery, dftspite the protf!sts ot the Vice-Lega.te A'l\at,
a toree or 2000 was stationed. if! the o1.ty.

A~a.t

could do no

mope th.an ins 1st What the oeeup"l'l"!g torce be regarded not as a
"~art"i.on,"

which would implY' a perma.nent stationing of troops,

but only as "peaslng troops mak1:ng a !)ro1onge<i soJourn."
ex~ft8e.

alao insiated that the troopIJ'

He

must be borne by Austria,

not the elty.71
COMe.!.,.t. approved ot Amat'lS conduct.

apparently- resigned

b1ms~lr

prevent} be oontented

The

C81~1.na1

had

to the oCI'lupat1on whlah he (!ould not

h1~~elr

wIth insisting that Austria must

P«1 tor the expenses of the oeeuratlon.72

Approaehed

by

8pina

on this point, Mettern:teh prcrr-tsed that the Pa.paey liould be
I'ebhursed fot' all expems3. 13

71
1821J

Con$alv1 mace no further :protest

A.V., R210, Oppizzon1 to 00.. &191, 12, 13, 21 Pebruar,r

A~at

to

Cor~alv1,

14 February 1821.

't2

Ibid., Consalv1 to Arnat, 21 February 1821J R242,
21 Februar3 1821.

Oplzzonr·~· ~~nsalvl,

73

A.V., R242, Spina to Conl3alvl, 22 Febru&l!'7 1821.

about the oeeupatlon wh11e the eampaign lasted.

It reMained

to 'be seen it Metterl1ieh would keep his yom to withdraw the

Austrian troops atter the capture or Naples.
Though the Austrians were a.ble to

oeeu~J

attempts to occupy other alties failed..
co~~ander atte~pted

At Perugltt. the Austrian

to station a garr18on, thinl7 disguised as

"rrl11tary poliee,· In the c1tadel.

Consalvi's strict

Bologna., their

prohib1tio~

The Delegate, remewberlag

on the entry of foreign troops

into any fortress, refused the request, aDd the Austrians marched

orr

w1th no further lne1dent. 14 At Spoleto the Austrian comman-

der openly demanded the right to g8.l'Ti:son the efts.del, but here

too dep&rted atter meetIng w:!.th a r1m refusal. 15 Somewhat
elm1lar in nature was the attempt of the Auatr1an government to
seeur~

passage for its troops through Rome itself.

This request

woe was refused by Conaalv1 as incom.pat1ble with the special

poa lticn of Rone as cs.plt·al

0:

the Ce'.tholic Chureh. 16

'l'h& Austrian atterllpts to occupy Papal cities againa t the
known will cf the Papacy were
the l>enewt:d deteriol'at1on of
.in

eal~l~}i

1821.

probabl~'

the

1.~atro··Pa:pa1

cl~eial

teet or in

relations that began

Certainly the deliberate and frequently-repeated

rr4
A.V., R210, Dolegate of Perug!a to Conaal1f1, 22 Pebrt.UU7

1821.
75

Ibid. J Delilgate of Spolet!) to C':)nselvl, 10 Mareh 1821.
70" "'
A.V., R242, Cansuyi to Spiu" 21 Febl.~al.7 1821.
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attempts of Austria to deceive the Papac7 as to its intentions
and. it. blatant disregard. tor Papal sovereign rights had. a veX7

Once again we fina in hi. correspondence a strorc J'lOte ot 41at1"W1t towards Austrla. 77 This lack ot

bad

effect upon Consalvl.

contldence was to grow in months to come.

T7

8ee. e.g., p. 218 above.

5. fte'fol t 1n Ple4mom;
With the Auetr1&ll

"l~to%7

at R1etl. the tate of the

Neapol1tan Revolution _aa 3ealod.

torees en:tereci NapleS

Oft

But eyen betore tile Auatrlan

24 lYIa:Nh came the

lleWS

ot another

revolution, in Piedmont at the oppoSite end of the peninsula.
The Allied represantatiYes atill at La1baeh hastily authorized

Austria to suppreas thla new revolutlon&r,1 oontlagratlQn before
it couto spreao.
With one of it. armie. entAie4 in oeeuPTlng Naples while

another

WP

<ii.patchett agail'Wt PltHimont, Auatria felt an

iocreulng neeQ to hold some .trong point in central Italy to

aate&uara ita over-utended lines of eOTl'!!nurdcation arlfJ suPP17.
Ancona, the

:i tronges t

fortreata. and bee t

between llaple& anti the Po,

Wd

po~t

on the Adria.tic

the logical onoic..e.

lienee.. on

24 II.areh Appouyi once aga.ia renew"ui hla gOYel'nmEw.tts req\.&.eat
tv occupy th.at city.

Ne&~11ta.u

that u

the

r.aec.i no

lOI~er

and could

Afte;,.'"

War

e.x;pla.ill1~

W8£

th.e

'Virtually at

preset'vEl its neutralit;,y uo

p~:H'iuit

thw

~uatrlUl

I;.)

ocuupat1on.

ltuatiQn,. he
'"-1:' (,:11.0.,

~ued

tile Pupa.ey

~cru.pulously

as bti:fore

H1a govertln1eut would

eover all t:1Apen:uu" of t:ru.; ocuu.pation and \fould uuUE;;rtake not to

lnt.rte~
w1th the uormal Papal administrat1on. 18 Three days
.... 18 .-.--A.V ., Rl55, AppoJS71 to Cona&l91, 2.4 March 1821.

~

22j:?

l.!tter the P:r"usslan a.nd RUlI!sia.n

a"'1bMSa~ors

e.lao wrote in

supp~rt of the Austrian request. 79
Consalv1 was reluet,ntly
the AUfltrian argm'lent, and be
the position of

o~nll'

eo~pel1ed
h~.d

to

~~1t

the force ot

no wish to put the

Papet(~y

1n

oppoa1ng the wi.shes of the three powe:rs.

Yet, his .version to an Austrian oeeupat1on was as strong as
~verJ evid~ntly

toJ!' Para!

it

Wd

dtstrust or Austria. rathar than concern

neutrality that inspired it now.

taotoN mingled 11'1 his reply to AP!'ony1.

These eonrl1et1ng
Cort!ullvi elecla-red that

the Papacy was elw87$ reedy to meet the wishes ot the AllIes,
and .specially or AustM.a, wheneyer poSSible, and admitted that

w1th the end or the Weapolitan Revolution it would now be
po.aible to aclmit Awstrtan troops without 'f'lo1ating Papal neutNllt.,..

Ho weYeI' , Buob ... oocupatlo11 would still Inevitably!

oause great inoo. .enienee to the 11th..b! tanta or Aneona and might
alao be unravoraDly laterpNte4 ab1'Oad.

Moreover, the

Pl.4mont••• altuatlon had greatll" Imp!'OYed in reeent 4Q'S and

the Yloto1'7' or the IIsooci Oa... " .eemed .. all'.

In y1ew or these

tacto.. , Coual..,s. hopetull.,. 11lC1uired 'tfhethe1" the Allies would
.till teel the need to oocupy Ancona, and expressed his govern-

meat'. hope th.at

th.~

would not.

Should the)" continue to lna1at.

however, the Pope would agree to the ooeupatl1)•• 80

-----"-79

Ibid., Niebuhr to 00_uT1, Ital1R8q to eoual.1. 27
l'1arch 182f:-

80

A.V., R247, Conaalvl to Leard1, 31 March 1821.

The Cardinal appaftRtlJ' reared that th18 plea would h .....

no .ttect, for on the folloWing dq he ordered tbe Delegate ot
AMona to prepare solutio_ tor the ,,&1'10\18 problel1lS that would.

be raised by the entry of' A:ustrian troops. 81
Aust1l1a was moat ~avol*ab17 imp"•••d. b7 00. . &1'91.'.

attitude, Which oould

DO

longer be expla1De4 . .

OOne8ft

Papal nenltft11.t;y lUlU feu- of' Nsapo11t_ repriaala.

for

Ria re11&O-

t8J'1ati to admit the AuatJtiUl forces was obYious" an4 th1a

"strange 1nflexib1l1tylf toWBl"ds the
and. the good
nonoth~lesa

sent. and

O&ua(;lu

w_ ..

took prompt ach'aut&&e of the ooa41ttonal 'apal

Appo~1

cond.1tlot18 and
into Ancona. 3S
~he

friends of 1'811&1.08
vere17 erit1clze4 at V1eDDa. 82 Austria
lttrwt

QO....

waa aireoted to work out with Conaalv1 the

pl\)~a.tiona

for the ontruee ot Auatri.an tl'OOpa

reault ot <Uacuas1QIW between Conaalvl, APpoJQ'1, ud.

the Austrian General

B~atr

waa

~he

Car41nal'a aote of 7

Getting f'orth the pl!Opoeed t.J.IImIl fOl! the oooupation.

~

1821

COlWalyl

bfjcan tha uote 07 po1ftt1na; o\1t qaiD. that w.tth the r'07al1at
l~atoratlon

in ?1eGmont taure •••med little reaaOD tor ..

Austrian oeoupatioD, but nonethele•• the Pope, to show hi.
devot1on
imnnrtu
. _ ... 81 to the ttgQod C8.lJ.8e ~ 1't would pert>l1.t it. '.rhe most _.or1821.

A.V., RIGS, Consalvi to the

wIe,..k Qr

Anoona.. 3l ~

82

A.V •• R2hl', Leardi to CQl1salvi, 17 .. a6 AprU 1821.

83

R16!3. COM alvi to Delepte

or

~Qna..

31 MarCh 1811.

of

·t;h~

l~:td

cond:ttions

i10"frm. f0r

th~

In~n,

prrison was to bl! l1r'11.ted to 2000
fifty ,m'..1ld be

a(j·;l1itt~d

there

~houlcl

~:uetrl.a,

"!lore than

th~lr

m~..ke

arriTnl;

be nc! inter-Terence lr'.th the ol'dt-nary c1v11 t'.nd

or

R~volutlon

or

the laws

w1thdr~wn a~ $o~n

Pledmontese

110

y..mJ.eh tlo. . 'l.d
.

tor supplying the troops prior to

~11itar.r a~in!$trat1o~

r.hould be

or whom

the

t:, the lrmer eltadel J the expenses of

the oceupllt1on :!'hould 'be borne 'by
nrran~~ment5

occupation '(feN:

11ad

aa the
ende~,

the elty;

an~

the foree

~mergeno7 ereat$~ by

or in the event that

the

Aust~a

became involved in a war in Which the pretrence of' the Austnan

gtlM."i$(')n would oompl'O'11!.•e Pal'al neutrality .. 84

In order to oounterflet
mission of Austrian

troo~

~ny

bat!

f:':lpres~ ion

that this ad-

"!'tight oreate Pl"Oad# COnllalTi 4is-

pat;.el1ed a. note or eXJ)l_tloft on the following d.q to all toretca

tJel't-elJentttt'-"es 11"1 Roryte; e.nd to Lord Ca.stlerengh in London.
note

de~~tt1be4

the A.llied requests to occupy Ancona, the Papal

1"esiets.l'loe I and the eond1t1otta
e~sree., .. -dcmU t1_oM

deRfte or

'!'hie

011

1Ih1ah tbe Papac,. bad f1JJJa117

a•• i~,ultd to tu"fegt,p.ri the essential

lftde~n

the pepa«y.85

~.~ cor..d~_t1.{)na

IF.!.td down. by Ccn.<'Jalv1

wn~

s.ecepted by the

AU!ltrian p::oveml'ftent;. and 8.!"l"Ilngement5 _)!Ie rapidly made tor the
.at. tbg gam.ecn :tn Jtme. 86 Just when nll ~eemed ready,

'mp'

84

85

Ib;Ld., Corwalv:!. to APponJ':t. 7 Mq l821.

Ib16." CODlalv1 'a Note of 8 Mq 1821.

reprea.h~~:t'iye in

86

A.V •• AJW

}lome

245.

at; ~.At

time.

Appti):Q71 tQ

eo_at...,.

Bnalam.t had.
.

2l _

1821.

DO

• alol.4dea reveraal of th. Autn.... attltu_ took pl_.
MaJ'~.

APPGtq'i notified COMalvl that fma BmpEJNI', 1.

aUJ.rp~liul.ltiin ot

rr

On

'V....

or tILe

tM 11eGm.ollkse a4 Keapolltan litevelut1o_ and

tn. tranqu1111;y re1gn1nc tbroughont Ital7, Q4 _cd.ded that tile
oOG,upat1on of A.ncona would be unnece.sal7 aad batt aAcorQ.lDSl7
swpended plans tor it;.

However, should o1rcuraatucea ever

in the future to make the occupation a necesstty again.

oIU~1ee

Augtr1a expected the Pope to agree to the oeoupat1on under the
worked out. 87

prev1ou~lY

conditions

Conaal'Vi t'laa plea.<sec:1 by t."t1s

news,

but the Auetzt1aD. assump-

tion or a right to garrison the city in any future emergenc7
~as

it

not to hte liking.
w~uld

Artoona.

Ats this stipulation had no time limit,

in theol"Y g1:ve A\18tria a pernanent right to oecupt

Pref"err1rc not tQottend Austria by open oppoa1..tlon

on this poi'nt, he adopted an indirect wa;y of setting " t1.tJ:le
ltm1t.

!n his I"eply to Ji.pponyl, he agreed that

indeed allow
e~nt\ittol1$ M
eo~equenee

all

pa:pa07 would

Austrian oeeUpation of Ancona, under 'bhe same

those

~eently

established, b:ut only -if', .. a

of recent eventrs, the fc,:rcee of the Sects should

twer er;ein !,;lanage to
th~'t

th~

th~aten

the tranquility Of Italy. • • eo

in the rev1v-al of the aarte circWldltan.ee the Allies should

l'IIfIaaN AJv)()~.tl. as indiepenaable. 1l88 ':fhua* A.ustria. could oal)'"
Meu.py ,A.tM:Oll& in . . .-l'W.~
o.

'S'7

.

tha.t ... a di_et l'H\llt

A.V., R165, Appon;y'1 to Con&alVi,
Oo.al.1 to "'••Id., 9 .TUM 1321.

88
Did .. ,

1.1",

.
rr. Mtq

or

the

1823.. AD-YIII.

C_aId to AppoDJ'l, _ .1. . 1821.

1820-1821 revolutions.
.e~p11shed

Thls limitatioll!, aooepted by Austria,

its a1m: as no further emergenoy arose in 40nsequence

of" the 1820-1821 revolutions!' Austrla

-.taB

not

abl~

Anoo:aa. n9

89

,sc;h,In1<1J.in (201, Note 80) et'Z's on thifl p01nt.

to oocupy

6. The Condemnation ot the Carbonari
It w.. in late 1820, while engaged in preparing the way at
Troppau tor Austrian military ..tion against Naples, that
Mettemich tirst tentatively suggested to Conaalvi the desirability ot a tormal Papal condemnation ot the Carbonari.

To

Mettemich, such a condemnation seemed a logical compliment to
the Austrian intervention: it w.. one more weapon 1n the arsenal

ot legitimacy, to be used when it seemed expedient.

The

Carbonari "must be attacked by all weapons at once," spiritual
as well as temporal. 90 The Austrian armies soon to attack Naples,
representing the secular arm ot Soc1ety, would supp17 the material
torce necessary to crush the Carbonari; but this alone
sufticient.

"&11

not

The Pope, wielder ot the spiritual power ot SOCiety,

must also unloose his weapons to destroy the moral poSition ot
the Carbonari. 91
Mettemieh broached this subject to Consalvi with some
caution, traming hie requests in general terms and not as yet
mentioning a tormal Bull, though that w.. clearl,. his aim.
doubt, he tore. aw that hi. reque. t , involving u

No

it did the

rlther obviQY8 intent to use spiritual weapons tor an essentially
90
Van Duerm, 311, Mettemich to CO_UTi, 22 November 1820.

91

Ibid., 326, Metternich to Corasalvi, 13 December 1820.
2

political e.d, .ould encounter .ome dlftioultle. at Rome.
pro.e" to be the c....
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Such

H.edle•• to • ." Mither Oonaalyi nor

PI_ VII bad the .lighte.t .7Mpath7 .1th the Carbonari and .ould
hardl7 ha.e b ••D d18pl....d bJ the .xtlrpatloD 01' the S.ct.

Th.

dltficult,. ... that the Carboaarl could. aot be .0nclemMd .1mpl,.
'becaus. theJ' .ere politlcallJ' obaox1oU8 J 1t would ha.e to be
demo_tNted that theJ' held to errors in mattera 01' doctr1M, &ad

.. ;ret the PapacJ' lacked .1lttlole.t lmowledge 01' the sect to
ju.qe lta NliSlo_ priacl,le..

Moreo.er, cODdemnation 01' the

Carbo.....l milbt ...tacomae the reYolutloDal7 COYel"l'lmcnlt In Haple•
...d lead to repriaal..
ratl0.at

OD

POl' the.e re ..o.. , the PapaoJ' • •

the poa.lbl1itJ'

01'

a condemnation at that time.

Coual.i replied. to Jlllettemlclt fa letters oDlJ' 'be d.eclariq in

c... raJ. te1"l1dl that the Pope would 01' courae
h18 ,art, 1. e ••J.71;h1q that 18 possible to

"t17 to o"ncur, on
him 1. h18 oharacter

and hl. relat10.. wlth the .ie.. maalte.ted H 1. Matteraioh'.
lettera. 92 Taia .... 1•• rep17 taile4 to .attar,. the Pril'1c., .no
coatinued to beeeech the 'ap&Oy to briD8 1t•• pirltual weapons
to the aid

01'

the Alll.. 1. order to orush the Carbonar1

complete17. 93
Suapeetlq trom the.e appeal. that NetteNioh would

re._

hle i_tat••ce at x.,-baoh, Oo.. al.i la•• Sp1aa preo18. i_tNo-

92
Ibid., 315, Coualyi to flletternich, 5 Decembe.. 1820.
93Ibid., 326, Jlletteraich to Oo.. &1Yi, 13 Deoember 1820.
Jlit£era1oh to 00U&1Y1, 18 3_&17 1821.

..
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tlo"

th18 ,olat.

Oil

Th. Papal ztepzte•••t.tl....... to explain to

Jletteraleh th.t the Cubonarl, 11ke any oth.r oraaalzatloft,
could oal1' be condemned tor dootrlaal

N_O_,

lt the,. erred ln

mattel'll or taith, p4 tb\UI tar the illYest1gation ot the 8eot had
not produced sufticient e.. l0.clt to make thl. posslble.

The

PapaoJ' had gone as tar .. 1t oould 1ft the "lot ot 15 August 1814,
nleh hact prohiblted the "ooat1auatlon.

1"8.. l ...al,

ot treemasolU7 or slmilar seoret orgaa1zatioM.

or .stabllahmeat"
It th1a general

prohibition ... ROt autllcieDt tor Mettera1ch fa purposes, then
theN .... !lOthlDS more that the Papa07 could. 40 at the pres ••t
t1••94
looa atter Splna arrl...ed at LQ'bach, NetteNloh d14 1n
taet br1111 the l"b.180t up, &1'1\11.. vehemeatl.,. that auch a
eoademnat1on ... neeee.an tor the cI.t.nee ot Cllurch ar:4 Itate
al1ke.

Spl•• replled. 11l aeool'Clanoe wlth Co_al1'1's l ..1;l'\1otlo_.

The Prill•• the. arcue4 that 're.masoar,r ha4 been coDdemne4 becauae it. .eoreo7

m...

1t • •peot J th.retore, the CaPbou.rl, as

.. _ .qaall1' I.oret orgp18atlon, should al.o be eondema.ed tor
the lame .... uoa.

Ipl... polnt.d out that th1a araument ....ste4

upoa • tals. premise. the ooadem...tl0. ot tbe m"o_ had be••

b....

011

ao\U'l4

e.,.ide... ot th.lrdootrlaal el'1"O",

thelr •• 0reo1' alo_.

Welther th1a ItOr

&R7

80t upon

other ot Spin '.

arcumeats macle any i.t1lpNss1on upoa J4ettern1ohJ the Priaoe

COPJ'

94
A.V., 1t2.i, I_tNotio_ tor 8piRa2 10 JanlUl1"1 1821.

ot the B410t ot 15 !quat 1814 1.

Jt2~2,

Janua.r:r

1821.
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remaiaed UReony1need an4 oont1nued to insist upon the neoesait,.
01' a eoad.mnatl0•• 95
D1.cour.... pemapa by Papal res tat..... • Autria allowed
th18

~estio.

to 11e dormaat until April, 1821, whea lt .as

rals.d qaln b7 a peraoaal letter f'rom Pranois I to Pius VII.
That the Emperor himselt aaw tit to write d.ireot17 to the Pope
lndloate. the import.... waich Austria attach.. to this question.
Eyldeftt17 lutria had grown -&17 01' the del.,- &ad. opposition
encountered at Rome, and hoped to

OV.Nome

all opposition by

appealing stra1Pt to the Head at the Church.

In h1s letter the Bmperor explained that he .as writing
directl,. to the Pope bee...... ot the great importanoe 01' his
aubJect, "which int.reste .quall,. the welfare of' ael1l10n aad
that 01' Soolet7. tI

H1s armies had oruhed the leapo11tan

Revolutlon, but:
The 8ueo.s. whloh •• ha.. jut soored aga1nat

crime cannot be oompl.te, rather it wUl be Ullcertain 041 l ..ecure. as 10" .. the 1m,luus seo,'ts
are act .u,pre•••d • • • whioh. threat•• to cover
Ital7 and the world wlth d•• olatlon and rulae • •
• .The temporal power aloae euuaot brll'11 to an
ead
aalutU7 a work. '!'be .ove. ot the .'111 Is
1. the tleld ot morallt7 &ft4 ,..l1&io., lt 1. that
whloh Your Holl.... rule., an4 lt is trom 1'0u that
I ask'aid &ad . .s1st.....

.0

B7 ooa4emiq tlle.e wimpio\18 s.et., the Pope would. "oo.tribute

DO 1... powertul17.
95

----

Ibid." ,

• • to the

0"". ot Juatloe

and ord.r

232

than the uited eff.orts ot the Powere ha". thus tar • • •
oontributed to it." The Imperial letter 010.ed wlth the hope
that -tour Holine•• will wlah to complete, In a moment ot sueh
aa.ra! .ria 1s, the trlu. ot principles by whioh alone oan
Soolet., be sayed from ita own

eM"ON"

'b7 comp1ylng with the

A_triu reque.t to condemn the O~JIlazei. 96
Conalderab1e diplomatIc pressure was exerted upon the
Papaoy b7 this direet I'TIper'la1 request.

DUcua8ioae

Oft

the

proposed condemnation were now besun at Rome by the Austrian
ambassador.

No

d.etalls ot thea. oonveraatloJ8 aeem to hay.

8ul"t'lYed, but eYide.t1y the Austriu point ot 't'iew gradually
preyailed.

'!'hla wealcen1ng ot the papal posltlon was no doubt

aided 'lt7 two faetore I atud7 ot thlf wrltinp ot the Carbonari
I

N't'ealed illereul", eoncNte eyide... ot doctrinal errors on
their part, while the collapae ot the .eapolitan "11me remo't'ed
the daqer of repr'18ala trom that qu.arter.

At the elld ot JIa7,

Matteraieh learned with aattataetton that "the d1louaaiona whtOh
haya· taken. pla.e to 11lduca the Ho17 'ather to speak as Head ot
the Ohurch aca1nat the ',ettar" ••• haye ended wlth mutual.
aattataotloD. • • • Pather wl11 make 811 apostolic Yoioe heard

96

Vaft Duerm, 316, l'raRe1a I to Ptu VII. 12 AprIl 1821.
Thia lett.~--aad lndeed the Whole incident or the oODdemaatioD-i. an iaatruoti.e example or the Autrlan theol'7 ot the Union ot
Thro. . . . . Altar at work. both _lDC thas.r Nape.tlye _apons ift
01801l tor the benetit ot aociety .. a whole. .. well as ot a
certain hasitaao7 OR the part ot the 'apae7 to al.e its full
s.pport to puttl-S that theory iato pneti.e.
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to the ta1thrul. M91
The prepal"at!oa of this muoh-de.ired Bull (or, more
pro pe1"17 , Pontifical Constitution) occupied some tinte, but it
finally ap,eared on 13 September 1821.

It decreed the rormal

condemnation ot the Carbonar1, described as

~a

multitude ot

wicked men • • • ulted against God and Chnst, with the principal
objective ot attacking and destroying the Church. • • , deceiving
the taithtul, ad lea<iiag them. astra,. from the doctnne ot the
Church b7 means ot a valn aDd misleading philosoph,.."

The

reaSOn5 given tor the condemnations weres
The 'books • • • , .tatute., anc! ather authentio

doeuments ot the Carbonarl • • • .. well as the
te.timoDJ' ot th.. e iii. mer beloac1ac to the
soelet,. haTe lett it • • • • demoDitrate clear17
that the Cv'bonarl aim at li..1Jl1 e ..e17oM the
110••• to ere ate at wl11 hie on religion ae ....
coNi.. to hta 0 . . opialo_, the reo,. latro4uo1ft1
rel1g1oua 1a41ttereaee, than whiob nothing mON
pel"lliolo'U c . . 'be 1mas1_dJ that the,. paroq
•••»eel ritual. by their

.acrilegious oeremonies

• • • aftd that theJ plot to ruin the Apostoll0

s •• as.teat wh1ch • • • they hay. . . special
hatrecl.9t5

eoualv! took OaN to aead copies of the Bull to Mattemien

1mme41ate17 atter its appearance.

The Prince was highly pleased

§7

A.V., R241, Lear41 to Consalvl# 31 Ma7 1821.

98

Bullattl Romani Cantlnuatic • • • , XV, 446-4l&.8, Damnatl0
.ooleta\;i8 .e.reiil _oupatM ouboaariol'Um, 13 September 1821.

b7 tlle Bull, wbleb he tel t would be a potent weapon In the
st1'U&Sl. qal_t the reYolutioaarlea.

He took care to hay. the

con4emaatloD well publIcized in the presa and elsewhere, aDd in
Noyem'ber

all

Imperial Patent q;atll8t the Oarboaari ... 18aue<l ,-

support ot the Bull.99

It .e.. improbabl'e>, ho....r, that the

Bull eyer had the great moral ettect that )lett.mich had uticI-

pated.

Liberal. were un.l.1kely to PQ' mueh head to 'apal

patlle1'fl8, While thoae aurti.iently re11&io_ to be impres.ed

thereby were not lUrel,. to become Settarj 1. &IV' case .100 Here
ohyiousl,. ... a major

taa.

11\ Metternlch'a plantto use the

Ohuroh as a weapo. acatnst the aeyolutlon.
Contemporaries were ftOt unaware ot the role that Austria
had pl.,.d in the eon4emaation or the Carbonarl.
'"

Some LIberals,

at least, felt that the PapaoJ' had. been too reapoR8Iye to

AustrIan wiahe. and criticized the condemnat1on as
maniteato and not • rel1cious act."lOl
cation tor th18 view.

ft. political

There.as aome Justifi-

Althouch certainly the condemuttoR • •

justified by the aociety'. pr1ne1ple., there can be 11ttle
doubt that the immediate motive

w..

politi.al and that the

99

A.V., ANV245, Oo_81.,.i to Mwti, 15 SeptemDer 1821, R247,
LeaJ"di to 00_&1y1, 27 .eptember, 26 '1o.ember 1821.
100
Abbe de Pradt. lt~fB pd. Amariea 1ll 1821, traM. J. D.
Williams (2 vola J LoadOD,d); II, 2C'1-209. Alberto AquaroDe,
"La reataurazloDe nello Stato Pontlt1eio 84 1 suo1 ladlr1zz1
1.Cl.latl'V1~l."
119-1~.

1955,

101

Arehlvle <lelIa So.leta roman. ci1 Storia patria,
. -

De Pradt, II,

209.
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ohler impetus

wtuJ

provided by the pressure exerted '01' the

Austrian government.

1. The Aftermath of the !tevolutloM
The Neapolitan Revolution was Grushed in

of 1820-1821.
~~h

of 1821,

but two problems deriving from it continuod to plague the

Papacy for some time thereafter: the coll.etlon

or

Austrian debts

and the presence of Austrian troops in Bologna.
During the passage or its troop" through the Papal state,

Austria had given frequent usurMcee that it would relmburse
the PapaoT tor all expenses caused thereb7. 102 Sooa atter the
end of the

oampusn,

00ualY1 thereto" 4ireotec1 the Delegat••

to lea.rn from their eommunee the expenses 1ncurrec1 anet to send
their ela1m8 to Rome. where he would work out a settlement with
AWlt:r1a. 103
Tbe 1n1t1a1 Austrian ;response to the presentation of these
claims was

unsat1sraeto~.

The Austrian autborities declared

m8.ft7 of the claims invalid, while the rema1nCler

war.

first

reduoed 1ft amoun.t and then tumed over to Slcnor Pol1dor1, the
chier tom1tore,
. ... for payment.

Prom laek of fUnds f PolIdori was

able onlT to make sMall 'Q"ment. on aecouat:l clef.entDg pQ1nent

ot the balance to aome unspec1fled but pl'Obably diatot date 111

102
A.V., R242, Spina to COMalv1, 12 Feb1"Ual7, 28 Februarr

1821.
103

A.V. , R210,

AprU 1821.

Conaal,,1 to all te1.gat•• and. Lecate., 7
2

6

the

tuJ~ure.

The indignant

COmnt1lDeS

complained to 00_&1v1, who••

v!6orous protests to APP011¥l produced a Nvenal or Auatrian
policy.

In eal-1;y May V1.exma agl"eed tllat it would itself settle

all claims at th.e1:tt full value during the luonth of June.

Thll

promise lfaa unduly opt1r:1istic, for to Consalv1 '8 exasperation

the Imperial Tressur:r.r, with what seeraed to be its

O\68tOl1l8J:.7

procrastination where debts to the Papae:r were ooncerned, failed
to i:take the expected payments in June, and tl,e
ftlll passed with flO

ful.~heI'

s~r

progrea6 on this point.

l-Joyember elid pqnent at lut begin.

and earl,.

Not until

BJ' mJ.d-December the

had settled its accounts by the parment ot
Be. 1;2, 572, 13i to the varioua Papal oommunea. 104

Austrian

ioyern~nt

Thea. flnaneial negotiations were parallea. e'd;

b\)rr :teq.ua;J.1W;,piFo-

traoted 4iseu8s1oftS on the Austrian torces in Bologaa.

It w111

be Nealled that Metteraioh had promiaec! that the oecupatlon ot

Bologna. would be aDded When the Aus trian &r!1l¥ took Naples.
1)4-0The Vatic.. Archlves oontain little on thea. Degotlatlona
aR4 mwst be supplemented b7 the add1tional material in the
Arohlvio cit atato, Rome (A.S.It.). '!'he above acoount 1& baaed 01U
A.V., R197, Conaalvl to all Dlleptes and Legates, 30 .Mq 1821.
Jt210, Conaalvl to Appoll71. 23 July 1821) Consalv1 tofAardl, .4
Ausust 1821; Consalv1 to the Delqate or Maeerate, 1 lIovem.bel"
1821;. ANY 245, ConaalYl to Leard!. 16 Janul.1'7 1822. A.8.B.,
Ar-eb.1v10 dl Buon Governo, !3er1e I., Busta 5. Passag10 dell 'armata
••• t
December 1821, 8er1e XI, Busta 221. Pl"Ospetta general. d1

11quldazione ••• , DeceMber 1821. The last contains a list of
the creditor oommunes, with the type ot goods and services
supplied. 'l'he author "'~.beell Wlable to fia4 &rrI' addltloft&l
intormation on Polidori.
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Naplea was oceupled. en 24 March, but nonetheless aeveral months
paa&ed. and the Ai;.atr1ana showCl no sign ot evuuat1ng the clt7.

Consalvi

I.

ear11er 8uspiolona tha.t the Austrian force was in-

tended as a per!'nanent gart'i&on .retul"'uod in full force. and

'lIeN

increased wh6n Spir48. l"'G'por-tea th.a.t rumoura to that effeot were
cI,u':r'ent allQng the Au.strian
was proviUt#u b¥ the

dell.W'l~

OrriCCl'll" 105

)lore ta.rJglble evidence

of' the Auatrlan commander that Spina

undertake anu,utansive ren.o(V1l.t-a.ol'1i. of tile baJ:'raelw to ranaex'
tht}m suitable
~~p11oat1on

£01"

ocoupation d....r:ing the ooming winter106 .......the

was oBv1ous.

For .orne time 00.&1v1 d.elayeu taking action, perhaps
beea,uae he lloped that Awatria m1ght yet w1tbc1l'W ber foroes
'YolUfttarl1J'.

'8y Sttptembep it had b~hlorf1Et apptt.rent tkl.&t th.1s hope

was vain..

5 September theretore, eoual... 1 presented Apponyl

On

with a formal demand tor the withdcra'i1al ot the Austrian torce,

in aooordance with Mettern1cb t s prmn1f:es. 101
Two months palSlSed betore the Aua trian rep17 oame --a t1rm

though 1"Ogrettul. retusal.

The Auetr1al'l covern.-nent would like

to grant the Papal reques t, but unfortunately thiB was irnpo8s1ble

lJ.be oontinued paaenee ot an Austrian ngarr1sonll--tllls term WM
now used for tbe tirst time,

a1'1

o'jinoue sign-... 1n :901ogna wu

105
A.V., R242, 3pt. . to OOD$.lv1, 21 April l8al) .210
Spina to Conaalv1, 28 April 1821.
106

A.V., Rl91, Spina to 00ual,,1, 9 Juae 1821.
10'7
A.V., R210, COMaly1 to Apporql, 5 September 1821.
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essential to seeure communications with the army occupying
Naples. Moreover, the garrlson was no doubt useful to overawe
the Settarj and maintain order in the Legations. To show his
regard for the Papacy, Francis I would reimburse it for any
expenses caused by the occupation; but the occupation itself
must continue.
Consalvi was unimpressed by this display of Imperial
"regard." He prepared another note, in which he criticized the
Austrian reply at great

length~

He denied that the force in

Bologna could be considered a "garrison,tt which implied a
long-term occupation, for no agreement for such an occupation
had been made and Austria in consequence had no right to
garrison the

city~

Moreover, Metternich had specifically

promised that the troops would be withdrawn at the fall of

Naples~

The Cardinal pointed out that an Austrian garrison was not
needed to protect communications, whieh were threatened by no one,
or to maintain order in the Legations, where tranquility reigned;
He also stressed the inconvenience caused to the Papal government
and the people of Bologna by the occupation. The only point on
which he fully agreed with the Austrian note was that the expenses of the occupation must be borne by Austria. 109
l08Ibid., Apponyi to Consalvi, 9 November l82l~
109
A.V., R260, Consalvi to Apponyi, dated 17 December 1821
but never sent~

This tlctG; was written in mid-Decerr,'ber, but for sOTl:e :reason
was never sent.

Possibly Consalvl delqed 'because he had been

privftte17 informed that a
might soon

t~.ke

place.

8pontaneou~

In

any' c~~e,

tl.nd 1n February }\:a~tr1.a:l poliey
Feb!'Ue~J f1~tternleh !nf'orr"!e~

e1deCi to shc')l"

the

h!.~

sp~e1f.l

:ti11med~.$te e"llel.1~tlo'M

ba,el-tS

0'"

snoh

'1

~tefJ#

revereal of AUBtri&n po11C7
he

~ade

no further protest,

lndeet1 reveme~..

'rlGlS

On 16

Appony1 th:lt the E'nperor had de-

mepeet for the 'P8.pney by ol'deI'1ng

or Bolcgna, dee1'1te the -rll1tary draw ...

HC'l1'fe"(!i!l', ~hould th~re

d:teturbanoe in the !..er,tlt!on"

'by any serlo'US

the Al lztr1an oeeul'atlo1'l of

~uI'!n~

Naples, Vienna reseM'ed the r1ght to l"eoeeupy Bolo«na to protect

its commwn1eatlons. 110 !n this reply Consalvl aeeepted this
reservation and expressed

hl~

~ati8rRetion

nt the friendly

solution that eliminated a potential source of irrltation. Ill

The incident wne thus closed in a
C()nsa.lY~..

''las entitled to :-eel

~Rt1Eract~ry
SO"':1e

manner.

sa,t1stactio1'l with the

results of his policies during the revolut1onar'Y period..

Un.der

extremely difficult cll'eumstanees he had dealt skilfull,. With
both Austria. and !iaplcs an.d had :3ecured his essential :u::w: the

preservation or the independenoe and
~md

r~ut~lltr

of the Papacy,

the prevention of a:erioue dttlilage and hardship 1'ot" the Papal

State and its people.

Althou.~

Papal neut:ral1t,. had perhap.<J

110
{"i.d • .t Mettemieh to Apponyl, 16 Febl"'t.l8lT 1822.
111-A.V., AN'{ 2-5. 00,..al.,.1 to Appotq'l, 1 March 1822.

I
I~

been bent, it had neft:r:- pUbllely bI'Oken.
,,,~roI'r:lad nUille!'Ol.13 unnelltt'al

ConsalY1 had 1n taet

acts (for example> int-e:ttOept1na the

.orrespondenoe of the Neapolitan d1plo!'lats at Bologna) j but these

r<tr'tained

scc:~t.

Obv1oU51y,

eom~l.t '13

p1"1tJtB.!*'IJ' eoncem in t..h1s

regard was not the abstl·act principle of' Papal neutttality an auGh.

but Its preservation in the eyes

or

the world: the forme!' be had

not hes1tated to "iolate if' expedient, the latta!l he had defended
tenaalousl'1 t:lrtd 6ucaesst'ully.

the Cardinal fS easentlal1y

ReI'S:ts!l\ gorHI

pJ:'tBo~at1rt

tha/c did not involve tho essence

Mutnllty··-1n

q\le1!t:tons

Papal authority OP

80;

()rda~, $ay'

to 'PrtWlfn't

!l

aa.tho11~

Neapolitan invas1on--he

and. likewise he Gml14 at t11\14!s use Papal neutrality

as an excuse to oppose Auatl"iaD pol1t!lss ....ueh
of

r.)o~t

app:roaeh to

C'tr

If it seemed expedient to def'nd the prinCiple of

doot:pina.

would do

o~

~.11ustI'at1on

A1&<lQft&

01',

.a~11.!t,

&8

th8 o<)cupatto'B

the Ital1a:n Co1l1."8ftfttto"......whlua he 1ft

taCJt oppoged ttrontd1atPWIt ot

AU8'~lall

1llte'fttlcms ~

H• ...,er,

.ho\tlti it seem expedient to disftgud the pM-neiple of' MutralttJ',
he Gould &ad' did do so lf1thout a q\laL'lt.

Conaal"l had ,...s1ated ..

the." nth ()ons1del"llble thcmgl'l not eomplete s'U6ees8, these
A".tnan ~e!tlaftM 'Wb1eh would ha"e eOm'p'PO.-.1set! Papal neut!'tlllt1'
01'

limited. Papal :lndepe1'l4enoe.

tfnlU.the ether ItalLan atat••

wh1. were oont.1It to follOe. a1o~ In the wake of. AuatPia. the
Papal lo.el't'lment _ _ • COMalYi's 41N.tloJllta4 adopted and

rollowed both at Latqtacb and elaewheN an iadepend.eat policy

b•••

Olt

1tB own proper lnWresta.

At the

.ame

t1me, b_ ll1a
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skiltul diplomae7 and his insistence on aeutrallt7 he had averted
the danCer ot :Neapolitan iacureions.
Oft

The mat.rial los. inflict.d

the Papal State b7 the .eapolitan War had be.a sl1sht com-

pared to what It might have be.n had a major Neapolitan il'lVUion
taken plao••
But OOJ'Ulalvi'. poliole. had olle untortunate cOM.quence z
their .ueo..... had been purchased at the coat or a further
d.terioratlon In A_tro-Papal relatio".

At the outs.t or the

•• apellt. . Revolution, it had ••emed that the ver,r oppeait. would
be the case--that the PapacJ' an4 AUlltria would draw to,.ther
acai.. t th.ir mutual enerq the RevolutioR.

Durins the briet

Iadian Summer ot AWltl'O-Papal oo-operatlon 1ft late 1820,
Oo.. alvl had demoaatrated hia lood wll1 towerda Austrla whenever
po.,lble, whlle the Austpl.. attitude towardl th. Papao, became
veq trle.ell,. as Vi.JU'l& reallzed the value or Papal moral aupport
and the ...d tor Papal co-operat1oR In the cruade qalD8t
Napl...

Mett.rnich '. lettera to Coualv1 or late 1820 were more

oord!al thu

&D7

he had wrltte. tor over three ,.ean.

Once more

.ere heard tho.e e.tlci.. phrue. "Auatl'O-papal oo-operat10n,"
"Ulll0• .ot ThroM 04 Altar,·

~14entlt,. of

Auatrlan and Papal

iatere.ts,· and others, once .0 common, which had .eemingly disappeared forever durlnc the ,ears ot rellcloua controversy.
Yet thl. rev1val was oftlJ' temporar,r, foredoomCd b, the
inherent conflict betweea Conaalvl t s pollcles and those of
AWltria.

That Power had expeeted, not \Ulft&turall,., that the
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'apac,., reallz1na the ciallger poaed to Church aad State allke by
the Neapolltan Revolutlon, would co-operate whole-hearteelly.
CertaiDl,. Oo.. alyl teared the danser presented by the ReYolutlon,
hoped to aee lt auppressed, and waa wl111ns to co-operate wlth
AWltrla to that ead, wlthl. the 11mlta ot hls overall pollcy
baaed on Papal lnteresta.
to satlsty Vienna.

But those limlts proyed too aarrow

Co_alYl, lt ltlUIIt be repeated, wu cletermlned

to preaerve the lndependeaoe and neutrality ot the Papaoy and to
avoid aD.7 pretext tor Neapolitan 1_ulon.

'!'hese aima inevltably
,

ooDtllcted wlth the Austrian pl.... tor crushlng the Revolutlon.
On

~

polnts the Cardlnal telt obllged to oppose Auatria--the

supply ot Austrian troops, the occupatio. ot Papal cltles, the
proeeedinsa at La7baoh--aad thoUCh he trled to be taotful

~d

cORoUiatory, Austria was surprised and irrltated by hls unexpected oppositloR.
Aa 1821 WON on, lustro-'apal relatlona became lnoreulncl,.

stralaed, and ORee again bitter ctlt101am ot the PapaOJ' aDd ot
eoualyl beS'" to be heard at Vlenna.

"I would be bet1'Q'iac my

d~t7 [Leardl reluotantly admitted to Co_81yl ln Aprl1] it I

oonoealed trom you that • • • on those oooulona on .nioh Y.R.
haa Yigorawll,. sWlt.ined the system ot strlot aeutrallt7, there
~ave not been laoki. oomplaints b1' tho. attached to this

Is0yermnent about 70ur strance obatlnac7 towards the true trlends

ot religlon and the sood. cause. If Oo_alyl fa obvious reluctance
to allow Austria to occupy Ancona had oaused. these complaints to
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This apparent cU.strust ot Austria, a "proven

be redoubled.
friend,"

W&8

UDtavorably oontrasted with the tormer w1llingness

ot the Papacy to allow Napoleon,"a

lc:nOWD

anet dangerous toe," to

garr1son that city in 1805. The Card1nal's reluctance was oonaidered inexplicable, unle.s it stemmed trom d1atrust and 111wl11, for "now the Holy See haa 11ttle reason to maintain a
strict neutrality between the Gooel and the Evil, aince, Naples
haYing submitted, It 18 DO longer exposed to imminent ctanser.,ll2

Oritioiam ot the Papaoy ia general and Oonaal.l 11l
partioular continued to gro., cd Leardi could 40 little to
cheek it.

Mettemlch anc:l Prancia I were 800n to retum from

Lqbach, ud the nunoio had. reason. to fear they too would .101n
1n the chorus ot critloism.

Aooord1ngl7, on 26 Aprll he begged

Oonaalvl to "gl.e me speolal instNot10ns tor the case that
durlna the dlscusalona [with Mettel"ll1cb and the Emperor] the,.
ahould apeak to me ot aome cauae tor d1aoontent that a government, though aaimated b,- the beat Inte.tiona,

mQ'

In ve1:7 dlt-

tlcult clreumatancea elve to another." The BUncle explained
apologetioally that .. he
00.. aly1'a pol107 it

w..

not tamiliar wlth the details ot

w.. dlffioult tor hlm to defend it

4IfteotlYel,-.113
TRial requeat proyolatd a sharp rep1,- trom the Seoret&17 ot

112
A.V., R241, Lear41 to 00_al.1, 17 Aprl1 1821.
113
!.!!!!., Lee.l'dl to 00_ alv1, 26 April 1821.
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state.

He was "amazed that you could so much as conceive the

idea that H.I.R.A.M. or H.R. Prinee Mettern1ch could have anT

cause tor discontent with the Pontifioal government atter the
shIning proofs ot special regard that the Pontitical government
has given to that ot

H.I.R.A.~.·

To show the absurdity ot such

ideas. he embarked upon a lengthy dere.. _ ot his policies.

describing in d.etaU the great co--operation of the Papacy w1th
Austria durinc the entire NeapolItan cris18. e.pecially durIng
the pus8le ot Austr1an troops through the Papal Statea.

He

enumerated at length the expe•• e and 1nooRYenienee Wbteh this
W11111'11 c0-operatioJl bad. c&Ullec1 the Papal go.ernment and its
subjects J aurel,. tbe.e aaoritice. .hould prove Papal lood wUl

towarda Austria.

In oo-openting with AWlStria and. tultilliftg

1ta wiah••• Oo_al.l had lone .. tar as he could. po.sibl,. go
without open17 vlolating Papal neutralIt7. which Austria could

not justly expeot hIm to saoritioe tor her aake alone.

The

greateat proot ot his good w1l1 was the recent agreement allowing Auatria to OCCUW Anoona.

The Papao," might well have

retuaed to allow this oocupation, as there waa

DO mll1tar,r

neceastty tor it, nor ... It nece.sary tor the preservation ot
order.

Honetnelea., the HolT See. 801e17 trom cood will towards

Austria. had acNed to the occupation. though in so doins It
had .erious11 imperilled ita preclous neutral1ty and impartiallt1
betore the wole world.

Xe.pins in mia. all these -shining

proote" ot Papal lood w111. Oonsalvl eoncluded, be could not aee
how AWltrla could. DO.aibl,. tind. au jut

AAHA . .

fitop eli. a,

....

246
with the Papal goverrrnent.

Le~1

should therefore have little
d1ffieult,- 1n defending it against unjust critie1am. ll Jt.
It Leardi uaed the detallSe outlined. by COJJ8alvl, it wu to

l1ttle etfeet, tor criticism

or

the Papacy contlnued. llS The

The Papal cOMent to the occupation of Allcona and the condemnatioD ot the Carbonari produced some improvement, and the attitude
of Metternlch upon hi. returD was leas critical than Leardl had
teared.

Nonethele.a. the Prince had not forgotten Conaalvi IS

opposition and feared that it might continue.
In hie first conversation with the nuncl0, Nettemieh
prai••d the Pope, but ci1d not entirely conceal hilS annoyanoe at
the "dlvet.'ge.ce of opiJlion tr between Auatria and the 'apacy" in
regard to the ut11it,. &ftd ):Olitical aims 01" the neutral It,.
mainta1ned bY' Hia Holiness dur1ng the hosti11t1es. tt
41verse.ce

Afq' such

ot opineD ... • threat to the commell cause J 01117 1n

00-ope"'t10n ancl uait,. could. safety be touD4.

In th•• e er1tloal

tlme., "governmente must become oloe. friende and establlsh
among themse1ve. the moat pertect trvat."

In partlcular, the

It&11....tat•• muat ahow createI' contldence ln Awatrla: lurelY'
"the Italian gO.,ernmellta mut b7 now have beea cOJlYinoed by
expel"1enee that. • .Auatria hu no other aim then to preaerve
pu~11c

order, .no.. di.turbance menace. the .ecurlt7 of all

114

Ib1d., Coualvi to Leard!, 19 MaT 1821.
115~., Leardi to Consalvi, 24, 31 May 1821.
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throne3 &"'1.d of the altar as well. II
in AU$ 'tria and

00 -operate

reservations or excusers.

TheY' must therefore trust

tully- with her. with no doubtful
Ar~

doubt that m1gh.t have lingered in

I.e a.rdi •s mind as to whether these remarks were pr1::narily

directed at Conaalvi was d1spelled by JrIetternloh ta (loncluding

Nrr.arks.

"H.R. charged me [the nunoio reportaQ to ConsalVl] on

th13 point not to let a11p a'n7 opportunity that mq &r'ise in

writing to Y.E. to confirm w1th the moet explio1t assurances on
his part, that no mot1ve ot ambition, nor anT other motive
beyond those 1ndioated above. could ever
of the Imper1al Cabinet."

ent~r

into the conduct

116

It 18 a.pparent tl'Om the above that Mettemloh was not
merely annoyed. but also a1~ned by eonsalvi'. polioy.

He had

divined that btlthlnd the various explanat10ns of his opposition
offered by Consalv1--explanatlons otten quite genuine in themselves--lurked an 1ncreasing d1struat

ot the aims and ambitions

of Austria 1n the Italian Peninsul....

His remarks to Leardi were

clearly- 1ntended to reassure Oonsalvl.

They were, in effect. an

appeal to the Cardinal to abandon his di8 trus t ot Aus tria. and
I

co-operate Wholeheartedly with her again.
1'1\e appeal rail.fi.

It faUed, 1:n .......10., beeaWie

00_alv1'a 8upie1oDS were not 1n tact without found.ation.

'1'l'WJ.

Mett...l4bt. defenee of Austrian po1107 ... aouad--but only 1.

116

Ibid. ,I Lear41 to ConsaJ,v1, 31

M~*

1821.

a aert;a.in seooe.

The Frinae was not l;ying \'lhen he asserted that

A·tlstria IS essential ai!;1 was only to maintain order and the
status quo in Italy and that ahe oherished no expansionist

8.l'"':bltiol"ls there.

Howevar# the Austrian goVertrilcnt, Met;tat'nich

in the lead, had become convincsd that its

pr1ma~1

aim of

maintaining tranquility could only be attained by greatly increasing Austrian influence over the var10us ItalIan governments
and by exercising a

t'~ight

of' supervision" over them, whioh

inoluded the right to intervene in their polioies both internal
and external. 111 From the point or view of" the Papal atatesman,

these policies preaented almost sa great a danger as
ritorial
treedom

~~bitlon

or

could have, for they threatened that

ter-

t~mporal

!t.ctiOJl which was considered neces.&l7 tor the

Pa.pacy 18 aplrltual INlependenee.

COmialYi therefore did not

and eould aot respond to :t.t!tternioh'$ appeal.

trust

~

A~trla

so

lo~

He could not

as these considerations governed her

Italian pol10.1 ~ tor thaI' poseci a threat to what he wu determined

to delead.

While Austria

persist~d

in her present policy.

Consalvi was reluotantl7 compelled to pppose hare
The end result or the Neapolitan Revolution, then, was DOt

to draw the lapae7 and Awstna oloser together, as miSht have
been expeeted, but to drive them farther apart.
anel enmltl' arcueecS bJ' 1'811&10\18 eontro.eN7 ...
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To the distru.at
ROW

added -'-:'-, .-;'-,

On Austria's wish to exerc18e .. rlpt ot supel"Yla:1oD over
the Italian states, see Schroeder, 125-128, b&Sed on extensive
reaearch in tne Austriaa arehl.ea.

tha.t resulting fron political l,}onfl:tet.

A'tlStr1a peX"SisUtd in

ita Italia!1 policy 1 Conflalv! pe!'l!iBted in oppos1ng it.

'!'he

reeult was growing d.1atruat, mutua.l Busple1on,; and renewad. conflict.

The rel1C1ous eont'tOve:fIBY' (}f lsrr"'18~ had begun the

deel1.."l& of Auatro-Papa! (to --o~ratl()1'lJ the pol1t1ealdiaputes ot

1821-1823 were to oomummate 1t.

THE COLLAPSE OF' AU~tt'RO -PAPAL CO··OPERATION: 1821-1823

1. The IDter-CoQlre•• Per1od, 1821-1822
Superficiall,., the eighteen morr'chs batween the Congress
of' Laybaa.h and that of' Verona ware a perlod of' oalm 1n Austro-

Papal relations.

The even tenor of" tht'Jir relations was

apparently disturbed only by a

'~inor

incident in Januar,y of

1822 when an Austrian offioe!' was Iddnapped by brigands in the

southern

~apal

states and the Austrian

eo~ander

in Naples

threatened to enter 'apal territory to suppr3ss the brigands
h1~selr.

Through prompt action by the Papal toreea, the eaptlYe

Austrian was returned and. the

bl"'~ds

punished.

The Austrian

GOm'nander waa rebuked by Mtttternieh tor his threat to occupy
~apa.l

terr1tory an4 the affair blew oVllr.

The onlY' significant

result was, in fact, a :rnea51..tN for increased Austx-o ... ~a.pal

ao-<)peratlon, 1n the form of an agreement tor joint act1ol1
against the brigands alollg the lleapolltan border. 1 Papal
antagonism that had .."eared during the revo1ut1ol18 had not

..

1

A.V. I ANY 245. Consalvl to Leard!, 16, 19, 21, 22, 26, 30
January, 9 PebNa%7' 1822. Jl260, Mttten10h to Appoft71, 15

Fe'bl"\l&l"l' 1822. ANY 241, Lear4i. to CODaalv1, 11, 14 Pebl'U&l'7, 14
March 1822. R247.. Coualy1 to IAUlrd1, 6 Maroh 18220
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C1T.inlshed. but rather had grown. ter its essential cause
eon\lnuec to exist t AViSt:r1a. had not aba..'1doned her plans tor

Increasing her eOl'ltlt"Ol over tl\e Italian hn1r.aula, 1\or was

Conaalvl any lesg

det&rtitt~d

to

oppos~

those

plar~.

CODlalvi tl9 grow1.rJg rJ1.Stl"'tiSt 01 Vlemna was ted bT several

Austrian polieies during

~e inte~-eon&ress

mediately annoying, pifrhaps, was Austrlaa
.evere repreSSion or the Set'tarJ.

MOst im-

perla4.

tor mQre

P"SSUH

l'rlor to the Neapolitan

ll(tvQlutlotl.. rl.ettelmioh had appeared fJI!!.t1atled with Papal measurea

agaiM t the Seo'ts I but the eyenta of 1820-1821 had

eha!lg& 1n his attItude qn this po11tt.
the 8e'tar3 wette

t~ T!\Or-G

.iously, and that in

a ,"at

He Game to believe that

da.qe'J.40tUJ than It.,

iSOM&q....et\f.t&

~'Ught

hartthe]!t

ha~

thought P!'e"

"p~8s1on

of them

wall

aeCeSfS8l'7. 2

Desp1te the alarr1 al'Otm\,Hi bY' tha :'eVolution i . HaplCHJ,

Coualv1 ha.d not been tl-1&htened into extreme measures ap.UWt
th(t 3ettarj -'

He ci1x.cte&S that

rapretuJe4 1 ud those

whO$6

lie punial1ed aGool'd1ngly.

t;) 'be puUiahad QnlJ'

III doub'.

agitation 8hould be

r1~nll

se:rlo'WI guilt could be pt'oyed were to
Howver # be ol·dered the atr1ct

Obaeftan48 ot lega11t7 1n tM
1IQ:N

~lr

arN3t pc!

trial

ot auspect•• td10

it tltei.. pilt could be pt-o\,en beyond

Aft'e.t OJ- 1mpriaO'l1.l1le'ft' 011 meN suspioion W88 tor-

;252

bidden.

Subordinates who aoted with exoea81ye rigor were rebuked

aJld ordered. to proceed wlth moderatlon.

Dur1ag

the oru18 or

1820-1821 a number ot ~..C!~~.~..1 were &rr8ated, but no executlons
or other .e"ere pun18hmenta were oanled out J exUe or pollee
8uperYleloD were the oDl7 penaltie. intlioted, and eyen the

exl1.. were

.OOD

allowed to retum. 3

'!his mild po110y met with no raYOr at VleMa.

In "aroh,

1821. LeIU"d!. reported that -the Imperial government 18 not efttire1y pleased with tae oonduot or the Oourt or Rome

OD

this

point. • • , which 40e. DOt 418.,1", that rigor ud actlYlty that

such situatic_ call ror • • • • - Autl'1a oompl.1Md that the
Papal IO'l'4!UI'runellt

d14 not alwa;re aet on the lato!'mat1on siven lt

b7 the Autrlan poliee. ud that when it 41d. it trequ.entl,. dispIqe4 too muoh -indulgence. tt

Th18 lenient Papal con4\tot was

contrasted untayorably with the properly aevere measurea recentl,.
taken qai11St the Seeta in Lombard.7-Venetla and Mode_. 4
COMalv! did. yield to mountillg A'WJtrian cHtiolsm to the

extent ot arresting and exiling a tew

S~~~jl ~om

Austria de-

3

il..V., R165. CCn:Jalv1 to the Legate of Forli. 15 Jul)", 16
to the Governor of Rome lJ 17 July

Deeembe:r 1820, 13 March 1821 J

1820; to the Delegate of' Perug1a .. 31 July 1820; to the Legate or

Bologna, 28 June 1820. R242, 00_alv1 to Spina, 16 November 1822.
Gualt~riQ_

4

Is 286-287_

P-•• V •• R247; Leard1 to Conaalvi, 10 fwlarch 1821} also,
10 JuJ.y 1821.
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ounaed, but in. tt,eneral he held to his poliey of' moderaatton a.nd.

l~~a1ity.' No doubt it was partly beeAlme or his dlssat15faction
ith Canadvi's continued moderati.nn th.at Mettemleh revived a
torme~

plan

r~r oombattl~

the Seets, one that posed a

r~~

reatel' threat to Papal independenae t the establtsh."'!ent or a
polltieal Commission or General Commisslon ot Polioe under
This Commission would. eo-ord:tnate and direct
he police activ1ty of all the Italian states against the
e~"'!:~3. t

the Peni1UJula-wide peyolutlontU"y' ol'gMizat:f.on would be

ontront&d uti ov.reame by a Peninsula-wide pol10e, efficiently
'l'o Metterrdch, the idea may ha...e seemed.

bjeetlonable J COMalyi saw it 1n a 41fterent light.

'l'he

apuy--and any other Itallu gove1'nl't1ent DOt content to be a mere
uatrlan aatelllte--had a compelling mot1y. tor

op~lt1ont

auoh

Commusloft would in ettect 81ve Austria oontrol oyer all

liee aetiYlt7 ift Italy, 8ftatly increasing her influence over
be Ital~an atates and presenting her with limitless opportunt-

1e. to interfere 1n their internal atta!",. 6 '!'he pro~fJal ot
ueh at Commission could onlY' 1.nereesft Consal..,! '8 d.1strUllJt

uetrian aims and

or

ambltlo~.

The Cardinal. first leamed ot Metternieh '8 plan from the

GlW.!tel'io, I, 36-27- A.V., RlGS, Consalvi to Governor of
ome# 20 July 1821. 1t242 , Coualvl to Spina, 16 November 1822.

6

A. V. t R242, Observations on the projeot ot a Po1itioal
OMm.18sion. • • J 1822; Instruotions for Spina. 1822J Consalvl

oSpina, 28 November 1822.

~~.

latter'.

con~ldant,

Count Butro, wbo y1alted Rome In April. 1822.

The Count, at MetteMllch '. inatruetlona, Informed Consalvi ot the
projeet and sought hi. :reactIon.

The Car41nal, taken by surprlae

... unwilllng to eommlt himself and

merel~

replied 1n general

terms that the 'ap.07 would. a.lw..,.. 00 -operate agaift8t the
S,ettar.,- _tn.yer po.slble.

Mettel'ftioh mq have interpreted thes.

Nma,rlal . . indicating 'apal approYal.

In tact, COMelV! was

Implaoabl7 hostIle to the Oommi•• ion, though he planned to yell
hie opposition as much .. po.aible 1n the hope that the plan

!'11cht !'all through without hUl intervention. But he toresaw
the l1)el1hood that Nettemien would propose h1a Comm1aslon at
the approaehing Congress, and W88 prepared to oppose Austrian

de.iSM there openly it

MC•••

&r7.J

A seoond sauroe or continued Auatro-Papel tenelon was the
app&l'ent determination ot Austria to impose eertaln retorms upon

the Papal and othel:' Italian governments.
8\tpporte4 Consal...l

flJ

Mettemlch be.d long

plane to reform the Papal goYerRn'tftnt, as

hu bee. discuaeed ln Chapter II, but after the Neapolitan
R....olutioft, he de.leSe« that the slow paM or Papal refol:'m, hampe~Cl

b7 the

!!~_,=,

.... t.uttlelent. He eaw "without .urprise

but Rot without eoX'l'OW that because of the.. obetacle. rnan.v
Ibid.., Alao, R242, OODBe.lv1 tQ Leardi., 1 MI!Q" 1822. Fur1an1.
XXXIX, ~.J;.85, is inoorrect in assuming that the chief subject
of Rw"'i'o '8 mi.alo11 .aa the reform or the Papal government) there
i& no e1,.ldenoa the le.tter lias e·ven discl.latled. See R2/~2, ConsalYl
to Spina., 28 November, 4 Leeemb-er 1822.

t")~:5

'-.,I

parts (Of Oonaa1vl f8 reform program] haye remained unexecuted or
paral,-zed. •
S&r1'

retorms

It the Papal goyernment would not oarry out necesOft

ita own initiative, then the Powers would haye

to 4tOmpel it to aet. 8

A_tria waa not alone in this opinion.

At

~baoh

Russia

ba4 been eonoerned l •• t the NeapolItan Reyolutioft spread to the

Papal territor:!.es.

In January', 1821 ~ the Russian ambassador at

Rome, Prince Andre Itallnslty. was instruoted to impress upon
Conaalyl the Mees8it,.

or

prompt reforms to forestal.l revolution,

aftd to ttuggeat that the subject be brought up at the
LQ'baeh. 9
Itallnalq/'. ovel"tUl"es were unwelcome

tOi

COng~sB

of

Oonaalvi, who had

no 1nten1;ion or allowing f"oJ."'etgn 1nteI'fex-eflce :tn Papsl 1.nternal
affairs and bel1aved that his ~..:P.!-~l'2Jt~£. of 1816 contained all

the essentIals or a sound govemment if only he could put 1t into
erfect.
rrero~

Mo:reOV61',

as Ital1M ky did not 8 pec!ty the type of

desIred. the Cardinal tea1"ed it might be in the direction

of constitutional

go,~et'l'!ment.

which was Inoorr.patlble with the

absolute authority of the PO'f'e.

Re therefore re,1eeted the

Russian pJIOposals!, e.nd the sub.feet was not brought up at Lal'baeh

8

A.V., 1~2h·T .. Leardi tc Cvnsal'Vi,

9

A.V., R2h2,

C~nsalvi

so

June 182l.

to Spina, 14, 11 F'e'bl'Ua.I·Y 1021;

Nesa.Irette to Itallnsky, 22 January, 3 Febl"tlary 1821.

Andre Italinsky. Russian aJi1bassa.dor in ROli~, 1815-.l82~7.

Prince
'I

III

II
:!,
I'

,II
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during Spina's sojourn there. 10
The Taarts interest In promoting Papal retor.m seems to have
dwindled a:f'ter thb rebu:f't, tor hencetorth llussla took onlY' a
",err aeoonda17 role in this queatlan.

It .... now Austria that

took the lead in preasing the Papal and other Italian governments
to carr.y out fetorms.
'!'he queatlon ot retorm was taken up bY' Austria, Pl'UBsia,
and llus.la at La7baoh atter the departure ot the Itallan delesate..

The re.ult ot their d.ellberatloM .as the ie.uanoe on 12

Ma7 1821 ot Ciroulal'll bJ' the three Eastern

POWN

represent.tiv•• at the various Italian oourt..

to thelr

'!'he Austrlan

Circular, the atroqe.t ot the three, argued. th.t s
A_tria can be oo_i"red • Part17 Italiu power.
Auetri. h.. lent to the other St.te. ot the Pet.insula
material ... i.tan•• whioh had led to the re .... t.bll.hmeat ot peace. Austrla otters to tho•• state. the
materlal
ot whloh th.7 will atil1 tor aome time
have Med to ensure the preaervation ot thl. benetlo1al peace. • • • Theretore, Austri. b in a oertain
aenae .uthoriz.d to i_1st on the adoption ot m....ure.
that the state. themselves must take so that this ineORV.nient and expeMive aid wl11 aot be continuall,.
••••• &1'7. • • •

me..

Austria did not speci:f'7 1Ihat these measure. should be J the
individual .tat•• should choose tho.e measures ot reform be.t
calcul.ted to .ati.t7 the legitim.te grievaRees ot their subjects
aDd thus .1imin.te all cause tor disconteat.

At the Congress ot

10
Ibid., Spina to COMalvi, 26 'ebruar;y 1821, Co_elvi to
SpiRa, If Mii-eh 1821, with undated letter trom Conaal..,1 to
Itallu
0
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Florence the ItallaD atatea would have to explain to the Powers

the measures which the,. had adopted and demonstrate that the
latter were suf'ficient to ensure tranquilit7 if the Austrian
forees were withdrawn.

If' their measurea were found inadequate

at the Congress, then the Powers would themselves have to prescribe suitable reforms and ifti!at upon their implementation. ll
It is difficult to S&7 which more alarmed Consalvi in these
circulars: the immediate threat of interferenoe with his own
reform plan or the explicit assumption b,. Austria of a general
right of iDterterence in the Italian states, but neither was to
hi. li1dJl8.

Hia first reactioD wu to aend Leardi a detailed

description of all receRt ref'orms, le,al, administrative, and
financial, eaacted in the Papal Statea, as well as those that
were planned, with inatructiona to communioate it to Metternioh.
This description, the Cardinal felt, should convince the Prinoe
that Austrian i.terterenee in the reform ot the Papal State was
unnecessar,r as well as objectionable, tor "the paternal solicitude ot the HolT Father does not ee .. e to ocoupy- itselt in giving
to his people the moat uaetul institutions which serve to
establish their well-being on solid to\ll'ldations, and that it is
wrong to accuse the Papal government ot not protiting trom the

present moment ot calm to promote those uaetul institutions that
ever increase the love ot the people tar their legitimate

11

Ibid., Clroular of' 12 May 1821.

IV, 458~.

Alao printed in Alberti,

govemmel'lt • "12
COMaly1 evlc!ellt17 dld not tl"T to hlde h18 di.like tor the
Circular 1n his private con..eraations, tor news ot critioism on
hiS part soon reached Vienu.

At the end ot June Metternich

decided to let the Card1nal know ot h18 c!1apleaaure at the
latter'. attitude and at the same time to t17 to reassure him as
to Austria'S pollcies.. Speaking with Leardi (who had just oonveyed Consalvits congratulations on the Prince's eleYation to
Chancellor), Nettemioh praised the Seoret&l7 of state's "rare
gift. ,.. but "he cltd not tall to let me know ~the nuncio reported]
that he had experienced some disple_ure in noting that Y.E. had
not alw.,a judged the eoDduct ot the Austrian oabinet with the
full conti4enee it dese"e•• II

Oo_alyits reaction to the

Circular wu the latest example of this miaJudgment.

The

Chancellor eXl'la1ned that the 801e motive behind the Circular
had bee. the fear that it the Itallaa courts did not malre nece.s&17 reforme, the reaut tine popular disoontent would end in
reyolutionJ Auatria had thus be•• acting wIth the beat interest.
ot all the Italian Bo... rnmenta in mInd.

~e

Italian so.eromeat.

oannot fairl,. judge in anv other • ., the intentioDS at H.M., tor
H.M. h .. alreaQ' si.eR the moat atrUd,. proofs that his aotions

are not motivated by U7 pereoDal ambltIoaa, but onl7 b7 the
good of all the

12

80..ere1&_

ot the Peni_ula. tt

In view ot thIs

A.V., R247, Conaaly1 to Leardi, 9 June 1821.
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purity of' Austrian intentions, Metternich could not conceal "the
e orrow he reels that Y.E. has, in reading the Circular, as als 0
in the progress of the negot1ations for the occupation of Ancona,
shown an irritation that betr&JS a certain distrust, as if the
House ot Austria wished to encroach upon the sovereign rights of
the Italian princes."
Metternich .ent

Oft

to praiae Conaalvi's great efforts for

reform, all the more commendable in that "the obstacles to be
overcome are much greater and more complicated than anywhere
else."

Nonetheless, it was undeniable that despite his heroic

efforts the Cardinal had been unable to put more than a fraction
of hie reforms into full efrect.

Circumstances demanded the

rapid 1ntroduction of' more extenaive reforms.

ConaalYi should

not allow the apparent tranquility' of the Pa.pal States to deoeive him, tor revolution&r7 forces were at work under the surfaoe.

tiThe present milita17 occupation keeps the <11scontented

in check, but this will not last forever • • • • "

Coual.,.i and

other Italian statesmen must therefore take advantage ot the
present temporaJ.'7 respite to aat1at7 all popular oauae for complaint, or the withdrawal of' the Austrian torces would be
followed by peninsula-wide revolution.

At the coming Council of

Florence the Papal and other Italian governments must be able to
convince the Power. that they had satisfied their subjects, or
AustrIa could not evacuate it. armi.s.

Metternich charged

Leardi to report hia worda fa1thfully to 00118&1,,1, remarking that
i.
I

I
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"you will agree that I can hardly be oalled a JacobinJ so it I
speak to you ot necessary institutions and reforms. I can only
be motivated by the wish to see the repose ot all legitimate

governments 88sured."13
Apparently Metternioh never specified in detail the reforms
he desired the Italian states to adopt.

The general model he

proposed can be seen in the new government set up for Naples,
which provided

tOl"

a system ot councils whose advice the king

must hear but need not tollow, tor some participation by the
pl"Opertied eluses in 100al government, and fol" greater administrative articien.,-.

For the special case ot the Papal State,

he particularly desired a greater number or
government. 14
The Card1nal t 8

d1st~.t

la.ymen~in

the

of Austrian policy was not dimin-

ished by Metternlch t s explanations.

Realizing thiS, the

Chancellor delivered another equally lengthy apologia tor
Imperial polio)'" 1n June 1822, using the same arguments as berore
with an equal lack or suceess. 1 5
Despite Metternich's denials. the tact remained that the
Austrian attempt to compel the Italian states to introduce
--~3~---

IbId., Leardi to Consalvl, 30 Jun.e 1821.

14

Also. R242. InstructIons tor Spina, 1822) Untltled
"Easendosi stabllito ••• ," 1822; Fog1l
lettl nella prima Conge. tenuta. • •• 1822. Schroeder, 124-126.
15
A. V• J R247 J Leard! to Cons a1vi, 6 June 1822.
Ibid.

dooumen~llnn1ng
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reforms did represent interterence in their internal affairs, and
might well be the thin end of' the wedge tor mueh more extensive

interference later.
willingly aocept.

Such interference Consalvi could never

Furthermore, though considered b7 itself this

attempt might be as innocent in motIvation as Mettern1eh claimed,

when taken In the oontext of' Austria'. overall Italian policy it
assumed. more sinister aspeot: it then appeared as one of the
three facets of an oftensive movement designed to establIsh
Austrian hegemoJ'l1' in Italy.

The tiNt facet

WM

the AUlItrian

attempt to assume control over pollce activity in Italy by the
establishment ot a (Jenera! Commias iOl'll interference 1n the internal arfai" of the Italian states in the name of reform

appeared as the seoond; and the third taoet, the keJStone in the
&reh, was the revival of Mettemieh '& old projeot tor an Italian
Contederation.

It will be recalled that the project of an Italian Oontederation had first been suggested by Mettemich at the Congress
of

Vienna but had been abandoned in the taee of strong ItalIan

opposition.

He had. howYer, been able to persuade Naples and.

Tuac8ll7 to sign treati•• lomewhat NltrIctlng their independ.ence
an4 forbidding them to oontract any obligations that might

weaken the proposed Italian

Confederatlon--t~atie8

that were

clearly intended to aerYe as a possible basis tor the ContedeNtion. 16

16

See above, Chapter II, Seet10n 2.

There i3 some doubt as tc ,mat Mettornich meant by an
"Italian Confederation."

The phrase'

"'HJ3- "

applied to have two

different concepts, and Metternioh never stated clearly which ot
the two he sought: first, a true Confederation, similar to that
in Germany-; seco1'1d, a 8Y'8tem of bilateral allianees, si>'l'lilar to
that of. 1815 with Naples, by which Austria would acquire considerable control over the polioies ot the individual Ital1an
states.

The most plausible explanation for this contusion is tha

Metternieh himself was not certa.1n as to which concept to pursue.
probably he would have preferred the true Confederation which
offered greater control over the Italian states, but in view ot
the strong opposition to that scheme considered the alliance
BY3tem to be more practical.

Ift art::! ease, it the alliance

could be worked out it could serve roB the toundation on
which a true confederation could be bul1t. 17
8yste~

\Ihlohever of these two versions TwIetternich had 11'1 mind in

1822, the Italian Oonfederation was certain to meet with strong
oppOSition fror" the Papal government:

Whate..er might be the advantage that might result
to the Italian governments trom a Confederation
(ConaalYl explained to Spina) their chief interests
are always opposed to it • • • • The exeesaive disproportion between the colossal torces of Austria
and those ••• eyen of all the Italian atates
together would give her a preponderanee so decisive
that Austria alone would decide the destinies ot
Italy. and the independence of' the Italian rulers
- -....\[11"{.--

On the different ooncepta 01' the Oontederation, see
Bettaninl, 3-501 Srblk, I, 561; Furlan! XXXIX, 488-491.
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'I

I'

'tlculd be tn the greatest d~tne:er. But if e"eIT Itallen
government should recoil from this sys tern, how much

J!ore ehould the Pontiftee.l govern~1ent oppose it' (The
Pope, as Head of the Chureh as well as a temporal ruler,
1'1'ust !,rezerve co~r.plete impartiality towards a.l1 nations.;
therefore he cannot] join for temporal objeetiyes with
other rulers, for their interests, though now common
with those of the Pontitieal government, could at times
be in opt'los1t1.on to the relations Which the Pope must
preserve with other powers • • • •
['1'he le;paey1 therefore w1l1 have to rejeet any
proposal for an Italian Contederation, whether this
Confederation ecvers all the relations of the Italian
states or whether it is limited only to so~e 01' them.
Should ~ ot the Italian sovereigns, whether
for family connections or tor an.y other reason, agree
to form with the Em~ror 01' Austria a politieal alliance
and to regulaDe in accordance with the will of hls own
state [the PapaellfiUlt also aisapprove such an
Alliance. • • • J
Thus,

Cor~alvi

Austr1~~

il
il
1,1
"

,I!
"II
III:
il'l

I!

Indeed, he feared the Political Co:nmisinsistence on

refo~

in large part because

those :neasures could serve as stepping atones to a Confedera-

tion. l9
Beneath the superficial c.alm of the inter-Congress period,
then, tension had in faot been buIldIng up between the Papao7

and Austria over the latter's program tor attaining hegemony in

Italy.

'l'h.UB far, prior to the Congress of 1822.. thiS tension

had been l.tent.

It

iHhirrJ.ed

proba.ble, howeveI

1

,

that a.t the ap-

"lTf----

A.V., R242, Instructions tor Spina, 1822.
lq
~ Ibid ... Instructions for Spina) Queaitl che 8:1. propongono.

1822; C'O'i1Salvi to lV'.acch:i, 2 Deee~:lbflr 1822

Uk2).

,I

I,"

was opposed to either form of Metternich's

Italian Confedera.tion.
sion and thz

il

I'

I,

proaehing Congress Metternieh would attempt to impose part or
all of his program upon the Italian states; and if he did so, a
direct collis 1,,,0,. hetween Papal and A:uBtria.n policies could not
be avoided.

,.....

2. The Congress or Verona
vl'iginall,. scheduled for Florence, the Congress of 1822

was shifted to Verona \\'hel"'e the

~ore

~ou1d rnaintuin better ord~r. 20

As the disousslon of Italian

affairs

WEW

efficient J\:ustrian poliee

to be an important part of the Congress, every

Italian state was to be I'epresented.

rJfet'ternloh hoped that

Consalvi wCluld act a.s Papal plentpot€nt!ary I "at least for e1ght

days, until general prinoiples have been agreed upon; II thereafter
some lesser diplomat, pNf'erably 116ardi, could handle the :re-

ma.in:1.ng negotiations. 21

Evidently, Metternleh w1shed to d1seuas

the sore points in Auatx-o-Papal relations 1n the hope or
qu1etir.g Consa.lv1 's distrust and persuading '1m to eo-operate

with AustrIa's plana.

Papacy had been

D1t'f'iQultle& between Austria and the

~moothed

out before by personal discussions, at

the Congress of V1ennaJ p4&rhaps the $ame eould be <lone at Verona.
Tha Chaneellor realized, however, that very possibly the

"press of business" would make it impossible for Consalvi to

---.----20

A.V., R247, Leard! to Consalvi, 4 July 1822. Leard1's
explana.t1on, appa.Nntly oYerlooked by Furlani" rendel"S unneoessary the latter's arguMent that the Con3ress vias moved to Verona
for the sake of Awstrian pOBtal esp1.onage, the latter may' have
been a factor, but there 1s no evIdence to support it. Furlani,

XXXIX, !~65-".f.7l.

21

Ibid.)' Leard1 to Consalv1, 8 June 1822.
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attend the Congro;Js. 22

In that evant, the probabl;, Papal

represalltat:.e would be Cardinal Sp1na, a choice little to
!Jbttern13h '3 liJ,::ing, for at Lay-bach Spina. had not hesita.ted to
oppose AUEtrian plana and might be expeoted to do so aga1n at

Va rena.

l'./rett~rnlch.

would ther--etore have lU'eferred some other

delegate, suoh as the more

Lear41, but hia f'requent hint.
at this preferenue produced no response from ConaalVl. 23
!~ttefll1eh

do~lle

therefore appears to have made an attempt to

prevent Sp1na f 8 apPointment

shortl~'

before the Congress was to

In August, 1122, Spina was aoewsed by the Dulce ot Modena
(",rho .t'reqv.ently served as a "stalking horse" for Mettem1Ch 24 ) ot

begin.

having displ&Jed sympathies with the

Bologna.

$~tt~~_

while Legate ot

Spina, I>ealizing the probable or1g1n or th18 accusation,

at once sent an eloquent and skillful :refutation of these charges
direct to J\!etterniah.
Spina's

il1nOCenC6

Confronted b7 the detailed proof' ot

presented 1n his letter, the Chancellor

grudgingly ad"ltitted that the 8.eousation was unjustltied. Nothing

more was heard of thase oharges. 25
This aeeusatlon, whether insp1red by Mettern1ch or not,
taUed to affect COmsalY1'B determination to appoint Spina.

.

In

22~n1d.

23

Ibid., Leardi to Consalv1, 8 June, 16 July, 9
2lt, Ooto\ier-·1822.

24

E.G., SChroeder, 226.

Furlani,

Septe~ber,

474.

25

Furlani, XXXIX, 414-483, dieeusses this 1nc1deat at length,

argt:d.l'lg that !<tltternlch

l'las

behind ltj this see.lllS very probable,

though not eomplete17 proven.
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September, Metternleh formally iftylted. ConaalYl to attend the
Coql"ess.

The Seoretary or

Sta~e

reruaed, oourteously but flrmly

stl.·CH1Bing the "press of bus1.ness'* and_ the "praoar1oW3 state of

health of His HolIness, which m.akes it blpos81ble for the

Seoretary of State . . . . to leave hie 81de."

He had ohoseR Splna

as hls representa.tIve, for he hs.d "eomplete oonfldence 1n hi.

ability and loyslty_"
"that very
Oh0080
II

•••

As for the Duke

e1~cw1atan.e

al'"J.yOlH~

or

Modena'. oharae.,

in a way obl1ges HiB Holiness not to

elsa, sinee l ' he should pass eyer Cardinal Spina

he woulcl thus ea'WI. lt to be belleye4 that he l.olas

oomplete \!:cmric1enee in h1:n a:r"tcr the letter of It.R.H. tbe Duke. tf

1ft derereaoe no doubt to Metternloh'. frequently expres.ed wl.h,
Learcll was to aeeompany Spina, but onl,. 1ft ... advlsor,r capa-

elty.26
fl'be PoweN had qreed that the Coqre.. should be cl1yld.ed

into two per1ods: the

r.lrst~

a dieeu8810n of

gene~ E~pean

questions, ... to begia Oft 1 September, the secoRd to begln
three weeks later, would deal witn Italian attaiI'S.

delegatee

~re

to attend only the eeeoRd period.

The Itallan

However, the

auiolde of' LON Caatlereagh. the BI'1t1ah Forelgll MinIster, In
Auauat 4el8784 the ope.1"1

aad

p~longed

at the ColtCree. until 29 September,

dllpute. OR the Spanish queation further retarded

the discus.lon ot ItaliaR problema.

Spina therefore did not

26--··--- A.V. R242, 00_&1'1'1 to Leardl, 17 September 1822. Leardl
pl.,ed only a yer.y .econdary role at the Congre•••

c.?68
1 eave Ho~ for Varona ul1.til 21 OatobeI'. 21

Comal vi pu'; this del87 to good use bY' thoroughl1' discuss1n,g
with an

adviS01~r

congNgation and with Spina. the problems that

seened likely to <lome up at the Cotlgreas.

As J'light be expected,

the discussions with the Congregation centered s.roUlld the threat
p,:>sed by AU3trian 1'011.,..

probably not
Wl)ulti

to

p~pose

and bl attQ nptlng to,
1

!tal1a~'l gO~\T(~rtlIi3nts

po11c1(ls were to btl QPlY.,sad
01.18

~u.t

openly an It.t.llan Contederation,

to prepa:.r>c the wtrJ fo1/' it bY' seeking a Politte&!

'l;ry

C~·rlirlta. ien

of the

da~

It flU agNe4. that Aut..1. 1IQul4

in the

as

to Papal 1ndapandenee. 28

[wide range

Qr

lnt~r!ere
l\a}~

in th!3 inte:r.nal attaiN

of reform.

u.~oea.ar:r.

Both these

useleas, and danger-

\With Sp1M, Consal vi i11aeuaee4

a.

top!.. that m!pi; be bNupt up, panlou.lar

attention being given to Austrian po11e1ea. 29
'.rh.s eoneluaiQn8 re&cheti in the8e vuio'WI ci1sewss1oDa were
jel:1bo<lied in Spinats

ponsalvi.

r. . . YlAtl1 J:.H

ID$truot1o~

of 1)) October, u1ttea b7

Arier first describing the Congresa of I..qbaoh and the
1~>1J:i\ed at

it'" eoneltlalon, the Seeretar,y

27
Ibid., Spina to COMal1f1s31 October 1822.

of

state ..at

28-

Do~a~nt$ bearing on tbes~ ·d1sCUJ$lons ~aa be found 1.
RM2, Congreelo dl Verona, 1822. See "",alall,.: Que.ito Ohe 8t
propongo!1O. • • : OSsf)"a~1onl suI Pro,~tto della Commi$sioue J

'od-l l1ttl nella prima Conge. tenuta. • •

J and

the document

beginning 1I~~ssendoIJ1 stabUito •• « • •
29
110 l:eeord or the,s dl••uaalo11$ haa b4teJ1 pl'esewe4, but
there u1ats a 118t of
teploa 4.1a. . . . . z Rt_I, Le

tu

_'en.

"'e11e cr..lal1 s1 'e PU'lato CI08 1 'E11inent1aa1rlo Spil'lO, 1822. 81gI1tioantly' , "Oonr.4en.s1oJM ItaJ.lltlUl lf is the first item oa tile

list.

I
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on

t.r)

a...'rla.lyze Austrian polioy and the thre&"t it posed to the

Papaay,

A_tria, being that power which possees ei;;-.iii~· I..'tltly
a t,~rri"hory !'lOi'e extens lYe than 3Z'l1' othGlr ruler ..
ad ha,,:lftg eont:rlbutad :tte trooP'! to !'eetore the
diRtul"bed order in Na.ples and ttledm.ont, see:t'lS to
believe that ahe has t'he right to oompel all the
other Italian goyernments to adopt measures (she
oonal.).IIII] app1'Opnate . . . . , and to uettm.e a sort
J

of' 8Up1"emaey in the Tl'L'1nage"nen c of' those interests

oommon to all the stat.. of the Peftlnaula. • • •
Pl"U8sia and Russla. rag~\31 ...

" tha.t

.Austrta 11.aa

• Bpe.lal 1atereat 1ft ItalIan ~ta1".. .. .. and should
pJ.ay the do"linant role 1" tht';;;TI.. .. • •

TllefIe e1J.teumatpe.. J
~"H3Ul1l'Ptlon
OftJl all tlle

able to the

1Bflue__

.1on a.re

certainlY' favor-

by A\wtria. of a

prepondel~a.nt

Ita11an gOTemments, eauae
aO"lle to believe that the ktUSt1"'la.n goverrlntent. • •

a1ma at PJlltparillC the.., to. the establ1'hJ!'Jent of
an Ital1.an Confeciaration flimlla:r to the Gem....'\n Con-·
fe""'t10., ma1d~ keNelt Head e.af. Protector • • • •
rBut English ana FNneh opposition has made Austna
ii•• ltat. to .uaeet t1\le pro,1 ••t opeJ'll7]. Howeve:J!'.
the Aus trlan govfll'nlneftt J not being able to propose
thia ym')j ••t opealJ' 3_t DOW, wUl probably .eek to

prepare

fo~

it

b~

securing the adoption or

and. 1mtt1tutloll!l of suoh

by little to a federal

It.

p~1no1ple~

nat1Q!l'e as to lead little

ayste~

under Austrian pro-

tect:10ft.

ObviouslY:t Spina ltl'l111 havo 'to reJect any proposal
Italian Confederation" :tn view or

th~

restriction of' Pa.pal

1ndependence tmieh it would ineVitably produ<1e.
Wa,8

the an..Bwer

tor an

Less obvious

to

the yeX7 4el1.oate b\1.t -.1'1tW q'Wtflt1on,fta.'R81y
whether the Pontlf'loal Plen1potent1aryshould refuse
to agNe to a.ny measure, institution, 0... gellera.t
principle regaN.1ftS ~. lntel'Mta ot all the It-ellft
stiat&3 .. [Such COrmllOrl nteaaurea 'Might be uaei"ul asa1l1St
the 1~t.:tari{. * .. .. Howve~) wha1)ever ganenl in.'1tut1oR
adopted, 'tdlate",.r eommon .aaUJ.ll'e 'be 4e-

cJ'ee4 ••• , it would al....". be another step. more or

less (}Ol'lS 1der&ble.J to'\;;rarl!3 3. syete'i~ of federation.
AU8t~la Will always wish to have the dominant role
S:lch

I;iea.sur~6.

ana.

1n

• • •

COl\Sal'Yi therefore concluded th.at the PapMJ' would kave to
oppose Auatpiaft project.

'fhe projeot that

tOf!'

Bueh eommoa measures .:>r iJl8t1tut1ona.

wu moat l1ke17 to ..,. propoae4 was the OenenJ.

Commus1on of Poll...

S,lft& mut oppose th18

with.out atating" it pcaalble, the •••••t1a1
poa1.tloa, namel", that 1t WOUld

IMH • •

OOnmlUS10D,

but

"_Oft tor hu op-

Autp1aft intluenc. 8.f1d.

le.. to a Cont.deMtt.O". I i._te.4, he 'Ao\lld Q'&ue It·that the
Po"tift.a!
!!!~ar.1.

so•• J.IIftm8at

1It tald.. a4e4Ute

.t.,.

to hoI4 the

1n ehe.lt, u4 tllat "'!p.I'Oe4L1 communioat1oft bet,,"n

gO....J.IIImeIlU

or thelp 41JJooye.1e. a'Dout the

S!!~arJ

..._t~e. eqn1 t." tihoae that oould be "rl"ed.
mi•• lon."

'!'he I_tNotic_ ..... eO,"N' tAe tkiN

treJIL

ph_.

A_tnan ott•• iYe, tM att8w.pt to 11\tart8;' 11'1
af'taiN ot the Ital1M

wo\l14 otter
a Oom ....

of the

~

lateraal

.tat.. 1a the name or :retorut and. to lmpoee

upoft them • GOmmoR .,..tem of 8QVel'ftm8R' model" upoa 'that 4r&1m

up

tOI'

Naplea at Lqbaoh.

8p1n& 1fU to oppoa$ aJV' such 18-

ftOy.t1ons on tn. srowula that they weN
"tOt-IllS

~.e•• &l'Y.

tor the

wl'l1eh Conaalvl had drawn up and whioll were alrea,dJ beiDg

put into effeot would satiSfY all

th~

naeda of good government

and ...,uld ell!tt1natet all just cautJe tor' discontent.

A detailed

deaor1ption ot the3e reforms and the progreaa made thua tar 1ft
II

27[
putting them into etteot was enclo.ed.

The various teatures

ot the Neapolitan a,..tem were then eOl'Ulldered in detail and
shon to be either superfluous or undesirable.

The MOst un-

desirable teature ... the Coaeulta, the eODSultative council
whose advioe the ruler was required to hear, though not neees ...
saril,. to take J thiS bod:;r oould become "the tirst step towards the

formation ot a constitutional goyernment"·-a prediction whose
aGourao,. was to be demonstrated b,. the later experiment ot Pius

IX ift 1848.

Consalvi concluded b,. detemting certain much-

criticized aspects ot the Papal administration: the tinanoial
8ptem, *oa. bur4e_ were, he demonstrated, 11&hter than thoae

ot the other Itallan atates J and. the judiclal a,..tem, whoae
remalnt.. detecta were to be remed.Ied b7 turther retorms. 30
'l'heae Inat;ruotiona .pbollze the breakdown ot the AustroPapal al11&ftoe: their v.PI e ••••oe 18 a protound d1atI'WSt ot
Austria and. all her worD.

Co_alvl 'a dial1lusioRmeRt wlth

AWltria ... oomplete J her pollol.. were a threat to the In.d.epen...
dence ot the Papac,., 8d. he ... d.etermiJled. to oppose and deteat
them.

'!'he Cardinal made 'DO turther attempt. to cOllcl1iat.

Austria or to pateh up the raveled. web ot Auatro-Papal oo--operatlon--the time tor that, he reallzed, was pot.

POI'

the re-

mainder ot hi. mIaI.tPl, d1atruat ot Austria and hoatilit7 to
her ambitIons would be the D7ftOte. ot Consalvi'. diploma07.

30

A.V.,

R2~2,

Inltructlons tor Spina, Oetober, 1822.
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Armed "ith the.. iutructioM, Splna s.t out tor Verona,
rriving there on 29 October.

He round that the dlsousslon or

eneraJ. European attaira was stl11 g01ng

80 that

tor three

d1plo~t1c

world and

OD,

aks he had l1ttl. to 40 but obserye the

eourt••,. oalla upon the v&l'ious rule" and minutera
sent. 31 S(,Oft atter h18 arr1't'al, he wa rece1ved ln audienoe
., FPano18 I.

The Emperor 41eplqed gNat concen OYer the

t1v!t7 ot the Settarj in the Papal state ancl the .ed tor

torme there.

Bpiu, mald... use ot the lntormatlon aupplied

1m b;y 00_&1.1, described reoent Papal retorms IUl4 measures

ainat the Bettarj, 1Ihloh ••emed to aat1atJ' Pranc18 I. 32

B7 the third week in Bovember, however, the geaeral
.-opee tuefltiou are well on their "q to .olution.

Metter-

lob was aow tree to tun tUB attention to Ita1&an attaira, and
ln consequenee Spina'a inact1vit,. soon came to an abrupt ••d.
On •

lfovember, the Sar4!R1Ul Foreign lUa1ater, Count de la

our, v181te4 Sp1na to tell him ot a "cl1sooUNe" whlob Mettem1ch

ad dellyered to him the previous dq.

The A_trio had a4m1tted

at t1Nt he had. thoupt or e.t&bliahi_ .. Comm1aa1on
Ib1d., Spina to Conaalvi, 31 October, 1, 2, 9, 14, 18
Hovem'beFIlJ22.

32

Ibid., Repopt or the Imperial Audience, 7 November 1822.
rancia '8 ilarm at Settar.1 aot1vit,. ill the Lesationa was UJ'lt.1g1'l ....
eI, and .... expres.ea: eye. MON stronslJ' to the 1"wIoan eDY07_
•• t A1'OhlYio 41 Stato, Florence (hereafter oited ASF), Ord1ne
2392, Se1'r. 1931', Corain! to Fo•• ombl'ODi, 2, 3, No.embar 1822.
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tor Ital7 like that at Ma1nz tor QermanT, but had
then abandoned the idea because of the diftioult7
ot briDging lt about. However, the idea had then
oome to him ot to1"'t91ng instead a Politi.al Commisslon made up or commiesionera tl'Om all the
Ita11aa goy.l"ft11tenta, whose duty would be to tollow
the MOYemente ot suspects in order to cl1scover all
the .tnadll or their weba and their relationa
abroad, e.pe01all,. with France which 18 their
ce.ter. The eomm188ionere would be ift touch .ith
their reapeotl.. governments and would reoiprocally
exehU&e the lRtormatlon thus obtained [trom their
so....mment.] •
Mter th18 des eriptloa ot l4ettern1oh la "die.OUNe, If La Tour

.. ked. 5p1. . to ooulc1er it ouef'ull,.
exohaale ideas 011 the a,,'bJecat.

80

that the,. might later

81'1_ acre.d., Gomme_tUg that

"at t:1.rat s1&ht lt a.e. to me 1mvraot1eal, and, preo•• r, simpl,.
the 014 lnqu1aitorial eommi.slon under a new name. 1f33

COR8alvi agreed. that Metternieh'a ... project w.. much the
same .. the 014 aDd. had tae _ame purpoae J it mut be iDrlexlb17
opposed by the Papal t*eprea ••tative tor the same re_o_.

Auatn_ drive tor h.pm0lV' in Ital7 had

"sun.

'fhe

The tiNt step

was "to take control ot all the police ot Ital7 H through the
proposed OommisaionJ it this moye succeeded, Austria would have
gone "a long distance towards a Oontedel'ation, Whoae resul ta
must be moat tatal tor the amall atatea."

Coftlla1Y1 theretore

d1rected Sp1na to t17 to 11_ up the other Itallan repreenetative
i_ a Uft1ted tront to deteat Mattemid 'a plana J but even 1t thls

l3

-Ibid., Spina to Consalvt,

20 November 1822.
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oould ROt be achieved and the papacJ' had to stand alone, Spina

must atill retuae to aocept the Comm188ion J de.pite the Austrian
enmity that such a course must produoe. 34
Conea.l.vl realized that the opposition ot the small Italian
state. might well prove insufticient to preyen.t Austria trom

estab11alhlft6 the Comm1aa1on.

However, "It Franae should oppose

hereselt to such an iutttution.. • • then the protests ot the

Papal plenipotenti&l7 would acquire much greater toree and one
could hope that the Commlsslon un<ler duenas.lon would not be set
up. " He therefore wrote at onoe to Macch1 in Paris.

After

exp1a1nlns the 81tuation and po1ntlftg out ita great dangers, he
i_trusted the n\lJ\O!o "to

dieOUS8

this subjeot [with the French

milli. teN]. • • 1n order to peNuade the :FrenCh go"ernm.ent to
oppoae the e8tabl1ehmeJlt ot thi8 Commiaaion without showing trAt
the 'ollt1tlca.l. soyemment hu had

"COUN.

be eompromlled .. little .. possible."

As

to it,

80

that he mq

the traditional riyal

ot A_tria 1ft Ital7, Fran.e mtsht be w1111ng to oppose Mettel"nieh'. plua. 35
Spina had not mea:nwb.l1e been 141e.
repl,. same,· the Papal NpNse.tat!•••u

Long before Conaalyl '8

attempting to align the

other Italian atat.. , .8:peelally TuaoUlJ' and Salldln1a# in a
uD1ted opposltloa to the Com:n1as1on and to enlist French support.

31

Ibid., (Jansaly! to Spina, 28 November 1822J al80, 30
NoyembeFl'B'22.

35

~. It

Consal'Yl to kechl.. 2 Deoember 1822.
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His first move had bean to inform the 'l'uacan representative,
Prince Corsini, of the Austrian plans.

Corsini agreed that the

Commission was a device for giving Austria control over the
police of all the Italiar, states, "to the destruction
independence. 1f

or

their

He promptly set to work with Spina to "dev1ae

suitable and prudent ways of defeating auch a measure."

They

agreed upon various pretexts for refusal, auch as that the

CommisSion was unnecessary slnce a voluntar,r reCiprocal exchange
of

information among the states could achieve the same results,

so that theY' need not express their distrust of Austria too
bluntly-.

They ale 0 agreed to invoke the aid ot Franee in

secrec7 and. to cOMult the other Italian governments. 36
The efforts ot Spina and Corsini to obtain the support ot

the other Italian states had little sucoess.

Al though.

La Tour

had first given the alarm about the Commission, Corsini at their

next meeting round him ine1ined to aoquiesce in Mettemich's

plans and unwilling to oppose the Commission activel;y.31 Probab1
the difficult negotiations with Mettern10h tor the evacuation of
Austrian troops from Piedmont 1n which LaTour was then engaged

36 -

A.S.F., Corsini to Fos8ombronl, 24 Noyember 1822} alia,
23 Noyember 1822.
37

Ibid., Cor.1.1 to PoasombroD1, 26 November 1822~ 2
Fossombroni to CorSini, 30 November, 6 December

Deoembe~22;

1822.
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explains his reluetanee to go against Austriafa wishes.

Of' the

other Italian statee, Naples seemed favorable to the Commission,
wh11e Parma and Modena would eertainl:J' accept It.

'!'his lert

onl7 the tiny sta.te of LUGea in oPPoslt1on. 38
vIith the Italian states thus d.ivided among themselves,

Metternich pressed forward with hIs project during early December
"The artair

or

the Comn1ssion. far troD being abandoned, 1s on

the contl'al'7 maldng progl'tlSS," Spins reported 1n alarm..

To make

matters wONe, Metternioh now spoke of locating the Commission

not !n Piacenza as tonner1y planned, but in the Papal city ot

Ferrara.. 39
Ooneal.,! WaI not daunted by the knowledge that the Pap&47

stood almost aleae aga.S.nst the Commasion.

He continued to

1natruet Spina that even if' all the other Italian sta.tes should
agree to the .Ituatrlan

P~OPOI!Hil..

the Papal representative must

still refuse bis consent, no matter wha.t diplomatic pressure
Austl"ia might bring to beer.

He real1zed tha.t "the odium

or

refusal Will tall entirely- upon !!'le," and that'not onlY' the Papal

go"errtrnent but h1maelt personall,. wotlld incur thereby the enmitJ'

ot Austata, -but u I know that I would betn.y nrr duty it I
aeted differentl,., I am ready for

~

consequence that

'3S--

~

betell

Ibid ... COrBin! to Foaaombronl .. 2, 6, 8 Deoember 1822.
A. V... R'M2. SpIna to Co.elY!, 2 .. 5 Decemb$r 1822) Conselv! to

Maeohi, 2 Deeember 1822.
39
I.V ... Ra!f.2, Spina to Consalvi, 2 Deoember 1822.
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me

"'" 1140
r rom t h .....,.

However" the p081t10n of the Papaey was not 80 serious, nor
that of Austria 80 strong, as COMalvi feared.

:Mettemich was

well aware ot the opposition of the Papal anc1 Tuscan govex-nments J
should both of these states, which between them oontrolled all
Ital7~

central
the

or

pera1at in their refusal to join the Commission,

latter would be so han410apped as to be ot little value.

He~

pre.sure by AlUltria, supported or at least tolerated by t11e

other Powers, upon these small s tate8 might eOll1pel them to
submitJ but thiS Mattemien could not bring about.

Sp1na had

already warned the Frenoh representative., the Fwreign Min18ter

Via.ount Mathieu de P<tontmorency and his usatant Count Pierre
De La Ferronaye, that A\18 tr:La

mission.

was maneuvering towards

a Com-

Spina had little diffioulty in oonv1ncing them that

such a. move was daadvantageous to French 1nteres ta, and they we
aooordingly p:reparec.1 to inteM'ene on behalf of the Italian
state. aga1nat the Austrian project.

Moreover, La Fel.'TOn&.73

diSeusseCl the proposed COIIlld.ssion with the Teal'" and was appar-

ent11r able to oonvince him ot its un(lesu-abi11ty"

Faced with

the oppoaition of France and the central Ita11an statea and
deprlvea.

or

the support ot hl8

Ii!.08t

eS8eut1al all,. Alexander I,

Mettern10h fS hopes ot toreing the CommiSsion upon the recalcitran

40 .... Ibid., Comalv! to S:pina, If Deeer.'lber 1822; alIa. 7

De ••mbeP 11I22.
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tade4. 41
Thequestian or the Commission came to a head at the
••as ion or 8 December, Which was prlinarl1y oonoerned with the
evacuation ot Austrian troops from Naples and PIedmont.

After

the latter aub.1ect had been treated, Mettemleh announoed that:
The ape~ial af'tairB of' Al'Jltr1.a, Piedmont, and
Naples being settled, it remains for 'US to W'at'rt

the other governments of the PeninsUla, beoa~e,
although those goftrnments rtUI.'Y' see their 1nte%"Nl.1
situation in rO~7 oolora • • • , rMettern1ch] has
ver./ d.1tterrent reports, and coula not doubt that

ferment and disoontent were evel"'f1fh.ere I as pec1aJ.ly-

in the Papal States.

He

theretol~

felt it

_8$

neeessary to "warn them of their true

situat1on. n
At this poInt La

Fl!rro~

1nterrupCted Jr.'letternloh to uk

ttit he really l'nahed to limit himself only to warnlrCtl, t: as he
had heard d1fferently.

Mtttex'uich ins 1$ ted tha.t thiil was

indeed his sole aim, but the Frenc.h

l.~pre.entative Watl

deceived: he at enc'! retorted bluntl,- that !lit

notorious

~nong

WaB

not

the plenipotentiaries that 'i.H. had expressed

.:;;tb.er 1de., and in

part1eul~

I

by now

that he had spoken • • • of' a

I
III
III

I

certain

Corr~n1ss1on.u

Trapped, Mettern1Gh tried to equivocate,

IJlrn La. I"errona;ra..

obv1ous1;r well informed, eont1nued to
A.V., R2l~2 .. Spina to Oonsalvi, 9, 11. 17 Deo.e:".'!ber 1822.
A.S.F. COl"'S1Di to P08sombroni, 9, 10 Deoember 1822. Schroeder,
121-12~, 225. Viscount Mathieu de Montrriorency (1767 ..1826), French
but

statesman and .t'avoz.1.te ot LouiS XVIII} M1n1Ster tor Foreign
Affa.ll"'s .. 1821-1822J Duke in 18221 Ye1!'T devout Catholic. Count
Pierre de La Pe!':ttOnf[1S, Fl'ench ambassa.dor in Russia .. 1821-1828.

Ii
,Ii,

"I
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I
II
I

II
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pres. him., he finall., admitted haying broached the idea.

or

still continued to protest his innoQenee
offering the

Ingeniou~

defense that

He

any ulterior motives,

had only acted thus with

~he

the aim ot creating fear, oonvineed that without this prel1m1nar,r

the Italian governments would have g1yen little attention to his
NOlf, tilled with apprehension, they w111 be more

a.rn1nga.

oompliant!1 to aug•• tiona of reform from the Powen.

It i . unlike11 that tb1a 41aingeauoua explan&t1on eon.,inoed IIl1YQne, but sinee Mettern16h had now publlc17 dJ.savowed
h18 plan, La Ferronqa allowed. the subject to drop.
"I believe that the arfair

or

the Cormra1.8s1Qn wUl end

here. h predicted Spina, and hla propheey proved accurate.

De-

prlve4 of the su.pport ot hiii Ruaaian alll' ana With France openly
h~tile,

lVlettem1eh could not oompel the Papal and Tusoan

goYernmenta to

lu~t.

The Commission was thGrtif'ore abandoned.

Papal diplomae7 had aeored

a. notable success.

'!'he Oommia.lon had been deteated and an

had not

80

mu.eh .. bee. mentioneci .. but

0"

l~2

I~al1a1'l

Cent.4eratic

threat .tll1 re-

malned: A_t,,1arl interfere.. in the intemal attain ot the

'I'

, !I

ra,..oY' in the name ot reform.
of the Papal regime, but at th.

Mettemioh had. long been oritical

Cone"'••

h1lJ criticism became

1noreaa1ngl7 virulent and publio .. Papal

42

o~poslt1on

to hi.

A. V• , _R2421 Spina to Conaalvl, 9 December 1822. Also ..
17 Decemter- 1822. A.S.lI'., Corsini to :PosaOrtbrolli, 10 Deoember

1822.
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plans

beaa~e

obvious.

Ria rGmtw.'"k at the

ae~s1on

of 8

D~hleJnbe1"

tha.t "ferment and diseontent" WrtN cr.r,pee1all3" bad in the Pa.pal
I

State was only the latest evidence of his attitude.

He had

p:revioue1y spolmn vehemently in this atl"ain not only to the

Italian :representatives but also to

In an. apparent
attempt to pre.1ud.1ce the latter against the Papal gover-nment. 43
t![ontTuOl'enoy #

Spina therefore suspeated that the plen&lV session of 11
December whQn the question of reform itl the Italian atates would
be taken up, would be the occasion for

uS 0li18

censure of or

a.ttack upon the conduet of.' the goverrenent of H1s Holiness. ,,44
lIe decided to approach lVfetternich the evening befOJ:le the session.
to "&ho\1 hLrn my distaste f"or the unfavorable opinion he has oi'

us" and prove how unjust this
Prince frank}y that I

opin1~n WaJJ.

1~t.nded

to

~l"ase tlli1:l

false repol.""ts that have caused it '* ff

Spina. "told the
ol>inion and all the

lils frank and vigorous

defense of the Papal govel-ttment <lay have had some effect upon.

r:;etternich,; at leaat) the Prinoe au.m1tted that his infor.:lation
uight; lie

el~l:'oneous

and uked fol.'- a confidential note uesoribing

the true s tate of affairs. 45
Whether beoa.uae ot Spina '8 defense or--more 11k:ely--as pfU1tt
of a seneral weakening of the Austrian clJ:'t1ve tor hegemony in

--

to

43 -- -

A.V., R242, Conaa1vl to Macchi, 2 December 1822J Consalvl
December 1822.

Splna~ h

'L'.t

!bid .. , Spina to Oonsalv1, 9 Dleember 1822.

45---

Ibid., Spina to Conaalvl, 12 Deoember 1822.
---

j
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Ital,. in the race of strong opposition, no
Made on the Papal governraent the next day.
read

~.

Declaration by

A,11r-;tr1a,

8~c1al

l1!ettern5.oh merely

Prussia, and Russia whlch did no

more than repeat the 1deas ot the Lqbac.h Circular'.

floy.reigns

lffn'e

attack was

The Italian

reminded that they rrust act to end d1aoontent.

tlwhether bY' ra1nfol"01ng and consolidating their power on the
basts of just.ioe and orden?, or by introducing into their ad-

m1xus'trat1ve systems

GUQh

Lilprovementa as are necessary to

satiat"y tIle tI"U6 needs or their States. It

l:t.6
'

The Italian atatea were to repl,. to th1. Deolaration and
to the L,,··':bacb. Circular at the aeaaion of 1:) December by

desoribing the reforms whiob. the,. baa undertaken and demonstrat1ne that the-y were rntttlc10Dt

-to end popular disoo.teat.

Mettern1eh had intended. this aeasion as the s;rand ol1r.nacter1c ot
the Congress, 110 far u

the Italian statea

state. would be ealle'ii upon to

det'\~nld

tere

eoncerned.

'l.'hoae

their intemal polioies.

and. 111 the 11_17 event that they would be unable to do so

aueee•• tull;y, he had planned. to put forward ... -uabg the Duke of
Modena.

U

his "stalking borae"--a program of administrative

refol"ms and a common pattern of government to be imposed upon

them.

The opposition of the Italian staa.tes, ba.okad by- France,

had 11'.s.de it evident to h1."11 that his position was not strong
enough to put this plan into street.
_ ..____

"."~.Q'''''''''_-''''''_v~

Therefore. all the d.eclara-

_.,.......

CO!);! of I:ecla\"s,tlon (~f 11 lJe.ee!:1CCl' 1822 1n ~. J also

printed in Blanchi, II, 133-135.

r
~

tions of the Italian

gove~~nts

oeptod by Metterniah without

a8

to

the1~ ~forms

OOT!ltl'lent 01"

were ae-

o'tlt1c1sffi, although most

were ovas1ve or unsat1fl fnctory.i-1-7
Spj.na wu -the tirst called upon to read his government 18

decl8,ratlol'l.

In this statement, he explained that the Powers

wlehed the Ii..;.l1an governmenta to carry out reforms. but
fort\;:.natelr:

The Plenil'otentlaI'ies of Hls Holiness have the
great satietaetion of ob.ervl-C that their so.erRment has fore-seen the des ire of' the Powers, In such
a way that, to conform to their .uh, this goyernment haa only to follow Without deviation the oourse
it a~opte4 some years ago.
S!11na then enuf'1eI'ated brietly the reforr-,16 v..111ch the Papao7
had

carri~d C),llt,

~"'Ol"m8
~te..teB

l)eg1nn:tng t1:tth the

~J_l!..:n..:r:cJ2!.~()_

of. lS16. (.!'bene

had este'bl ifShed "!,crfeet tranquility-" in the Papal
anCf henee no alteration of' the basic refvr':'l plan \1a$

rtPt'!estHlry.48

This roelaration Gonstituted, in

affe.~,

a polite rejection

01" the l\llicd dat1a..l1d for goverm;<iontal @hanges j on the ground

that the policy long followed by the Papacy rendered thenl un-

253
that all that (the Papsl government] h.aa done has been well done I
8.nd that they intended to continue to per.3ist in thtl same
&~t.m," whcth~r it pl~as~d Austria or not. 49

Although no doubt

Mett~rnieh

perceived as olsarly as

Corsini the oefiant tone of the Papal Declaration, he made no
upon tt or upon the polioy of the Papal government.

oo;~ent

other

~;tatef!J

The

then lllade their declarationa, the Powers aceepted

the'11 'I'lithout d,emur, and tbe

:Jea~ion

oame to an end.

'l'be thir<1

facet of the Austrian plan for esta.blishing :LtG hegemollY' 1n
Italy had failed

all!

the other two had done before it.

"!lth the end of thi3 ocaaion, Spinats 'tliss1on to Verona
was conoluded.

In general, Consalv1 had good reason to be

pleasad with -"he outcon',o of the Consress. 50 Austria's plana for
the expansion of' her inl"'luence in Italy" which had seelned 60
f01."L1idablo a maaa,co 'co Papal independence. had been cbeolred all

along the 11116.

The Itali.an COnfeaE:l·e.tion had not even been

m:nri;ioned by l/Jetternich. though its speotre had haunted the

Italian

delegate~

throughuut the Gon,zre8s" for the Chancellor

had realized that it could not be set up 1n the teeth of Italian
and

FI~nGh

opposition.

TDe Political Cormni&sion had been a more genuine and im-

mediate danger.

It

'R"

a lesa obvious device for extending

'1$9

11..3.!' •• COl'1'J:i.ni to Fossombroni,

~o

.letter

C~nsalvl IS sat1sfaetion is
Ov~nplirnenting Spina on the

15 Deoember 1822.

eVident froY1 the tenor of hi.
latter'. skillful oonduotJ

A.V •• R242, Comalv! to Spina, 21 Deeember 1822.

JI.Hstrian inf"luenllo and a plausible ease eould be made for

a weapon agaInst the

~ett8;,r.J.,

nrOmle less opposition..

hence it might be expeeted to

~1etternich

had therefore passed the

project vigorousl:;, l10ping it ;T..1ght
tirat step

tc\~ards

o~d

i~

a Confederation.

?a.pacy and '1:\.!"'\ can.y; bacl:ed by

onee

it as

aueeess!'u.l seJ:."V'e as the

The f'irn resis.tance of the

~~rance

J

had disposed of this plan

:cr al1_

:,"llnall:r I the fl.uatr1arl atte'npt to e:Iercise a u!'1ght of
3upervls1on H over the Italian s·tatea bY' interfering in thair

internal affairs in the name of reform had (lome to nothing, ..
Metterulch's pos ition was not sufficiently strong to finable him
to ir:lpose such

"fO:rtl~lS

upon the r-c!calcitrant states.

Spina '8

Deolaration of 13 Decerfiuel' was in effeot an announct)"':1ent that
the Fapacy iuteudt:d to puX'Sue its uwn (jou;rsu in internal affairs

and would '!;o1erate no Aust:r.·ian

lr\terfe4~n(Se

thereilh

Thus none of' the dangens whioh Consal v1 had
iliateria,lized.

In pal"t,. this happy

QUt(,Hh1e

fea.l~ed

had

was the result of

f'ortuitous Jevelopu;.ents--"co l\fettern1.-:h's preoceupation with th$
.spanish

q.u<~$.tion

that prevent.ed him. f'rom devoting s\.1.f't1aient

attention to Italian atraire_and to his inability to obtain.
13urfi~lent

resistance.

support

f'ro~n

the other POvJ'ezte to overcome Italian

Yet the stubborn resistance

ot the Papaoy and

'J.'uculny l1.a4 been an essential t ••tor without WhIch Hettemioh fa
plana would hay. 8uoft.e4ed.

that ntt one e&r.!

.ongratulat~

Spiu was JUlltitlea in NlllUld.nc

8. Jti.rdater beo8.\I8e noth1", of that

whieh a eertain Power

planne~

complished, that negat1ve
ministers of

QUI'

to do at the Congress was ac-

;~er1t

can well be applied to the

Italian governr-:ents. ,,51

aah1e',ed none of' its a1ns for

Certainly, Austria hact

strengthen:~_ng

its powe.r in Italy,

and, though Spinn was too TtOdest to lay so, it was undoubtedly
he of' all the Italian

ropre£entat::Lv~s

who deserved the najov

credit for this result.

He had taken the lead l.n opposing

Au.stri~).n

per:.~cv(;rcd

designs and had

was attained, despite the apathy
Italian delegatoa but Corsini.

O~

in his erfOl..ta until success

hostility uf all the other

Consalvi appreciated Sp1na'.

achieven.ent aD its full value and p:r:al.seti him \'iarmly

tor the

!fzoal, skill, and loyalty" tl1th which he had performed lUa mis ...
s ton, "especia.lly in the delioa.te rmttel' of the CO;:~Jtd.s61on. "52

l\t the Congrm:.;s (xf" Verona. then .. Papal diplo":\a.ey ha.d been
hl.r:hly successfulj hut it

of ConsaIv:f. '13 career.

\,las

to be the last d1plonatlc vlotoJ'1

Already J even befol"e the end of the

Conr;ress, another prcblem, prev!.ouely unforeseen" had arisen
that "rould compel Cnnsalv1 to rer.laln in oppos!t!on to Austria,
ns h(! had been at Verona; but the dlplo!'j\atlc lStruggle that
follotred--the last of COM.lv!'e l1fe--had no such happ,- outoorae.

51

R2_2, Spia. to ConaalYi, 11 December 1822.
,2A.V_>
A.V., R242, CORBalv1 to 5p1Da, 21 Deoe.la.r 1822.
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3. The Postal Controversy: 1822
The oentral issue in Austro-Fap&l relat:!..on.:: during the last
months of Gonsalvi'u minil:ltry was the attempt of Austria. to

bring under

i~s

l.'eninsula.

This ..ttempt. though. a continuation of a long-

contl"Ol all

th~

cOl"j,"espondence of the Italian

atandinc; Austrian polioy, waa also

all

integral part of the

genel'al Au.atz-ian dr'iye, 1napireu by the 1il20 revolutions, to

flna1'leial aru1 admiaistrat1ve aciYantagv&t

fo~

de.ired primarily froM politieal motive..
tian period. eep10nage WP

&

A'Wttria, it wu

Du.ri.~

tile Restora-

NgW.&r' and iiil5Nrtant f'llnQtlo11 01'

tile Austrian poatlLl serviu", all ll1a11 tlult pas&(jd tllrough the
Austrian poat oti'ioe8 WU oUiltUnla>.·Uy (Jpttne4 and exaul1nea for
".. ,- ...... _f-.;" - .... -

... _.- ..... ,.-

~

;)j

'!'his
.,r:tmarl1y

Josef K".rl

of AUtlJtpu. 'a geaePal poatal po1107 18 baaed
standa.l'd 'iNo!"l..: of thCiof pi.oneer in th(~ fi.eld,$

a~ooURt

1,l~OU tlle
~J

lt3;tem1W aCh.,_&- Britr.s,,,.t: paat1 _

n

aDd..

llo;:;tlru.r:ie CV:ilJn, 1935) whioh. 18 ·oased .on aoeurnentatlon from the

illeMe. Arent..s.

Little else has bettn done OD thta _aleet.d
subject. which is Qf greatel~ tilgnificance than m~ at f lrst bQ

apparent.

Si1v10 Furlan! planned a study' ot Austrian postal

policy in Italy. but haS apparently abandoned the project afte~
produeiq two artie1es s "La eODYOUiOM postale a\VItro ...
pontif':leia del 1815, n UC\}1ylo g,11A l&umlt az ,"ON! Damena d1.. StOMa
Patria, 1946, 23-58) and La que.tic. . postal. italian&. a
Congresso 41 Verowa," Ha9YI B1Yi§ta Star1Qa, 1948, 36-49- ConSiderable wOFk remaims to be dOM on th1S suoJeet ••8.,.01&117 OD
ita Italian aspects.
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intormation that mi&ht be at use.

The data thus obtalned was

otten at couiderable yalue to Auatriu diplomats as a guide to
eon4itlona in toreiCIl atates. and ot even createI' value to the
Austr1an aecret polloe in keeping track at the aotlYlties and
later-relatloM at the yarlous NYolutl0n&17 organlzations.
Oby1ouslJ", the yalue or thi. postal espionage would be
much enchanced it ne1ghboring state. could be persuaded to turn
oyer to Austria tor torwarding all correspondence pas.ing
throuah thelr boundaries, correspondenee wb,ioh normally they
would haye aent bJ" other routes.

A8 a step toward this goal,

Austria opened new and better postal rout.s throUlh it. territori.s alons which mall eould move more rapIdl7 and cheap17
than b7 older routes throUlh other states.
polie7 ... the openl.... ot a

MW

An example ot thls

route trom Ital7 to HueJl1ncen

OD the Rb1ne J because ot its more etticient organizatlon, a
letter .eDt trom BoloCU to Paris on this route would arrive a
•

4q earlier than on the older route. throUlh PIedmont,

However,

despite the adYantaaes ot theae route., tew states were willing
to send all their eorrespoDden.e alone them, tor the espionage
ot the Auatrian postal a,..tem was too well known.

Austria was

there tore compelled to reaort to diplomatic presaure, to
aubterruge, and to otterine speclal tinancial lnducements in
order to pe"uade or oompel other atate. to enter it. postal
orbit.
No_ere were the ettorts at Austria to attain postal
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hegemolV stl"Onger--or, for a time, more successtul--than in
Italy.

There, the weakness of' the small states made it diffioult

for them to rea18t Austrian pressure for long, and their lack

ot tinancia1 resources made them susoeptib1e to Austrian
financial inducementa.

Nonetheless, the first Austrian efforts

in the Peninsula bore little fruit.
The first Auatrian target 1n Ital7 was the Papal state, tor
oontrol ot 1ts correspondence would be eapecIal1., valuable:
beeause of' it. geographical looat1on, virtually all correspondenc
between northem .... southern Italy,

IS

well .. a good part of'

that 'between northem Europe anc! the Med.1terranean, natural1,.
' ....d through Papal terrltor,r.

In 1815 Metternich .ent to Rome his mo.t .k11Itul poatal
diplomat, Baron Char1.s de Lilien, to negotiate a oonvention
"plating Auatro-Papa1 postal relations with the Superintendent

ot Papal Poata, Cayali.re Lorenzo Altieri. 54 The ohief' purpose
of' Lilt.ft t • miaaioa wu not the mere regulation ot routine
poatal matters, but to sain eontrol ot all Papal eOrN.pondenee

tor Austria.

Altieri, an uaimqinative bureaucrat,

W88

con-

cerned onl7 with technical poatal queations and had little oonception of' tbe _ider political implicationa ot the negotiations.
54
Por a detailed d.ner1ptioft ot the 1815 postal 'ftesotiationa
a •• IPu:Plaal, aLa conveulone postal•••• 481 1815. tt 1815 and

1831 he.oncluded more than twent)r !'Oatal eonventions with varlous
atatea. Lo1'e1lZO Altleri (117a-la17) wu Superintendant ot Papal
Poata from 1814 to 1816, the 7ear ot b1s death.

Iii
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Lillen therefore had little difflculty in aecuring the insertion
into the prelimlnary draft ot aeveral artie lea that would
.&hiev. h18 politioal obJectiye.

Moat important was Article 6,

.nlch provided that "the Po.titi.al Poat Ottiee will conalgn
4ire.tly to the Imperial Ottice all eorre.pondence. • • destined
for • • • " and here all the nations ot Europe, trom Ruseia to
England, were lated. 55
Altieri made

ftC)

objeotioa toib1a olauee, Gioh would have

made Austria the master ot all Papal correspondenoe.

At this

poiat, however, Co_alv1's attention wu attracted to these
MgottatioM.

The Seoret&r7 ot State saw the dangerous im-

plicationa ot Article 6 at tirst Ilance. 56 Though Austrian
control ot its correspondence l'JlU8t 'be 41atastetul to aftl"
Italian state, it posed a much mo1"'8 aerious danger to the Papal
government than tor &n7 other.

The reason wu that, wbereas

most atatea sent their important diplomatic correspondence by
apeeial diplomatic eourlers, the impoverished Papal government
coulel not aftord thu upensi•• meana of communication and was
theretore oompelled to communicate with ita repreaentatives
abroad by regular mail.

Papal correspondenoe with the Vienna

nuncio was alread7 aubject to Austrian 8crutiJ'O"J should. the

55

A. V•• Rll1, Prellmlna17 dNtt of the postal eOJ'lYention.
Au.guat 1815.
56
Oonaalvi's reasona tor o"osi-. this article are explained
in A.V. Rl11, oaaerYazioJU aul proletto del 318. Baron Lilien,

1815.
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Papac)" agree to tum over all ita mall to Austrla, then all

lts diplomatl0 correspondence would be as restricted and
hampered as that with Vienna already was. 57 The da'llage that
such a sltuat10n would do to the conduct ot Papal diplomacy is

readily apparent.

The Papal govermnent, theref'ore, had greater

reaaon than 3nJ other 1n Italy to oppose Austria's plans to

obta1n oentrel at all Italian correspondence, tor those plans
poaed .. threat Rot only to the pr1vao7 ot its citizens, but to
the 8uoces.tul conduct ot tts ow dlplomac;y as well.

Consalvl

aoeorc:t1ngl,. rejected Lill.n fS proposed convention at onee, sub-

stltutlng a project ot hlw own elim1nating tbe objectionable
artlcle••

Onoe hiS subterfuge

~

been detected by Conaalv1, Lilian

made no turther attempt to seoure oontrol ot Papal eorrespon ...

dence.

No attempt waa made by Austria to apply diplomatic

pre.sure upon the Papao)", probabl,. because any such pressure
would haye intertered with the pollc)" ot Austro-Papal oo-opera-

51

Unless, that la, some other sta.te offered the use or 1ts
c11.plomatie .0urieN or some trwstworth;y priYate traveller was
willing to o&l'r7 the Papal correspondence. Code would be and was
uae4, ot eourse.. but the sk1ll ot the Austrian cl"1Ptographers
made this an insecure ret'Uge. Th18 situat"n explains wh7, tor
example, much ot CCMalvi'. correspondence with the Vienna nunoio
or w1th S,1J1l8. at Verona and Lqbach (both In Auatrian terr1to17)
wu ao pard.ed in tone. Oftl7 eft the infrequent eo_10na when
he could seJl4 b18 letten b7 8cme other state'a couriers or by
pr1'Yate trayeller <lid Consalvl teel able to speak treely. The
historian t1nda it cl1ttleult to cSi.eover Co_al'9'1-. real attitude
to AWltria trom hl. eOJ'1"e8poftdenee.. tor the latter was written in
the knowledge that it would. SQon beeorne known to Vlenna.

:,i
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tion then sought by Metternieh.

The postal convention which

wae eventually signed on 7 Ootober 1815 dealt only with rout1ne
admin1strat1ve matteI'S and had

110

political overtones.

The

Papacy was left tree to send its Gorrespondence by whatever
route it preferred. 58
For six Tears af"ter thiS rebuft Austrian postal diplomac,.
1n. Ital,. was relativel,. qu1escent.

Once again, as in other

fields, it was the !'evolutions ot 1820-21 that stirred up

renewed activit,. on Austria's part.

The information on the

aetivities ot the Settarj that eould be obtained by control over
(

all the oorresponden•• ot the PenInsula now came to seem vitall,.
1mportant to the Austrian govpmment.

,
Aatriara charge in Turin,
could

The opinoD ot the

Baron DUser, that the revolutions

ha.. been prevented had Austria been in control of all

Franao-Italian eorrespoBdenoe I !fUQ' have been an exacgerat1on,
but it w.. tn1oa! ot the Auatriaa attitude. 59

In 1822, theretore, Metternioh aet to work with redoubled
eneJ.'gJ' to impose Auatr1an control upon the corx-eapondence

the Italian states.

ot all

The buic Austrian stratea' was a revival

ot an older plan I to torm a sort ot poe tal blocka4e across
oentral Ital7 through Which no mail could pass without falling
into Austrian haadll.

58

:Metternich would oreate this blockade bJ'

CO" ot this Convention in Rl17J al80, printed 1n Purlani,
"La convenz1one postale. • • I It 51-53.

59

Mqr, 44.
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by negotiating oonventions with Twsca.ny, Modena, and l''ta.;..''''1na, bY'

which those states would agree to turn over to Austria all
correspondenee originating in or passing through tbeir territorj.es.

These three states when Joined with Lombarey·-Veneti&

f'ormed a contin'UoutS band of tcr:t'1to17 stretching across the

Peninsula froM the Adriatic to the Tyrrhenian Sea and all land ...

borne (Jorreapondence between northern and southern Italy
th:POUgh. them.

pa88

ril.Wt

The Papal State and !'1edm.ont, the states

rmet likelY' to oppose Austl:"Jian designs, would then be isolated
from 6aoh other.

If they would not voluntar1ly agree to tum

their correspondence to AUfJtr1a, then it would perfol""Ce be
turned oveI' by the central Italian atatee through e10h it must
pass.

aWe out Italy- in half a.nd

becol.~e

its master'S," oOn1!1:1cnted

Mettern:tch. 60
Tbe crucial 11nl{ in this plan was Tuseany, for Parma and

f.1cdena were eompletely subservient to Austnan wishes.

Seeret

negot1at1cne were iftitiated at Florence in early 1822. and
Tuscan hesitation waa overcome

by

a niXture of diplomatic

pressure and very advantageous finanoial ooneess1ons.

The

result was the Austro-'l'uscan Convention of.' 4 September 1822, bY'
which Tuscany agreed to "pas!! on to the Imperial Austrian poets

all letters or1g1nat1ns 1n or in trans1t through the Gra.nd Duchy.

'60---

,Ibid.,
-

'61
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deetined tor ••• , in ehort, the whole world, except only·

letters to and from the South ot France, which alone are to be
consigned to the Sardinian ottlce.· 61
With the conolusion ot this CORvent lon, Metternich had
taken the tlrst and most crucial atep towards poatal hegemoD7
In Italy.

A postal barrier had been ereated 1.01'0.8 central

Italy Which eould not easl1y be o1roumvented and throUSh wh1ch
no mail coul4 pass without talling into the Austrian hands.

This

agreement pJaced. Austr1a 1. a strong, 1ndeed. almost impregnable,

posIt1on, from whioh It would be ver,y ditficult tor the Papacy
to dislodge her.

The Oonveat1on wu kept secret tor some months.

It 1s

uncerta.1n p1'8c18e17 when Oonsalv1 t1rst learned ot 1t, but

apparently he had some idea ot Its cOl'ltents by late October.

In

that month he apoke about it to B1_, requesting the aId ot
Prance to avert Austrian oontrol over the correspondence ot all
In relpe_e, the Pnnoh government .. sured him it would
oppoa. anr such Austrian deSign. 62 Equall,. enoouraglns was the
Ita]:,..

attitude ot Piedmont: De 11. Tour promised. that "he will dlsp1ay
the greatest f1rmne.a In the postal cueatioD at the Congress

ot Verona, and wl11 do eYerything there in complete hc.rmol'l7
n63
Jdtb • • • Sp1na•.

5lA.V.,
6~

a.

R2~2,

Consalv1 to Spina, 4 December 1822.

A.V., R201, Blaoaa to Consalvl, 28 October 1822J R248,
Macchi to Conaalvl, 29 october 1822.
F~

. . A.V. Rt48, Macohi to 0088al.,1, 29 ootober 1822.

At the
both

ye~

Pl~(lmont

minute these assuranoes ware

and

F~ce W0l'l9

g1ven~

however.

negotiating postal agree:nenta to

g1ve all their eorrespondance to Austria.

Imnedlately upon

heu1ng of the Austl"O-'l'u:!ean negotiations.l Piedmont hood dis ...
patched the Poste..l D1rectol" of Genoa .. Ce:.a11ere Cerruti, to

Flottetlef1 to negotiate e. fa'J'orable convention.

In the end,

Cerruti was eompletel:r outmaneuvered, and the 'l'i.maall-!Jier'!.ontese
Convention

or

for Piedmont.

~ 19ned lW.6

9 Novenbel' 1822 which he
By this

~r;t.ent

a die liE tel'

Piedmont was obliged to turn

over to Tuscany (and hel'tee to AU8tl:"1a) all rr.a11 trom or to the
Papcl State and Naples, While '1'u!cany

'IaS

not bound to tl.um over

to Piedmont any eorreepondeftce save that tor southern France. 64The inept Cerruti was promptly disavowed bY' his go"er-n.Tl.ent ..

which rrerua.d to ratify h1l conventloa as too unfavorable to
Pie~~onteae

interest!.

Not only would this Convention contribute

to Austrian postal hegemony .. it would also tlepr1ve P1e4mont of
an important aou:roe

or

l"I!venue, for the eorrespondenae of Italy

tor w•• te~ Europe would no
postal 8J'8tem.

Time

\f'M

longe~

pass

thro~~ th~

Pledrnontese

or

these draw-

to show that the eeeond

baoka f"ar Gutwe1ghed the tltt8t in the e,-es of '1'ur1n. and that
Piedmont '8 main obJeet1Ye was to se$ure lt$ own f'1nana1al

Interec ts t not to detend the freedom or Italian corr$S pondence •
In late 1822, however, P1eal'ltont seelaed

eqe~

-----6lf-.-O':;'fJY of

th18 convention in Rll1 .. 1822.

to ao-operate with

I

1
II
I
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the papaeT to defeat Austria.
The oontent.

o~

the lustre-Tuscan Convention were fully

divulged to the Italian goYernments in late November, and at
once Spina, La 'four, and the pepresentatlYe ot LuoQa, Marchese
Manzi, met to disouss it.

All agz-eed that the eODYentlon must

not be allowd to go into effeet, but it lfP tlitfleu! t to see
how th1a desirable aim ... to 'be attained.

The oall' • .,. in

whleh these tlu'ee atat.a could brlJlg p1'&"aw.-. direotly would be
foft them to clel\7 Auatria and 'rwIO&n1' the use

or

certain %'Outes

1d1ioh th.,. oontrolled I the 11piae pas... through Piedmont, the
Bolopa Road from Venetia throUlh the Legatione to Florence,
and the route throUSh Luoea to 'l'usc&m1'.

Unfortunately, Austria

aa4 Twlean:r had alternate.t though longer, routes to theae I so

that closing the latter would. aot oompel those powers to give
in.

Oil th1a SloomJ' aote the tlaDterenoe 'broke up.

·OUr

situation • • • 18 .ertaiftl7 .,st unpleasant,· Spina conoluded. 65
Meanwhile.. Coneal'Yl too had learned the f'ull content ot
the Austro-Tuaean CORYentloJt, _loh was eyen worse than he had

reared..

He at once realized that the Papaq alone had little

chanee of defeating Austria under ex1atlng oiroumstances"
only hope 11\1' in aeeUl'1ng the eo -operation of other powers.

tiNt ate, ... to seek . . understanding with Piedmont.

The
Hla

A

reoent dispatch from Turin had implied that if the Papaey would
formally protest agaInst the Tusoan-Pledmontese Convention ot

65""---A.V., Rl17, Spina to Consalv!, 27 November 1822.

r

9 November,

Pi~d~ont

would use this protest as e vretext for

refusins; to ratify the agreement.

Con$uvi. accordingly dlrec;ted

Spina to give De 1a Tour such a protest.

Cardinal

r:l.l\Q.e

At the

~&.me

time, the

plans to bl"ing the A:umtro-Tuacan Convention to the

attention of' France and England, ltho oo'Uld hardly look with

favor upon the conoentration of their correspondence in Austrian
hands. 66

Spina promptly sent De 1& Tuur a

Consalvi had directed.
(>lle

rO~"'lIfnal

proteat, as

The P1edmonteae repl1ed with two notes,

public, one oonf'1dent1a1.

piedmont, from considerat.1oll

The f1rst declared fQrma.l.ly that
tOl"

the l"1&iite of the Pope, v#ould.

r-efrain from rat1.fyiag the Convention with 'I'uaealll'.

In the

eonf'1dent1al letter, De 1.. Tour agreeu eor.lpl"tely on the dangers
pNsentec1 by the

Aust1"'o~_.an

Convention and the need for

Piedmont to unite wi.th the Papacy to oppose it. suagestir", as

one means of' opposition tae establ1sror..ent of a pa(Jketboat
sel"Yice between Genoa and C1vitavecGh1a to circumvent Austrian
control of the land :routes. 67

Consalv1 was pleased b7 De 1&

the paeketboat 3ugseat1on

~ourts

1.te~st1ng.

rep17 and. Gorw1darsd

but he teared that l?rance

might objeot it its eox-respondence was dolqed V \We 01.' this
()l)

A..V., Ra42, Coaaalyi to Spina, 4 December lS22.

67

Ib1d..~ Spina. to De 1& Tour, 9 De.ember 1822) De 1& Tour
to Spinr, 15 Deoember 1822 (#1 & 2).

r

novel route in bad. weather. 68
Meanwhile, Consal"i •• efrorts to rouse France and Engla.nd

were haYing e, miXed sueeess.

The Cardinal had b$$n astounded to

learn 1n late November that despite Blaess's promise of support,
Franee had signee! a Conyent1on turning oYer all ita Italian

correspondence to Austria. 59 Macchi ~ported that the French
postal bureauerat$ h.d signed the 8I:reel1'lent without realizing
its

,ollti.~e.l

Mont~reney

1t

,t1

tmpl1GattoM.

The Freneh li'oN!lgn Minister

ha4 been "most svrprlsed and indIgnant to learn or

and had M sured J'!teeh1 that the French gov$rnment would

refuse the ~~lrleatl¢n or th~ Convention. TO
J'font'l'loreneyts Sttrp!ttse was probably genuine.

Like most

stateam.n, he tended to ignore postal m_ttere es mere teehnleal
C!'Ueet1ons of no po11tical significance.

auspicious or AU$tr'.an

~s1ans

HoweYer, be wu h1gh17

in Italy and favorably disposed

t('lwards the PapaeYJ When the po11.t1cal t1'>',p11eat1ona ot' the

Conventicn were made elear to him, he promiSed to dQ all in hUS
po~r to help d.ereet Austriafs aims. 11 At Verona he made a
aeterrttned effort to persuade Tuscnny to abandon its convention
"t1th lhl£tt1a., and to his errorts were joined thote ot Lord

_·_--w. _··G]

A. V. Rll1, Oonae.lv1 to Maochl, 2ti Deoember 1822.
Ibid. J Consalvi to Macchi. 29 November 1822.

''"[0--'--

Ibid. J Consalvl to Papal oharse'lost! in Turin, 30
December;-yg22.
71
,-

Ib1d~,

Toati to Oo_al...1., 25 Febl'WU"1' 1823.

r
Burgherish, the English ambassador in Florence, who had also
been enlightened as to the danger; but their combined efforts
met with no success. To all pleas and protests, the Tuscan
government replied that its Austrian convention was far more
advantageous than its former agreements with Sardinia had been;
that in signing the Convention it had been motivated entirely by
these financial advantages and was unaware of any wider
political considerations; and that it accordingly saw no reason
to abandon its Cmnvention. 72
Since Tuscany, secure in the knowledge of Austrian support,
thus resisted the combined pressure of France, England, and
the Italian states, nothing was accomplished at the Congress of
Verona to halt Austriafs drive for control of all Italian
correspondence--and as 1822 passed into 1823, it became
increasingly apparent that that drive would not be stopped.
72A•S •F ., Corsini to Fossombroni, 7 December 1822.

Even before the !ll'l1J. ai:J&oluticm ,?t tne

Congr~s:J

the

opposit1on to Aua'tria had suffered a seri(}w, s¢tb8.4k: 1n lat&
December

~Iontmo.ren¢y r~ll

Praneoia Cha.teaubriltnii.

from power a.nd was

repla.ee~

by Vlseount

Since Cr,.ateaubrial'.ld was less ecncerned

with Papal. interesta and lees die.posed to

qt~ar1"'el

,d.th AU1!!tr1a.

over ttuy thtm hu pre<leces:tvl", J.'f.ont!'?1oreney t e rall wu a
aer10us raattel."' for the Papacy I a.e Conse.lvi ret~l ized.13 From tht.
tUte onward,

}l reJl¢h
1

cppos1t1on to J:u.striaft;, plans ateadily

.-akenea, in raot it not in prlneiple.
Ko_thel... , at their tint la.eet1n& ClLateaubriand. alluJul....ed

Jluell.1 th.at tb.e A_t70-i'WMh
ht oRll'

Walt

eQDyea1;1on

would not be ratified,

tha't asreoment cOlltr&'17 to l<"fren.ch i.terea -l;a I but

B8Ilaad too bad

.t1"O~11'

proto.ted. the \leviation ot its oor-

fta,ondenoe h-om the former route.

Fo:rtunat(;tly .. eonvenit)nt

pre,,"t for reJection eouid. 'be fowad in the refusal

or

to rat1t7 its oonvention with Tuaean;.y .. a ratiflcatioJl

the

AustI'O-Freneb ConYfltntlQn had stipulated as

It

S&"41n1a

Vlh14h

nc¢easary pre ...

lL"!l1n.a:t:7. Tune aaavanoC'$ Wel"'e vel!7 encGuraglng. bu'; when
. .chi sua&eate4 a GOl'l4u"ete plan to~ action in the form
• .. '?j ..,.. -...,..

ot the

,~

A"V., :R165~ Consalv1 to Bpi_, 19 Jal'lU8.t'Y 1823 (eoW) J
Rll? Test!. to Consalv1, i!6 ~ebraa17 1823. P....eo18 V1.aeount

noted French wnter uti cllplomat, FolNt1Cft
JU.a1a'teJ> 1822-1824.
299

Chat.aub~,'&1ml.
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paeketboat aohe::1., Chateaubl"'land pro;;').ptla' 'Vetoed

i~

on the

gr.:>uw1 that it ;ni3ht delay the transit of Frenoh correspondenoe. 74 '1'1118 was to bo the pattel"'l of :Frenea policy dw. ing 1823
1O

voluble

Q.'i3Ull anoes

Nor
ing.

ttl..

I

but no tangible ~upport.15

the oourse ot: eventa in Pi.elmont entirel,. rEtaasur-

Tul:tin continued to p:roteBt ita i'1nn oppos1tlou to A'U8triarl

plana, '75

but COll$alVl waa diatUllbea to learn that Sarcl1n1a ·:.~i

MU al.l,1Ultaa&oual¥ engaged in _801;1&t11'18 a BflW poatal .on-

vent10n with Austria.

Oa 28 Jamuu"J', the 11edmollt••• Oharg.~ in

itOI_. Count

1llf'orme4 Consalvl that h1a sovernntent

:6a.1th.~ux.

~ontempl"1ng axl

A:ustr1a. all

asreeme.t OJ' Wb1011 it would turrl o.er to

co~poRde"

. . tern Pa.pal at&tea.

to IU.'l4 tl"Om the _.tem but not the

Altho. sueD an agree.nit would not ln

1teelt be a serious th.l'eat # eoualv1 considered 1t

all

al&1'fB1D8

sign that P1cd.tnont was waVGJU.ll8 in ita O»POfj1t1on to A.tria.
his repl¥

to Bar'bcroux he eDQrte4 P1eanlOnt to ftmaiR f'1ft.

wam1ng of the Austrian atl'l.telJ':
Haying ral1.d with thft Papal go..,el!'nllent, AustI'ia

now rruLkeo tn1. proposition to ~arQ1n1a, 1n order
to tONe the hand ot the Papal gov8lmmant a.nd

11l"

P..111, r-1acchi to Ccrmalv1, 9, 28, Januar:r 1823.

15

Ibid., Consalv1 to 'l'osti, 2'7 Pebl"'Uar--.f 1823; Macchi to
Consalvr;-rr ~.h, 22 Apl'il, to ~, 2 August 1823.

76

.

waa

.

!~i..t:!., 'l'ostl to Consalvl, 13 January If-'23.
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divld~ the Italian states.
This l.a the Bola
al~ of the Av~t~o·Sard1nian negotlatlon8 • • • •

Austrian 1'l8."8 to dlviea and conq,uo!l by approaching S IU'dln1a alOM. It Ss.rdinta agrees,
~he Papal State \'l.1.11 be isola.ted and forco::;d to

See. • • its e0Tr'spo'ft4enee b:r-oUSht into
Aua trlan hands.

Despite the Oardlnal IS warning" the Sardinian government

eontinued the negotla.tloM.
that 'J.'ul'in

'I'wo weeks later, Oonsalv1 learned

was ,lying ta:f'orable eonsia.ratioR to a new Austrian

proposal 1tto c()nslgn to the Sardinian poste all the eOrTeapon-

de."

received at Milo to'l! Frane., England., Ute! be7ond.. • •

Ho. .yer, all Ital1u.

eo~pon4enee

.1t

would stUl pue tlu"Ough

the AustrIan. ott!•• at Milan betoPe be1!lg Slftft to SaMin!••
"'!'his tleheme. 1t eo_sly! e01l'1l1\ented bitterly, "W111 aast1re the
peeualU'1 tnt.rests or the Sa.N1nian poats, but al10118 the
.oneellt~tl&JIl

ot OOl"ftspo.den.. 1n Austrian hands to oontinue to

the tullest exteat; pu'm1ta the pre•• rn.t1on !! totQ lOt the
A_t1'O-'l'8o_ Oon'ftntlo'll, ancl • • • deprive. Prance or it. best

ezeus.

tOXt

!lOt ratlf'J'1.l'l8 ita ool'l'f'ltntlon. • • • It Sa1'd1ft1a

7 1e1ds to Auatr1. J all 11 loet. If

'78

While Prance and S6\l"dln1a were thua wav.r1ng, Oonsal"l had.

been maiJlta1nlng a tlrm Hsl.tan.. to A'WItr1a t s plau. The
,'
.. Ib1d., COfl..salv1 to Barbero'UX, 29 Jan'W.U'7 1823. with cOPY'
or Bu'baroUx to Co_al...1, 28 JaJlUal7 1823.
7';,~~-i""-
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Ibid.,

Conaal~1

to Tosti, 10 Februar" 1823.

In taot.

this scheme had been t1.r6t propose' by Sardinia .. not A\I4tl'1&1

aee Xueni to Conaalvl, 4 Mareh. 1823.

r
!

t'tll8t o:rfle1al notice 'he F~"al go..ernmtnt had had of the

Austro .. 'l\l,qaan ConV'$tlt1on \i'M a 'brief
1'ostal
lent,

~hlperi.nt$ndtlnt I

the TUsean

le1;te~ tr-.)lTi

Cavallej.--.e Luatrini, to h.iS ?apal equiya-

~arquia 1'18..;131mv (Who

had replaved

A1tie~"

forming h1r:l or th<t Oonv.ntion"a pro'V1a1ona.

in 1817}, in ...

As th$tU: provUlolW

\fOuld neG<!ss1tata various ilhangea loll T'usCa,n ...r-a.pal

lations,

Lust~ni

,ottal re-

l"'equ9sted .. m.eetinr; with Ma$s1:rno to dll!euas

th(J$tt points.

A~ent17

Iln,e~l~ taet1~

or tt'.11nt: tl.) malm 1. ts pGstal 1nno.,at1ol'lS appear

L_trtll1. Vfa, follow1ll; the usual

as men rQutine adm1:Jilst%lat1ve :'leasUl'es.

r.fa.I!:l1.'1l0 was

~t

as this ;:na:tti!t' "~o:l!b1ne$ not onl~
~.ltda41"1J.1n.1St:Mlt:1.ft afr.1l"$, but also pol"ual and.

de<)e1ve4; he replied that
~«ol'lo'ltie

n\in1.te..la1~ n 1t was beyond. h1s

compatenG~

to treat and must be

tak~ up wttA t!ae 1'3~~l!'eta.l7 of St&t~. 19
'WO weeki after ~18 robl.ltt" Appony'i ('Who served 11'\\ nome

d

fusee ambalfSafo!l as well

$,$

AUlJtltian) took up the postal

question on the ae.ired i1liltlBMr1al level" l"QQuesting Oama).v1
\0 authorize Massi"11.O

to ,"at

with LUlStPi."1"d..8Q

In hie l'ePl:r

Goualv1 ~tused Appony1 '8 r$quest and ~"t forth f'ol" the tiraii

time the arguments aga1nst the

he was to

U'5e

Auatro-'l'UsCall C01'lV9U1;1on wb,1oh

l'egv.1arly henee:r.orth in bill ot'f1oial

~()mmun1o.a...

F1l'1Jt t "e .l'Jl.U!d~ tile OonventiQn Violated the pl1ilU)1plAt

tlons.
----.--7<')

. :tbl~., Me88t.mo to Lustrl.ft1, a8 ~.el" lata; &110
tustr1nrto Massimo; 26 Jfo"Y'!mbep 1812, _ai;mo to. Oonsaln, 18
JIf.....be:r.- 18ft.
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. p.~t..

.

APPOlfl1. to C_"'tIl, 10 lie. . . .

1".

r

of

~dom

ot

the right

eo~po"denee,

or

JOJ

the sender to choos.

the rrrttte along wh1ah his mail should go J seet'}n.d, A-..mtr1a and
Tu8ean~,r

had no r1::::ht to negotiate

fl

treaty d1sP081ng ot Papal

eO:P!'espondenee without eomult1ng the 'Pope and. satistying his

1\IPJt interests and soyereign rights J third, the lJal*l S;OVtu'nwnt
~ould

not agree to the deYiat10n

England,

~~anee,

et~.j· r~

or

its

oo~spondenee

its natural

oou~e

ror

without those

nations. eonsent; and tinally, the new route was longer and went
~ore

th1"Ough.
of

~oM'lttlpon6!nee.

'f'Ja'Paoy

to

dlftleult tex-nln, henee it would delay the transit
1'01' these reuoM, Comalvi declared., the

~t fo~a11y

,!'Ot•• t &g&lnat this Oo!W'en:tion ad reM.

Papal-

'!'u.s.an postal ftgulatloM to eontol'm "ith its Pl'OV1al0M.

liIfore ....

O'ftr',

with it in

way,

by ada~ting

oo-ope~te

.~

ro~

example

$1?loe TuiJoany aftd Aust1'1a retuled to allow Papal

eorl'eS-

l'Ondttftee to 1'a.'!t! fNel,. t the Pope '1'tU8t exercise h1a sovereign

right of retwalrag to allow their eourieft to 1..tse the POSt road
through Bologna.

fte Papal gove1't'l1Tlent would be w1111ns to dis -

anew }OO8tal eoftYetrt1oft, but o1'll.y it the interests of all
the Ita11art states WN . .speeted. 81
flUS"

The

lm~ed1ate

reaction to thIs letter was mildly eneourac-

it'll: TufJeanye- aMOuneed that it

WOUld,

not put ttl! Oonventlofl with

Austria into eftect on 1 Januar,r 1823, as
poatpone it

u~t11

1

~areh.

Howeyer~

no tund ..v'1ental changi";> in policy.
'B~'

plan~d.

but would

this pcotponement betokened

A letter of

~o Jar.lUtu.,.

,'---

~. J

COnlalv1 to Appony1, 19 Deeember 1822.

from

r
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Metternich to Apponyi which the latter read to Consalvi rejected
all the Papal arguments. The most telling point was a demonstration that although the new Austrian postal road (through
Hueningen) was indeed longer than the old Piedmontese route, it
was better organized and in better condition and therefore mail
sent along it would travel faster and arrive with equal or
greater rapidity~82 This contention--which was in time proved
correct 83 _-seriously weakened the best of Consalvi fS offioial
c

arguments, and was therefore repeated in greater detail in
Apponyifs official reply to the Cardinalfs letter of 19
December. 84 Consalvi could only retort that it remained to be
seen whether the new route could equal the old in rapidity, but
"this muoh at least is certainly true, that the longer road,
despite all improvements, remains the longer." Hence, the Papal
government would persist in its protests. 85
In the following weeks, various unofficial communications
were exchanged between Consalvi and Apponyi, but none offered
anything new or in any way eased the tension between Austria and
the Papacy. On March 20, Apponyi, following Metternichfs instructions, made another lengthy attack on the Papal

position~

82Ibid~, Consalvi to Macchi, 8 February 1823, describes
Metternicfifs letter, of which no copy could be found in the
Vatican Archives;
83Ibid ;, Macchi to Consalvi, 2 August 1823;
84A•V., ANV 250, Apponyi to Consalvi, 9 February 1823:
85Ibid;, Consalvi to Apponyi, 14 February 1823;

II
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He began bY' del'17ing that the Auatre-Tuscan Convention "had any
polItical end at all" (a good example at the guilty tleeing
where none pureueth, aince Consalvi had caretully retrained trom
even hinting at this charge), but was deSigned solely tor administrative and financ1al improvement ot the postal system in
Italy.

He also denied that the Convention v101ated the Pope's

soyereign rIghts, tor Auatria and TusoarQ' had the aovereign
right ot regulating the transit ot ma11 within their

they Judged best.

bor.rt~-r~'

as

In conclua1on, Apponyi asa1n praised the

advantages ot the new Austrian route, which was both ahorter
(he olaimed) and better. 86 These same arguments were repeated
in tive additional notes which APpol'17i gave Consalvi during 27-29
March. 8'

The Cardinal replied that he had never accused the

Conveation ot beins politioally motivated, that h18 information
on the length ot the new route d1ttered tram APPOft7i '8, and that
in a.n,- cue it was an unnecea8U7 deviation trom the natural
route J and that Austria and TuacaJ17 did indeed have the right
to regulate poetal attaira within their borders, but not to
injure the riChts and interests ot other states in

80

doing.88

So pused the winter and early spring at 1823 tor Consalvi,
in ceasel.s. aetivity to .tem the AustrIan advance: protests to
Austria, proteats to Tuae&J'J7, exhortations to SardinIa to hold

86

Ibid.,
8.,-

Appony-i to Consalvi, 20 March 1823.

Copies 1n Ibid., ConsaIv! to Leardi, 12 April 1823.

88

~.,

Consalvl to Appony1, 29 March 1823.
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firm and to France to oppose Austria's designs, plans for new
postal routes to circwnvent Austria's, plans tor paeketboat

service, plans for a congress of all Italian states on postal
aff'airs--but all in vain.

struggle was hopeless.

As

Oonealvi already suspected, the

Neither Austria nor Tusea.ny could be

forced to abandon their strong position by any pressure that
Consalvl alone could bring, and ot' his presumed allies, Piedmont
sought in effeet only its own financial interest, while France

feared to challenge Austria openl,-.

In the last analysis the

Papacy stood alone--and in a single contest with Austria and

Tuscany, Conaalvi knew well that the Papacy had no hope ot'
victory.
The crucial step 1n the isolation ot the Papacy came with
the sign1nr; 1n March ot a. new Austro-8addinian postal convention
by

which Piedmont acquiesced in Austrian postal hegemony.

Tosti,

the papal charge' 1n 'l'llrin, had long foreseen this development:

"The primar.1 interest ot this government," he had warned
Conaalvl in Peb1'l1ar'Y, "is its peeuniar.r advantage J on various
pretexts it WUl negotiate, as it i8 now doing, anc! will 8ign
&n1 treaty with

Aust~ia that safeguards its tlnanees."89

Tosti'S prediotion was proven acourate at the end ot March,
when De 1a Tour admitted that Sardinia had signed a convention
with Auatrla.

'!'be Piedmonteae insisted that the agreement con-

tained "not a word.. • • that coulc! harm the rights. • • ot the

89

A.V., R117, Toat! to Conaalvi, 19 February 1823.

Ho17 Father,n 90 but the facts belled hls words.
vention

B,y

this oon-

Piedmont agreed to turn over all correspondenoe for

states on the lett bank ot the Po to Austria, While that for the
right bank (including the Papal States) would be consigned to
Parma.

Thus, in the o17 , the concentrat1on of all correspondence

1n Austrian handa would be ayolded.

In return, Auatria would

consign to Sardinia the correspondence tor much ot western
Europe, but onl7 atter it had tlret ,dsed through Austrian

oft10es and had thus been subject to 1nspection.

9l

Thus the last

gap in the Austrian po.tal barrier aoro.. Ital7 had been t1l1ed,
and every route b7 whioh the Papal State m1ght send mail to the
Mol"th .... cut ott.
Oonaalvi, brushiJtg asid.e

De

1a Tour'. attempted justifica-

tions I .a bitter17 critical or What he considered Piedmontese
betrqal:
Piedmont J by which the Pontifical Government was

tiNt eDcouraged to oppose the Austro-Tuacan
Convention, 1nstead ot holding firm in the defense
ot the old s7lltem as the Pontltlcal Government has
done, has sought to ass'u.re ita o\'m selfish lntereets
07 securlng the greatest posslb1e consignment ot
correspondence, without opposing the concentration
ot all letters in Austrian handa • • • • It is true
that Austria, feigning to retreat trom the principle

90

Ibid., Toati to Conaalv1, 31 March 1823.
91. COP1 or this convention in R1l7, 1823. Sardinia also
agreed to put its convention or 9 November with Tuscany into
errect.

I
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of eoncentration too olearly manifested in its
Tuscan Convention. has set up two centers for
correspondence ••• ; but this does not really
prevent the conoentration of all coreespondence
in Austrian hands, for Parr'1a can be cons 1gered
as aotually an Austrian territor,r. • • .9

But Consalvits indignant protests had no effect and the Convent-ion was duly ratified. 93
The Cardinal's last hope was to arouse Prance to active
o~osition

to the Austrian plans, but onee again he was dis-

appointed.

When Macchi, rollev1ng Cones-lv1's instructions,

sought the support of Chateaubr1ana against Austria, the latter

agreed as to the

ftn~eessity

that Prance protest and thwart

them.However (Macehi eont1nued) he oontessed to me with
complete frankness that 1n these timesot war with
Spain he could not clash with Austria and eater
upon aorimonious disputes. For the present, he
wished to limit himself to using language that will
not displease Atwtrla, and to g1ve advioe, not
protests.
No help, then, eould b9
the Pa:paoy was eomplete.

ex~oted

frc:n Franoe.

The isolation of

A.I1 that was left for the Pontifical

government to do now, Maochi felt, was to negotiate with Austria
in the taint hope of n~aF~ng her a bit more reasonab1e."94
92

A.V., ANV 250. Conaalyl to Leard!, 13 April 1823.
93
A.V., Rl17, Tosti to ConsalYi, 4, 11 June, 2 July 1823.

9b.

~.,

Ma.e.hl to ConealYi, 22 Apr11 1823.

r
Conaalvi had already come to the same distasteful conclusion.
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On 29 March he had suggested negotiations tor a postal

convention, but Metternleh, atter a lengthy crIticism ot the
Papacyfs

8~legedly

unreasonable suspicions, had refused to

negotIate untIl the Papacy revoked certain measures it had

:recently taken, notably the denIal ot the Bologna road to
AustrIan eourlers. 95
Consalvi :rejected this de"1land l which would have compelled
the Papacy to abandon the use of' what rew weapons it had against
.A.ust:ria, and onee agaln defended the principle ot tree correst>Ondenee !.n terms sharply ci'ttioal ot Auatria.n postal
poll:3ies. 96

Ma7 and early June passed while the PapacY' and AustrIa
exchanged acrimonious notes on the preliminary conditions tor
negotIations..

Desptte all Austrian pressure, Consalvl retused

to :retreat tl"Om h:ts stand J or to eo-operate in any
Austrian postal oonventions. 91
put fully

~.nto

way'

with the

As the conventions could not be

etfeat unless the Papaoy adaptAd its postal

regult!tt1ons to oonform to those of Austria and Tusca.ny, their

exeou.tion. was cons 1de:r.-ab1y ha."'1pered by the Papal ret'usa1 of

95

A.V., ANV 250, Consalvl to Apponyl, 29 Maroh 1823, in
Consalv1 to 1.teard1, 2 Apr1l 1823; Mettem1ch to APpol1J'l, 17
API·:1.1 1823, in Conzalvl to Leard1, 21 May 1823.

96

A.V., Rll7, Consalv! to Appony1, 9 Mar 1823.
97
Ibid., Apponyi to Consalv1, 19 June 1823.

COlUHtlvrtO Leard!, 28 June 1823.

Also, AliV 250,

eo-operation, and postal aftaris in central Italy were in
contusion.

Austria and Tuscany needed aome sort of postal

settlement that wauld end this confuaion, which meant obtaining
at least the pasll1'V'e adherence of the Papacy.

To obtain this

adherence aome minor caneeasiona on Austriats part seemed
Juatified.
govera~ent

On 19 June Apponyi informed Consalyi that his
had decided to drop its prel1minary conditions and

open negotiations for a new canventlon "correspondant awe
",if

,~~ •

interets rec1proques. tt

Once agaln, Baron Lilien wuuld aerve as

Austrian plenlPotentlary.98 Consalvi accepted the Austrian
oyerture and appointed Massimo as hil plenipotentiary.99
Lilien arrived 1n Rome at the end of July and began
negotiations with Massimo, but after a rew meetings 11'1 which
nothing

Wal

aocompl18hed he requested

118~4e.1on~

wlth Conaalvl,

"to establish fundamental principles on which the aubaid1ar.y
proylaioM dt the convention can be baaed."
henceforth the negotiations on major
tween Conaalv!

allQ

las~es

Consalvl agreed, and
were conducted be-

Ll1len. 100

These negotlations took place agalnst a tragic background:
on 6 July, P1U8 VII had autrered a ser10us accident from which

98

.

Ibid., Appo~l to Consalvi, 19 June
Conaalvr""to Le8.1"dl, 28 June 1823.

99

A.V., Rl17, Conaa1vl to

Appo~1,

1823~

Also, ANY 250,

7 July 1823.

100
.
A. V. II A~"V 250 .. Consa:lvi to Leardi, 13 August 1823. The
follow1ng acoount ot the 1823 postal negotiations 1s baaed

largely upon this 418patch, together wlth thoae to Macchi, 4, 9,
14 August 1823, in H1l7.
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in h13 poor state of health he eould not recover.

DurIng July

his condition tended to deteriorate, and by early August hope for
his recover.; was slight.. During these weeks when ?ius VII was

edging closer to death, Consalvi1a chier concern was with the
health of his sovereign a.nd frlendJ he could spare only a

f'raetlon 01" hie time for the postal negotiations.

Moreover, thea

cireul1stancea in effect iHlposed a time limit upon ConsalV:11s
(!onduct of the negotiations, for the death of Plus VII would
mean the end of the Cardinal's ministry.

If the

Secretal~

of

State waa to complete the posta.l negotiations himself, he I:lUSt

fIght not only Austria, but time as well.

Discussions between Consalvi and Lilien went on in halting
fashion during the early weeke of August, whenever the Cardinal

oould find time to spare fro:u all the pressing probleMS c8.uaed
by the Pope fa

condition.

At !"irst, IlLl1ien was unable to reply

to [ConSa!VlfS] sound arguments • • • , and seemed dIsposed to
become

reasonable # It but "suddenly he presented a project • •
• co~plately Identleal to the Auetro-Tuscan Convention." Such a
itlOl"e

project was of course inadmissible and Conealv1 at once rejected

it,

remal~king

eaustically that if this wo all LI1ien had to !Q',
"it was useless for him to have come to Rome from Vienna. n10l
After this rebufr Lilian abandoned his proposed convention,

.but ogt h.1J--.tternptm to persuade Consaly1 to eo-operate with
101

A.V., Rl17, Consalv1 to Macchi, 4 August 1823.
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A1.1strla '5 aims.

The chief point at issue during the discussions

that followed wns the
government

Austrient~

"o~~~~t~ l~se...:1f"

insl~tenee

that the Papal

to give to Auetria all the corres-

pondence originating in or passing through the Papal State, not
only for Austria, but also tor [all of Europe north of the
AIrs]. ,,102

In 3UPP('Jrt of this derrand, !.Jillen argued that the

nations concerned were indifferent to what route their eorrespcndenee tool{, tha.t J¥lail would travel l';ore

rapidl~r

over the

Austrian route, and that the la.tter was more eaonom:'Leal for the
Furthe;r:'more, oontinued Papal I"esiatance "would be

Papa.cy.

useless ~ ror 'ruscany would have to turn these letteI'li over to

Auatria in I!J.n1 ease. f'
Conaalvi was hard pressed to answer these arguments:

How difficult and de110ate [he lamented to Maoohi) is

CAe F'apal position on thifl point. If only we could
give the polit1oal reason tor not wishing the conoentration of correspondence, we i'/ould have an unanswe:I'able argument J but as we are unable to adduce this

r·ea.sol1, all the vdlum of I'ef·u.aa.l falls upon the
PontIfical Govermnent which, againat its own finanoial
interest and with the eet"talnty of not being able in

&n7 case to attain ita objeotive • • • , finda itself
in the necessity or giving a most embittering refusal

without being able to support it with the arguments so
i)oliC. thaI; they a<1:11t of no reply.
But "despIte all this, we have held firm to the prinoiple of ••
~t ob111!~ ~u.!Welves to give Austria the eorrespondenee. Ml03

f"02
A.V., ANV 250, Con3alvl to Leardi, 13 August 1823.

103

A.V., Rl17, Oonsa!vi to Maochi, 4 August 1823.
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Consalvi fS position became yet raore difficult during the
second week of negotiations when Lilien, in addltlon to repeating
his previous arguments, offered tempting financial inducements
to overcome Papal reluctance. He first offered free transport
for all correspondence for the Papal States from France along
the Austrian road from Hueningen to Bologna, and when this had
no effect, added the free transportation of all foreign corr>espondence for the Papal State through Austrian territories. Thus,
the cost of sending a letter between, for example, Rome and Paris,
would be reduced by well over one third. If, Lilien warned, the
Papacy should still refuse "despite these great advantages,
Austria must conclude it had some ulterior motive and is displaying a definite hostility to Austria. • • • ,,104
Consalvi "could not but realize all the strength of this
argwnent, and all the offensiveness of a refusal which (not
being able to give the true motive on which it is founded) must
appear utterly
refusal~

irrational~1t

Nonetheless, he perSisted in his

The Cardinal was now pursuing a favorite tactic:

seeking to preserve a principle even when compelled to yield on
its practical exercise, in the hope that one day more favorable
conditions might allow the Papacy to put that principle into
effect again~ He saw clearly enough that under existing clrcumstances the postal situation was hopeless: the Papacy alone could
not possIbly overthrow Austrian control over the Italian postal
104Ibi C!., Consalvi to rvIacchi, 9 August 1823.

system and preserve the freedom of its own correspondence.

How-

ever, if the Papacy could avoid binding itself to turn over all
correspondence to Austria, if it could preserve the princ1ple of
free correspondence, then ln time circumstances might turn
agaift8t Austria and the Papacy might recower its postal independence.

Such a charge could come about When the Spanish

war ended and France we free to take a stand against Austria.
'I'he Papaoy must prese"e its freedom of action until that time

came.
Conealvi therefore rejected Lilien's proposals, despite
his tempting otters and his threats ot Imperial displeasure.

It

was difficult to tind arguments to justIfy this stand publicly:

ln this "difficilissima" sItuation Consalvi "could tind no
better argu'1lent than that bued on the natural character 01' the
Papal government," that ls, lts necessary neutrality and im-

partiality.
partiality

The Papacy, he elaimed, would be displaying
fo~

respondenoe,

Austria if it agreed to give here all lts cor-

an~

other states (tor

just cause for complaint.

exa~ple,

Piedmont) would have

Lilien brushed thls admittedly weak

argument aslde, and, irritated by the tenacity with whioh
Consal.,.1 clung to it, broke off the talks, warning tha.t lithe
Austrian ambassador would intervene in this

.ffa1r~

and the

Papal governMent would haTe to explain 1ts refu~al to Austria. HlO
c"'ro5"'"c. .

~c.:..;'"_C_

J.bj.,d., Consalvl to Macchi. 9 August 1823.

j15

Appcny1 then entered the negotiationa in support of Lilien,
but desp1te thel:e

another

\!o,!~bined PI"eSSure

\'i~a]{ Gf talk;;)

C0l1salv1 held firm.

After

t;he Austrians at last gave up and. agreed

to the Convention of 19 Auguat by \'oilieh the rapac;y '8 freedom ot

in prinoiple if not in practioe, was

a~tion,

nizt)d. 106

fo~nal1y

recog-

On the clrueial point, the oonsignment of Papal 001"-

respondence, the Convention reads:
Th.e ?apal rost Office wlll t:;.end in closed a.nd sealed
packet. I07 the oo~pondene. .nich it m,y decide to
to turn over' to the General l'c\st 01"f106 of 3 .M. the
Emperor of Austria, both that origlnat1n@ 1n its own
b0r'ders lilm:! that eOtlling from • • • Na:ples and bey-ond,
and de.tined tor tall ot EY5@pe and. the Near Eut except tha ItalIan atatea]c.

W·ith this Convention the postal controversy

C9..1'l"e

to an end.

Though not unimportant in 1tse1f, the greatest s1gnifioance of
that a1spute liem 1n the revealing light it casts upon the disintegration of the Austro-Papal alliance.

The

h~leyon d~B

of

-------~- .

106

Ibid.

.1.1&0, Consa!-vi to Macchi, 14 August 1823.

Ho

account of the negotiations after 14 AU~8t 18 in the Vatiea..'1'1
Arohives, but one may assume f'rom the outcome that COMa! vi continued his resistance and the Austrians f1n1l11y ",-drn1tted defeat.
10'(

This ... a point on whioh there

d1aeuasion.

h~d been e~nsiderable
Custo 1narlly, rna!! was gl'9'en to t'orelp,n pORt orrices

in sealed pa~l\Sts. As this would ha~per, though n~t prevent,
AustrIan inspeotion of the letters I Lil1en ..-tJ~hed the mail to be
trana:nitted loose. Consalvi, equally aware of these faots" inaisted on 010•• " and sealed paokets and $v&ntually won his point.

with

10<'3
Copy 1n :tI17, 1823.
t~~hnioa1

'I'he numerous othex' ?z'o"v"1s io!W dealt

po.tal mattera onl7.

r
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eo-operaticn were long since vanished.

ustro-Pa~&l

eat'S Auatl.\,;)-f'apal relations haft

For five

detel'iorated und<:r the Lilpact

and polit.tcal disputes until by 1823 those states
l~ ill

open oP1>os1tlon.

The Q(J"ntrast between the

tiona of 1823 and those ot' 1815 is

onnection.

~:lO$t

~o$tal n~goti

instruot1Ye in this

In 18156 the negotiations had been conduoted on a

riend1y basis throughout: the Papal rejection of the A\Wtrian
roposals had l>een aocepted. by Vienna with good

&l"aoe, and the

8sue had disappeared beneath the smooth flow of Austro-Fapal
How different waa 1823 when tha tone of the whole

o-operatlon.

eget1:t.t1on

\1as

oue of hostility and distrust. nhen Austria and

he Papacy fought to bne b1tter ead tor its
1ag whatever weapon it could tino.

objectiv.s~

each

Clear17J by 1823 Austro-

l\'hat JadgmE'mt shc)uld be passed upon CCMa.lvl'3 handl1ng ot

postal controversY''?

'l"he grudging prll.1se given by enemies

s JT!ore 1>;pres31ve than. th.e eager adrntl'llt1on of friends.

hen

th~

fi!l.tll

ttered by one

wordR
~1ho

()l'l

the postal dispute and lts

h:td. no

he Zelantt CardInal della

eeretary of

10V6

01ltCO"l'Tle

Let

be

for Consalvi: his bitter enemy,

8e~ag11&

who succeeded him as

~tt.te ~

Prex (the eCl'lvent1on of 19 Augttet], it a:1n be seen
th~.t the Pont:Lf:tca.l Government, despite all obstacles J
held f1rm to the p~tne1ple ot freeoom ot correspondence,
and has not o1:;·11ge.ted itself to give A~tI'1~. th~ cor-

refJpOftieiCi" eltfier for England or ter JPr8J'l•• ~ or UIT
other foreign eOl."'l·esponde11ce, but has only ril~de arrangements fop the cost of that correspondence wh'.ch it !!!!Z

r
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decide to giV to Austria, under Which arrangement it
remalns-Yree 0 give any correspondence to whomever it
considers most suitable.
Moreover, ••• the Government ot H.H. has not
obligated itselt to give its correspondence IOOse-to
Iustrla, so that it remains tree to transmit closed
packages • • • •
It is true that the Austro-'1'wIcan Convention, by
Which Tuscany haa obligated herselt to give Austria all
toreign correspondince, prevents in practice this consigning (ot Papal correspondence to other states than
Austria)) but it France and Sardinia should ever make
Austria and '1'wIea~ recede trom their convention, the
Pontitical Government will alW8.1'S be in a position to
make a special convention with France or Sardinia, and
will alw.,. be tree to consign that correspondence
which, aec~rding to the Convention, it ~ decide to
11ve them. 09

t

On the testimony ot his toe, then, Cona&lvi had once again
sk1llt"ully guided the Papacy through another "ditticilissima"
situation and, acting under the most Gntavorable circumstances,
had managed to save tor the Papacy all that could still be saved.
It was hi. last servioe to the Papacy.

On 20 August, the

d8.1' atter the Convention was Signed, Pius VII died and Consalvi
once again reSigned his ottice" th1a time torever.

Sick, worn

out by years ot overwork and bitter contlict, within six months
he had tollowed to the grave his friend and ruler whom he had
served so well.
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Ibid., Cardinal della Somaglia to Macchi and Tosti, 30
November-nJ'23. Giulio Maria Cardinal della Somaglia (1744-1830);
Cardinal Deacon (1820) J ultra-reactionary and a bitter enemy ot
Consal"'i, his appointment as Secretary ot State (1823-1828)
symbolized the reaction against Consalvi'l policies under Leo
XII (1823 -1829) •

'I
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CHAPTER VI
CONCLUSION
Consa1vi's second mlnlstry, whlch had opened with such falr
promlses of Austro-Papal co-operatlon and good wl11 In 1815,
ended In 1823 In an atmosphere ot mutual distrust and hostility.
The development of Austro-Papa1 relations in 1815-1823 exp1alns
how and why thi8 radical transformation took place.
A~

alliance will be effective on17 do long as it continues

to satisfy the essentlal interests ot the states concerned. Thls
principle al80 applies to the informal alliance that Metternlch
and. Conaalv1 sought.

In the yeara trom 1815 to 1817, Austro-

Papal co-operation seemed likely to serve the interests of both
states. Austria hoped to obtain thereby the support ot the
Papacy's moral and religious authority 1n the struggle to uphold
the existing order and defeat the revolutionaries.

The Papacy,

on its part, sought the material backing of Austria against

any

possible future aggreSSion and, more important, against the
immediate threat of internal subversion.

Moreover, Papal co ...

operation with Austria might persuade that Power to moderate its
Joseph1st re1iglous po1ic1es.

Finally, Consalv1 had his own

motive: Austrian support could be of great value to him 1n his
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bitter struggle with the Zelanti for reform.

For a time these

expectations seemed justIfIed, both states benefited trom cooperation, and the alliance prospered.
However, this Bmiling surface of eo-operation could not
permanently conceal certain fundamental divergences of interest.
The elairns ot the Josephist Imperial government to control the
Church in Austria were essentially incompatible with the Papal
claims to supreme authority in the Catholic Church as a whole.
The lurking Austrian ambition for hegemony in Italy posed a
threat to the political independence of the Papacy which the
latter was oertain to oppose.

In 1815-1817 these divergences

were latent, over-shadowed by the points on which Austrian and
Fapal interests were in agreement.

As long as these conflicting

interests remained submerged, Austro-Papal eo-operatlon survived;
when they once again eame into prominence, then unless one side
or the other retreated, co-operation was doomed.
The first stage in the decline of the informal Auatro-Papal
alliance came with the revival in 1811 of open religious con ...
trov~7

between the two atates over the extension of

Joaephinism, especially in Italy.

Metternlch foreaaw that the

Papacy must resist this expansion, but his attempts to win over
FranCis I to a conciliatory policy ended in failure.

~e

rel18ious negotiations of 181'7, which might have saved AwstroPapal oo-opeaat1on, for a t1me at least, had. Austria pursued
them 1n a conCiliatory spirit, failed because Vienna demanded
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everything and ottered nothing in return.

Despite his wish tor

good relations with Austria, Consalvi could not negotiate on
such a buis.

To the cardInal, Auatro-Papal co-operation 1mp1ied

a relatIonship between equal partners, each respecting the
other'S rIghts and interests and each willing to settle disputes
on a

mutual1y-satistaet~

take.

basis through a process ot give-and-

The relIgious negotIations

of

1817-1818 made it apparent

that this was not the concept that prevailed at Vienna.

Con-

salvi'S disillusiOnment with Austre-Papal co-operation began at
this pOint.

Mutual dlatru.et and recrimination soon came to

charactepize relations between Rome and Vienna.
The rapid deterioration ot Austro-Papal relations which
began with the religious controversy and

wa.

ted by the

torniture attair was temporarily checked in 1819-1820, when
Francis I seemed to be planning some mitigation ot his Josephist
policies.

The outbreak ot the Neapolitan Revolution ot 1820, a

threat to Austria and the Papacy alike, also serVed to bring
those states closer together.

Austria wished the moral support

ot the Papacy and itsco-operation in the passage ot troops

towards Naples, while the Papacy tound Austrian military strength
a reassuring bulwark against the spread ot the Revolution.
Thua, a basis tor renewed oo-operation existed.

Austro-Papal

re1ationa during the autumn ot 1820 were better than they had
been for three J'ear8.
This revival ot good relations was only temporar.r.

It soon

r
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became apparent that Austria and the Papacy were onee again at
croas -purposes.

Au,.-;tria expected fi.1l1 Papal eo -opera.t1on against

the Neapolitan rev()lutlonartes.

Con3alvi was willing to co-

operate, but only wIthIn the li'71its

01"

hie firm determination

to preserYe the independence and neutrality of. the Papacy and to
prevent a Neapolitan invasion.

This determination compelled the

Cardinal to oppose Auatria's wishes on several. occasions.

More-

oyer .. varioUl3 inCIdenta, such as the AUBtrian attempts to occupy

various Papal cit1es .. reawakened hIS cIa $uspicions of Austrian
ambitions in Italy.

AustrIa, on her aide, was (U.• appointed and

angered by this oppositIon and distru.at, and became increasIngly

critical of the Papal government.

Before 1821 had ended, all

the improvement in Auatro-Papal relations that had talmn place
In 1819-1820 had vanished.
The revival of Austrian ambitions in Italy, which Consalvi

first suapected during the NeapolItan campe1gn, dealt the death
blow to Auatro-.J:'apal co-operation.

The 1820-1821 revolutions

had convinoed Vienna that greater Austrian control in the
Peninsula was neceasar-.r to preVG1'lt further outbrealo1 there.
w&J'S

The

in which Austria sought to increase its control were varied:

an Italian ConfederatIon, & Political Commission, the exercise
of a right

or

supervision over the Italian states in the name

ot reform, control

~f

the Italian postal system--but all in-

evitably met with Coftsalvi t s oppoeltlon, for all would Berve to
restrict the necessary polItical independence of the Papacy_
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Austrian and Papal interests were now
and

the last two

ye8l""S

obv1ou~ly

1n coll1sion,

of Consslvi is ministry were mal""ked by

001'1-

flict w1th Austria, none the 1es8 bitter for being partly concealed.

Austria's plaM to increase 1ts control in Italy

came

to

a head at the Congress of Verona; the Pa.pa.cy took the lead in

opposIng those plans there, and eventu.ally brought about their

defeat.

Thill stI"Uggle sounded the death-knell of the Austro-

Papal allIance.

Heneeforth, little more than the bare pretense

of friendly reletlons was maintained.
Two other faetors must be mentioned that probably m.ade the
Cardinal le88 reluotant to oppose Austria.

First, it was clear

b7 1823 that Franois I was not gGing to undertake any sweeping
revision of hie religious poliey and that Josephinlsm would
~ontlnue

to rule at Vienna.

Since eo-operation with Austria

would plainly not produce any favorable modification of its
re11glo'WI pollcy, auch began to seem less desirable.

Seeond,

by 1822 the Revolution that Consalvi had so dreaded had swept

through Ita1y--but there had been no uprising in the Papal State.
Even durIng the heIght of the NeapolItan Revolution on the

Papacy'. very doorstep, there had been little disturbanoe and
the Papal government had little d1fficulty 1n preserving order.
The Secretary of State may well have felt that his

reforr,~

had

appeased popular discontent and that Austr1an support against
the Revolution was not so necessary as It had previously seemed.
Thus, the factors that had once made the alliance seem attractive
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~o

Consalvi were dimin1shing in appeal, Juat at the moment when

~he fundar,li:hltal

dJ..VE;4"genC&i3 in the polit:'cal and re11gioU3 In-

~vident.

Only in ita seheme3 f"or postal

hege~ony

.ueeesarul dur1ng Consalv:t fa ministry.
~ook

the lead in the

~.8erted by
~t

atl~la ~or

free

in Italy was Austria

The PapaQY onoe ass:!.n
oo~reGPondenaej

but,

the ,)ther Italian state3 and unauPPol"ted by Pra.noe,

was t'oraed to L'ecognize the Austrian viotory in practioe,

~hoU&h

by a deaperatte N8utanee C01l3alv1 was a.ble to save the

princlple ot tree oorreaponden39 for tuture use.
The poatal ovntroTeray 1s stgn1flc&l1t, not only in
~ut tv~

lt~elr,

thu revt#allli6 ligl.t 1'1; sheda upon the bNakdown of

~WJtro-Papal

oo-opeJ.4s,tlon.

~ettled,

A·~tro-lap&l

the

• victim or the

?iT the time that

con·trov~rsy

alliance had cll.ilarly

divergi~ inter~sta

~$aaCJd

of the two states.

was

to exist,

The

It'Yentua.l oollaptlte of Auatrv-l'apal c")"'operatlon wa. tor all

practicAl

purpo.e~

~omltlatlng
~ ..v~d

~d

1nevitable,

Austrian poIlu,..

giv~n

True, the alliance could. have been

bad Auatl-'1a a.dopted a more

been

willi~

the basic pNconeeptlons

¢onc.d.11ato~·

rellCious policy

to respect the full temporal independence of the

~apuYJ but thel"$ was little ohance that these modifications of

poliey wolud be adopted under el:1st11'lg ol);ocu:'llStanees .Joseph.:tn1sm
~u

stll1 too strong in the Imperial goV'ex.rf4nt for ever.

Mettornlch t", be able to defeat it--too atrOl1g, indeed, rOI~ even

the Emperor to be able to rever'Be l"eligioua policy unless he

were a stronger man than Francia I.

Only after the intelleotual

climate in Austl'ia had u-tldergone a ratUoal trtanSforr:1ation could
the hold of the Josephleta on the
be broken.

1'~ustrlan

government and ohurch

It was equally unlikely that Austria would cease its

efforts to ti&hten ita control in Italy, £lor since 1815 tha.t
l'enirusula had been :r-egarded as a leg1t1r:late lmstrlan preserve,
and the

revo1u~~lon5

increased control

the dreaded

Qr 1820-1821 had seemed to show that such

'/JSiS

vitally necessa::. .../ if a.nother outbreak of'

reYolutla~J

fever waz to be prevented.

While these po1ioies prevailed at VIenna, there

was nothing

Oonsalvi could do to s.ve AUIltro-Papal eo-ope!t"ation exoept by

saoriticl.ng essential Papal interestl, which he would never do.
The Fapao7 oould no longer continue to eo-operate with Austria,

tor to do so would mean aoquiescence 1n AUJ3tria.n Nl1s1ou3 and
politiea! ambitions that

thl~atened

both its spiritual and its

tempot'al power.
In tliew of the ul tlmate fa1lue of Aus tro -Fapal co ··operatioD)
the question may well be asked whether Conaalvi was Justified in

attempting the

experlm~nt

in

th~ til~t

plaee.

8eem to be definitely in the arfir!n.ative.

The answer would

The expel'irnent was

well worth tr,rlng" tor, it auoeessf'ul, It promised. great
benefits to the Papacy: protection

internal reVolt,

SUPP01~

~ainst

foreign attack and

tor reform and tor Papal interests

abroad, perha.ps a moderation of Austrian religious policy in the

3~"!5

interest or good relations.

In 1815, thet.. seemed good reason

to hope ths-.t the expe:t....:1nent would be
~.rotwed

opposit1on to .Tl.JGGph.in:t.sT:',

while

Austl~la

for some

t:1;...e

~

success.

f1ettcrnioh te

hope ot relis:tous 1!"llpro'fementa,

after the Congress of' Vienna gave no

hlat that it "l1shG<l to '.ncreaae its pol1t:.i.ea.l control over the
Papal State..

T$lJ.-:ing thesG promising CirCu,l7lStanees into cona1dera

tioll, it would surely have. been an error- for Consalv1 to have
refused at leaot to try tll& e:r.perirnent of. co....operation with

Austria.
Pu~~~~ore:

3ven though the

Info~nal

allianoe with Austria

eventuall;, Qollapsed, 1 t did bPlng sor!1\1 bllnef'1t to the Papacy.

The fir", support t!1a.t COl13alv1 ro9celvad from J\ustl"1a for his
raro4~

waa

enaot:,u6nt.

ul~doubtadly

an lIaportant factor itt uaow:r1ng th.11'

AUlltr!a.,,-,. d1plolnatla $UPport was at tl:,naa very uaetul

-to the Papacy 1.1 deal1ng with nOl1-Catholla states
Tul"k<l7.

Co ...operat1Qn aaa11lSt

p~obably th~ ~hlat

th~

benet1eial"J /I

su~h

a3

3attarj .. tho-:lgb. Austria. was

-':3.a

also ot slf:vietl to the Papal

govwrr1in.el1t.

In Nturn for

~es.

StUns.

eo -operat1on with A.ustria.

SettarJ
in

aetivit1~s

liU~ Q.a&6

~onsalvi gav~

up

VflJry

little b7

His trans;nis.s lon of intormation on

to Austria coat the Papacy noth1Dgil and was

1n the general interest of the "good eaus€:. ft

In hi.

rel1gious negot1at101'UJ lt1th Austria he surrendered little, it
anything, that the Papac.,- would not have been compelled to

relinquish by- terce of a1hrc\ll'l1Sttl,nces in

a~

ease, suab as the

nominltt1on-r1ght in Venet:!.a; on

({Ue~t1on!J

where the essential

authority of the PaptvJ'!! wa.s eoneerr:::ed, he neye!, '1:!.elded. or

eOM-

promised.

ConseJ.v! '8 8.;ld wae of velue to AUJltrta dunng the

N~npt')l~tan

eempa1gn"; but the tJnppreas10n or that revolution was

also in the Papa). 1nte:rest 7 and th~ C8.:~M"ne.1 '8 skilful handling

of the situation

p~1'fentAd any eer10UB ha~ !'~~

:t:>a.l'al !tate in the
~ons1de~d,

'ttlake

"r

the A'tlStrlan intervention.

Conedv! in his

little that oou.ld hlllve been

im :return.

befalling the

deali~

with ft,ustria yielded ..,e'J!'1

IUl'Ved, M~

EYftn leavlngll51de the

A,ll thinp

reeeived usetul aes1atanoe

~reat poe~lbil1tles

or

Att'3tl"O-Papal eo-opel"at1on whieh never mate!'1e.llme4, Oonsal,,1's

decision to oo-operate eeems juet.i:r1ed on a practical buis or
value reeel.ed

tOJ!t

"alue

g1v~1'!.

One furtMr question

m~

be _ked in e1"1t1eis'ft or COMuvl'.

pol1oy: waa he TYtotlvate4 too 'ftUeh by eonsld.entlom ot secular

polley, to the det1"1r'1ent or religious lntereats'

Although it 1.8

ditfleult to determ1ne the pree1se motivations of oue
seeret1ve as Oonsal,,1, in

30 faY!

ae his deal1ftg8 with Austria at

least are eoncerne4, this questIon
"eg~t1.e.

In the relIgious

~3t

be

ne~ot1at1ons

Ilel'ttail'llY' dld not aael'lflee the

80

:rell~ioUJS

anewe~d

1n the

o! 1811-1919, he
1!'ltereets or the

flapacy ~ l:mt 4etended them tenae1ously, even though in eo <loins
h~

angered Austria and

the~by

weakeMed hie

~lit1eal

posItion.

Ho1.f easilY' eould. eonealvi have kel't Au.etrian good. will, 80

po11t1eally valuable, by ext$n31ve

rel1g1ov~ eonteAelons-~but

~oreCTerl

was

~~t1vate~

the

by

~%t~nt

to wb1eh even Consalvl t 3 secular polio,

1111 politte&l

~tal:r1,

1."pe~de~ce

of tha ?apa41. not,

but

U

&11

epirlt'tlal

not be overlooked.

r~l!,lous ~vn'1~~ratl~m3 ~U3t

(tssa1'ltlal
rN1d~·T.

111., bas 1e aim wu tto

;Ui!lQ.r.3 ~o

of aotloll.

pr~s$"e

bowav~r. a~

an

the tttmpoftl

an~

in itself.

the prtls!!M'atlon ott the Papa41 f lS
It AutStl'la had su.eQGed(Jd

1~' :t....

4't.:ut1:sg the !apal 3tata to the l'3vel of a. satelllttt, eou14

'a.pae1 ha.""e

'ut the

pre4~M'~d

blato~

its full s,1rltual

th~

of

eour&g:tng parallel.

1l\4&l»!.'l~n.•• ?

th~

l'<trhaptl,

Avignon lapae7 doe$ not prov14e an $n-

earta1nly the Papal repllt.tt1on to¥' 1m ..

J)ttrtla11't;J' '#Oul4 have $utfINd.

It. anT cune,

.h~ther

the

tem~oral 1ndepe~Qoe

of tho

Papacy was still e3sentlal or not, Consalvl. like virtually
e ve l70 ne else lr~ 1S1;, ae::ta1nlyb$lieved that it waa.

fight1ng tor

ins: 'lor

th~ ~apac7t$

In

political 1ndependence, he waa t1sht-

its f!plt"ltu.al f:t'e¢dQYJ as Til~11.

No one -.110 luis stud1e4

the record of thlf! Clard1nal '3 A\latr1al\ d.i~lomaey ~&n deny the
consu~~ate 3~...l1

tr1th wt.loh he defended bot:b.

Th~

l"epu.tatlQn

which Oonsalv1 hac long justly enjoyed for th. aehleve:i1!@llta of

his first

~lt1n:!ztr.r

rr.u:st now be f'u.rliher enhanced.

by the stu4y of

r
I. PILCHiJ:lY

The pr-J.nc1pal;

docun~erit~

souac-d!

SOUI"Qe for thia die:.:.ertation is

the Vatioan Ill!"Chivea (A,rchivi.o SQeto

ya.ti~c).

Or the

~

oollect1ona 01' UoQUli.ente in the Vaticun. the 1a.l"'&eet. and b:r fathe

lnot.\t

il;lportant for the u1plomatlc h1atorian.

Secretarl&te of State
~lb.

(~eIPetar1a.to

§,(t0t u-.1a.to ~ 3ta.to oolleotion

pl'1ol.~

to oa. 1790/1800J

that of the

.s! ~tato).
u arran&eQ in three

div1aiorm on a ehrono1o&ical buiu: tll.e f..ondo

lnaterials

a

yec~o.

~ea N!i91eonioa..

eOL'1pr18iaa

FJ&terial ot

tho NapoleotU.c era. now be1xll reor&ani%Oci, tUld tlle Fondo l"bderno.

materials a1nee 1814. from whicll. the 4ioc\Ullen'ta oited in this

diladerta>t1on a.re ta.ken.
<iivilsio.w ealle(,\

docwnente

~

Fon40

~1tQl.1 (~itle8) ..

pe:cta1n1~

tields of ACti"ity.

to ona oi:
Tlle

cU.v1f1ed. into u1ne

caoh Titolo aOnUin1na the

tn.

~1toli

l'Cod.Gr~ ia

SeCl"\1tar:;-

ot State fa maJor

are J.n turn eubd.1.vj.d.eQ. into

:ulaller collections called 1!UPl:'1che 'l:ula.d1~).. ~aeh rubl."1Ghe
d.ealini w1th OM 11lnite4 aapeClt of the general aubJ$Qt 01 tIle

fJ:1tolo of whioh 1t forma a part.
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For a turther and more detailed description ot the
organization and contents of the Vatican Archives, consult
Natalie Wood, "Vatican Cit,.,« in Daniel H. Thomas and Lynn M.
Case (eda.), Guide to the Diplomatic Archives ot Western Europe
(Philadelphia, 1959), 288-310.
Material usefUl tor this dissertation was also found in the
Archivi ai Stato (State Archives) in Florence and Rome.

In the

Florentine Archive the following material proved ot value:
Oraine 2392, Serie 1931: Congress ot Verona and
Congress ot La7bach.
Oraine 2393, Serie 1932: Revolutions of Naples, Spain,
and Portugal.
Ordine 2407, Serie 1932: Minister ot the Austrian Court.
Ordine 2435, Serle 1973: Tuscan Lesation in Rome.
Ordine 2452, Serie 1990: Tuscan Legation in VIenna,
1820-1821.
Oraine 2453, Serie 1991 : Tuscan Legation in Vienna,
1822
The State Archive in Rome ,.ie1ded the following material
dealing with Austro-Papal relations:
Archivio della S. Congregazione del Buon Goveme:
Serie I, Attari Generali: Buste (Files) 5, 33, 88.
serle XI, Conti e tasso diverse: Buste 219-221.
Nothing ot value tor this

stu~

was obtained at the other

State Archives consulted, at Naples, Parma, and Lucca.

It may

be noted, in pasSing, that the Archives in Naples and Parma
suttered sever1,. durIng the 1&8 t war, and that at Parma in
particular considerable
destro7ed.

material.~

tor the Restoration Era was
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